

rary journalism, but has always been, and probably still is, a hawk in the Vietnamese debate. He tells us that "the Nation's armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units, with all available forces spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere. * * * The commitment of more than 200,000 men to Vietnam, supported by strong air and naval forces, and the maintenance of two divisions in Korea, more than five in Europe, and of smaller units elsewhere, including the Dominican Republic, have reduced the forces in the United States to a training establishment."

This report poses for the President the enormously difficult question of how much longer he can overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a limited mobilization of Reserve forces. It also poses the question of whether Secretary Rusk realizes what he is saying when he tells us we have some 40 unilateral military commitments and that we must be prepared to fulfill them all. How can the American people have confidence in an administration which expands its commitments to the extent that Secretary Rusk expands them in the face of the condition of the military forces?

Mr. Baldwin's article raises the question, too, whether Secretary Rusk realizes what he is saying when he keeps telling us that the credibility of all our alliances all over the world is at stake in South Vietnam. Can he really believe that our value as an ally in Europe rises when we have to draw more and more trained men out of our Armed Forces in Europe and replace them with untrained men? Mr. Rusk has entangled himself in the error of failing to realize that it is not what the United States is willing to do but what in fact it is willing and able to do which determines the credibility of any one of its alliances.

Settled Policy

SPEECH

OF

HON. HALE BOGGS

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 14, 1966

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker:

U.S. policy in the Vietnam war appears to be definitely settled for the time being—

The Times-Picayune of New Orleans declares.

It is one of building up military and economic strength in South Vietnam and, though it may take years, to exterminate or banish the Vietcong—

The newspaper states. And it adds:

President Johnson has now indicated the definitive shape of the policy by saying that he had the overwhelming backing of the country and of Congress for the course the administration is pursuing.

The editorial declared:

Why we are in Vietnam, it seems to us, is becoming better understood. The short reason: To stop aggression. But it is not merely to stop the attempted take-over of the Vietnamese. It is even more to raise a barrier to the almost limitless plans of the Peiping Reds to spread their wars of liberation as fast as they can find opportunities * * *. A long

war in Vietnam carries with it some hazards. But the hazards of failing to meet the challenge now are probably much more grave.

Here is a thought-provoking article on an issue of national concern and I am making it available for the RECORD, where others can study it in depth:

[From New Orleans (La.) Times-Picayune, Feb. 14, 1966]

U.S. VIET POLICY SEEMS SETTLED

U.S. policy in the Vietnam war appears to be definitely settled for the time being. It is one of building up military and economic strength in South Vietnam and, though it may take years, to exterminate or banish the Vietcong.

President Johnson has now indicated the definitive shape of the policy by saying that he had the overwhelming backing of the country and of Congress for the course the administration is pursuing. He avers that there is little or no difference between that policy and what main witnesses have said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "No one wants to escalate the war * * * no one wants to surrender and pull out," he said.

As we read it at the moment the outlook is this: A long grueling war with gradually rising pressure on the Communists but also restrictions on escalation that might result in a bigger war; intensified efforts to eliminate the guerrillas combined with economic improvement projects to lift the spirit of the Vietnamese in the villages and strengthen their will to thrust out the Vietcong infiltrators.

The economic-morale problem won't be solved in a month or a year but it has to be a part of a winning war (and after war) strategy. Experts believe that the job can be done if it is pursued with the determination that should mark all aspects of the war effort.

This country will pursue its drive for negotiations to end the hostilities. Nothing promising has yet developed. Until it does, there is no alternative to getting on with the war business.

The "quit Vietnam" element in the United States has been having its say. From here out it probably will be looked on with increasing disapproval wherever it is shown to interfere with the deadly serious war effort.

Why we are in Vietnam, it seems to us, is becoming better understood. The short reason: To stop aggression. But it is not merely to stop the attempted takeover of the Vietnamese. It is even more to raise a barrier to the almost limitless plans of the Peiping Reds to spread their wars of liberation as fast as they can find opportunities. There is nothing secret about these Chinese sponsored national liberation fronts as standing policy with the Mao regime and its satellites. Any success with it in Vietnam would probably open up a bag of troubles in areas outreaching southeast Asia.

A long war in Vietnam carries with it some hazards. But the hazards of failing to meet the challenge now are probably much more grave.

CHANGE OF RESIDENCE

Senators, Representatives, and Delegates who have changed their residences will please give information thereof to the Government Printing Office, that their addresses may be correctly given in the RECORD.

LAWS RELATIVE TO THE PRINTING OF DOCUMENTS

Either House may order the printing of a document not already provided for by law, but only when the same shall be accompanied by an estimate from the Public Printer as to the probable cost thereof. Any executive department, bureau, board or independent office of the Government submitting reports or documents in response to inquiries from Congress shall submit therewith an estimate of the probable cost of printing the usual number. Nothing in this section relating to estimates shall apply to reports or documents not exceeding 50 pages (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 140, p. 1938).

Resolutions for printing extra copies, when presented to either House, shall be referred immediately to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, who, in making their report, shall give the probable cost of the proposed printing upon the estimate of the Public Printer, and no extra copies shall be printed before such committee has reported (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 133, p. 1937).

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Additional copies of Government publications are offered for sale to the public by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, at cost thereof as determined by the Public Printer plus 50 percent: *Provided*, That a discount of not to exceed 25 percent may be allowed to authorized bookdealers and quantity purchasers, but such printing shall not interfere with the prompt execution of work for the Government. The Superintendent of Documents shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which he may authorize the resale of Government publications by bookdealers, and he may designate any Government officer his agent for the sale of Government publications under such regulations as shall be agreed upon by the Superintendent of Documents and the head of the respective department or establishment of the Government (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 72a, Supp. 2).

RECORD OFFICE AT THE CAPITOL

An office for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, with Mr. Raymond P. Noyes in charge, is located in room H-112, House wing, where orders will be received for subscriptions to the RECORD at \$1.50 per month or for single copies at 1 cent for eight pages (minimum charge of 3 cents). Also, orders from Members of Congress to purchase reprints from the RECORD should be processed through this office.

CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY

The Public Printer, under the direction of the Joint Committee on Printing, may print, for sale, at a price sufficient to reimburse the expenses of such printing, the current Congressional Directory. No sale shall be made on credit (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 150, p. 1939).

PRINTING OF CONGRESSIONAL RECORD EXTRACTS

It shall be lawful for the Public Printer to print and deliver upon the order of any Senator, Representative, or Delegate, extracts from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, the person ordering the same paying the cost thereof (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 185, p. 1942).

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addressed a letter to the President of the District Board of Commissioners, in which he transmitted a draft of a bill which had been prepared by the Board of Optometry in cooperation with the District of Columbia Department of Occupations and Professions, the Optometric Society of the District of Columbia, and the American Optometric Association. It was designed to improve the District law as it pertains to the practice of optometry. The bill I have proposed contains all of the essential provisions of the Board's draft. As pointed out in Dr. Ephraim's letter, there is nothing in it that is not now contained in the laws of one or more of the States. The purpose of the revision is to bring the standards of practice in the city of Washington up to a level which exists in most of our States and will provide adequate protection for the visual needs of persons seeking vision care within the District of Columbia.

As the Nation's Capital, we have visitors from all over the world and from every part of our country. They are entitled to the same high standards for the practice of optometry which prevail in their home communities. Mr. Speaker, that is the purpose of the bill which I have introduced. I hope that it will receive prompt and favorable action by the House District Committee and the House of Representatives itself.

THOSE WHO COUNT

(Mr. HULL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include an editorial.)

Mr. HULL. Mr. Speaker—

America has the courage, the will, and the resources to defend the frontlines of freedom against the tide of Communist aggression.

These words appeared recently in an editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, which properly believes that America's purpose and commitment in Vietnam were made a matter of formal public record in the historic Hawaii meeting.

Meanwhile, the newspaper states:

With Vice President HUMPHREY accompanying the South Vietnamese leaders back to Saigon on the first leg of an extensive diplomatic mission to rally the forces of freedom in Asia, the implementation of policies agreed upon at Honolulu is underway.

Even as the war goes on, the Inquirer believes:

There will be an acceleration of cooperative programs by American and South Vietnamese officials to improve the economy of South Vietnam, raise the living standards, fight hunger and disease and build the foundations of a democratic, self-governing society.

The Inquirer is convinced that:

The United States, in alliance with South Vietnam, holds the trump cards—in military power, in economic resources, and in the moral issue of self-determination versus Communist enslavement.

This is an impressive, forthright summation of the situation and I would like to make it available to others by having it printed in the Record.

THE DECLARATION OF HONOLULU

America's purpose in Vietnam, and America's commitment to the South Vietnamese Government and people, have been made a matter of formal public record in the historic conference at Honolulu.

With the return of President Johnson and his advisers to Washington, and with Vice President HUMPHREY accompanying the South Vietnamese leaders back to Saigon on the first leg of an extensive diplomatic mission to rally the forces of freedom in Asia, the implementation of policies agreed upon at Honolulu is underway.

What, precisely, are these policies proclaimed jointly by the United States and South Vietnam?

Essentially, they are a mutual resolve to frustrate Communist attempts to conquer the territory and people of South Vietnam by armed aggression and terrorism.

The Red assaults will be countered by defensive military action, of whatever intensity is required and for as long as necessary.

Tireless efforts to achieve a negotiated peace will continue.

Meanwhile, even as the war goes on, there will be an acceleration of cooperative programs by American and South Vietnamese officials to improve the economy of South Vietnam, raise the living standards, fight hunger and disease, and build the foundations of a democratic, self-governing society.

How, it is being asked in some quarters, are these noble goals of freedom and peace and democracy—so solemnly proclaimed in the Declaration of Honolulu—to be achieved when the Communist North Vietnamese refuse to negotiate and when the South Vietnamese vow never to recognize the Red Vietcong?

There is no clear answer because, in our judgment, it is the wrong question. The wailing voices of woe, who call constantly for an American surrender in Vietnam, manage always and very conveniently to overlook the problems confronting the Communists.

The United States, in alliance with South Vietnam, holds the trump cards—in military power, in economic resources, and in the moral issue of self-determination versus Communist enslavement.

We believe that Ho Chi Minh and his comrades in Hanoi are the ones who ought to be worrying the most about escalation of the war—and we suspect they are.

America has the courage, the will, and the resources to defend the front lines of freedom against the tide of Communist aggression. Let this be the message Vice President HUMPHREY conveys.

ALLOWANCE OF TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR MOVING EXPENSES

(Mr. RONCALIO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, today it is my pleasure to introduce a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code to avoid tax discrimination against the construction worker.

These builders of America have been truly the forgotten and neglected people of our generation. Too often their needs have been given a back seat to the less meritorious demands of more entrenched groups.

Specifically, the inequity which I hope to correct is in the allowance of deductions for moving expenses for workers of the trades and crafts of the construction industry.

The Internal Revenue Code provides a general rule that:

There shall be allowed as a deduction moving expenses * * * in connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer as an employee at a new principal place of work. (Internal Revenue Code 217.)

This is a good principle, Mr. Speaker, and it has general application for almost everyone except those who need it most—the construction worker.

The code goes on, in its conditions for allowance of the deduction, to provide time limitations and other requirements which virtually eliminate the construction worker. In short, the effect is that the worse a construction worker needs this deduction, and the more he really deserves it—the less his actual chances are of obtaining it—Internal Revenue Code, section 217(c)(2).

This, Mr. Speaker, is the inequity my bill is designed to correct and it is my sincere hope that my colleagues will see its merit and offer their active support for this amendment.

FOOD FOR FREEDOM

(Mr. TODD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TODD. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson said in his food-for-freedom message:

A balance between agricultural productivity and population is necessary to prevent the shadow of hunger from becoming a nightmare of famine.

This last week, at the gracious invitation of Chairman COOLEY of the House Committee on Agriculture, I was privileged to hear 10 distinguished experts submit their predictions and then offer their recommendations as to how this "nightmare of famine" might be avoided.

Their recommendations fell into two broad categories, as I understood them:

First. Make every effort to reduce rates of population growth.

Second. Make every effort to increase agricultural productivity in these same lands faced with the blight of famine closing in over them.

Every witness emphasized that there was no apparent means of providing adequate food for those who have joined the banquet of life while the population explosion becomes more violent. The last witness, Prof. Theodore Schultz, of the University of Chicago, urged that adequate American agricultural resources be devoted to providing food for those now starving; that we follow the recommendations of the President in assisting our friends to modernize their agriculture; and that we allocate a portion of the funds received from the sale of food for freedom to family planning and birth control activities.

I offered this last idea to the House in a speech made following the President's message. Since then, I have explored it more fully, and considered it in the light of the remarks of these outstanding experts which have appeared before the distinguished Committee on Agriculture. I should like to offer it in more detail

today, so that it may be further discussed and improved.

On February 14, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. COOLEY] introduced the food-for-freedom bill, H.R. 12785. Section 103(b) of title I includes a provision that the President may determine that foreign currencies may be received as payment for food for freedom in order to implement certain purposes defined by subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e) of section 304. I suggest that section 103 (b) be extended to include a new subsection (i) of section 304.

I suggest that to section 304 be added a new subsection (i), which might read as follows:

For financing programs emphasizing maternal, child health and nutrition, and family planning services, and research activities related to the problems of population growth, for which purpose not less than fifteen per centum of the currencies received pursuant to title I shall be available, through and under the procedures established by the President upon request of the country with which the agreement is made: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to carry out the foregoing provisions of this subsection through any agency of the United States, or any international agency and/or organization of which the United States is a member, and which he determines is qualified to administer such activities.

This would mean that food for freedom would be used twice: one, to help fill empty stomachs now; and twice, to avoid empty stomachs in the future. This is the basic merit of the idea.

Now let us explore the idea in somewhat more detail. It suggests providing a total family service—to the mother, to her children, and to the entire family group. It is directed to the health, well-being, and happiness of all of them. And if the program were implemented as a unit—directed to the mother, father, and the children, it would achieve its greatest effectiveness at the least cost.

Dr. W. H. Sebrell, Jr., director of the School of Nutrition Sciences at Columbia University, testified before the committee:

Protein calorie malnutrition is actually one of the largest causes of the death of children. It is estimated that 70 per cent of the children in developing areas suffer from malnutrition and upward of 3 million children die annually from malnutrition, largely of this type. This fact is hidden because these deaths often are recorded as being from diarrhea, parasites, and infectious diseases. If these children were well nourished, they would not die of the intercurrent diseases. In those millions it does not kill, malnutrition permanently impairs their growth and probably causes irreversible mental and emotional damage. The mother's ignorance is of the greatest importance to the nutrition of the small child in that she does not recognize that the child is suffering from malnutrition.

My provision would look to this child health and nutrition problem. It would look to the health of the mother. And it would provide her, if she wished, information on family planning and birth control, so that she and her husband might space and number their family in the manner in which they feel they could best support it. Therefore, this provision would assist the parents, and offer them personal help.

It would assist the children, now being, and those unborn, to better realize their potentials, and it would move to eliminate the social and political instability which accompanies hunger and frustration.

What of the other part of the problem—providing more food for the total increases in population which will occur, even if family planning programs are given a great push. In his message, President Johnson said:

Many of the developing countries urgently need to give a higher priority to improving and modernizing their own production and distribution of food.

Section 103 of title I of the bill introduced by Chairman COOLEY says "take into account efforts of countries to help themselves toward a greater degree of self-reliance, especially in providing enough food to meet the needs of their people, and the resources required to attain that objective." The bill is intended to help increase the agriculture productivity of nations as rapidly as possible—which is the other side of the coin.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I believe the addition of the section I have suggested would round out this important legislation, and make it a total attack on hunger, deprivation, and the terror of famine. Today, unlimited population growth is on a collision course with limited food supply. Only total attack will avert disaster.

OUR FRIENDS, THE FEDS

(Mr. WELTNER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, my friend Opie L. Shelton, executive vice president and general manager of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, has long since established himself as a man of unusual clarity and vision. One of his many services to Atlanta and the State of Georgia is his continuing attempt to effect a realistic attitude toward the Federal Government. I laud his most recent effort, an article in the February issue of Atlanta magazine. It is a forceful presentation, and I include it at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

[From the Atlanta Magazine, February 1966]

OUR FRIENDS, THE FEDS

(By Opie L. Shelton)

The reason Atlanta has become partners with the Federal Government in so many projects is that Georgia's State government has failed to enter the world of reality where her cities are concerned.

The old county unit system, one of the greatest calamities any State ever experienced, was the prime villain. It placed the absolute control of State government in the hands of people who were openly antagonistic to the cities. Atlanta was their favorite whipping boy.

Today Atlanta receives less financial assistance from the State than any of the largest 25 cities of the Nation. Even though the county unit has been abolished (courtesy of the Federal Government) many of the people who run the State still think in county unit fashion. They still don't understand the problem, nor do many of them seem to want to understand.

Georgia has moved from a rural to an

urban society, but so far as the State government's reaction to urban needs are concerned one might think we were still living in a cotton-dominated economy.

The State highway department is a good example. If it had not been for the Federal Government we wouldn't have even the pitifully few major thoroughfares we have today. That department's philosophy has been so politically-oriented that the cities have been systematically shunted aside when the highway tax dollar has been divided.

State government that isn't responsive to the needs of its cities is soon going to find itself * * * useless * * *. America will double its population by the year 2000, we are told, and better than 90 percent of that growth is going to be in urban areas.

The Federal Government appears to understand these simple facts of life. And that is why Atlanta and every other growing city is forced to beat a path to Washington. A city that is treated as an unwanted child must, of necessity, seek a foster parent.

Most of the people who yell loudest about States' rights and cry havoc about big Federal Government are those who have done the least to exercise the responsibilities that go along with States' rights. They are phonies and frauds to the core.

If State governments are to survive they had better take inventory and begin to exercise better judgment in their treatment of their cities.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY AGENCIES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business have permission to sit this afternoon during general debate; and I make the same request for Wednesday and Thursday of this week.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

WATCH THE TROJAN HORSE

(Mr. MONAGAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, Senator KENNEDY and others would have us welcome the Vietcong into the process of settling the fighting in Vietnam by inviting them to be a part of any future government there.

History indicates that this course would be full of danger.

In this connection, it is appropriate to quote the words of the distinguished historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, in his recently published "Oxford History of the American People." Writing about the Iron Curtain and the diplomatic mistakes which the Allies made at the close of the war, he says:

The final mistake was the assumption that a joint regime, Communist and non-Communist, would work in defeated or liberated countries, like the "popular front" governments before the war.

Later, he says:

The event proved that no popular front with Communists could have any other result but a Communist Party takeover.

It is clear that we must proceed carefully in this respect. This does not mean

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Kabriel said Belton shouted out, "It's your duty to get up to the captain," crawled over to the reluctant radioman, grabbed the apparatus and moved up under fire to his captain.

Spriggs has used him as his radioman ever since.

"Belton in his conduct and bearing has been above average as a soldier and a valuable asset," Sprigg said. "He has worked in very well socially and he has got along with the men.

"I am personally satisfied that he now honestly believes his actions in the past have not been consistent with being a soldier or a man.

"I personally wrote to the commanding general recommending that he be promoted and his sentence remitted. Belton has seen men fight and die for his country, and he has felt the honor that comes when you do fight."

Spriggs tried to promote Belton 2 months ago, but the Army wanted to wait longer. Spriggs was told he must be absolutely sure Belton had changed his ways.

"I told Belton he deserved to be promoted," Spriggs said. "I knew he was happy. I knew he felt he had made it."

SHRDLU

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, many Federal Government employees availed themselves of the retirement benefits which were theirs provided they retired by the end of December 1965. Perhaps it is the loss of well-trained oldtimers in the printing business which is causing the Government Printing Office difficulties in preparing the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Whatever the problem, I call attention to the garbled form in which my extension of remarks appeared in the RECORD on February 7, 1966, page A545, entitled "Nuclear Nonproliferation Resolution," and on February 8, 1966, page A613, entitled "Special Report on Vietnam."

I ask unanimous consent that these two statements be reprinted correctly at this point in the RECORD and the permanent bound RECORD be corrected accordingly:

From: Representative CRAIG HOSMER, chairman, Committee on Nuclear Affairs.
To: House GOP Conference.

Subject: Senate Resolution 179 urging negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty.

Tomorrow the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will take testimony from Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Senate Resolution 179 and companion bills in both Houses which urge the negotiation of a treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. Negotiations toward this end currently are going on in Geneva at the 17-Nation Disarmament Conference.

Present members of the nuclear club in order of seniority are the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, and Red China. Sidewalk estimators claim 10 to 20 more countries could achieve nuclear weapons if they want to spend the money to do so. The most frequently mentioned candidates for membership are India, Israel, and the United Arab Republic. The Russians also talk much about their dread of West Germany getting the bomb even though it does not appear to be doing anything about it.

Senate Resolution 179 undoubtedly will pass. It is doubtful the Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy can find any persuasive witnesses favoring the spread of A-bombs and H-bombs. Politically being proliferation is about the same as being pro-sin and anti-motherhood. Therefore passing the resolution will be something of a pious platitude.

It could achieve significance, however, if it is amended as follows:

1. To recommend that the nonproliferation agreement be accomplished by amendment of the existing limited test ban treaty; and

2. To recommend that the limited test ban treaty be further amended at the same time to permit the peaceful use of nuclear explosives.

Present terms of the limited test ban treaty make these uses practically impossible. The United States has a real need to dig a second Panama Canal and using nuclear excavating techniques will make the second canal economically feasible. We will have other projects requiring these techniques, so will many other countries even including the U.S.S.R.

For mankind's benefit it is time the peaceful nuclear explosives' locker be unlocked. This is a way to do it.

SPECIAL REPORT ON VIETNAM

(By Congressman CRAIG HOSMER)

"Vietniks" demand we get out of Vietnam. Mothers wonder why their sons are sent there. The President wants to negotiate. Military leaders want a victory. Most Americans believe we should see it through. There are many questions about the war.

What is the country like? Half the size, but similar in shape, population, and coastline to California. It's rugged—mostly thick tropical forests, dense mangrove swamps, and concealing rice paddies. Vietnam is more a collection of small villages and hamlets than a strong nation to which the people give allegiance as we do to our country. The people are very poor. Until recently their only contacts with their Government were visits from the tax collector with no benefits in return. Along with Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, South Vietnam was created from French Indochina after France's 1953 defeat in Dienbienphu.

Who are the Vietcong? The Vietcong are strong Communist forces seeking to seize South Vietnam with the same war of liberation strategy used successfully in Cuba. Following 1953, the North Vietnamese Communist dictatorship of Ho Chi Minh saw the south as ripe for takeover by this means. The war now is in its 12th year. Red China, just to the north, encourages the aggression by supplying great amounts of munitions.

How do the VC fight war of liberation? Strictly according to Communist doctrine. Cadres of VC political organizers and disciplined military units infiltrated South Vietnam. Glittering Red promises of a better life recruited thousands of South Vietnamese into VC ranks. Where promises failed, threats were used. Systematic terrorism began. Village chiefs, school teachers and officials were murdered wholesale. Kill-and-hide tactics—so effective in Vietnam's concealing terrain—were used by VC military units to capture much of the country. Final victory was to be capped by consolidating guerrilla bands back into regular military regiments for the last battles.

Why haven't the VC won? For two reasons: First, millions of South Vietnamese would rather be dead than Red. They've fought back desperately and valiantly. Second, the United States has helped them fight. To begin with, by supplies and military advisers and now directly with over 160,000 men and more coming every day. Early this summer the tide of battle began to change. Now it's the VC who suffer setbacks.

Why is the United States fighting? For at least three strong reasons: (1) Born in free-

dom, our country cares for the freedom of others. (2) Should South Vietnam fail, so will Laos and Cambodia—then Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia. Ultimately all of Asia—the Philippines, Formosa, Korea, Japan, and New Guinea—could pass behind the Bambo Curtain. We fought World War II to keep the Far East from domination by a single, determined aggressor who would force our first line of defense back to the Pacific coast. We fight in Vietnam for the same reason. (3) Castro got away with his war of liberation. If we don't defeat this one, the Communists surely will start more of them all over Latin America, Africa and elsewhere in the world. U.S. troubles will be endless.

What we are doing in Vietnam is morally right, militarily sound and geopolitically correct.

How do U.S. forces fight? At sea Navy Task Force 77's carrier aircraft share with the U.S. Air Force an around-the-clock harassment of North Vietnam, bombing and strafing anything that moves on roads, rails, or trails. In South Vietnam they blitz suspected Vietcong concentrations. They are on immediate radio call to aid friendly units engaged on the ground. The Navy also hunts and sinks Vietcong shipping in South Vietnam's inland waterways and along the coastline. Its guns fire at enemy units ashore. A U.S. naval officer assists the captain of each Vietnamese Navy ship.

On land the Vietcong enemy wears no uniform and assumes many disguises. He may be anywhere—a laborer or farmer by day, a guerrilla at night. There are no front lines. One is seldom out of range of the fighting anywhere in South Vietnam. The U.S. Army and marines fight independently and in cooperation with Vietnamese forces to search out and destroy the enemy. Often the Vietcong cannot be identified until he fires at you.

How is U.S. morale in Vietnam? It's tops—ashore, afloat, and in the air. A fighting day may last 16 to 20 hours—our men are glad to take it. They know their job and its importance. They want to win and are determined to do so. I talked with many wounded in field hospitals. They want to recover quickly and get back to their fighting units. They feel the demonstrators at home stab them in the back as they face the enemy and are as hostile to them as the Vietcong.

Do planners in Washington try too much to run the war? Most probably. The volume of instructions to generals and admirals on the spot is tremendous. They know as much about fighting this kind of war without letting it get out of hand as Washington does. They know the circumstances at hand much better. It would seem wiser to give them more authority while still reserving top policy decisions to the Pentagon.

What would happen if we pulled out of Vietnam? Our resolve and action is the keystone of free world resistance to Communist aggression all over the world. Pull out that keystone and everything collapses. Red China and the U.S.S.R. get a green light to take over most of the world.

Why not declare war, bomb Hanoi, blockade the north, etc.? Wisdom of these actions must be kept under constant review. For the present we do a good job destroying supplies from Red China and reinforcements from North Vietnam. Also, supplies from the U.S.S.R. and other bloc countries are coming in less quantity than might be expected. Should we escalate in North Vietnam, it would give Ho Chi Minh cause to call on his allies for more effective help. Thus, these are two sides to the coin when contemplating these possible actions. We want the best one up.

Should we use atomic weapons? In my judgment this amount of force is not needed against targets in North Vietnam and the location of friendly forces and people in South Vietnam is too close for their safe use.

How about using nonlethal gases? These agents, such as tear gas and nausea gas, could be used very effectively. Example: clean out enemy caves and tunnels with non-lethal gas instead of lethal explosives. A lot of killing could be avoided and the work of our forces made easier. The gas here suggested for use does not kill and does not leave lasting aftereffects. It is unlike World War I's deadly gases which created so much horror.

Do we fight cold war along with the hot? Indeed we do. Realizing this is the key to understanding why military victory over the Vietcong is only part of the job in Vietnam. To win final victory and get out we must create a strong nation there—stable and able to take care of itself militarily and in other ways. This means convincing the people that Communist promises are hollow—that the better life comes from their own free government and alliance with the United States.

How do we fight cold war? In addition to fighting, every one of our servicemen does something to make the people's lives better. As they liberate a village they bring in food and medical supplies; they help rebuild schools, roads and other public services. This is done through and in cooperation with Vietnamese Government officials. It teaches the latter how government should serve the people. It demonstrates to the people that real benefits—not just hollow promises—follow allegiance to their own government. It also demonstrates to the Vietcong they have chosen the wrong side—many are defecting from the Communist side.

We also have in Vietnam many hundreds of dedicated U.S. civilians in the U.S. Information Service and AID mission. They risk their lives daily to carry the war for men's minds to the rice roots—right inside enemy strongholds. They also help build up the country's economy to make it self-sustaining. They often fly through heavy barrages of anti-aircraft fire to drop millions of leaflets urging surrender of the Vietcong and rallying the people to their government. An important part of their ammunition is relief supplies for the people bought by contributions from Americans.

When will we win in Vietnam? No one can predict when or how the military war will end. Right now it looks like the Vietcong effort will intensify for a while, then it could peter out after some months—but terror tactics will continue much longer. Final victory will take a long time. We must win the cold war too. That will be when Vietnam not only is peaceful, but when a strong nation is welded together—able to care for itself against the enemy and to provide a decent life for its people.

What can we at home do to help the cause? (1) Use this document and other data to convince doubters of the importance of America's stake in Vietnam. (2) If you know a serviceman there, write him your appreciation for his bravery and sacrifice—say the same thing to his family here at home. (3) In addition to your regular donation to United Crusade, consider a contribution earmarked for "Vietnamese relief" to an organization such as CARE or Catholic Relief.

MOUNT VERNON

(Mr. SAYLOR asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, with the celebration of George Washington's birthday, I must call the attention of the Congress to a series of recent editorials emphasizing the imminent danger to the view from Mount Vernon if Congress does not act during this session.

These excellent editorials testify to the efforts of my colleague, the gentleman from Maryland, HERVEY MACHEN, to prod the administration and the Congress into fulfilling the commitment made in the early 1960's with the passage of Public Law 87-362, to save the view from Mount Vernon. This law was introduced by Senator CLINTON ANDERSON in the Senate and by the gentleman from Colorado, Chairman WAYNE ASPINALL, and myself in the House.

With the passage of that law—without a dissenting vote—the Accokeek Foundation under the presidency of our beloved colleague, the gentlewoman from Ohio, FRANCES BOLTON, along with the Alice Ferguson Foundation, agreed to donate to the Federal Government, without cost, about half the land needed to protect the view.

Beyond that, over 130 private landowners have, without cost, donated scenic easements to the Department of the Interior to further this effort to save the view from Mount Vernon.

The State of Maryland has passed pioneering tax reform legislation recognizing the public purpose of these donations, and the Prince Georges County has passed the first local scenic space laws in the land, giving tax credits to the donors.

This is the greatest joining together of private, foundation, county, State, and Federal efforts to preserve our heritage for the people of this Nation.

Here is the one shining example of a project where everyone has done his part—except the Federal Government.

Unless the Federal Government acts now—at this session of Congress—this great pilot project will dismally fail. Other States, counties, organizations, and individuals throughout the Nation, who have watched the development of this unique project, may well be discouraged in their efforts.

Fortunately, my colleague, the gentleman from Maryland, HERVEY MACHEN, who took office in January 1965, and who represents the area in Maryland opposite Mount Vernon, has placed before us a bill to get the Federal Government moving again. This bill provides for the increases in land prices due to the Government procrastination in purchasing the remaining acreage needed.

We have been constantly reminding the Congress and the executive that further delays and procrastination will be the death knell of this project to which so many have devoted so much. Congressman MACHEN deserves our full support in this campaign to complete this task so well begun.

To lose all that has been accomplished would be a real tragedy. The loss would be not only of the millions of dollars worth of lands and rights in lands being patriotically donated without cost, but also the loss of the pilot project in which Federal funds are outweighed by founda-

tion and private donations, and the protection of natural beauty of a large area is accomplished without increased expense, dislocation of families, and attendant problems.

Congressman MACHEN has thoughtfully said:

If we can show the country how we can carry out an experiment in cooperative and coordinated scenic protection such as this program at Piscataway Park opposite Mount Vernon, we are setting the stage for a great movement across the country.

If the Congress does not act on Congressman MACHEN's bill this session, we will have failed. We cannot wait longer for the Department of the Interior to make up its mind whether or not to support the President's year-old program to make the Potomac a "model river of scenic and recreation values for the country."

Let us move quickly to do our part, as indicated in these recent editorials:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Dec. 15, 1965]

THREAT AT PISCATAWAY

Back in 1961 Congress leaped at a rare opportunity to preserve forever, at moderate Federal cost, more than 1,100 acres of choice shoreline property along the Potomac near Maryland's Piscataway Creek—directly across the river from historic Mount Vernon.

In brief, this remarkable deal provided that the Federal Government need buy only about half the newly authorized Piscataway Park. The remainder, it was understood, would be acquired entirely by private donation. And the 1961 law also authorized the Park Service to seek scenic easements—also free—restricting obtrusive development in a vast area of an additional 2,596 acres contiguous to the park.

Well, the private part of the bargain has progressed with phenomenal success. Thus far, private foundations have actually donated or committed themselves to donate some 499 acres for the park. Scenic easements have been contributed by more than 120 landowners, involving about 900 acres of land. These generous donations are conditioned, however, as might be expected, on the firm understanding that the Government meet its obligation. And the sad fact is that the time when these donations may begin to revert from Federal control is rapidly approaching.

For the Government has not held up its end. Thus far, only 97 acres have been bought—largely because the figure authorized for expenditure by Congress in the 1961 act has proved to be grossly inadequate. Before further funds will be appropriated, the authorization needs to be increased some \$2.5 million. Representative HERVEY MACHEN is leading the sensible legislative fight for the increase, and seems to have met a stone wall.

The latest frustration surprisingly came from the conservation-minded Interior Department itself, which the other day recommended to Congress that the Machen bill be "deferred" pending the outcome of "a broad study" of all of Interior's land-acquisition programs. The presumption is that the study will wind up early next year. But there is no assurance of that, and, even if there were, any loss of time at this stage of the Piscataway project constitutes a threat.

It is a needless threat. Instead of his wishy-washy approach, Secretary Udall should be beating the drums for the Machen bill. With assurance that the Federal Government intends to carry out its agreement, there is every reason to believe that other donations of land, and many more donations of case-

ing war threatened this Nation, the Coast Guard found it necessary to expand as rapidly as possible, and thus the Coast Guard Reserve came into being.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, Coast Guard ships, planes, and stations were ordered to carry out extensive patrols to insure that merchant ships in our waters did not violate the neutrality proclaimed by President Roosevelt. The next summer the Coast Guard began its port security operations under the revised Espionage Act of 1917 and the newly enacted Dangerous Cargo Act.

On November 1, 1941, the Coast Guard was ordered to operate as part of the Navy. The next month Pearl Harbor was bombed, and we were in the war. As in World War I, a big part of the Coast Guard's task was antisubmarine warfare. Coast Guard cruising cutters and convoy escorts helped with the battle of the Atlantic as they sank 11 U-boats. At the same time, more than 4,000 survivors of torpedoes and other enemy action were rescued from the Atlantic and Mediterranean by Coast Guardsmen.

But there were losses too. The cutter *Hamilton* went down while in tow after being torpedoed off Iceland. The *Acania* was sunk in the Caribbean; *Escanaba*, *Leopold*, *Muskeget*, and *Natsek* in the Atlantic; *Serpens* in the Pacific. Only two of the crew survived *Escanaba*—no one, on board *Muskeget*, *Serpens*, or *Natsek*. More than 90 percent of those who went down with these vessels were members of the newly established Reserve component of the Coast Guard.

When she was desperately needed for convoy duty in the North Atlantic and was thrown into the breach to help stem the mounting losses to German submarines, the *Escanaba* was based at Grand Haven, Mich. The members of her crew and their families were a valued and highly respected part of that small community. The tragic loss of the *Escanaba* with all but two of her crew was a deep and personal tragedy to that entire region. Today, those men are still mourned in Grand Haven. Each year, memorial exercises are conducted there, in memory of the *Escanaba* and the gallant men who perished when that vessel went down.

Many more reservists manned landing craft that hit the invasion beaches with assault troops at Guadalcanal, Anzio, Tarawa, Attu, north Africa, Salerno, Makin, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Normandy, southern France, Luzon, Guam, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa—the Coast Guard Reserve made all those stops and a lot in between. At the conclusion of the war the Coast Guard had 802 vessels of its own and in addition was manning 351 Navy and 288 Army craft.

Total personnel had reached a peak of approximately 174,000 and of that number more than 150,000 were Coast Guard reservists who had entered the service for wartime duty. Many of that number formed the nucleus for the establishment of our regular peacetime Reserve and are still serving with Reserve components. Others have completed their 20 or more years of satisfactory service and, having reached the age of 60, are

now retired under the Reserve Retirement Act.

Through its intensive and well-organized training program the Coast Guard Reserve is today a highly trained and efficient organization which, I am confident, that if called to the defense of this Nation, would prove to be both ready and reliable and once again would serve with honor and distinction. I am extremely proud to be a member of this organization and honor it here on its 25th anniversary.

BOYCOTTING SHIPS OF NATIONS SUPPLYING NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, the action taken on February 18, 1966, by the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO in proposing a boycott of ships of nations which permit any of its flag vessels to carry or supply goods to North Vietnam clearly reflects a deep concern about this intolerable situation.

It is indeed tragic that the administration has remained so indifferent that it has become necessary that individual efforts be undertaken to pressure our Government into halting this aid and comfort to our enemy.

The recent administration action prohibiting vessels which engage in trade with the Hanoi regime from carrying U.S. Government financed cargoes, while certainly necessary, is clearly insufficient to bring about an end to free world traffic into the harbor of Haiphong.

If the administration is not sufficiently concerned to stop this trade then it is clearly the responsibility of the Congress to do so. Legislation to close our ports to those helping to supply North Vietnam is now pending before the Congress and should receive our early and favorable consideration.

Mr. Speaker, this is a simple issue, and I predict that if the administration continues to abdicate its responsibility of leadership it will continue to be shoved into doing whatever necessary to stop this trade.

POSTSCRIPT ON A SOLDIER

(Mr. CALLAWAY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, on October 6 of last year I rose on the floor of this House to express my regret and deep concern over a soldier from the 1st Cavalry Division—Airmobile—who had gone on a self-imposed hunger strike protesting his assignment to Vietnam on the grounds that he disagreed with our policy there. On that day, Mr. Speaker, the world had heard a great deal about this soldier, Pvt. Winstel Belton, and relatively little about the newly formed 1st Air Cavalry. But how things have changed since October 6. Over the past months the world has learned about the 1st Cavalry. Its victories, its bravery, and its sacrifices are well known and are

now a matter of record; while the story of Private Belton has been out of the news entirely. But, Mr. Speaker, while he has been out of the news, a great change has come over this soldier. He has distinguished himself in the service of his country, he has won honor on the battlefield, and has earned a promotion to private, first class. Therefore, I think it only fitting that I insert in the Record the very gratifying postscript to the story of Winstel Belton, as reported last week in an article from the Atlanta Journal:

SOLDIER WHO WENT ON STRIKE WINS HONOR
ON BATTLEFIELD

(By Peter Arnett)

BEN CAT, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Six months ago a university graduate named Winstel R. Belton staged a 7-day hunger strike at Fort Benning, Ga., to dramatize his distaste for being drafted and his refusal to fight in Vietnam.

Thursday a big, proud smile flashed across Belton's face as he was promoted to private, first class, on a battlefield in South Vietnam.

Looking just as proud was his company commander, Capt. R. E. Spriggs of Mexico, N.Y., a professional soldier who hated everything Belton's hunger strike had stood for.

Spriggs was furious last November when he returned to his unit after recovering from a bullet wound to find Belton assigned there.

Spriggs said Thursday he would take the 26-year-old Winslow, Ariz., soldier into combat with him anytime, anywhere.

Belton arrived in Vietnam with a 12-month suspended jail sentence hanging over his head because of his hunger strike in mid-August. A court-martial had given him a bad conduct discharge, total forfeiture of pay and the jail sentence.

But he was also given a chance.

Belton, a Negro, was told that if he went to Vietnam and proved himself, he would not have to serve his jail sentence. If he failed, he would serve it.

His old unit, the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division, wouldn't take him back. The 1st Infantry Division accepted him.

Spriggs was the only man in a company of the 2d Battalion, 28th Regiment, who knew that the new radio-telephone operator was the hunger striker Belton.

Lt. Gus Berzines, a weapons platoon commander from Kalamazoo, Mich., recalled talking with Belton one day about various things and finally saying, "You mean you're that Belton?"

More and more men in the unit began realizing that Belton had publicly protested what they themselves had accepted as a patriotic duty. None of them brought up the subject with him except the company commander, and few ever discussed it among themselves.

"That was his business," said Sgt. Frederick Range of Dallas, Tex. "We treated him like any other soldier."

Belton, holder of a bachelor of science degree in education, was initially cold and reserved with his buddies. But the heat of battles in December and January melted his attitude and forged ever-tightening bonds with Spriggs and the other men in the company.

Initially given the job of laying wires between the company headquarters and the platoons, he began carrying Spriggs' radio.

Early in January, he proved he had what it takes.

Sp5c. Larry Kabriel of Summerfield, Kans., recalls that the company was under heavy fire near Trung Lap and an urgent call came over the radio for Captain Spriggs.

The radioman shouted back: "The captain's not here. He's up front. There's heavy fire, I can't reach him."

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that Vietcong, as individual South Vietnamese, would not be listened to along with Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards, North Vietnamese exiles, and others. It would mean, however, that they would not be given an opportunity to move into sensitive government departments and take over by indirection as was done in Eastern Europe.

It is also educational to recall President Kennedy's statement in Berlin, in 1963, when he said:

I am not impressed by the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world. I do not believe that any democrat can successfully ride that tiger.

Recent dispatches from Peiping and Hanoi have suggested growing doubts about the conduct of their military effort, the strain on the economy, and the resulting emergence of a peace element.

Now is the time to emphasize firmness rather than vacillation.

TELEVISION OF HOUSE PROCEEDINGS

(Mr. ICHORD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, the eyes of the Nation last week were focused on the South Vietnam hearings conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Most of the appraisals of the hearings that I have heard on this side of the Congress have been very unfavorable, but I submit to the Speaker—and I speak primarily to the House majority floor leader and the Speaker of the House—that there is one thing we should have learned from these hearings: Under no circumstances should we ever permit House proceedings to be televised. The televising of House proceedings, Mr. Speaker, is the most effective way I know to convert serious deliberative proceedings into a first-class comedy.

RADIO FREE ASIA

(Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I have this morning sent a letter to Mr. Crawford H. Greenewalt, chairman of the board of directors of Radio Free Europe, urging that his organization investigate the feasibility of establishing a Radio Free Asia in an effort to counteract the relentless barrage of hate propaganda now being disseminated by the Communist Chinese throughout southeast Asia.

My admiration and respect for Radio Free Europe is boundless. It has been, and continues to be, one of the most effective private means of disseminating truth to the captive nations of Eastern Europe ever devised in modern society. It is my hope that a similar effort can and will be made in the strife-ridden areas of Asia.

With your permission I should like to read the text of my letter to Mr. Greene-

walt and urge my distinguished colleagues to associate themselves with it if they share my belief that a Radio Free Asia can be an important ally in our struggle for the minds of Asia's peoples:

DEAR MR. GREENEWALT: It is imperative that our Nation, through its private citizens as well as through its Government, do everything possible to offset the fantastic volume of vicious propaganda now being drummed into the minds of the Asian peoples by the Red Chinese.

Since World War II, few organizations have done a more effective job of presenting the truth to captive nations and their people than Radio Free Europe. Most of the time the only access the peoples of Eastern Europe have to the truth is through our own Government's agency, the Voice of America and through Radio Free Europe.

It becomes increasingly apparent, in these perilous times in Asia, that there is a grave and pressing need for an operation similar to Radio Free Europe in this part of the world. Communist propagandists are expending millions of dollars and thousands of hours of air time in an unceasing barrage of hatred against America and the free world.

We must counteract this relentless campaign through every effective channel available to us as a free country.

I therefore strongly urge that you and the members of the board of your organization give serious consideration to the formation of a Radio Free Asia. Such action, I am convinced, will assist the official agencies of our own Government and those of other free nations in this world in their effort to win the minds of millions away from the seductive and totalitarian influence of Red China.

The bulk of the world's population lives in this troubled and terror-stricken region. There is no doubt, whatever, that the Chinese Communist regime recognizes the pivotal role the commitment of these millions of human beings will play in their quest for world domination.

Our American Government and its people stand firmly against the encroachment of communism in southeast Asia. We have made our stand known through economic assistance and through the commitment of men and arms to aid South Vietnam in its heroic fight against aggression from the North.

We must seek to win the propaganda war as well. And in that war there is no greater weapon than truth.

The American people should be given the opportunity to enlist in that struggle through a voluntary, nonprofit, nongovernmental agency in addition to all the official effort now being made. Radio Free Asia can become a reality. I pray that you, the members of your board and the expert advisers you have working with you may be able to make it so.

"LOVE-INS"

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, according to U.S. News & World Report of February 28, 1966, the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County has ordered an inquiry into what one of the supervisors terms "love-ins," permitted under the welfare program in Los Angeles.

At issue is a rule which permits aid to a family with dependent children, even though the man who lives in the house is neither married to the mother nor is the father of the children.

Said Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli:

We have had sit-ins and lie-ins, and now we have love-ins. This places a stigma and indictment upon supervisors unless we actively challenge this phase of the welfare program.

Taxpayers must not be forced to subsidize any welfare program that has the inherent danger of promoting illegitimacy, to say nothing about apparent outright immorality.

RESOLUTION TO BAR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST U.S. EMPLOYEES

(Mr. SCHWEIKER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a concurrent resolution calling for an end to discrimination in the assignment of U.S. employees to overseas posts.

The administration has been practicing religious discrimination in its assignment of employees abroad, thereby preventing assignment of qualified Jewish employees to U.S. posts in Arab-bloc countries.

The resolution which I am introducing today expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary to assure that the assignment of U.S. employees in the United States and at posts abroad shall be made without regard to race, religion, color, or national origin.

By its demonstrated willingness to go along with the anti-Semitism practiced by these Arab-bloc countries when assigning U.S. personnel abroad, the administration is guilty of following a double standard, properly outlawing discrimination by private employers at home, but improperly discriminating in assigning its own employees abroad.

Mr. Speaker, I would welcome the support of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for this important measure.

A TRIBUTE TO THE U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE ON ITS 125TH BIRTHDAY

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, 25 years ago, on February 19, 1941, a new Reserve component of our Armed Forces was born, and it is with great pleasure that I take this opportunity to pay tribute to this fine organization, the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve.

From my personal experience and long association with the Coast Guard Reserve, both as a commissioned officer and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I can state with a great deal of conviction that its members, whatever their individual backgrounds may be, reflect one thing in common—devotion, extreme pride, and an intense feeling of national responsibility.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Coast Guard had no organized reserve, and its entire strength numbered less than 20,000 officers and men. With ever-increasing duties as the approach-

The United States holds title to the minerals of the El Ranchito grant and since this site is part of the grant it is not proposed to convey mineral rights of the said parcel to the tribe.

Santa Ana Pueblo has a relatively small population of 366 and badly needs a community center of its own with adequate sanitary facilities under present planning programs. This need would be served by the pueblo acquisition of this site.

The fourth and last pueblo is that of Zia which has an administrative site of 428 acres more or less within the Borrego grant, which was purchased by the United States in the submarginal land purchase project. There is a bit of legislative and administrative history involved in the case of the Borrego grant.

Jurisdiction of the Borrego grant was transferred to the Department of the Interior from the Department of Agriculture by Executive Order No. 7792, dated January 18, 1938. Then some 11 years later the act of August 13, 1949 (63 Stat. 604), all of the Borrego grant, excluding minerals and excepting this administrative site of 428 acres became trust land of the Zia Pueblo. Since the entire Borrego grant was originally purchased by the Federal Government for \$68,239.40, or at an average per acre cost of \$3, this would make the cost of the administrative site \$1,284.

There are no improvements on the administrative site. The Borrego grant is used by the pueblo of Zia for livestock grazing purposes and the administrative site would likewise be used for livestock grazing. The present estimate fair market value of this administrative site is \$2,568 and the site is not currently being used by the Government nor does it have any plans for its future use. The interior of the Borrego grant which includes an administrative site does not have a sectional survey hence no present description is possible. The United States holds title to the minerals in the remainder of the Borrego grant and it is proposed to retain the minerals in the administrative site.

Plans to develop the economy of Zia Pueblo would be expedited by the acquisition of the administrative site by the Indians.

In summary, all of the lands relating to the four pueblos involved in this bill, are in excess of the needs of the Department of the Interior and it is considered that the pueblos involved can make effective use of these lands for community centers or for agricultural and grazing purposes. Through this transfer the Government will be relieved of further responsibility for maintaining the buildings no longer needed and the Indians will receive trust title and assume responsibility for lands and buildings which can be used to their own economic and social advantage.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 12265) was laid on the table.

WINNING THE PEACE

(Mr. KING of Utah asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include an article.)

Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, the Deseret News of Salt Lake City puts it quite plainly when it says:

As we go about winning the war in Vietnam, let's make sure we lay the groundwork for winning the peace, too.

It hails the President's pledge to help achieve political and economic reforms in South Vietnam, stating that "the more that is done to give the people of South Vietnam a greater voice in their government, the more incentive they will have to make the sacrifices necessary to win the war."

Speaking of the woes which the people there are suffering, the paper says:

Simple common sense dictates that everything possible be done to alleviate such suffering, not only for humanitarian reasons but also to expedite the war effort.

We all know that we are now facing conflict on two fronts, and because this article sheds light on the subject I am offering it to the RECORD, where others may want to read it.

[From the Salt Lake City (Utah) Deseret News, Feb. 10, 1966]

WIN THE PEACE, TOO

Since an end to the war in Vietnam seems to be nowhere near in sight, President Johnson's pledge to help achieve political and economic reforms in South Vietnam might seem premature.

On the contrary, the more that is done to give the people of South Vietnam a greater voice in their government, the more incentive they will have to make the sacrifices necessary to win the war.

One of the major problems in South Vietnam has been the rapid turnover in the governments at Saigon. While the more democratic constitution and the elections that have been promised are no automatic guarantee of stability, particularly in a country with virtually no experience with democracy, they at least represent a chance for improvement.

Then there is the drag on the war effort that is being exerted by the 1 million refugees in South Vietnam and by the inflation for which America's presence is at least partly responsible. Simple commonsense dictates that everything possible be done to alleviate such suffering, not only for humanitarian reasons but also to expedite the war effort.

Moreover, once the war is over, peace with freedom will be insecure as long as people are hungry, homeless, and jobless.

As a case in point, remember how tired, disillusioned, and skeptical we all were after World War II, particularly the people of war-ravaged Europe? Remember how close an economically as well as spiritually sick Western Europe came to succumbing to communism?

What saved the day was, of course, the Marshall plan. It got the recipients on their feet psychologically as well as economically, and won the U.S. allies and markets we might otherwise have lost.

The situations in South Vietnam and in postwar Europe are not, of course, parallel. Europe was already highly industrialized; Vietnam is not. Europe had plenty of highly skilled workers and businessmen; Vietnam does not.

But after a decade or more of war, South

Vietnam is sapped and in need of help as Europe was after 4 years. Moreover, if we were to wash our hands of Vietnam after having won victory on the battlefield or at the conference table, it might not be long before war flared up again there just as it did after the Geneva Conference supposedly settled things in 1954.

Nor is there any good reason the United States should be expected to shoulder the burden alone. Even those who oppose what we are currently doing in Vietnam cannot reasonably object to making sure it does not long persist as a potential tinderbox for world conflict.

As we go about winning the war in Vietnam, let's make sure we lay the groundwork for winning the peace, too.

FOR BETTER LIFE

(Mr. KING of Utah asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include an editorial.)

Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, the Honolulu Declaration, the Salt Lake Tribune points out, stressed "a resolve to win the war against the Vietcong through both counterinsurgency tactics and civic reform programs."

"Experts have long contended that the only way to defeat the Communist insurgency is to attack the social, economic, and political defects which helped create the insurgency, while the military struggle against the guerrillas continues."

The paper believes that "from a long-range standpoint a U.S.-backed program to improve Vietnam's agriculture and education is of paramount importance."

As I read the editorial I thought: here is a summary of the task which lies ahead, and in the belief that others might find the article illuminating I request that it be made available in the RECORD.

[From the Salt Lake Tribune, Feb. 10, 1966]

BETTER LIFE PLUS VICTORY?

The greatest immediate achievement of the Honolulu talks of President Johnson with Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and others of South Vietnam may stem from the first face-to-face confrontation of chiefs of state of the two countries.

In practical terms, the greatest longer term direct benefit may be action to curb ruinous inflation which is sweeping the war-torn little country. The communiqué at the close of the meeting pledged "further concrete steps" in this direction. These might include new efforts to keep U.S. military construction from creating pressures on the supply of Vietnamese labor and commodities and reexamination of the monetary exchange rate for American military personnel.

The "declaration of Honolulu" stressed a resolve to win the war against the Vietcong through both counterinsurgency tactics and civic reform programs. Experts have long contended that the only way to defeat the Communist insurgency is to attack the social, economic, and political defects which helped create the insurgency, even while the military struggle against the guerrillas continues. It is surprising that it has taken so long to give real meaning to this part of the program.

From a long-range standpoint a U.S.-backed program to improve Vietnam's agriculture and education is of paramount importance. Agriculture Secretary Freeman is

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the beneficial interest in certain federally owned lands heretofore set aside for school or administrative purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, again I would like to interrogate one of the chief handlers of this bill. I notice that this bill is a little different from the others which would give title to Indian lands in that the Secretary of the Interior would at some future time decide when, as, and if he wants to place the title in trust to these tribes.

In other words, other bills that we have passed placed the title in trust in the United States, or, as you said, give title in fee to the Indian. Here is a little different situation where we might be establishing a precedent, in that we are reposing the power to vest title in trust in the Secretary of the Interior. Have you noticed that in this bill?

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. ASPINALL. I have not noticed any major difference. As far as this legislation is concerned, the transfer is purely an administrative act, and inasmuch as we give to the Secretary this authority to transfer these lands to the Indians themselves, in trust, then the Secretary will do it as soon as he understands that the Indians are ready to go ahead and take over the administration of this additional area.

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Then the gentleman feels that the Secretary of the Interior can repose a trust in lands over and above the right of Congress?

Mr. ASPINALL. No. As I understand it, in this respect this is an action of Congress which places these lands in the ownership of the Indians in trust. The trust-estate is still the same in this instance as in the other. The presence of mineral rights may make a minor difference. It is a question of procedure, if I understand what my friend is talking about.

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I believe the gentleman is right, and I withdraw my reservation.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There was no objection.

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that a similar Senate bill, S. 1904, be considered in lieu of the House bill.

Mr. SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There being no objection, the Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

S. 1904

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That when the following identified lands (other than the mineral interests specifically excluded in the identification), which were set aside for school or administrative purposes, are no longer needed by the United States for the

administration of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to declare, by publication of a notice in the Federal Register, that the title of the United States to such lands and improvements shall thereafter be held in trust for the Indians of the Pueblos of Acoma, Sandia, Santa Ana, and Zia as follows:

(1) Acomita day school site comprising three and five-tenths acres, more or less, to the Indians of the Pueblo of Acoma;

(2) Sandia school site comprising sixty-three one-hundredths of an acre, more or less, to the Indians of the Pueblo of Sandia;

(3) Santa Ana school site comprising two and eighty-one one-hundredths acres, more or less, excluding mineral interests therein, located within the El Ranchito grant, to the Indians of the Pueblo of Santa Ana; and

(4) Administrative site in the Berrego grant, comprising four hundred and twenty-eight acres, more or less, excluding minerals therein, to the Indians of the Pueblo of Zia.

Sec. 2. The Indian Claims Commission is directed to determine in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of the Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1050), the extent to which the value of lands and improvements placed in a trust status under the authority of this Act should or should not be set off against any claim against the United States determined by the Commission.

(Mr. MORRIS (at the request of Mr. ASPINALL) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to give to the Indians of the Pueblos of Acoma, Sandia, Santa Ana, and Zia the beneficial interest in certain federally owned lands heretofore set aside for schools or administrative purposes.

The purpose of H.R. 12265 is to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to give in trust to the pueblos of Acoma, Sandia, Santa Ana, and Zia in New Mexico the beneficial interest in certain federally owned lands and improvements when they are no longer needed. The lands total 435 acres and were set aside for school or administrative use. The value of the lands and their improvements is approximately \$31,000.

Each one of the four pueblos has its own distinctive needs for economic betterment which, through the acquisition of these lands, will be met in part, at least, through present planning of the pueblos themselves. The first to be considered is the Acoma Pueblo.

The Acomita day school site comprises a tract of 3.5 acres located within the Acoma Pueblo grant. It was acquired by the Federal Government through condemnation proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico in 1920 at a cost of \$350 for the construction of a school building. The tract, however, was never used for school purposes, and a revocable permit was given to the pueblo of Acoma, which authorized the pueblo to use the tract for agricultural purposes. The present value of the land is \$560.

As the development of agricultural resources and irrigable land is part of the Acoma Pueblo present plans of economic betterment the acquisition of this site will be beneficial to the pueblo—population 1,674 in 1952. The location of the tract is shown on the accompanying

map. The total acreage of tribal land is 245,801 and there are 370 acres of allotted land but most of this is nonagricultural grazing land.

Turning now to the Sandia Pueblo we have a day school site comprising 0.63 acre, more or less, which was acquired by the United States in 1930 at a cost of \$126 through condemnation proceedings. The tract was acquired as a site on which to erect Government buildings for the use and training of the Indians attending the day school at the Sandia Pueblo. On July 1, 1960, the operation of an Indian day school at this pueblo was discontinued and the Sandia children now attend public school.

The present estimated value of this tract at Sandia Pueblo, including improvements, is estimated at \$14,227. The improvements consist of one school building and teacher's quarters, pump-house, storage building, warehouse, building for bathhouse, garage, dispensary, plus sewer and water system.

Under a revocable permit the Sandia Pueblo Indians use the buildings on this site as a meeting place for the tribal council and for other community gatherings as the need arises. A portion of the school site is used for a health clinic and as a school for U.S. Public Health Indian sanitarian aids. No conveyance of land or buildings used for health purposes will be made to the tribe without the approval of the U.S. Public Health Service.

The Sandia Pueblo has a small population of 124 people and presently plans to develop a community center providing facilities for library study and youth recreation by securing necessary funds through the Community Facilities Act or other appropriations at an estimated cost of \$75,000. The area in question would be well adapted to serve the purpose of a Sandia Pueblo Community Center.

The third pueblo is Santa Ana and a parcel of 2.81 acres was acquired by the United States in 1920 at a cost of \$140.50 through condemnation proceedings. The purpose of its acquisition was to provide a site for the construction of a school for Santa Ana Pueblo.

Since July 1, 1960, when the Santa Ana Day School was discontinued, the Indian children have been attending public school.

The present estimated value of this land, with improvements is \$13,747 and the improvements consist of a school and quarters building, storage building, bath and storage building, a pump-house, a water and sewer system.

Under a revocable permit covering the use of all buildings and facilities at the site issued on August 28, 1960, the pueblo Santa Ana plans to use the school site as a meeting place for the tribal council and for community gatherings as the need arises. A portion of the site is being used by the U.S. Public Health Service as a location for an Indian clinic and no conveyance of land or clinic buildings will be made to the tribe without the approval of the U.S. Public Health Service.

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taking 20 specialists to Vietnam to look at the Mekong Delta area, one of the great rice bowls of southeast Asia. Freeman is one of several high-level officials accompanying Vice President HUMPHREY to southeast Asia. The purpose of the Humphrey trip is believed mainly—psychological—to “continue the momentum” of the Honolulu talks.

If communications between Washington and Saigon are improved and social and political improvement are given real meaning and impetus, then the spectacular conference at Hawaii will prove useful. This is, after all, the first time that a South Vietnamese government has definitely promised to create a better life for its people.

IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

(Mr. GRAY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, the importance of the office of the Vice President has been increasing steadily over the past several years. At the present time, the United States does not own or maintain a permanent residence for the Vice President. Such a residence is badly needed. The Vice President is called upon to entertain diplomats, various officials from this country and abroad very frequently.

Accordingly, I have introduced today, a bill authorizing the General Services Administration to plan, design, and construct an official residence for the Vice President of the United States on a 10-acre site at the U.S. Naval Observatory on Massachusetts Avenue NW. We propose a three-story brick and stone structure, three-car garage, grounds to be properly landscaped and fenced. The bill calls for a maximum of \$750,000, including the furnishings.

The Senate passed a bill last year providing for an authorization of \$1 million.

Public hearings have been scheduled for 10 a.m., on Thursday, February 24 in the Full Public Works Committee Hearing Room 2167, the Rayburn Building.

Congressman GEORGE FALLON, Full Committee Chairman on Public Works and I, invite all interested colleagues or their constituents to appear before the committee or submit a written statement concerning this important matter.

We also welcome cosponsorship of the bill.

CONGRATULATIONS TO THE GAMBIA ON ITS INDEPENDENCE DAY ANNIVERSARY

(Mr. MATSUNAGA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, The Gambia, which achieved independence on February 18, 1965, as a constitutional monarchy within the British Commonwealth, has just completed its first year of independence.

My warmest congratulations are extended to Prime Minister Dawda Kairaba Jawara and the people of this young but important member of the family of African independent nations.

The estimated 325,000 population of The Gambia live on a stretch of land, from 7 to 20 miles wide, that extends from the west coast of Africa to a point 200 miles inland. The country's economy is almost entirely agricultural, with peanuts normally comprising about 95 percent of the total value of annual exports.

This young African nation became a member of the Organization of African Unity in March 1965 and was admitted to the United Nations as that organization's 115th member in September of the same year.

Mr. Speaker, it is my sincere wish, as The Gambia enters upon its second year of independence, that the friendly ties existing between the United States and this young African nation will be expanded and strengthened.

LINCOLN, OF SPRINGFIELD

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. HUTCHINSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, on February 12, the 157th anniversary of the birth of Abraham Lincoln, the Governor of Pennsylvania, the Honorable William W. Scranton, spoke at a dinner in Springfield, Ill., sponsored by the Abraham Lincoln Association.

It was my privilege to hear this excellent address. I was struck by the parallel drawn by the speaker between present-day national circumstances and those that prevailed during the period when Lincoln was a citizen of Springfield. In my view, the speech points the way of opportunity for the Republican Party, and for our country.

Here is the text:

I do not possess profound scholarly knowledge of the life of Abraham Lincoln, but, as apparently with you, the example of his life among all Americans has always held first place for me. In one critical moment of my own life, I found myself asking, "What would Lincoln have done?" And Lincoln's answer led me to the right decision.

Lincoln's life is probably more familiar to the average person than that of any other American—more familiar even than those of Washington or Jefferson.

We know of him as a young man in the small village of New Salem. The tales of the early life of Abe Lincoln, the railsplitter, still inspire and entertain each succeeding generation of Americans.

And we know him of course for his unmatched accomplishments in the Presidency from 1861 to 1865—the Saviour of the Union, the Great Emancipator, the first successful national leader and virtual founder of the Republican Party.

But it is about neither of these Lincolns that I will talk tonight—neither the New Salem Lincoln, the struggling and humorous youth; nor the Civil War Lincoln, the leader who "belongs to the ages."

Rather it is about the Lincoln who dwelt in this very city of Springfield from the time that he began a law practice in 1837 until he left for Washington in February of 1861—a period of almost 25 years.

These were the prime years of Lincoln's own life. During this time he married, raised children, bought a home, entered politics as a Whig—formed the views and

confirmed the character to which he later was to give such magnificent expression.

They are the least well-known years of Lincoln's career. Nevertheless, they should have particular interest and significance for us today.

It was in many ways a time very like our own.

During most of this period, the Nation was governed by a Democratic combination bent on achieving consensus that offered something to everybody—something to farmers, something to bankers, something to southern slaveowners, something to northern factory hands—and something, of course, to the politicians themselves. The minority party, the Whigs, were chiefly negative in outlook and captured the Presidency only when led by a military hero. An extremist group broke and for a time seemed about to take over the minority party. Discrimination was debated as a great national issue. The country became involved in an international war which was severely criticized by many of the leading intellectuals of the day. And while all this was happening, unprecedented economic growth and expansion were taking place.

All of these factors find echoes in our own time.

At first glance, there does seem to be one major difference between the two periods. During the era that culminated in the Civil War, the great moral issue of slavery infected and colored and finally overwhelmed every other subject of political debate. Look where you will at the issues of the time—national expansion, monetary policy, States rights, the tariff, even construction of a transcontinental railroad. In the end each of them comes down to one question: What effect will it have on slavery?

Slavery was indeed the irrepressible issue. Beside it, all other questions sank into at least momentary inconsequence.

There is nothing quite like it today. And yet there is a moral issue that today confronts every one of us and pervades the entire political and intellectual firmament.

That is the question of peace or war. We can no longer define war simply as a more forceful extension of diplomacy. Either war is going to cease or the human race will.

It is the issue that comes back to us, either in a whisper or a roar, from every discussion of politics or economics or culture or indeed existence itself.

So even in this respect our own time is not so very different from those critical decades of the forties and the fifties in which Abraham Lincoln passed most of his mature years.

Consider some of the problems of political principle and national morality with which Lincoln dealt in those years.

This is of interest for what they tell us of Lincoln, the man. Of interest, too, for what they tell us of ourselves, and of the problems that now confront us.

There was first of all the issue of the Mexican War.

President Polk and his administration defended the invasion of Mexican territory, on the ground of national interest—then known as manifest destiny. Our presence in Mexico, they claimed, was dictated by our national interest. To leave would be to imperil our strategic position in the Western Hemisphere.

Most of the intellectuals of the day left little doubt as to what they thought of that argument. Henry David Thoreau, in his customary outspoken way, declared, "The people must cease to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people." If Thoreau had been living today, he probably would have burned his draft card. As it was, he simply refused to pay taxes.

Lincoln did not support this position. As a Whig Member of Congress, he questioned

the wisdom and even the constitutionality of the war. But once it had begun, he supported its vigorous prosecution.

He did not, however, believe that the minority party in time of war should abdicate its responsibility to criticize.

Again and again, he questioned the assumptions on which the war was being carried on. He rejected the doctrine of national interest, at least in its simple form.

He insisted that the Nation's aims be defined in moral as well as in military terms.

During his own Presidency, Lincoln said it was not so important that God be on our side, as that we be on God's side. This conviction found its roots in his observation of the confused maneuvering of the Polk administration during the Mexican War.

Second, there was the issue of extremism on Lincoln's own side of the political spectrum.

The Whig Party never really got off the ground as an instrument of government in the United States. Although it elected two Presidents, it never captured the imagination of the American people and was unable to achieve a record of stable continuity in office.

By the 1850's, it was evident that something new was needed. The people were crying out for change, and the Whigs were unable to offer attractive or exciting change. For a few years, it seemed that know-nothingism might provide the answer.

The know-nothings were formed as a response to the growing tide of immigration from non-Anglo-Saxon countries to the United States. They had a very simple creed: If you are not like us in race and religion and national origin, we don't want you here.

They fed on fear—the fear of those who had achieved some measure of security toward those who were still struggling upward from the bottom of the ladder. They offered deceptively simple and brutal solutions to difficult social and economic problems.

They were, as we would now say, extremists.

Know-nothingism was a particularly difficult problem for Lincoln. He found many of his closest friends and political allies in the know-nothing movement. When he ran for the State legislature in 1854, he was offered the know-nothing endorsement. At first he hesitated to make his views known.

But he could not hesitate long. He was, after all, Lincoln.

The know-nothing party, he said, was "wrong in principle."

He wrote to his friend, Josh Speed:

"I am not a know-nothing; that is certain. How could I be? How can anyone who abhors the oppression of Negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? * * * When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy."

Lincoln dealt forthrightly with extremism. He said that it had no legitimate connection with true conservatism. He warned that conservatives who lent it a sympathetic ear would do ultimate damage to their cause.

Lincoln was proven right. Within a few years, the fever of know-nothingism had passed. If it had not been stubbornly opposed by men like Lincoln, the birth of the new Republican Party might have been long delayed or might never have taken place. Slavery would have dug itself ever more deeply into the national fabric. Conservatism would have been discredited, and would have been unable to play its necessary role in the development of our country.

The final great national problem with which Lincoln had to deal during his Springfield years was the formation of a new politi-

cal combination to take the place of the Democrats as the governing party.

The Democratic Party was wrecked by the issue of slavery. Constructed on the twin pillars of patronage and compromise, it failed to evade the moral issue.

Slavery would have to go, or the Nation would be torn asunder. The Democrats were unable to accept either alternative, and therefore collapsed.

The question remained: Who would take their place?

During the long period of Democratic supremacy, the minority party had two great leaders: Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, and Henry Clay, of Kentucky.

Both had an overpowering itch to become President, but neither ever made it. Both made many valuable contributions to our national development, but neither provided a satisfactory response to the fundamental moral issue of the time.

These two great leaders held different views on how the minority party should be converted into a stable governing combination.

Webster believed that his party should adhere to the business interest, and that it would eventually come to power as surely as day follows night. He is reputed to have said: "Let Congress take care of the rich, and the rich will take care of the poor."

The United States, he reasoned, was inevitably becoming a business civilization, and the party of business was sure to be the governing party within a very short time.

Henry Clay did not share his colleague's certainty on this point. Clay believed in the art of political maneuver.

"All legislation, all government, all society," he declared, "are founded upon the principle of mutual concession." In short: If you want to get along, go along.

Lincoln, although he admired both of the old Whig leaders, particularly Clay, in the end could agree with neither.

To Webster's contention that the conservative party should rest its cause on the business interest, Lincoln replied, "Republicans are for both the man and the dollar, but in case of conflict the man before the dollar."

Clay's argument he found more compelling. Henry Clay had been Lincoln's particular hero since the time of his first entrance into politics. Lincoln himself had spent his share of time in the political back rooms, and he knew that a man who is unwilling at the proper time to compromise is unable to govern.

But Lincoln did not believe that compromise alone could be made the basis for a political party.

In 1859, Lincoln said, "If we shall adopt a platform that fails to recognize or express our purpose * * * we not only take nothing by our success, but we tacitly admit that we act upon no other principle than a desire to have 'the loaves and fishes.'"

Lincoln knew that no successful political leader can afford to neglect "the loaves and fishes." In a democracy, they supply the indispensable motivation to command the loyalty of the party shock troops on election day. At the same time he knew that a party that relies on tangible rewards alone may win an election or two, but it will never win a generation.

With Emerson, Lincoln saw that the conservative party of his time "contained the best men." But with Emerson, too, he realized that the conservative party could never become the governing party so long as it was merely defensive, merely negative, untransformed by any overriding spirit of idealism.

It was just this act of transformation which Lincoln achieved within the new Republican Party.

For the first time since the days of the Founding Fathers, it was the conservative party that looked confidently toward the future. It was the conservative party that spoke up for the rights of man. It was the

conservative party that offered land to the dispossessed, liberty to those who were in chains, and the prospect of economic fulfillment to all.

The result of course is history. A new political party came to power and for the next 70 years remained the principal instrument of government in the United States.

It is entirely in the spirit of Lincoln that I conclude tonight with the suggestion that once again our country is in need of such an act of transformation.

The party that Lincoln helped to create is, now as then, the only available substitute for the current majority party.

I cannot, in all candor, tell you that an act of transformation has as yet taken place within the Republican Party.

But I believe that it will.

It will because it must.

The problems are too grave—the issues too serious—the prospect too glorious—for merely partisan maneuvering in 1966.

The minority will become the majority when it has seized the spirit of idealism that is latent within our people—when it has divested itself of any association with extremism—when it has offered real solutions to the real problems of our country.

I am a Republican—and I believe that is going to happen.

But more than that I am an American—and I believe that it has got to happen.

And if it does not, we will not have America.

WHO WILL HE SACRIFICE?

(Mr. GURNEY (at the request of Mr. HUTCHINSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. Speaker, the recent administration announcement that \$190.6 million would be cut from the aid to schools in federally impacted areas is a severe blow to education. The President tells us in one breath that he will spread our high standards of education to the world by the new worldwide war on poverty. Then with the next breath he says that he will cut a vitally important educational program here at home in half.

There was concern expressed for educational excellence in the state of the Union message, and grand new programs promised. But actions speak louder than all the speeches and the ringing phrases. I recall one phrase vividly—the President asked of those of us who believe in fiscal responsibility "Who will they sacrifice?"

I think it has become very clear who the President will sacrifice. He is asking us to sacrifice the schoolchildren who seek a good education to prepare them for a complex world. He is asking us to sacrifice education standards of the many towns and counties of this Nation where Federal installations have brought in a great influx of workers and their families. These people work, and often live, on tax-exempt land, for which the local government receives none of the taxes that other citizens must pay.

The Federal Government has a clear and well-established responsibility here for they are the cause of both the increase in schoolchildren and the loss of tax sources.

Two of the counties I represent in Florida are good examples of the pro-

ground—for automobile drivers and passengers, as well as trucks and buses.

Our colleague, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Mackay], a member of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, has gone into this problem very thoroughly and has proposed legislation to establish a National Traffic Safety Agency to provide national leadership to reduce traffic accident losses. I am introducing a similar bill.

The National Traffic Safety Agency, which would be headed by an Administrator comparable to the Federal Aviation Administrator, would do the following:

Establish a National Safety Research and Testing Center.

Provide leadership to achieve a more uniform traffic environment, including more uniform rules of the road, more adequate standards of safety in the manufacture of new vehicles and inspection of vehicles in use, better definition of fitness to drive, and a more uniform physical driving environment.

The proposed new agency should not seek to supplant existing public and private agencies, but it should provide aggressive leadership to achieve a concert of action.

It is my hope that the legislation will be enacted promptly so we can begin a real effort to reduce wanton destruction on our highways.

VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] is recognized for 1 hour.

(Mr. SELDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, the Nation in recent weeks has watched with great interest and concern the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in regard to our policy in southeast Asia.

Last week both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gen. Maxwell Taylor presented excellent arguments for a policy of firmness in dealing with the threat of communism in Vietnam. In view of the persistent carping of foreign policy soft liners, who would have this country retreat in the face of Communist aggression, it was most refreshing to hear the statements of experienced and knowledgeable spokesmen such as Secretary Rusk and General Taylor.

With regard to the recent Senate Foreign Relations hearings, I read with interest the accounts of testimony given to the committee by Mr. George Kennan. Mr. Kennan seems to argue that the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam has assumed exaggerated proportions and that this country should therefore limit or curb our efforts there.

Mr. Kennan, as we know, is credited as the creator of the original policy of containment which this country followed in its dealings with Soviet communism in Europe during the period immediately following World War II. Now it would appear that Mr. Kennan has evolved a latter-day policy of containment regard-

ing the U.S. commitment to defend southeast Asia from the threat of aggressive communism. But, unlike his first containment policy, the general thrust of his current advice is that in 1966 we should contain our own efforts in meeting Communist expansionism in southeast Asia.

Needless to say, Mr. Kennan's remarks received wide attention in the press and on television. It is unfortunate that the American public has not been given as great exposure to the facts, circumstances, and results of a meeting held in Havana last month—the so-called Tri-Continent Conference—which spelled out the future course of Communist aggression in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The recommendations and policy statements coming out of this Havana Conference represents a veritable "Mein Kampf" of international Communist designs and aims throughout the world in the 1960's and 1970's. And although the Soviet Union was represented by a 40-member delegation, it is well to note that the chief result of the January Havana Conference was to implement and foster the Chinese Communist thesis for eventual Communist seizure of power in countries aligned to the free world.

Critics of present U.S. policy in South Vietnam, such as Mr. Kennan, make much of the ideological split between the Soviet Union and China. It is, in fact, currently fashionable in some U.S. foreign policy circles to accuse those of us who speak of the threat of communism as being simplistic in our approach. We are told that we should differentiate between the so-called various forms of communism—whether we refer to Soviet or Chinese or even North Vietnamese communism.

Yet the unanimity which the delegates of the Havana Tri-Continent Conference demonstrated on the matter of waging Chinese-style wars of liberation throughout the world points up the futility—if not the real danger—of this polemic fragmentizing of communism in the world today.

It may be true that communism is no longer monolithic as it was in the immediate post-World War II era. But the threat of Communist expansion—and the Communist design for subversion and domination of countries of the free world—is monolithic and universal in every Communist capital.

Thus it was that the basic theme of the so-called Tri-Continent Conference in Havana—a theme repeated by Soviet and Chinese Communist spokesmen alike—was a strident call for war on all fronts against the free world.

As the Soviet delegate to the Conference, Sharif P. Rashidov, stated:

We are participating in a major event in the history of the national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The anti-imperialist struggle, with its demands for the unshakable unity of its fighting forces, has brought the peoples of our continents to a realization of the urgent necessity for an even greater consolidation, and an even greater coordination, of our struggle against our common enemy—imperialism and, first and foremost, U.S. imperialism.

The Soviet delegation earnestly appeals to

all the national organizations and their movements represented at this Conference to unite in the struggle for this great goal. Let our Conference be a new stage on this road. Let it multiply and strengthen the unity of our ranks, and impart new force to the liberation struggle throughout the world.

The resolutions approved by the Conference are in the same aggressive and militaristic vein. They call for an intensified campaign of subversion and political warfare against democratic regimes of the free world.

But the larger significance of the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana does not lie in the unified pronouncement of revolutionary aims among Communist nations. For only a fatuous self-delusion has ever persuaded the soft-line Kremlinologists of the free world that the Soviets and the Chinese alike seek Communist world domination, and by violent revolutionary means. They are as one, differing only on tactics, and timetable, and those who doubt this fact should be furnished the record of the Havana Conference as required reading.

No, the truly alarming significance of the Havana Conference last month stems from the scope and nature of participation by nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—many of which, while purporting to be "neutralist" as between Communist and the free world, in fact are providing political and other support to the revolutionary and subversive aims of Communist bloc nations.

Indeed, all the speeches, resolutions, and actions of the delegates of the 82 nations represented at the Conference were geared to the propaganda needs and aims of aggressive international communism. In fact, the Tri-Continent Conference went much further than any similar meeting in recent years in spelling out the aggressive designs of world Communist leadership toward nations of the free world.

As chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs I am especially concerned with the serious implications of the Conference as regards our vital national interests and commitments to the defense of the hemisphere.

The Organization of American States expressed its alarm regarding the Havana Conference in a resolution of condemnation, approved February 2, 1966, with Mexico and Chile abstaining.

The OAS resolution reflects hemispheric concern regarding the possibility of new attempts of Communist takeovers in a number of countries, including Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Uruguay. And the Tri-Continent Conference itself serves to reemphasize the appropriateness of House Resolution 560, which only last year expressed the sense of the House regarding the need for firm U.S. policy to meet the threat of Communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere. In the light of last month's meeting in Havana, that resolution is even more pertinent today than when it was passed by an overwhelming majority of the House in September 1965.

So-called neutral, unaligned countries, with delegates participating at the Havana meeting, would do well to ponder the significance of this House resolu-

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I'm sure is in the files you mention as being before the Supreme Court was a cartoon which appeared on page 1. It showed a number of civic officials and others holding up a sheet and the caption said that somebody was hiding something. The top of the head of a man showed above the sheet and it certainly looked to me like the top of Dr. Sam's head.

"At about this time the Cleveland police were called into the case. They worked carefully and energetically but apparently too late and I don't recall that they turned up any really clinching evidence.

"Finally, the city attorney at Bay Village, the son of an Ohio Supreme Court justice, signed the charge himself and Dr. Sam was arrested and taken to jail in Cleveland. Police there were unable to question him at any great length because his attorney kept requesting to see him, hinting third degree.

"In the end the jury found Dr. Sam guilty of second degree murder.

"Certainly, the trial was a Roman holiday."

"The book of clippings won a reversal and freedom for Dr. Sam last year, but the reversal was itself reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Ohio when it said: 'Our jury system cannot survive if it is now proper to presume that jurors selected with the care taken in this case, are without intelligence, courage, and integrity necessary to their obedience to the law's command that they ignore the kind of publicity here involved.'"

Four Supreme Court Judges believe that a constitutional question is involved—and this may intensify the press-bar conflict particularly if it disturbs the status quo on contempt.

The landmark cases protecting both individual and press, from punishment for contempt, have thus far concerned prejudicial publication as it concerned judges only. The Pennekamp, Bridges, Los Angeles Times-Mirror cases and others brought about the "clear and present danger" concept—that a constructive contempt, away from the immediate presence of the court, would not be punished unless it could be shown that a clear and present danger existed to the administration of justice. The theory is that judges would not be so endangered because, forsooth, they are judges.

Yet, judges have been throwing newspapermen in jail for generations.

Ralph Conley is a 53-year-old reporter for the Wheeling, W. Va., Intelligencer. He is a 10-year veteran with that paper, and a 25-year senior in newspaper work. He was assigned to cover the New Martinsville area.

On Saturday, January 15 of this year he wrote a story listing five civil actions which had been set for trial on Tuesday, January 18 in the Wetzel County Circuit Court by Judge Lloyd Arnold. After listing them he wrote this:

"Probably the most interesting case is that of Mrs. Frances Ripley versus the city of Paden City.

"Mrs. Ripley, a resident of Paden City, and wife of Leo Ripley, fell into an open sidewalk grating on January 22, 1965, and seeks recovery of damages for \$24,000.

"In her petition, she claims permanent injury and that the fall resulted in a compound fracture of her left leg, and other injuries.

"The city carries a \$100,000 liability insurance policy and the city council acknowledged fault and recommended in a letter to the insurance carrier that the claim be paid. However, no payment has been received and the suit followed.

"Attorney Jack Hawkins represents the plaintiff, and Hassig & Snyder are attorneys for the defendant."

On Monday, January 17 Judge Arnold sent an officer to ask Conley to come to his office. At the conclusion of the interview and after Conley left, the judge prepared a rule of contempt directed to Conley. It was served on Conley that morning.

A courtroom hearing before Judge Arnold was scheduled at 2 p.m. the same day.

Judge Arnold concluded the hearing by finding that publication of the news story obstructed and impeded the operation of his court and that accordingly Conley was in contempt. The judge sentenced him to 5 days in jail, fined him \$10 and ordered the sheriff to place him in jail immediately.

Attorneys for Conley appeared before Judge Arnold the next morning and orally moved that the judgment of contempt be set aside, that a new hearing be awarded, and that Conley be discharged from jail. Arguments on these motions were heard at 1 p.m. Tuesday. The attorneys submitted four grounds for the motion, including the first amendment, and the judge overruled the motions. Thereon the attorneys for Conley moved for a stay of the proceedings in order that they might appeal the judge's decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The judge granted a 60-day stay, setting bond in the amount of \$50. Conley was subsequently released after 24 hours in jail, and went back to work.

The case is pending.

The city council action was a matter of record.

Then there was the 1964 case of Will Harrison, a 50-year-old columnist for the New Mexican, 14,000 circulation, published at Santa Fe. He presumed to make an adverse comparison of two drunk driving cases before a Santa Fe judge.

In one case, a Mexican-American boy tilled up on wine, had an auto accident and killed three persons. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for 1 to 5 years.

In the other case, a former assistant district attorney wiped out a family of five while driving under the influence, but was given a \$500 fine, the fine was suspended and the judge announced that at the end of the year he would pronounce further sentence. Will Harrison cried "outrage" and was convicted for contempt of court on the grounds that the lawyer defendant was still on probation, thus the case was still before the court.

Will Harrison died a couple of months ago, and he was, in my opinion, an unsung hero. He had been vindicated by the State Supreme Court October 4, 1965, on the grounds that no clear and present danger to the administration of justice had been shown.

But when you study constructive contempt, think about this one: In December, 1965, in Montgomery, Ala., three Ku Klux Klansmen were convicted of criminal conspiracy charges in the death of a civil rights worker. She was Viola Liuzzo, a Detroit housewife.

The judge held the jury in deliberation for 11 hours over the protest of the defense attorney, and the defense attorney announced that an appeal would be filed and bond for three men was set at \$10,000 cash.

Whereupon the President of the United States said: "The whole Nation can take heart from the fact that there are those in the South who believe in justice in racial matters and were determined not to stand for acts of violence."

Many of us joined him in cheering that verdict in a great national example of constructive contempt of court for commenting on a case still in the process of adjudication.

Where was the voice of the bar when that transpired?

And where was the self-restraint of the press?

Both were lacking, and both must be sup-

plied before we know whether we should be talking about fair trial and free press or fair trial versus free press.

Wiggins said it in 1964: "Newspapers, judges, and lawyers alike ought to try to improve the reporting of criminal trials. What is needed is more and better crime reporting, not less of it."

Burch said it in 1955: "It is the newspaper's duty to print the facts not to try them. That is the duty of the courts. We want every defendant to have the benefit of due process—the whole treatment, with all the trimmings. But we see too much of the undue processes that help armies of dangerous malefactors to escape conviction, indictment, or even arrest."

Vermont Royster said it in 1965: "Here the lesson experience, a thousand years of experience, was that the judicial process must be open to inspection from its beginning to its end, to the purpose that all should lie under the public gaze so that if error could not be obviated it could at least not be hidden. One instrument for this was the open court with the accused and the accusers openly confronted. Another instrument was the open press, so that nothing could be hidden from the first accusation to final judgment. The lesson of the common law was that the two were not irreconcilable, they were mutually dependent."

Today it is necessary to recognize that the hunt for the uninformed juror is fruitless, and that our reliance on the integrity of our peers is not misplaced. That is the nub of the problem, and it will not be solved by speculation; rather by careful research.

TRAFFIC SAFETY—ACTION NEEDED NOW

(Mrs. BOLTON (at the request of Mr. HUTCHINSON) was granted permission to extend her remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Speaker, the National Trial Lawyers Association predicted recently that unless the Federal Government does something soon, deaths from motor vehicle accidents will reach 100,000 a year by 1975—double the present auto death rate.

The report of this same group of lawyers noted that while 605,000 Americans have died in all wars from the Revolution to Vietnam, road deaths in the United States have totaled 1,500,000 in only 25 years. The study revealed that the number of persons injured in highway accidents in 1964 is the same number as the total beds in all hospitals in the United States—1,700,000. These are shocking figures.

I have thought for sometime that we should take steps at the national level to standardize highway signs, speeds, and so forth, in an effort to cut this needless death, injury, and destruction on our highways. Although the Federal Government has spent millions building interstate highways, we have done little or nothing at the national level to prescribe and enforce safety standards. Several years ago, when we became alarmed at the increase in accidents involving airliners, we established the Federal Aviation Agency to coordinate and improve safety in the air. Now we should establish an agency to improve safety on the

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tion. It must be made abundantly clear, not only to Communist nations, but to others which seek to advance their own interest by lending themselves to Communist aims, that the United States does not intend to remain inactive in the face of any external threat to the security of the Americas.

While I am reasonably certain few, if any, nations will admit that participants at the Havana meeting were official delegates of their governments, the fact that some of the delegates even at this moment hold official positions in their respective governments is shocking indeed.

For example, the Syrian delegation included Mohammad Ali Al Khatib, Secretary General of that country's Ministry of Information. Attending as an invited guest was Mohamed Fayed from the United Arab Republic who is Director of the African Affairs at the Presidency.

African countries were well represented by official members of their governments. Tanzania sent Salim Said Rasuid, the Deputy Finance Minister. The head of Guinea's delegation was Abdoulaye Diallo, Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and also included the Guinean Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, Fode Cisse. Ghana was represented by Ofori Bah-Emmanuel, Director of that country's Bureau of African Affairs; and Pauline Mirande Clerk, Office of the President of Ghana. Lakhdar Brahimi, representing Algeria, is that country's Ambassador to the United Arab Republic.

Since many of the nations which were represented at the Havana Conference have been and are now receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. aid, I have written to the Secretary of State with the request that he determine the status of the delegations to the Havana meeting. I also asked the Secretary to give consideration to the termination of U.S. assistance to those nations who participated with official or semi-official delegations in accordance with section 620(i) of the Foreign Assistance Act. This provision of that act prohibits assistance under this or any other act, including sales under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, to any countries which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts directed against the United States or to any countries receiving assistance from the United States.

The proceedings at last month's Tri-Continent Conference made a prima facie case regarding preparations for such aggression.

It would seem, therefore, that a State Department investigation is in order to determine, at the very least, whether U.S. economic aid should not be terminated to certain nations which were represented at the Havana meeting.

Immediately following my statement, I am attaching a full list of delegates in attendance at the January Havana meeting, as reported by the Cuban press.

Mr. Speaker, the Tri-Continent Conference clearly established that what is occurring in Vietnam is not simply localized Communist aggression, but is merely one front in a worldwide campaign against the free world.

American defeat, withdrawal or abandonment of Vietnam would not simply, as some have phrased it, roll back our Pacific front line to Wakiki. The roll-back would be to the Andes, and beyond, for Ho Chi Minh's battle plan in Vietnam is a blueprint, approved both in Moscow and Peiping, for subversive wars of aggression in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Once again we have been warned by our enemy. The United States and the free world will overlook or dismiss the Communist "Mein Kampf," as spelled out at the recent Havana Tri-Continent Conference, at its peril and the peril of future generations.

The following schedule shows in detail the delegates, observers, guests, and foreign press from the various countries. The data was compiled by Cuban authorities from the actual registration sheets. Delegates from 63 countries and 19 protectorates, commonwealths or colonies were in attendance.

List of accredited participants up to Jan. 10, 1966, "Year of Solidarity," 1st Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America

	Countries, protectorates, and colonies	Organizations	Accredited
Delegates:			
Africa.....	28	29	150
Asia.....	27	27	197
Latin America.....	27	27	165
Total.....	82	83	512
Observers:			
International organizations.....		5	24
Afro-Asiatic organizations.....		3	7
African organizations.....		3	8
Asiatic organizations.....		3	5
Socialist countries.....		7	20
Total.....		21	64
Guests:			
Foreign.....	23		50
Cubans.....	1		27
Total.....	24		77
Foreign press.....	38	95	129
Total accredited participants.....			782

DELEGATES TO THE FIRST SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE OF THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA, JANUARY 1966

Raúl Roa García, President.
Youssef El Sebal, Secretary-General.
John Kofitettegah, Vice President.
Pedro Medina Silva, Vice President.
Tien Nguyen Van, Vice President.

SOUTH AFRICA

South African National Congress (9): Alfred Dhliza Kgekong (Presidente), Reginald September, Yusuf Mohamed Dadoo, Mzimkulu Ambrose Makiwane (SP), Thomas Titus Nkobi, Robert Resha, Joyce Judith Mbonwa (S.F.), Marie Muthoo Prágalthan Naicker, Meinrad Hsimang.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

South West Africa National Union (2): Jariretundu Kozongulzi (Presidente), Moses K. Katjluongua.

ANGOLA

Angolan Popular Liberation Movement (8):

Lulz Andrade de Acevedo (Presidente), Miguel Baya Antonio (S.P.), Luis de Almeida, Paulo Teixeira Jorge, Spencer Nicolau, José

César Augusto, Daniel Da Costa García, Mario de Andrade.

ALGERIA

Algerian Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (7):

Lakhdar Brahimi (Presidente), Hamid Bencherchali, Adda Benguetat, Mohamed Harieche, Ahmed Zemirline, Mohamed Meghraoui, Abdelkrim Ghorailb.

ARGENTINA

National Committee for the Peoples Conference of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (7):

John William Cooke (Presidente), Alcira de la Peña, Carlos Alberto Lafforgue, Jorge Ruben Queijo, Juan Antonio Sander, Abel Alexis Latendokf, José Gabbriel Vazeilles Ullua.

BASUTOLAND

Basutoland Congress Party (3): Gerd Ramoreboli (Presidente), Koenyama Chakela, Ramagele Tsinyana.

BECHUANALAND

Bechuanaland Peoples Party (2): Peter Dick Marciping (Presidente), Bobby Mack.

BOLIVIA

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (3): Mario Miranda Pacheco (Presidente), Gabriel Porcel Salazar, Mario Monje.

BRAZIL

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (7): Alvizio Palhano Pedreira Ferreira (Presidente), Marcos Santos, Carlos Tavares, Celso Ridan Barcelos, Iván Ramos Ribeiro, Francisco Santilli, Alexina Lins Crespo de Paula.

BURUNDI

Burundi Workers Federation (1): Nicodeme Bigirama (Presidente).

CAMBODIA

Cambodian Afro-Asian Solidarity (5): Hout Sambath (Presidente), Un Samuth, Vutthi Thoutch, Kiv Moeng, Suncheng Sunthor.

COLOMBIA

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (6): Diego Montaña Cuellar (Presidente), Inés Pinto Escobar, Santiago Solarte, Camilo Losada Campos, Baltasar Fernández Alvarez, Teodosio Varela Acosta.

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

National Revolutionary Committee of the Congo (4): Julien Boukambou (Presidente), Gustavo Aba Gandzlon, Henriette Yimbou, Dominique Ntamba.

CONGO (LÉOPOLDVILLE)

Congo National Liberation Council (11): Gabriel Yumbu (Presidente), Nkumu Camile, Kaputula Bernabette, Kitungo Flacide, Ramazani Sebastian, Malanda Henriette, Mongali Michel, Eduard Marcel Sambu, Buka Masaku, Martin Brobey, John Ali.

KOREA

Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (8): Wal Lyong Kim (Presidente), Zi Sun Jon, Cheng Nam Kim, Ryon Yul Kim, Yu Yui Li, Yung Kun Kim, Te Jion Chon, and Ryung Chul Jun.

COSTA RICA

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (3): Arnaldo Ferreto (Presidente), Hernán Monterrosa López, and Luisa González Gutiérrez.

CUBA

Communist Party of Cuba (41): Osmany Cienfuegos (Presidente), Raúl Roa, Manuel Piñeiro, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Miguel Martín, José Alberto Naranjo, Leonel Soto, Haydeé Santamaría, Jesús Montané Oropesa, Lázaro Peña, José Matar, José Ramírez, Carlos Lechuga, Pelegrín Torres, Arnol Rodríguez,

Juan Mier Febles, Melba Hernández, Giraldo Mazola, Eugenio R. Balari, Joaquín Más, Lázaro Mora, Eduardo Delgado, Ramón Sánchez Parodi, Carlos Alfara, Ricardo Alarcón, Fernando Alvarez Tabio, Mario García Incháustegui, Raúl Valdés Vivó, Antonio Carrillo, Jorge Serguera, Armando Entralgo, Luis García Guitarr, Oscar Oramas, José Venegas, Rafael Fernández Moya, Luis García Peraza, Francisco Valdés, Arquimides Columbié, Silvio Rivera, Roberto Valdés, and Alfredo Guevara.

CHILE

CHILE (FRAP)

Popular Action Front (9): Salvador Allende (President), Waldo Atlas Martín, Clodomiro Alcayda Medina, Elena Pedraza, Luis Figueroa, Manuel Rojas, Walterio Plerro, Jorge Monte Morago, Oscar Núñez Bravo.

CHINA

Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (34): Wu Hsueh Tsien (President), Tien Min Kuo, Su Tien Yang, Ming Sin Tang, Chan An You, Yao Yao Ching Jung, So Yang (S.P.), Keng Liang (S.P.), Ta Nei Tsien, Bul Jua Hsu, Wu Hasu Shang, Yi Cheng Jung, Ning Chuan Tung, Tien Hui Chen, Yuan Hung Tao, Yang Pai Ping, Tsien Li Jen, Wuann Chen Sheng, Chen Tze Yin, Chang Chieh Hsuan, Chen Yu, Chen Chuan Liao, Chu Tzu Chi, Run Ho Niem, Chang Lin Yu, Tang Hai Yeh, Yu Ying Liu, Fei Yi Li, Chi Fan Wuang, Shen Yi, Chen Sheng Huang, Shou Pae Li, Yun Chun Li, Chen Lo Min.

CYPRUS

Cyprus Solidarity Committee (3): Christoforos Christofides (President), Joseph Yarmakis, Georgios Savyides.

ECUADOR

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (2): Carlos Ramirez Ortiz (President), Teodile Aray.

EL SALVADOR

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (2): Sergio Pérez (President), Pedro Martínez.

GHANA

Convention of the Peoples Party (15): John Kottetegah (President), Nathaniel Azarco Welbeck, Winfre Asare Brown, Yan Manu, Kon Bondzie Brown, Pauline Miranda Clerk, George Awonor Williams, Ofory-Bah Emmanuel, Patrick Ofel Henanleu, Kofi Batsa, Charles L. Patterson, Dr. Ekow Daniels, Kwamina Arku-Nelson (S.P.), Cecil Mc. Hardy, Anthony Korsah Dick.

GUADALUPE

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (4): Gerard Olivier (President), Guy Daninthe, Aude Daniel Rene, Michel Numa.

GUATEMALA

Rebel Armed Forces (5): Luis Augusto Turcios Lima (President), Gustavo Solares Ortiz, René Cordon, Orlando Fernández Ruiz, Francisco Marroquih.

BRITISH GUIANA

Popular Progressive Party (3): Cheddi Jagan (President), Lal Bahadur, Joseph Rodriguez.

FRENCH GUIANA

Guianan Committee of Solidarity to the First Tri-Continental Conference (3): Regine Prevot (President), Jean Marie Robo, Georges Giffard.

GUINEA

Democratic Party of Guinea (7): Abdoulaye Diallo (President), Fodé Cissé (S.P.), Mamady Mohamed Sakho, Mami Kouyate, Ibrahima Kourouma, Fanta Conde, Jean Baptiste Deen.

PORTUGUESE GUINEA

African Independence Party (5): Amílcar Cabral (President), Vasco Cabral, Pedro Pires, Domingo Ramos, Joaquim Pedro Da Silva.

HAITI

Unified Democratic Front of National Liberation (5): Paul Lantimo (President), Jacques Lacour, Pigeon Volage, Leslie Jean, Edmond Pierre.

HONDURAS

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (3): Ricardo Moncada Zavala (President), Raul Parra, Longino Vidal Berra.

INDIA

Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity (14): Aruna Asaf Ali (President), Nalam Narasinha Rao, Homi F. Daji Homi, Prabhakar Menon, Jagannath Sharma, Ladli Saran Shinhia, Sat Tandon, Harbans Singh, Balrat Mehta, Chatur Nadain Malviya (SP), Avloor Shiriniwas Chari, Mohammad Kelimullah, Noor Mohamed, Chandra Sekhar.

INDONESIA

Solidarity Association of the Afro-Asian Peoples (9): Ibrahim Isa (President) (SP), Francisca Fanggidaej, Willy Hariandia, Umar Said, Suhardjo, Soedhartono, Edy Soenardji, Sugiri, Margono.

IRAN

Iranian Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (2): Amir Halamou Amir Dihadj Torkestani (President), Rahaman Nader Zehtab.

IRAQ

Iraqi Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (1): Aboul Wahab Sallom (President) (SP).

MAURITIUS

Progressive Party of the Mauritian People (1): Teckaram Sibsurun (President).

ST. THOMAS AND PRINCE ISLANDS

Committee for the Liberation of St. Thomas and Prince (1): Antonio Barreto Pires Dos Santos (President).

JAMAICA

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (2): Dennis Daly (President), Roy Jeffrey Adaiphus.

JAPAN

Japanese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (10): Shizuma Kai (President), Hiroshi Ide, Toshio Tanaka, Mitsuhiko Kaneko, Masae Kitazawa (SP), Susumu Ozaki, Shesaku Itai, Yoro Ohno, Akira Nishina, Yoko Kitazawa (SF).

JORDAN

Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Jordan (1): Shafik Shafik (President).

NORTH KALIMATAN

Organization of North Kalimantan for the Solidarity of the People of Afro-Asian, Indonesia (5): Ahmad Zaidi Adruce (President), Muhammad Jais Abbas, Muhammad Kasin, Dus Tan Chon, Ahmad Mohtar.

KENYA

Kenya African National Union (3): John Mbiyo Njonjo (President), James Robaro Heuwallan, Ernest Gitu Muni.

LAOS

New Lao Hak Sat (5): Phoumi Vongvichit (President), Soulivong Phrasithideth, Phouthasack Khanleek, Thamavangsay Boun Nhum, Khamphay Boupba.

LEBANON

Socialist Progressive Party (4): Farid Gebrane (President), George Sulim Batal, Mouhamed Kechll, Georges Haoui.

MALAYA

People's Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee for Malaya (3): Lee Siew Choh (President), Abdul Rahim Karim, Chia Thye Poh.

MARTINIQUE

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (2): Edouard De Lepine (President), Marcel Manville.

MOROCCO

National Union of Popular Forces (3): Hamid Barrada (President), Mohamed Habib Sinaceur, Mohamed Horma Bahi.

MEXICO

National Liberation Movement (6): Heberto Castillo (President), Armando Castillejos Ortiz, Manuel Mesa Andraca, María Antonieta Rascón Córdoba, Antonio Tenorio Adame, Salvador Bojorquez.

MONGOLIA

Mongolian Afro-Asiatic Committee for Solidarity (7): Chadraval Lodoidamba (President), Nauzad Bayarju, Damba Dulamyn, Pountsag Berentsodol, Narhoo Tsoiglyn, Namsarain Sodnon, Badamtar B. Baldo.

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique Liberation Front (6): Marcelino Dos Santos (President), Eugenio Machado, Mariano Natsinha, Pascoal Nhapulo, Josina Mariatar Muthemba, Madalena Jingo Juvangire.

NEPAL

Afro-Asiatic Solidarity Committee (1): Poorna Bahadur (President).

NICARAGUA

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (3): Pedro Ruiz (President), José Pedro Rivera, José López Rivera.

NIGER

Sawaba Party (1): Abdculaye Mamani (President).

NIGERIA

Congress of Youth of Nigeria. Socialist Peasants and Workers Party of Nigeria (4): Wahab Omotilewa Goodluck (President), Salomón Olaleye Fagbo, Elías Dupe Fadipe, Johnson Ebohom.

OMAN

Oficina de Omán (Oman Office) (1): Faisal Faisal (President).

PAKISTAN

Committee for Solidarity of the Afro-Asian Peoples (7): Maulana Aboul Hamid Khan Bhasani (president), Itaz Husain, Arif Iftirhar, Qamaruz Saman Shah, Shauka Khan, A. T. M. Mustafa, Miraj Khallo.

PALESTINE

Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (5): Ibrahim Abu Sitta (President), Husni Khuffash Saleh, Zuhair Rayyis, Abdul Karim. Al Karmi, Sala Heddin Dabbagh.

PANAMA

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (4): Jorge Turner Morales (president), Francisco Gutiérrez, Roberto Madariaga Montes, Floyd Britton.

PARAGUAY

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (5): Carlos Valenzuela (president), Héctor Gutiérrez, Jacinto Correa, Juan Carlos Arza, Angel Gómez.

ARABIAN PENINSULA

Socialist Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula (1): Ahmad Jamaluddin Abdulla (president).

PERU

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (8): Roberto García Urrutia (president), Jesús Masa Paredes, Alberto Ramírez, Jaime Venegas Romero, Armanal Pérez Carlo, Elizardo Sánchez Lomba, Freddy Eyzaguirre Luque, Jorge Altoriga Campos.

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PUERTO RICO

Pro-independence Movement (4): Norman Pietri Castellon (president), Ana Livia Cordero, José Luis González Coiscoco, Narciso Rabell Martínez.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Youssef El Sebal (SG OSPAA), Mohamed Kaml Bahaa Eddin (ASG OSPAA), Morsi Saad Eddin (ASG, OSPAA).

AFRO ASIAN

Solidarity Committee (Arab Socialist Union) (21): Khaled Mohieddin (President), Sohair El Calamawy, Amina Ahmed El Said, Ezz El Din Ali Moustafa, Rifaat El Mahgoub, Bahja Karam, Mohamed Diab, Sekina Sadat, Ahmed Mukhtar Kobb, Ragua Rami El Kholy, Samiha Taher Moustafa, Ahmed Reda Mohamed Khalifa, Shebl Hefez Mohame Shalaby, Mohamed Wafaey Shulkamy, Mohamed Owda, Hoda Tawfik, Louis Grace, Anis Mansour, Edward K. F. El Kharat, Salah El Sayed, Hussain Rizk.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (5): Guido Rafael Gil Diaz (President), Asdrubal Dominguez Guerrero, Euclides Gutiérrez Félix, Ceyetano A. Rodriguez del Prado, Carlos M. Amlama Martínez.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NORTH VIETNAM

Solidarity Committee for Afro Asiatic (10): Tuyen Tran Danh (President), Nguyen Duy Tinh, Tuong Tran Cong, Le Nguyen Than, Coi Nguyen La, Bun Le Quang, Thang Dang Thi, Phan Truong Si, Doan Dinh Ca, Nguyen Dinhh Bln.

RUANDA

National Union Ruanda Burundi (2): Francois Rubeka (President), Nelson Rwagasure.

SENEGAL

African Independence Party (3): Mamadou Keita (President), Thierno Amath Dansoko, N'Diongue Babacar.

SYRIA

Afro-Asiatic Solidarity Committee (8): Moudaf Haffar (President), Morris Salibi, Mohammad Ali Al Khatib, Moustapha Amine, Rifal Nouri Mohamed, Mohammad Zouhdi Nashashibi, Ali El Khalil, Joubran Majdalan.

FRENCH SOMALILAND

Popular Movement Party (1): Ahmed Mobarak Mobarak.

SWAZILAND

Swaziland Progressive Party (2): Dingame Dominic Cain Nxumalo (President), Ephraim Mbhele.

SUDAN

Democratic Peoples Party (5): Aly Abdel Rahman (President), Yousif Bushara, Bilghies Ahmed, Ali Osman, Shazali Amin Shazali.

THAILAND

Thailand Patriotic Front (3): Bhayome Chulanond (President), Suchart Bhumi-morirak, Sid Hichai Songkaraksa.

TANZANIA

Tanganyika African National Union (6): Salim Rasuid (President), Amanas Swai (S.P.), Muhammad Ali Foum, Lugo Taguaba, Ali Hahfudh, Abdulla Said Netepe.

TRINIDAD-TOBAGO

National Committee for the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (2): George Weekes (President), George Bowrin.

UGANDA

Uganda Peoples Congress (5): Yomasani Kanyomozzi (President), Ally Muwabe Klrunda Kivejinja, Raiti Omongin, Khabid Younis Kinene, Henry Nyakalru.

U.S.S.R.

Soviet Committee for Afro-Asiatic Solidarity (40): Sharaf Rashidov (President), Anatoli Sofronov, Dimitri Gorbachev, Boris Gorbachev, Vladimir Judintsev, Rodolfo Chlapnikov, Yans Vladimireki, Timur Gaidar, Natalia Berejnala, Alexey Mayevsky, Latif Maksoudov (S.P.), Bahadur Abduzazakov, Chakhan Tiouleubekov, Vladimir Yarovoi, Mirzo Tursun Zade, Zinaida Federoza, Rasul Gamsatov, Fikriat Tabeiv, Dmitri Shevliagin, Mikhail Kossykh, Karan Gousseinov, Bijamal Ramazanov, Tchengis Aitmatov, Zoulekha Gousseinovna, Grigori Lovchine, Vladimir Kokkotal, Tchermyshev Vlatsheslav, Sima Panich, Nikolai Basanov, Veniamin Midtsev, Spartak Tsissanov, Richat Koudachev, Jouri Bochkarev, Riourik Beleroutchev, Victor Boukharkov, Valeri Soukhine, Arnold Dobkine, Mikhail Kovalev, Valeri Jikharev, Petr Nicolaev.

URUGUAY

Leftist Liberation Front (6): Luis Pedro Bonavita Salguero (President), Cesar Reyes Daglio, Blanca Silva Collazo Odriozola, Edmundo Soares Netto, Rodney Arismendi, and Luis Echave Zas.

VENEZUELA

National Liberation Front (15): Pedro Medina Silva (President), Gilberto López, Rosendo Menéndez Luz, Ciro Rodríguez, Atencio Manrique, Jerónimo Carrera, José Vicente Abrou, Héctor Marciano Coello, Héctor Pérez Marciano, Omar Cárdenas, Moisés Moleiro, Oswaldo Barreto, Jorge Rubio, Ali González, Adolfo Gañango.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Afro-Asiatic Solidarity Committee (7): Tien Nguyen Van (President), Tran Van Tu, Kin Nguyen H Dang, Van Sau Ly, Cao Le Thi, Anh Trinn Van, Ba Nguyen Ngoc.

YEMEN

Afro-Asiatic Solidarity Committee of Yemen (1): Abdullah Al-Alawi (President).

SOUTH YEMEN (ADEN)

National Liberation Front of Occupied South Yemen (2): Saif A. S. Dhalee (President), Jaffer Ali Awadh.

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (9): Edward Nodlovu (President), Ethan Allen Dube, David Mpongo, Charles Tarehwa Madondo, Amos Nguenya, Arthur Musuka, Charles Chikerema, Nolada Moshe Noko, Nelson T. C. Samkange.

Total number of delegates from 82 countries is 512.

OBSERVERS TO CONFERENCE (ORGANIZATION AND NAMES OF OBSERVERS)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

World Peace Council (9): Enrique Lister, Alfredo M. P. Valera, Omprakash Pallwal, Francis Boaten, Juan Marinello, Angel Dominguez Santamaria, William Gollan, Oldrich Belic, Lucio Mario Luzzatto.

International Federation of Democratic Women (3): Florence Mephoshe, Helga Dickell, Vilma Espín.

World Federation of Democratic Youth (3): Eulogio Rodríguez Millares, Ctibor Citek, Rodolfo Mecnini.

International Student Union (5): Tran Van An, Kwamena Ocran, Zbynek Vokrovlicky, Félix Rodríguez, Cándido Domínguez García.

World Syndacal Federation (4): Satish Chatterjee, Mark Shope, José Bustos, Renato Bitossi.

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Albania

Albanian Committee of Solidarity With the People of Africa and Asia (4): Foto Cami, Sotir Kambori, Falk Zanelli, Sezai Shyti.

Bulgaria

Committee of Afro-Asiatic Solidarity (2): Zidravke Mitovski, Elena Gavrilova.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakian Committee of Solidarity With the People of Africa and Asia (2): Antonin Vavrus, Vladimir Simek.

Hungary

Hungarian Solidarity Committee With All the Peoples which Fight for Independence (2): Andras Tardos, Eva Koltai.

Poland

Solidarity Committee With the People of Africa and Asia (2): Wladyslaw Sliwka, Josef Kulesza.

German Democratic Republic

Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic Republic (7): Horst Max Brash, Edmund Rodner, Heinrich Eggebrecht, Heinz Joswig, Siglinde Arkerman, Freidel Trappan, Heinz Schmidt.

Rumania

Rumanian League of Friendship With the Peoples of Asia and Africa (1): Mircea Radulescu.

AFRO-ASIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Conference of Afro-Asian Jurists (4): Shih Sheng Chao, Hsien Wang, Fadiala Keita, Wijanto.

Permanent Bureau of Afro-Asian Writers (2): Nihal Lakshaman Rathapala, Karunasena Jayalath.

Afro-Asian Journalists Conference (1): Dharmasena Manuweera.

AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

South West Africa Peoples Organization (4): Peter Mueshange, Andreas Shipanga, Ewald Katjivena, Emil Appolus.

Zimbabwe African National Union (3): King David Mutasa, Simpson Victor Mtambanengwe, Augustine Monbeshora.

African Syndical Federation (1): Prosper Akanni.

ASIATIC ORGANIZATIONS

Council Against the Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (1): Masahuru Hatanaka.

Asian Economic Bureau (8): Samuel Diaz Bandaranaike, Theja Gunawardhana, Packeer Mohideen.

Peace Commission of Asia and the Pacific (1): Victor James.

THOSE INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE

Argentina: Miguel Angel Rubinich.
Bolivia: Juan Carlos Lazcano.
Brazil: Félix Athayde.
Cambodia: Helene Thoutch Vuttni.
Colombia: Marco Tulio Rodríguez Martínez, Jorge Zalamea Borda.
Congo (Brazzaville): Auguste Mahoungou, Alice Mahoungou.

Cuba: Antero Regalado Fallón, Zenén Buergo, Reinaldo Calviac, Pedro Montalván, Asela de los Santos, Radamés Mancebo, Aleida March, Juan José León, Dora Calcaño, Francisco Dorticos Baier, Orlando Rosabal Llanes, Oscar Domenech, Lupe Véliz, Leopoldo Ariza, Enrique Velazco López, Félix Sautié Mederos, Roberto Ogando Faz, Gloria Aguilera, Calixto Morales, Alejo Carpentier, Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Rolando Cubelas, Nicolás Guillén, Salvador Vilaseca, Jaime Crombet, Justo Guerra, Agapito Figueroa.

Czechoslovakia: Jiri Melsner.
Chile: Juliana Rojas, Luis Eduardo Larbarca Goddard, Gonzalo Rojas Pizarón.

Dahomey: Codjo Azodogbehov.

United States of America: Robert Williams, Rick Rhoads.

France: León Feix, Josephine Baker, Yves Fernand Moreau, Régis Jules Debray, Madam Voisin.

Guatemala: Aurora Benitez.

England: Osmon Blackburn, Jack Woddis.

Italy: Alberto Moravia, Dacia Maraini, Joyce Lussu.

Mexico: Rafael Estrada Villa, Blanca Muñoz Cota de Tenorio, Adalberto Pliego Galicia, Alberto Orduña Culebro, Louis T. Córdova Alvelais, Gilberto Ramón Gallarde, Manuel Stephens García, Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, Arturo Orona, Manuel Terrazas Guerrero.

Paraguay: José Asunción Flores, Elvio Romero.

Peru: Hilda Gadea Acosta, Mario Vargas Llosa, Patricia Llosa de Vargas.

Puerto Rico: Halina Linger de Rabell.

United Arab Republic: Mohamed Fayed, Nadia Sulhcar Salvi.

Tanzania: Lidia Foun.

U.S.S.R.: Jursand Rashidova.

Uruguay: Aida De Matteis Ventura, Maria Victoria Espinola Gabreta.

Venezuela: Eleana Sánchez, Elizabeth Burgos.

FOREIGN PRESS

Publicity organs and names of journalists

Alemania Federal

Das Andere Deutschland: Lenor Velfort.

Argentina

Diario El Mundo: Juan Lefcovich.

Belgium

Boletín Informativo de Cuba: Hugo Bency, Le Drapeau Rouge: Hubert Jacob.

Magazine Europeo: Gabriel F. Dannau.

Marie Noelle Cloes, Alphonse A. Roosens.

Bulgaria

Agencia BTA: Todor Stolanov.

Canada

Canadian Tribune: Francis Williams Park, Ibbie Campbell Park.

Korea

Agencia Central de Corea: Choun Tak Zi.

Costa Rica

Semanario Libertad: Francisco Gamboa Guzmán.

Czechoslovakia

Czech Broadcasting

Radio-Difusión Checoslovaca: David Leř.

Agencia CTK: Jaroslav Boucek.

lyternary Noviny: Mrtha Dodd.

Radio Difusión Praga: Vera Stocickova.

Chile

Radio Minería: Ibar Aibar Varas.

Las Noticias de Ultima Hora: Frida Modak Schatz.

Periódico El Siglo: Adriana Serle.

China

Agencia Sinjua: Chiu Ling, Ho Ching Kuang Jen Mu, Chi Chen, Ming Fu Ming, Yi Lun Shu, Shel Chong Hsu, Liu Chowg Yang, Sun Shon Guia.

Denmark

Land Of Folk: Jan Stago.

CBS News: Carl Sorensen.

Scotland

The Week: Alexander Scott.

Spain

Oficina Actualidades Argelinas: Daniel Ortiz.

Revista Triunfo: Eduardo Garcia Rico.

Radial Press: Alfonso Sobrado Palomares.

United States of America

Agencia A.P.: Antonio Ortega, Isaac Flores.

Agencia U.P.I.: Gabriel Badia Diaz, Pedro Bonetti.

M'd-Week and Weekly Worker: William Allan.

The Worker: Beatrice Johnson.

Jewish Daily Freiheit: Joseph North.

Finland

Televisión Finlandesa: Antti Kovanen, Esko Haapaniemi, Pekka Makinen.

France

Argencia Intermande Presse: Pierre Ron-diere.

Nouvel Observateur: Claude Estier.

Radio Europeo: Francois Philipe Fetjo.

Agencia A.F.P.: Sergio Mendez. Ives Doude, Robert N. Katz.

Reveu Democratic Nouvelle: Albert Paúl Lentin.

L'Entincelle: Henri Herve.

Le Monde: Marcel Niedergang

L'Express: Edouard Bailby.

Le Partisans: Francois Maspert.

Guinea

Prensa de la República de Guinea: Bob Sow.

Great Britain

Agencia Reuters: Michael A'kus, Maria Isabel Arostegui.

Sunday Telegraph: Charles Ian Lumsden.

Evening Standard London: Peter Kingsley.

Holland

Algemeen Dagblad: Leo Klatser.

Hungary

Radio y TV Budapest: Lazlo D'Salgo.

Nepszabadsag Daily: George Kalmar.

Agencia Telegráfica Húngara: Havel Jozsef.

Iran

Shahbay: Rahim Hamyar.

Italy

L'Unita: Saverio Tutino, Gaetano Pagano.

El Mundo Nuevo, L'Astrolabio, Il Ponte: Mario Lana.

Foto Reporter: Antonio Sansone.

Giornale D'Italia: Giuseppe Dall'Oncaro.

Japan

NHK Radio Televisora del Japon: Hiroshi Shiohazaki, Kyoichi Hoshino, Kentaro Hirayana.

Asahi Shimbun: Bin Watanabe.

Periódico Yomhuri: Takeshi Ogawa.

Morocco

Diario Alkifah: Abdallah Layachi.

Diario L'Avant Garde: Tibary Moussador.

México

Cuadernos Americanos: Sol Arguedas.

Revista Siempre: Marta Solis, Alberto Gu-tierrez Sánchez, Eduardo del Rio Garcia.

Revista Política: Raquel Rabinovich, Car-los Perzabal Marcué.

Norway

Orientering: Oysteith Pettersen.

Poland

Zicie Warsawy: Aniela Krupinska.

Agencia PAP: Miroslav Iconowicz.

Dookols Swiata: Andrzej Binkowski.

Editorial Office Gromadzi: Henryk Borzecki.

Polish Presse Panorama Weekly: Maciej Szczepanski.

Chtopsha Droga: Lesack Mackow.

Tribuna Ludu: Ludwik Krassowski.

German Democratic Republic

Agencia A.D.N.: Dieter Coburger, Wolfgang Mayer, Peter Neinz Junge.

Televisión R.D.A.: Erich Friedlander, Peter Goeschke, Hannelore Coburger.

Deutscher Demokratischer Rundfunk: Man-fred Schroeder.

Neues Deutschland: Lore Peter.

Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Agencia Noticiosa de Vietnam: Au Vu San.

Film: Cuong Ly, Cuong Nguyen Duy,

Nguyen Nhu Ai.

Rumania

Ager Press: Victor Stonate.

Sweden

Nydag: Karl Staff.

Switzerland

L'Illustre: Luc Bernard Chese.

Tanzania

Uhuru: Dadu Hamduni Mansur

Unión Nacional Africana de Tanganyika: James Gilbert Markham.

Tunisia

Periódico Les Temps Moderns: Rachid Cheriff.

U.S.S.R.

Periódico de "Trud": Gueorgui Tikhonov.

Tass: Alexsi Stoujine, Mikhail Artluichen-kov, Valery Laskarlov, Ruslan Kniasev.

Radio y TV U.S.S.R.: Sergio Pokin, Vlad-imir Pugachev.

Pravda: Yuri Pogosov.

Izvestia: Vladimir Silatiev.

Novosti: Valentin Mashkin, Yuri Paporovo, Mijail Roy.

Konsomolskaia Pravda: Alexandre Krivo-palov.

Maladal Communist: Lev Kornechov.

Literoturnaya Gazeta: Rimma Kazanova.

Uruguay

El Popular: Ricardo Saxlund.

Semanario Marcha: Carlos Nuñez.

Diario Epoca: Manrique Salbarrey.

South Vietnam

Agencia del Frente de Liberación Nacional Vo Son Ca.

Yugoslavia

Agencia de Prensa Tanjug: Boza Rafaj-lovic.

Total foreign press and news media rep-resentatives from 37 countries: 129.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the gentleman from Alabama on the statement that he is making and also on the record that he has made as chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Speaker, I am referring particularly to the work that he has done in bringing out some of the facts about this recent Havana conference, because such a meeting and the attitude and identity of the participants have great significance for us in determining the path that we should follow in the pursuit of our foreign policy.

I believe that the gentleman from Alabama will agree that a study of the conference proceedings show that this was a Russian-organized meeting, that the facade of universal action was pretty thin.

At the same time there was one significant result of this heavy-handed conference that I should like to mention, and that was the reaction to its subversive activities and pronouncements of the countries of Latin America themselves. When the members of the Organization of American States heard of the action which had taken place, without any dissenting vote, they proceeded to take prompt action to deplore the revolutionary policies that were set forth and the stated interventionist objectives of this conference.

Mr. Speaker, it is noteworthy that subsequent to this Latin American action, whether for publicity purposes or otherwise, there was a very prompt verbal backtracking on the part of the Russians themselves perhaps because they did not appreciate completely the depth of the reaction in the Latin American countries to this conference. At any rate, the avowed sponsorship of subversion and intervention accords ill with the oft-stated Soviet objective of building bridges to the Western world.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that the gentleman from Alabama should be complimented

and commended for the work that he and the committee have done on this subject.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, who is a very able member of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross].

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join with the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Monagan] in complimenting the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Selden] on the presentation that he is making here this afternoon, and to say further that it is a pleasure to serve on the Inter-American Subcommittee under the chairmanship of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Selden].

Mr. Speaker, the Tri-Continental Conference held only recently in Havana, Cuba, means that there has been set up in Cuba now a headquarters for the subversion, if possible, of the entire Latin American area. This, of course, poses some real problems—and growing problems—for the United States.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Selden] is doing all that he can to bring forth, as he has in hearings dealing with this Tri-Continental Conference, the making aware—making the public aware—of what is taking place, what has taken place, and what may very well take place throughout the entire Latin American area.

Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman further, and to the Members of the House, that it is a sad and sorry situation when the taxpayers' money—approximately \$1 million of the taxpayers' money of this country—is being used through the United Nations to support a technological college in Havana, Cuba, for the purpose—ostensible purpose—of further training those who would subvert the rest of Latin America.

And, Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that the Inter-American Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs will take further action to denounce this use of American funds for this purpose.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I compliment the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Selden].

Mr. SELDEN. I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Iowa, who also is an extremely able member of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. I, too, am concerned in connection with the announcement that American taxpayers' dollars are to be used to support a technological college in Havana, Cuba. I have called this announcement to the attention of the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, which has jurisdiction over this subject, with the request that the subcommittee look into it. Since the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross] is a member of that particular subcommittee also, I feel certain he will want to make a similar request.

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I am happy to yield to my colleague from Wyoming.

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to congratulate the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Selden], for an enlight-

ening and most helpful speech. I am pleased to associate myself with his remarks, Mr. Speaker, and I certainly hope that debate in the Congress this past week will not weaken in any conceivable way our determination to act unilaterally and ex parte if necessary to meet totalitarian aggression in our hemisphere.

When the President took the bold and decisive action he did, nearly a year ago, to put down the Santo Domingo rebellion, I believe I was one of the first voices in Congress to laud his leadership. I also voted for H.R. 560—with a vast majority of my colleagues in this House and in the Senate—to support his leadership in meeting totalitarian aggression anywhere in the world.

If the Santo Domingo incident were to have happened next week, and the President respond as he did, I would again hail his action and again vote my confidence in his leadership.

I firmly believe that the last thing our fighting men in Vietnam need today, Mr. Speaker, are 535 commanders in chief holding forth in the Congress.

THE FEUD AMONG FEDERAL JUDGES IN OKLAHOMA CITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, on file in the U.S. Supreme Court, ignored and gathering dust for nearly 4 years, is an official transcript that sets forth in detail the shocking story of a bitter feud among Federal judges in Oklahoma City, Okla.

The transcript is the verbatim statement of Federal Judge Stephen S. Chandler in which he accuses Federal Judges Alfred P. Murrah and Luther Bohanon of persecution.

Chandler's testimony was given before the Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit Court, sitting in Wichita, Kans., on April 25, 1962, after Chandler had been disqualified by the Judicial Council from presiding in a bankruptcy proceeding.

Federal Judge Chandler asserts in the transcript that Federal Judge Murrah sometimes cursed him, once tried to get him to alter his estimate of property values in a certain case; that his telephone was tapped, and he was afraid of being poisoned.

He accused Federal Judge Bohanon of spying on him, circulating rumors about him, and soliciting a bribe. Chandler said that in 1942, Bohanon offered to get him appointed as a Federal judge for \$25,000. Bohanon was a lawyer at that time. It was on January 30, 1962, said Chandler, that Bohanon's attitude toward him changed from warm friendship to bitter hatred.

Murrah is the chief judge of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. It was the judges of this circuit, sitting as the judicial council, that disqualified Chandler from further jurisdiction in the bankruptcy case and, on December 13, 1965, stripped him of all judicial power and

authority, leaving him only his title and \$30,000 a year salary.

For all practical purposes this amounted to impeachment—an action which, under the Constitution of the United States, is vested only in the Congress, and Judge Chandler describes this action as a usurpation of power.

Subsequently, in February of this year—1966—and because of protests both in and out of Congress, the same judicial council of the 10th circuit restored to Judge Chandler some 160 of the cases which had previously been taken from him. This simply compounded the deliberate assumption of power implicit in the original action.

Throughout the 57-page transcript on file in the Supreme Court, the heart of Chandler's testimony is that he has been the victim of Murrah's bitter hatred for 19 years.

Pointing to his disqualification in the bankruptcy case, Chandler said:

This whole proceeding is actuated by malice and aided and abetted and assisted and really engineered by Judge Murrah and Judge Bohanon.

In the bankruptcy case, Parker Petroleum Co. was the debtor. It filed a petition for reorganization in U.S. district court in Oklahoma City on May 6, 1958. Since outside financing was necessary, Occidental Petroleum, of Los Angeles, holder of 40,000 shares of Parker stock, filed a reorganization plan for Parker Petroleum on August 14, 1959.

There followed months of litigation. Occidental tried to withdraw but Chandler held it could not legally do so. He was reversed by the 10th circuit but the liability of Occidental for damages was left open and the case returned to Chandler.

Occidental then requested Chandler to disqualify himself but before he could rule on that request Occidental took the litigation to the 10th circuit. Chandler was promptly ordered out of the case.

He fought back because, he said, he had unwittingly caused Parker Petroleum to have confidence in Occidental Petroleum mainly because Bert Barefoot, Jr., former law partner of Judge Bohanon, and a lawyer for Occidental, had made unconditional pledges of financial support.

He charged Barefoot with a conflict of interest on the grounds that he represented two parties in the litigation. Barefoot, Chandler said, became "menacing," adding that "he began spitting in my face and he took charge of the court and entered orders and it was pretty bad."

In the case in which he fixed the value of some property, Judge Chandler testified that Judge Murrah called him into his chambers and said:

Now you have got to change that * * *. You are going to delay our building here.

Chandler said he replied that his appraisal was right, and he refused to change it whereupon, said Chandler:

He [Murrah] jumped up and said "You (so-and-so) yellow son of a (so-and-so). I have worked for 7 years on this building and here you do that and we don't get it."

Chandler testified that on another occasion Murrah asked him to set aside

an order in a jury case. He refused and Murrah then said according to Chandler:

Well, every other judge of the circuit does what I tell them to. I don't know what the hell is wrong with you that you won't.

Mr. Speaker, I have never met a single one of the principals involved in this situation. I have in no way communicated with any of them nor have they communicated with me. I have no personal knowledge of the character or qualifications of these jurists, all of whom are now holding places of the highest trust and responsibility.

I do know that when a Federal district judge sits before a tribunal of four Federal circuit judges and makes the charges contained in this transcript—and for almost 4 long years little or nothing is done to prove or disprove those charges—that it is a travesty in the name of the courts and justice in this country.

As a citizen and a Member of Congress, I cannot sit idly by and watch while the respect and confidence in the Federal judiciary is undermined in Oklahoma or any other area of the Nation. And I submit that there are other areas that need attention.

I urge in the strongest terms at my command that the proper committees of Congress launch an immediate investigation.

THE CHILDREN'S SPECIAL MILK ACT OF 1966

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. QUIE] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, to supplement my earlier protest over the budgetary cut in the school milk and lunch program, I have introduced a bill, which I should like to have printed in full at this point in the body of the RECORD:

H.R. 12907

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Children's Special Milk Act of 1966."

LEGISLATIVE FINDING

SEC. 2. The Congress finds that the increased consumption of fluid milk by a maximum number of American children is in the public interest in order to promote public health and nutrition; to create and develop markets for dairy products produced by American farmers; and to effectively and efficiently supplement the dairy price support activities of the United States Department of Agriculture.

SEC. 3. The Act of July 1, 1958, as amended (72 Stat. 276; 74 Stat. 84; 75 Stat. 147; 75 Stat. 319), is hereby repealed.

SEC. 4. The Secretary of Agriculture shall, under such rules and regulations as he may deem in the public interest, encourage the consumption of fluid milk by children in the United States in (1) nonprofit schools of high school grade and under, and (2) nonprofit nursery schools, child-care centers, settlement houses, summer camps, and similar nonprofit institutions devoted to the care and training of children. For the purposes of this Act "United States" means the fifty States and the District of Columbia.

SEC. 5. All sums appropriated under this Act, less such amounts as the Secretary shall determine to be reasonable and necessary for

his administrative costs and reserves, shall be allocated at the earliest possible date for the use of nonprofit schools and other nonprofit institutions desiring to participate in the program and shall be used to reimburse such nonprofit schools and other nonprofit institutions for fluid milk served to children. Any such allocation, or portion thereof, which the Secretary shall determine will not be fully utilized by any such nonprofit school or other nonprofit institution as then allocated, shall be reallocated by the Secretary so as to accomplish maximum use of such funds.

SEC. 6. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, but for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, not to exceed \$105,000,000; for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, not to exceed \$110,000,000; for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, not to exceed \$115,000,000; for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and each succeeding fiscal year thereafter, not to exceed \$120,000,000.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to explain the intent of this bill, and some of the reasoning behind it. This bill would in effect make the present milk program permanent, and would continue to make the program available to children on the broadest practical scale. Known as the Children's Special Milk Act of 1966, my bill is explicit as to the intent of Congress both now and when the program was inaugurated in 1954.

Dairy farmers often refer to the "dual purpose cow." They mean, of course, that the cow can be used for milk during her life and that she and her offspring carry more meat than the dairy breeds. The beauty of the present special milk program is that it creates a tripurpose cow. Those three purposes constitute the three justifications for passage of my bill. They are:

First. Beneficial effects on the health and nutrition of American children.

Second. The creation of an additional market and the development of new and future markets for U.S.-produced dairy products.

Third. A better way to support the price of dairy products through greater consumption of fluid milk, rather than the subsequent purchase of manufactured dairy products by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

The biggest advantage of these three purposes is that they are never at odds with one another. We can have the best elements of each. Under the administration proposal to cut the present milk program to 20 percent of its present size, you have only one purpose: distribution of milk to needy children. Market formation and support benefits are forgotten. It is purely a matter of speculation on the part of the Department of Agriculture that children now being subsidized for milk will go ahead and pay full price for it; in fact, Department projections show that present milk consumption under school programs would drop by one-third, or half a billion pounds of milk. At a time when the dairy industry continues to need the support of every available market, this seems totally unjustified.

My bill repeals the present statutory authority for the special milk program. This will remove an obsolete provision from the law when the present statute

expires. It also avoids any problem of legal interpretation between the time of enactment of this bill and the scheduled termination of the present statute on June 30, 1967.

The bill further recodifies without change the provisions in the present law dealing with the eligibility of schools and other institutions for the benefits of this program. This section (4) also retains the definition of the "United States" as it appears in present law to include the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Another section sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Secretary of Agriculture in the administration of the program. Except for necessary administrative expenses and reserves, all available funds shall be allocated promptly and unused amounts shall be reallocated in a manner designed to accomplish the maximum effectiveness of the program.

Appropriations will be \$105 million in fiscal year 1966, \$110 million for fiscal year 1967, \$115 million for fiscal year 1968, and \$120 million for fiscal year 1969 and subsequent years on a permanent basis.

Mr. Speaker, the school milk program was used in approximately 92,000 schools in 1965, or 22,000 more schools than used the school lunch program. The usage of milk in both programs aggregated nearly 3 billion pounds. If the milk had not been so used, it would undoubtedly have been bought by the CCC, at a direct cost of about \$103 million, or exactly the present appropriation for the milk program. Congress was aware of the Nation's fiscal situation when it voted \$103 million for the special milk program, but it seems that the President's concern for inflation and the cost of the war has already forced cutbacks in the program that have been passed on to schoolchildren and school districts in the form of higher milk costs to them. Let me explain:

When President Johnson requested all his agencies to cut back on existing programs wherever possible in light of the war in Vietnam and the high employment level, the Administrator of the school milk and lunch programs directed that \$10 million be spent on the milk program instead of the \$103 million earmarked by Congress in its 1966 appropriation for that purpose. If this economy could have been achieved without changing the nature of the program, I doubt whether any Member of Congress would have legitimate grounds for complaint. As it is, however, the cutback forced the Administrator to reduce the reimbursement rate by 10 percent. This results in increased costs to the school district, and in most cases it forces them to raise the price of the milk to the children themselves. At that point, the intent of Congress is violated; the Congress was fully aware of the economic conditions in this country at the time it appropriated \$103 million for the milk program—and it fully expected that sum of money to be used to bring milk to children at the lowest possible cost to them. That cost would have remained at its previous low level had not the Department of Agriculture arbitrarily decided that this was a good place to relieve the pressure

stories of any country in the world or in its history. I find the attitude of the average citizen to be one of taking their freedoms for granted, and I feel sorry for them, for they don't know how free they really are. They have the chance to find out what the rest of the world is really doing and not just what the state allows them to hear. This to me was a privilege—to have the choice of some twenty newspapers to buy and read and get different viewpoints on the same subject. In my country there is Pravda and one other state-controlled newspaper. As I browsed through the newspapers in the library I read several articles which completely contradict what I had read in my country's news media, and I find truth in your papers and statements of great bearing by noted leaders of the world, which I had not the slightest idea were ever made, or that the leaders had a different attitude than what I read. We are taught from birth and childhood that America is an aggressor, warmonger type, world power, and that we are the under-privileged, suppressed ones who are being done so wrongly in the U.N. I find this to be a lie. I find that Americans don't really want war in Vietnam and are trying to stop it, and not that they are sending in thousands of troops trying to invade Communist China. This is a common fact in my country.

I find the standards of living to be much higher here than we are taught. We thought that all Americans lived in slums. I see the many colors, kinds and types of cars that almost any American can own. In my country there is only one type and only those in the higher presidium are allowed the luxury of an automobile. I stopped a man on the street and asked what kind of work he did? He gave me a rather strange look and said, "I am a salesman." I asked how much the Government allowed him in wages? Well, he looked even more dumbfounded and said the Government had no say-so in his financial status and that whatever he made was up to his own initiative. Then I asked how he was picked to be the holder of such a marvelous job with so much freedom, and he informed me he wasn't picked by anyone. It was what he wanted so he went looking for a job and was hired by a representative of the company and not the Government. I could not believe my ears.

I also found out that an American can move throughout his country and be completely free about it. I saw absolutely no one spot checked for their identification. There were no troops walking the streets. I saw a parade which bore no arms or showing of strength, only peace and beauty. It was a demonstration by a local college concerning their athletic program. There was much joy and laughter; such a demonstration in my country wouldn't have even gotten a chance to start, regardless of its purpose, unless it was of some military significance.

I see people who are allowed to worship their God in any manner they choose. In my country there is no Supreme Being but the State, and worship of any other form is a crime against the State and punishable by death. On our way to this beautiful city I saw farmers using new, modern equipment and with bountiful crops and hundreds of head of cattle. I see one man tilling hundreds of acres by himself and by his own choice—not a collective farm where the workers are people of lower education and placed there without a chance to show what they can really do.

No, I am not an American, but after I mail this letter I am going to seek refuge in this wonderful country and political asylum. I am glad that I have no relatives now living, for what I am about to do would bring great hardships on them for an offense they had nothing to do with.

Soon, I, too will be an American.

STATEMENTS MADE BY SECRETARY RUSK AND GENERAL TAYLOR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I had the experience, along with several friends—and I am sure a great portion of America—of watching a television report on the recent Vietnam hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In watching the various exchanges portrayed on that program I found myself tremendously impressed with the grasp of the realities of this complex situation exhibited by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

From these exchanges there emerged a very clear delineation of the difference between the specific criticism of our Vietnam policies and the requirements of responsibility for making the actual divisions involved.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statements of Secretary Rusk and General Taylor, before the Foreign Relations Committee be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECRETARY RUSK'S STATEMENT BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, FEBRUARY 18, 1966

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the immediate occasion for these hearings is a request by the President for a supplemental appropriation to the AID Administration of \$415 million, of which \$275 million are intended for South Vietnam. Mr. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, and I have both already testified on this particular request. These hearings as the chairman has pointed out, have also entered into the largest and most far-reaching aspects of our interests and involvements in southeast Asia. For my part, I welcome this opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss with you these larger issues.

Since World War II, which projected the United States into the role of major world power, we Americans have had to face a series of difficult tasks and trials. On the whole, we have faced them very well. Today, we are facing another ordeal in southeast Asia which again is costing us both lives and treasure.

South Vietnam is a long way from the United States and the issues posed may seem remote from our daily experience and our immediate interests. It is essential, therefore, that we clearly understand—and so far as possible agree—on our mission and purpose in that far away land.

Why are we in Vietnam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions or other regional organizations can find solutions to the quarrels which disturb the present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live. The situation we face in southeast Asia is obviously complex but, in my view,

the underlying issues are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental. I am confident that Americans, who have a deep and mature understanding of world responsibility, are fully capable of cutting through the underbrush of complexity and finding the simple issues which involve our largest interests and deepest purposes. I regard it, therefore, as a privilege to be able to discuss these problems with the committee this morning—to consult with you—and at the same time to try to clarify for the American people the issues we must squarely face.

I do not approach this task on the assumption that anyone, anywhere, has all the answers or that all wisdom belongs to the executive branch of the Government, or even to the Government itself. The questions at issue affect the well-being of all Americans and I am confident that all Americans will make up their own minds in the tradition of a free and independent people. Yet those of us who have special responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy have had to think hard and deeply about these problems for a very long time. The President, his Cabinet colleagues, and the Congress, who share the weightiest responsibilities under our constitutional system, have come to certain conclusions that form the basis for the policies we are now pursuing. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions—and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion—we are required to decide what this Nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determinations.

What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Vietnam?

They cannot be seen clearly in terms of southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Vietnam is part of a process that has continued for a long time—a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.

This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Vietnam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.

I have observed in the course of your hearings that some objection has been raised to the use of the term "Communist aggression." It seems to me that we should not confuse ourselves or our people by turning our eyes away from what that phrase means. The underlying crisis of this post-war period turns about a major struggle over the very nature of the political structure of the world. Before the guns were silent in World War II, many governments sat down and thought long and hard about the structure of international life, the kind of world which we ought to try to build, and wrote those ideas into the United Nations Charter. That charter establishes an international society of independent states, large and small, entitled to their own national existence, entitled to be free from aggression, cooperating freely across national frontiers in their common interests, and resolving their disputes by peaceful means. But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a world revolution, a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations. There may be differences within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself,

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In 1961 we were giving the name "Hoover Mike" to the levee around Lake Okeechobee which was begun during the administrations of the late President Hoover and our beloved former Gov. Doyle Carlton, our able master of ceremonies, today. In this project, the President, as an expert engineer, had taken an active interest. President Hoover, then a man of great age, came down to Clewiston to the dedication which was attended by a great and enthusiastic crowd. Shortly before the actual dedicatory ceremonies took place, Billy Bowlegs walked up to the official crowd dressed in the regalia of a Seminole chieftain, standing straight as an arrow—though he was then 99 years old. He greeted President Hoover cordially and made it clear that he had come to the affair to do honor to the former President. The whole occasion was a most dignified and unforgettable one and I well remember that President Hoover, before leaving the area after the ceremony had been concluded, stated to me that he had rarely appreciated anything so much as he did the unexpected coming of Chief Billy Bowlegs to pay his respects. I think that courteous act of Billy Bowlegs was performed in the finest tradition of the Seminoles. I could never forget the sight of those two splendid old gentlemen standing together with clasped hands and beaming countenances, each enjoying the presence of the other and showing every possible evidence of high mutual respect.

Later I occupied the speakers platform with Chief Billy Bowlegs at two other public functions in the State, first at the dedication of a portion of completed work at a structure of the Central and South Florida Flood Control District a few miles southwest of Okeechobee City, and later at the dedication of the historical marker at Fort Fraser between Bartow and Highland City. I have beautiful photographs of all three of these occasions in my Washington office and I prize them highly.

While I deeply appreciated the presence of Billy Bowlegs at the first two occasions mentioned, I thought it was particularly typical of him to show up at the Fort Fraser dedication. You will recall that Fort Fraser, just as Fort Gardiner and Fort Basinger, and for the matter all of the forts named during the Zachary Taylor campaign which culminated at the Battle of Lake Okeechobee, were named for officers who had lost their lives in the Dade massacre. Taylor's army regarded itself as an avenging army and their every effort was bent upon vengeance. Probably the most bitter campaign of the whole second Seminole war was the Taylor campaign which followed closely after the Dade massacre. Nevertheless, Billy Bowlegs showed up at the occasion when both the campaign and the location of Fort Fraser were being memorialized and sat on the platform with me. Without his saying so I felt he was trying to make it clear that his presence indicated that the Seminole Indian had overcome his bitterness of those far-off days just as our Governor Carlton's presence here today indicates so clearly the same thing. We all know that Governor Carlton's grandfather was killed by the Indians in the third Seminole war in an engagement south of Fort Meade. I feel that the active participation of such men as he and our late friend Billy Bowlegs in the various friendly affairs which show that the original American people, the Seminoles, and ourselves, have grown closer together and are becoming more and more one people are decidedly in the finest traditions and best interests of our country.

There are many other good and kindly things which have been done by other Seminoles which I would be glad to relate on this occasion, except that I feel we should confine ourselves as much as possible to the discussion of the good qualities, kindly traits,

and worthwhile accomplishments of Billy Bowlegs.

May I recite one rather light incident from Mrs. Minnie Moore-Willson's book which may throw some additional light on him?

"When the coast towns of Florida were still primitive, a storekeeper had purchased in New York, an old-fashioned organette, that played five tunes. The Seminoles at that time frequently came on purchasing expeditions to these trading villages. 'Chofee-hatch-o [Billy Bowlegs], progressive and musical, listened to the 'box of music' as it played in the little store, and was entranced with the melodies.

"Soon after, the organette refused to 'go' and the trader told his friends that unless he could 'stick it on the Indians, he would be out thirty-five dollars.' A few days later the Chief, with another Indian, came back to the store bringing produce to sell. The white trader wanted the Indian's goods and suggested to the Chief that he exchange for the music box, telling the innocent Seminole that 'music box no more play, wake up by and by and play good, him tired now.' The Seminole with his mechanical knowledge, looked the organette over, and making the trade, proudly left with the 'tired out' music box under his arm.

"The next day, the two Indians returned, bringing with them the music box to show to the storekeeper. 'That box, him no more tired,' and winding up the machine which the ingenious Seminole had put into working order, played the whole five tunes to the astonishment and chagrin of the trader. 'Him play good at Green Corn Dance, down Oke-cho-bee.'"

I think it is very clear from this little incident that while the white traders may have out-traded the Indians on many occasions, if not most occasions, this was one time when the opposite was the case and I am glad that Billy Bowlegs III was the very person who, in good humor, out-traded that particular white storekeeper.

I am happy that this occasion has brought out so many good citizens, both from among the Seminoles and among the rest of us who are latecomers, as compared to them, to this good peninsula. I hope that this occasion will bring even closer together all groups of citizens who now are proud to call themselves Floridians and that we will make the story of Billy Bowlegs III our common heritage of which all people in this State may be justly proud.

And so, speaking for the entire Florida delegation in Congress, as well as for the State and local officials of Florida and the citizens of Florida, generally, I now dedicate this marker in memory of a very fine man whose friendship I shall always cherish. A little Seminole girl who I understand is his grandniece, will unveil the marker which, just as Billy Bowlegs would have wished it, is a modest, though dignified monument. In concluding my part in the program I merely want to say that I feel greatly honored at having been asked to make this talk and to speak of a man for whose high character and worthwhile accomplishments I have the utmost respect. Speaking particularly for the Polk County Historical Commission and the Peace River Valley Historical Society, I dedicate this marker to the memory of our late, great friend, Billy Bowlegs III, one of the finest leaders ever produced from among the Seminoles of Florida.

TRIBUTE TO BILLY BOWLEGS III ON HIS 101ST BIRTHDAY

Long, long ago February's cold little moon
Dropped her baby boy on the lap of a hunter
Resting from a hard, bold chase of the
Lo-ko-see.¹

¹ Lo-ko-see—bear.

For brave chief, "Billy Bowlegs," the babe was named soon.

Strong he grew and walked in the grass like the wind.

Deft and cunning, he tracked the Florida wolf;

Feared not the panther nor the alapata,²

Knew the River of Grass for his steadfast friend.

Yet, young Billy feared the pits, so dark and hot

His mother dug and therein hid him by day
From the cruel paleface, evermore on the prowl;

Who ruined crops and chickees³ and killed on the spot.

Hoping to alter the fate of all his clan
Old chief Billy Bowlegs drank the "Black Drink"—and

Sent one of his twin souls to the Milky Way—
Where dwells the Great Spirit, god of the Redman.

"Thy trouble is no more," the Great Spirit roared

Before the plea was worded by the old chief.
"Unite thy souls," the Indian god continued,
"Thy foe will meet defeat from his brother's sword."

The third Billy Bowlegs birthright was denied—

All his daring dreams sleep in his heart unborn—

At time he views yesterdays that have failed him

And down through the long years peace has paced his stride.

Now ancient, Billy Bowlegs, grand to the end,
Beloved by his tribesmen and palefaces alike,
Has lived life to the hilt with ill will toward none—

Walks in the grass like the wind, the world his friend.

—GERALDINE THRAILKILL.

"I AM AN AMERICAN"—FREEDOMS FOUNDATION AWARD LETTER

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, every year the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge has a contest and offers awards for letters from Armed Forces personnel which typify some aspect of Americanism.

One of the winners of the 1965 contest is a young man from my State, Gary Arlaud, from Des Moines, Iowa. I ask unanimous consent that his excellent letter entitled "I Am an American" be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND GEORGE WASHINGTON HONOR MEDAL AWARD—"I AM AN AMERICAN"

(A hypothetical letter from an imaginary Russian student)

(Gary M. Arlaud, V-6 Division, U.S.S. LPH 7, FPO, New York)

Now if only I could say that. But I am sorry to say that I can't for I am a Russian student of the U.S.S.R. I am here in your country on tour with a group from my own country and I have had a chance to see what your country is really like and study what it's really like. In the evenings I have crept from my hotel room and my comrades to go to the library and find out a myriad of things including one of the most illustrious his-

² Alapata—alligator.

³ Chickens—Indian dwellings.

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but they share a common attachment to their world revolution and to its support through what they call wars of liberation.

So what we face in Vietnam is what we have faced on many occasions before—the need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world. That stability was achieved in the years after the war by the valor of free nations in defending the integrity of postwar territorial arrangements. And we have achieved a certain stability for the last decade and a half. It must not be overthrown now.

Like so many of our problems today the struggle in South Vietnam stems from the disruption of two world wars. The Second World War completed a process begun by the first. It ripped apart a structure of power that had existed for 100 years. It set in train new forces and energies that have remade the map of the world. Not only did it weaken the nations actively engaged in the fighting, but it had far-reaching secondary effects. It undermined the foundations of the colonial structures through which a handful of powers controlled one-third of the world's population. And the winds of change and progress that have blown fiercely during the last 20 years have toppled those structures almost completely.

Meanwhile, the Communist nations have exploited the turmoil of a time of transition in an effort to extend Communist control into other areas of the world.

The United States first faced the menace of Communist ambition in Europe when one after another of the nations on the boundaries of the Soviet Union fell under the dominion of Moscow through the presence of the Red army.

To check this tidal wave the United States provided the Marshall plan to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and then moved to organize with those nations a collective security system through NATO. As a result, the advance of Soviet Communist power was stopped and the Soviet Union gradually adjusted its policies to this situation.

But within a year after the establishment of NATO, the Communists took over China. This posed a new and serious threat, particularly to those weak new nations of the Far East that had been formed out of colonial empires. The problems in Asia were, of course, different from those in Europe. But the result was much the same—instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability to both the bully and the aggressor. Western Europe, with its established governmental and traditional social institutions recovered quickly. But certain of the new nations of Asia—particularly those that had not known self-government for a century or more—continued to face a far more formidable problem which they still face.

The first test in Asia came in Korea when the United Nations forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea supported by material aid from the Soviet Union. It stopped the Chinese Army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist effort to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the Korean peninsula.

We fought the Korean war—which like the struggle in Vietnam occurred in a remote area thousands of miles away—to sustain a principle vital to the freedom and security of America—the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to expand by overrunning one after another of the arrangements built during and since the war to mark the outer limits of Communist expansion by force.

Before the Korean war had ended, the United States, under President Truman, moved to settle and consolidate the situation in the Pacific through a peace treaty with Japan and through bilateral security

treaties with Japan and the Philippines and through the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Hardly had the Korean war been finished when France, which had been fighting a protracted struggle in Indochina, decided to relinquish its political presence in southeast Asia. After a brief negotiation it came to terms with the Communist forces that had captured the nationalist movement. The result was the division of Indochina into four parts; a Kingdom of Cambodia, a Kingdom of Laos, and Vietnam divided at the 17th parallel between the Communist forces in the north and a non-Communist Vietnamese Government in the south.

Recognizing that the Communists had not abandoned their ambitions, the U.S. Government under President Eisenhower, took steps to secure the situation by further alliances. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa. In the Middle East the so-called northern tier of countries lying to the south of the Soviet Union entered into the Baghdad Pact which established what is now known as CENTO—the Central Treaty Organization.

The United States did not become a formal member of this alliance which is composed of Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. But we are closely associated with CENTO and have bilateral military assistance agreements with its regional members, concluded by the Eisenhower administration.

In order to give support to the nations of southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in the creation of an alliance embodied in a treaty and reinforced by a collective security system known as SEATO—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In this alliance, the United States joined with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to guarantee the security not only of the member nations but also to come to the aid of certain protocol states and territories if they so requested.

South Vietnam was included in this protocol. The United States had not been a party to the agreements made in Geneva in 1954, which France had concluded with the Communist Vietnamese forces known as the Viet Minh. But the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, stated under instructions that the United States would not disturb the agreements and "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the * * * agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

Under Secretary Smith's statement was only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that "each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack * * * would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Vietnam.

The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated "to act to meet the common danger" without regard to the views or actions of any other treaty member.

The far-reaching implications of this com-

mitment were well understood by this committee when it recommended, with only the late Senator Langer dissenting, that the Senate consent to the ratification of the treaty. The committee's report states:

"The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions."

Following this committee's recommendation, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1, the late Senator Langer dissenting. All members of this distinguished committee who were then Senators voted for that treaty.

Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO Treaty had been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Vietnam. On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Diem offering "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." In 1957, President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement which called attention to "the large buildup of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam" and stated:

"Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability."

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render."

On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the U.S. declaration made at the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence." This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

These then are the commitments we have taken to protect South Vietnam as a part of protecting our own "peace and security." We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Vietnam has, under the language of the SEATO Treaty, been the victim of "aggression by means of armed attack."

There can be no serious question as to the existence and nature of this aggression. The war is clearly an "armed attack," cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese regime has sought deliberately to confuse the issue by seeking to make its aggression appear as an indigenous revolt. But we should not be deceived by this subterfuge. It is a familiar Communist practice. Impeded in their efforts to extend their power by the use of classical forms of force such as the invasion of Korea, the Communists have, over many years, developed an elaborate doctrine for so-called "wars of national liberation" to cloak their aggressions in ambiguity.

A "war of national liberation," in the Communist lexicon, depends on the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It has a particular utility for them

since it gives an advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

At the same time the Communists have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation a sense of ambiguity that they can exploit to their own advantage.

Yet, in spite of Communist efforts to confuse the issue, the nature of the conflict in South Vietnam is very clear.

Let me review the facts.

With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that in agreeing to the 1954 accords, the regime in Hanoi fully expected that within a relatively short period the South Vietnamese would fall under their control. The south seemed overburdened with troubles. Its formidable economic problems were complicated by the need to absorb almost 1 million North Vietnamese, who—having seen the true face of communism—fled south after the 1954 accords. The north moreover had concealed resources in the south. At the time of the accords in 1954, many Communists fighting with the Vietminh had been directed by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to stay in the south, to hide their arms, and to devote their efforts to undermining the South Vietnamese Government. These efforts of subversion were in the initial years quite unsuccessful. Much to the dismay of the Hanoi regime South Vietnam made substantial progress in spite of the extraordinary problems it faced, while North Vietnam lagged far behind. As a consequence the Communist leaders in North Vietnam were forced to conclude that more active measures were necessary if the subversion of South Vietnam were to succeed.

During the 5 years following the Geneva Conference the Hanoi regime developed a secret political-military organization in South Vietnam based on the cadres who had been ordered to stay in the south. Many of the activities of this organization were directed toward the assassination of selected South Vietnamese civilians. More than 1,000 civilians were murdered or kidnapped from 1957 to 1959. In 1960 alone, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnapped 700 others, while armed guerrillas killed 2,200 military and security personnel.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Vietnam—held its third party congress in Hanoi. That Congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Vietnam. Three months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning in 1960 the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate into South Vietnam the disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered north at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, these men had been trained in the arts of sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

All of this was documented by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. That body, established to supervise the performance of the Vietnam cease-fire, is composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members. The Legal Committee, with Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

"There is evidence to show that arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the objective of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the south.

"There is evidence that the PAVN (i.e., the North Vietnamese Army), has allowed the zone in the north to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the south."

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Vietnam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the south. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964, North Vietnam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Vietnam.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of southerners who had gone north. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the south have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese Army in increasingly larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the south.

I have reviewed these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because, it seems to me, they demonstrate beyond question that the war in Vietnam is as much an act of outside aggression as though the Hanoi regime had sent an army across the 17th parallel rather than infiltrating armed forces by stealth. This point is important since it goes to the heart of our own involvement. Much of the confusion about the struggle in South Vietnam has arisen over a failure to understand the nature of the conflict.

For if the war in South Vietnam were—as the Communists try to make it appear—merely an indigenous revolt, then the United States would not have its own combat troops in South Vietnam. But the evidence is overwhelming that it is, in fact, something quite different—a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Vietnam. It is one further effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the people of the other half at the point of a gun and against their will.

Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Vietnam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and are still in train.

These contentions seem to me to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the status quo. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly—as has been frequently pointed out—the world of the mid-20th century is not standing still. Movement is occurring on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world—Moscow and Peking—is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well—and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by organizing the Western Alliance. They have taken place because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime in Moscow has recognized that the Western Alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

Over time the same processes hopefully will work in the Far East. Peking—and the Communist states living under its shadow—must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept.

For unlike the Communists we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it. That was the meaning of President Johnson's initiatives at the Honolulu Conference—to encourage the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to transform the country in a way that will correct ancient injustices and bring about a better life for all the people.

In meeting our commitments in South Vietnam we are using substantial military forces. At the same time, we are making it quite clear to North Vietnam and to the world that our forces are being employed for a limited and well-defined objective.

What we seek in South Vietnam is to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the accords of 1954. We seek, in other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh—a settlement which was joined in by the United Kingdom, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Laos, and Cambodia. This settlement forms a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.

Unfortunately, the limited nature of our purpose is foreign to the philosophy of the Communist world.

It may be hard, therefore, for them to realize that the United States seeks no territorial aggrandizement in South Vietnam or anywhere in southeast Asia. We do not wish to maintain our troops in that area any longer than is necessary to secure the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. We want no permanent military bases, no trade advantages. We are not asking that the Government of South Vietnam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Vietnam should have the right and the opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat.

For months now we have done everything possible to make clear to the regime in Hanoi that a political solution is the proper course. If that regime were prepared to call off the aggression in the south, peace would come in almost in a matter of hours. When that occurred the people of North Vietnam could safely go about their business. For we do not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime or to force the people of North Vietnam to accept any other form of government. And—under conditions of peace—we would be quite prepared for the North Vietnamese people to share with the other peoples of southeast Asia in the economic and technical help that we and other nations are extending to that area.

This is the simple message that we have tried to convey to Hanoi through many channels. We have sought in every way to impress upon the Communist world the ease with which peace could be attained if only Hanoi were willing.

We have used every resource of diplomacy. I know of no occasion in history where so much effort has been devoted—not only on the part of the United States but of many other nations—in an effort to bring about a political solution to a costly and dangerous war. I know you are generally familiar with the record.

But to this point the sounds from the other side have been harsh and negative. The regime in Hanoi has been unwilling to accept any of the possibilities open to it for discussion. All we have heard is the constant insistence that they will not negotiate unless

we accept in advance their four points. Yet, the effect of those four points, as propounded by Hanoi, would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Vietnam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime.

To understand the situation realistically, we should not underestimate the harshness of the Communist side or overestimate the ease of a political solution.

From time to time we have heard it suggested that we should seek a Geneva Conference or enlist the good offices of the Conference Cochairmen or take the problem to the United Nations or invite the mediation efforts of neutral nations.

Well, we have done all of these things, and in most cases we have done them repeatedly—with no result.

We heard it suggested also, by governments and individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that no peace was possible so long as American planes were flying bombing missions over North Vietnam, but that negotiations might be possible if the bombing were discontinued.

We did that also—not once but twice. The last pause, as this committee will recall, lasted 37 days. And again with no response.

Certainly, we shall do everything consistent with our national objectives to seek a solution through diplomacy. There is no doubt as to the elements for an honorable peace as we see it. We have made them clear again and again. Most recently we have summarized them in the form of 14 points:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least \$1 billion;

13. The President has said "the Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem";

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

These 14 points are on the public record. Our Government has made quite clear what kind of peace we are prepared to accept—a peace that will guarantee the security of South Vietnam, a peace that will stop armed aggression in violation of international agreements and international law.

This is the position that we have made known to the other side both directly and through intermediaries. How does this compare with the position of the Hanoi regime?

Both Hanoi and Peiping have repeatedly rejected our proposal for unconditional discussions. They have insisted instead that before any discussions can take place our side must agree in advance to the four points of Hanoi's program. The words that they have used have differed from formulation to formulation. Sometimes they have said their points are the "sole basis" for negotiations, sometimes "the most correct basis." But the effect is the same. What they are insisting upon is that we accept in advance their substantive position and then discuss only the ways in which it shall be given effect. The technique of demanding such substantive agreement in advance is a familiar Communist negotiating tactic. It does not mean that the basic points are open for discussion or that they can be loosely interpreted. It means just what it says.

We have subjected these four points to the most careful scrutiny. What do they reveal?

The first point calls for "recognition of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." This point also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling of our military bases, and abolition of our military alliance with the Government of South Vietnam, "in strict conformity with the Geneva agreements."

The United States has made clear that we too are prepared to support a restoration of the provisions of the Geneva agreements and that we are prepared to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with the accords by all parties. We have said also that we would not expect or require a military alliance with a free South Vietnam.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements, and these too, we could agree to under the conditions I have indicated.

The fourth point provides that the issue of peaceful reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign intervention. This also we could accept if it be clearly understood that conditions must first be created both in the North and South that will make it possible for truly free elections to be held.

It is in the third point that the core of the Communist position is disclosed. That point provides that "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front."

To understand the significance of this point, it is necessary not only to examine what is meant by the "program of the National Liberation Front" but to explore somewhat further the character of the front itself and the purposes it serves in the tactics of the North Vietnamese regime.

Let us turn first to the front itself. Both Hanoi and Peiping have made clear again and again—and they have been joined in this by other Communist powers—that negotiations will be possible only when the United States recognizes the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people."

What are the implications of this proposal and why are the Communists urging it so insistently?

The evidence is overwhelming that the National Liberation Front is exactly what its name implies—a Communist-front organization intended to give support to the deliberate fiction that the war in Vietnam is an indigenous revolt. The front is, as the facts make clear, an invention of the Com-

munist Party of North Vietnam, to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the south.

As I have noted earlier, the front was created by the North Vietnamese Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after North Viet Nam's military leader, General Giap, announced: "The north is the revolutionary base for the whole country." The individuals proclaimed as leaders of the front are not personalities widely known to the Vietnamese people, either in the north or in the south. To suggest that they represent the aspirations of the Vietnamese people is absurd. The significant fact is that at no time has any single individual of political significance in South Vietnam adhered to the front or to its policies. While some Vietnamese leaders and groups may differ among themselves on how the country is to be led, none of them differs on the fact that the front does not speak for them.

In 1961 Hanoi sought to strengthen the fiction of the front's indigenous origins by creating a seemingly independent Communist Party as the principal element of the front. It therefore established the People's Revolutionary Party. A secret Lao Dong circular dated December 7, 1961, advised party members that "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam unified from north to south under the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho * * * during these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose."

The People's Revolutionary Party has not concealed its role in the front. It has frankly stated that it is the dominant element. On February 15, 1961, the Vietcong Committee for the South went even further, stating that in time the Communist Party would "act overtly to lead the revolution in South Vietnam." In other words, the Communists have told their followers that, at the proper moment, they would emerge from cover and cast off the disguise of the National Liberation Front.

And so the Communists have a clear purpose in insisting that we recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. For them this is not a procedural question but a major question of substance. They insist on our recognition of the front as the sole spokesman for the people of South Vietnam since our acceptance of the front in that capacity would in effect mean our acceptance of the Communist position as to the indigenous nature of the conflict and thus our acceptance of a settlement on Hanoi's terms—which would mean delivering South Vietnam into the control of the Communist north.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not asserted nor do we assert an unreasoning attitude with regard to the front. The President said in his state of the Union message, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points, or 14, or 40—and we will consider the views of any group"—and that, of course, includes the front along with other groups.

To the extent then that the front has any validity as a representative of a group, the views of that group can be heard and the issue of the Liberation Front should, as the President has said, not prove "an insurmountable problem."

It remains a problem only because Hanoi insists on using it to establish its own substantive position—that the front represents the hopes and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people—and hence should control them.

The significance of this issue is clearly seen when one examines the so-called program of the National Liberation Front, as it was announced from Hanoi on January 29, 1961, and revised and amplified in a second publication on February 11 that same year. The first point of this program discloses the full Communist intention. It calls for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the establishment of a coalition government from which the government in Saigon would be totally excluded.

In other words the Hanoi regime is demanding the following preconditions to which the United States must agree before the Communists will even condescend to negotiate:

First, that the South Vietnamese Government be overthrown;

Second, that the Liberation Front, the creature and agent of Hanoi, be accepted as the sole bargaining representative for the South Vietnamese people;

Third, that South Vietnam be put under the control of a coalition government formed by the Communists and from which the South Vietnamese Government would be excluded.

May I conclude, therefore, Mr. Chairman, with certain simple points which are at heart of the problem and at the heart of U.S. policy in South Vietnam.

1. The elementary fact is that there is an aggression in the form of an armed attack by North Vietnam against South Vietnam.

2. The United States has commitments to assist South Vietnam to repel this aggression.

3. Our commitments to South Vietnam were not taken in isolation but are a part of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace.

4. The issue in southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear that the United States keeps its word wherever it is pledged.

5. No nation is more interested in peace in southeast Asia or elsewhere than is the United States. If the armed attack against South Vietnam is brought to an end, peace can come very quickly. Every channel or forum for contact, discussion, or negotiation will remain active in order that no possibility for peace will be overlooked.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
RETIRED

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee for your willingness to hear my views on the situation in South Vietnam. I am afraid that they will not be new to many of you since you have often heard me express them in the days when I was an official of the Government. I agree thoroughly with the motivating purposes of these hearings; namely, to analyze the reasons why we are involved in South Vietnam, the importance of this involvement and the effectiveness with which we are dealing with the resultant problems. If my personal views can assist in clarifying these points, I shall be most happy to present them.

For the purpose of providing a basis for our subsequent discussion, with your permission I would like to make a continuous statement which will undertake to answer three basic questions.

First, what are we doing in South Vietnam?

Secondly, how are we doing it?

And, finally, can we improve upon what we are doing?

A simple statement of what we are doing in South Vietnam is to say that we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Vietcong, and Peiping. Opposing these Communist forces, in the front rank stand the Government and people of South Vietnam supported

primarily by the United States but assisted in varying degree by some 30 other nations.

The purpose of the Hanoi camp is perfectly clear and has been since 1954. It is to absorb the 15,000,000 people of South Vietnam into a single Communist state under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates in Hanoi. In the course of accomplishing this basic purpose, the Communist leaders expect to undermine the position of the United States in Asia and to demonstrate the efficacy of the so-called war of liberation as a cheap, safe, and disavowable technique for the future expansion of militant Communism.

Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms: "Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." This has been our basic objective since 1954. It has been pursued by three successive administrations and remains our basic objective today.

Like the Communists, we have secondary objectives derived from the basic one. We intend to show that the war of liberation, far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure. We must destroy the myth of its invincibility in order to protect the independence of many weak nations which are vulnerable targets for subversive aggression—to use the proper term for the war of liberation. We cannot leave while force and violence threaten them.

The question has been raised as to whether this clash of interests is really important to us. An easy and incomplete answer would be that it must be important to us since it is considered so important by the other side. Their leadership has made it quite clear that they regard South Vietnam as the testing ground for the war of liberation and that after its anticipated success there, it will be used widely about the world. Kossygin told Mr. Reston in his interview last December: "We believe that national liberation wars are just wars and they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers." Before him, Khrushchev in January 1961, had the following to say: "Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with peoples waging liberation struggles." General Giap, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese forces, has made the following comment: "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world." The Minister of Defense of Communist China, Marshal Lin Biao, in a long statement of policy in September 1965, described in detail how Mao Tse-tung expects to utilize the war of liberation to expand communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

These testimonials show that, apart from the goal of imposing communism on 15 million South Vietnamese, the success of the war of liberation is in itself an important objective of the Communist leadership, on our side, we can understand the grave consequences of such a success for us. President Eisenhower in 1959 stressed the military importance of defending southeast Asia in the following terms. He said: "Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hun-

dred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process which could as it progresses have grave consequences for the forces of freedom."

Now, this view has often been referred to as the "domino theory." I personally do not believe in such a theory if it means belief in a law of nature which requires the collapse of each neighboring state in an inevitable sequence, following a Communist victory in South Vietnam. However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Vietnam, if the war of liberation scores a significant victory there. President Kennedy commented on this danger with moving eloquence: "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East—the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides."

Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Vietnam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been taking sides in a cause in which we have a vital stake.

My second question was, How are we doing in the pursuit of our objectives in South Vietnam? Both sides in the struggle have over the years developed the current strategies which are now in confrontation.

During 1964 and 1965, the Hanoi leadership attempted to exploit the political turbulence which followed the fall of President Diem in November 1963. Greatly encouraged by the disorder which marked the political scene in Saigon, the Communist leadership made a massive effort to press on to victory. To meet the growing needs in military manpower, they began the infiltration of personnel of the North Vietnamese Army, first as individual replacements, later as formed tactical units. Utilizing this new strength, they intended to make the monsoon offensive of 1965 a major drive for significant military victories.

Concurrently, they increased the sabotage directed at the land communication system in South Vietnam for the purpose of hampering the distribution of commodities and thus adding to the economic stresses in the south.

Terrorism was stepped up and directed with added frequency at U.S. personnel and installations. They apparently hoped to be able to seize and hold politically important localities such as district and provincial capitals, to demoralize the Vietnamese people and Government, and to demonstrate to the United States that we were backing a cause which must inevitably fail.

Faced with this growing threat, the Vietnamese Government and our American officials were obliged to develop a counterstrategy to blunt and defeat the intensified efforts of our adversaries. It evolved out of the experience of the preceding months and years and assumed its full form with the critical decisions in 1965 to introduce U.S. ground forces and to initiate the bombing campaign against military targets in the north. Both of these courses of action had been under consideration at least since November 1961, when I presented my report to President Kennedy following a visit to Saigon to appraise the growing criticality of the situation there.

We did not take either action at that time but my report contained the following com-

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ment with regard to the possible necessity of using airpower against the source of the Vietcong support in North Vietnam. I quote: "While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken now, I would not suggest that it is the final word. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary."

"Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of the aggression after the fact that external aggression is clearly established?" By February 1965, it became clear that we could no longer tolerate this clandestine support from the immune sanctuary in North Vietnam which served as the external base for the Vietcong insurgency.

In brief, the strategy which we have been and are pursuing consists of four components. The first includes the many activities directed at increasing the effectiveness of our ground combat against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam. For this purpose, we have made the utmost efforts to increase the indigenous forces of South Vietnam always mindful that this is a Vietnamese war in which we should do only those things which the Vietnamese cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time to avert defeat.

From July 1964 to July 1965 the armed forces and police of South Vietnam were increased by some 140,000 trained men, a very creditable effort on the part of this small country where military leadership and administrative experience are inevitably in short supply. As of today, the overall military strength in South Vietnam is approaching 700,000, the largest military force in being among all of our allies, worldwide.

Encouraging though the results have been in increasing the Vietnamese strength, during the year cited, our intelligence authorities believed that the Vietcong increased their total strength by some 60,000. In other words, we are advancing at a rate only a little better than 2 to 1 in our favor.

Since history has shown that the Government forces successfully opposing a guerrilla insurgency in the past have required a much greater preponderance of strength, 10 to 1 or 12 to 1 for example, it was quite clear the Vietnamese could not raise forces fast enough to keep pace with the growing threat of the Vietcong in time. It was this sobering conclusion that led to the decision to introduce American ground forces with their unique mobility and massive firepower to compensate for the deficiency in Vietnamese strength. With such forces available, it was felt that the ratios of required strength cited above would lose much of their validity.

I am thoroughly, Mr. Chairman, aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American troops in South Vietnam. Is this an endless requirement in an open-ended war? I do not believe that anyone can give a completely satisfactory reply to this question but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on the matter.

First, on our side, we are not setting as an objective for our ground forces the occupation of all South Vietnam or the hunting down of the last armed guerrilla. We are in Vietnam to safeguard the people who are the real target of the enemy. Terrain has little meaning except insofar as it supports people. Thus the extent of control and protection of population is the true measure of progress rather than control of territory. By the former indicator we are not doing too badly.

Senator MANSFIELD estimates in his recent report that the Government controls about 80 percent of the population, the Vietcong about 22 percent, leaving 18 percent contested. When I left Saigon last July, those figures were 53, 25, 22 percent.

The point I wish to make is that when one expresses our military objective in terms of securing a high proportion of the population, the troop requirement loses some of its impression of open-endedness. Under this concept, the prime target of our U.S. forces becomes the mainline enemy units which constitute the greatest threat to population—not the entire guerrilla force wherever found.

Another limiting factor is the logistic difficulty of the Vietcong in supporting increased numbers of troops in combat. The combination of air attacks on their lines of supply and of increasing ground attacks on their units which must then consume supplies at an increased rate places some kind of ceiling on the forces they can maintain in South Vietnam.

I wish I knew exactly where that ceiling is but our basic data on Vietcong logistics are too uncertain to permit precision. But the point is that there are factors which tend to keep our troop requirement finite and limit the capability of Hanoi to support large numbers of additional forces in the south.

The second component of our strategy relates to the use of air power against military targets in North Vietnam. It is well to remind ourselves the reasons which impelled us to this decision. There were three which we recognized perfectly at the time of the decision and which remain valid today. The first was to give the people of South Vietnam the assurance for the first time of imposing a direct penalty on the source of the aggression. For 11 years they had suffered the depredations of the Vietcong without exacting any price from the country which provided the direction and support. The morale of the people and that of the armed forces in Vietnam received an inestimable lift from the decision to use the air forces of both our countries against military targets in the homeland of the enemy—a lift which has certainly contributed to sustaining their will to continue the fight.

The second reason for the decision was to use air power, insofar as it could be effective, to limit and render more difficult the infiltration of the men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. It was perfectly clear from the start as it is clear today that air power would not be able to stop infiltration. We were quite sure, however, that it could impose a ceiling on the forces which could be sustained in combat in South Vietnam. I do not believe that anyone who has reflected on the effect of the destruction of bridges, ports, railroads, and similar facilities, and on the effect of the limitation of daylight movement on the roads throughout a large part of North Vietnam can avoid the conclusion that the air campaign has had an important effect in slowing down infiltration and in raising its price. A testimonial to its effectiveness was the feverish activity in North Vietnam during the bombing pause to repair bomb damage and to move transport in daylight.

The third reason for the decision to use our airpower was to provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Vietcong insurgency.

In spite of their defiant statements of determination to endure these attacks forever, I for one know from experience that no one derives any enjoyment from receiving incoming shells and bombs day after day and I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the leadership of Hanoi. In a very real sense, the objective of our air

campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership.

We hope that, in due course, the combination of the Vietcong failure to win victory on the ground in South Vietnam and the effect of continued air attacks will present to the Hanoi leadership a situation so disadvantageous that they will decide that it is in their interest to halt their aggression, redefine their aims, and join with us in discussing ways and means of improving the lot of all Vietnam.

The third component of our current strategy includes all of those nonmilitary activities which are so important but which receive too little public attention. It is not that our leaders have been unaware of the importance of better government, better living conditions, and the promise of a better future for the people of this country. Unfortunately, lack of insecurity and governmental instability were for a long time factors limiting the effectiveness of the many programs for development and reconstruction. But now, with the growing military effectiveness of our forces on the ground and the slowly developing maturity of the civil leadership in Saigon and in the provinces, I hope that conditions will permit much greater progress than in the past in bringing the benefits of a comparatively normal life to this war-weary people.

As you know, the recent Honolulu Conference devoted most of its time to a consideration of these nonmilitary activities. If we are to leave a viable country after the end of the Vietcong insurgency, it is essential that we make progress even under the conditions of war in stabilizing the Government, the society, and the economy.

The fourth component of our strategy is that which relates to our political and diplomatic efforts to initiate the discussion of a peaceful settlement of this conflict.

The so-called peace offensive is so well known as to require no discussion at this time, as is also the discouraging lack of response from the other side.

I am obliged to feel that the Hanoi leadership is not yet convinced that it must mend its ways. Perhaps they still hope for some kind of military victory in the south. Certainly, they are not convinced that in some way the United States cannot be detached from the support of South Vietnam. They hope against hope that through international or domestic pressures our Government can be forced off course.

They have not forgotten that the Viet Minh won more in Paris than in Dienbienphu and believe that the Vietcong may be as fortunate in Washington. They doubt the will of the American public to continue the conflict indefinitely. In a contest of patience, they expect to win even though North Vietnam like the south has been constantly at war for over 20 years. Until it becomes perfectly clear to them that we are going to stay on course regardless of anything they can do, I am afraid we are not likely to see them at a conference table. Or if they come unconvinced of the inevitability of the failure of their present course, we can expect them to stall, delay, and maneuver just as they did at Panmunjom in Korea for over 2 years.

In summary, then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Vietnam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Vietnam, to stabilize the political, social and economic systems in South Vietnam and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict.

It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces employed, and as to targets attacked.

All parts of it are interrelated; all parts are indispensable; we must be successful

on all fronts. The key, I believe, is inexorable pressure at all points, directed at the will, the ability and the means of the Communist aggressors.

It is a fair question to ask, whether this is the best strategy to attain our basic objectives. I am the first to concede that we can and must do better in all four categories of our efforts and, unhappily, progress toward peaceful negotiations is a bilateral affair which can progress only with some cooperation from Hanoi. As you know, thus far that cooperation has been withheld.

Having conceded the need and possibility for improvement within the components of our current strategy, I must add in honesty that I know of no new strategic proposal which would serve as a better alternative to the one which I have described—that is, provided we do not sacrifice our basic objective. There are, of course, the two alternatives which we have always rejected and I hope will continue to reject—to withdraw and give up our basic objective or to widen the war by massive air attacks on the North Vietnamese or even on Chinese targets. These two courses of action appear so to contravene our national and international interests that I shall not take the time of the committee to discuss them here.

The only new proposal of which I am aware is the so-called holding strategy which, in its least extreme form, calls for a cessation of U.S. reinforcements and a limitation of military operations to those necessary for the security of our forces and for the maintenance of our military presence. On several occasions, I have expressed myself in opposition to such a course of action. To button up our troops in defensive positions and thus to the sacrifice of their unique attributes of mobility and fire power would constitute the abandonment of our allies on the battlefield and would assign a most inglorious mission to our troops who, for the present, have high morale and complete confidence in their ability to cope with the Vietcong in the field. The effect of such behavior on our Vietnamese allies could be disastrous. At a minimum, it would destroy all confidence in Vietnam in ultimate success and would encourage the timid and the wavering to turn to the Vietcong for protection and to the Liberation Front for political accommodation. Another serious result of such passivity would be the impossibility of obtaining honorable terms at any peace table.

The Communists are tough enough to deal with when one has the upper hand. They would never give us acceptable terms if the military situation reflected weakness on our part and a readiness to withdraw. Our only alternative would be to accept dishonorable terms or to continue to sit out the war indefinitely on a supine defensive. I can hardly see the American public or this Congress long supporting such a course of action. Thus, I am obliged to conclude that the so-called holding strategy is really not an alternative way of reaching our objective of an independent South Vietnam free from attack. We could never reach it on such a course. Rather than being a true alternative, it amounts to the modification and erosion of our basic objective and hence appears to me to be unacceptable.

In conclusion, I feel that our present strategy is the best that has been suggested and that it is important that we adhere to it, always striving to improve our performance within the confines of its general concept. Certainly it is not without risks—but little of value in this world is accomplished without risk. It seems to me that the risks entailed are warranted by the importance of our stake in southeast Asia. Congress recognized this importance in the wording of the joint resolution of August 1964: "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance

of international peace and security in southeast Asia." I subscribe to these words and believe that we should live by them and by the words of President Johnson when he said in regard to our commitment in South Vietnam: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Taylor.

IN TRIBUTE TO JAMES P. POPE

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the late James P. Pope is remembered as a fine U.S. Senator from Idaho. But many do not realize that this public-spirited man went on to help to direct the Tennessee Valley Authority for many years, following his service in the Senate. Three newspapers of the Tennessee Valley paid editorial tribute to his work as TVA Administrator last month. I ask unanimous consent that the three editorials be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Nashville (Tenn.) Tennessean, Jan. 26, 1966]

HE LEAVENED THE TVA LOAF

The death of James P. Pope, for 14 years a member of the Tennessee Valley Authority Board, will recall for many in the Tennessee Valley the period in TVA's history when most of its great decisions were made.

The former U.S. Senator from Idaho was appointed to the TVA Board only a few months before the sale of Commonwealth & Southern properties to a partnership of Tennessee cities and the TVA.

Many thought after the Pope appointment that the late President Roosevelt simply was reserving a TVA Board seat as a sinecure for a lame duck Senator. But Mr. Pope proved to be an active, able Board member.

He played a sizable role in all the decisions, from buying out the power companies to planning the steam plants and obtaining congressional approval for them.

At a time when half a dozen bright young innovators were calling the signals, making the scores and grabbing TVA headlines, he was the quiet, effective linebacker who worked with the staff and made sure smaller chores were handled so well.

Most of the men who are running TVA today will recall with some tender feeling how Mr. Pope managed always to obtain spectacular achievements.

In an organization as large as TVA it is always the Jim Popes who provide the sound judgment and inspiration that leads to success. His stewardship as a TVA Board member is one of the big answers for those always asking how TVA manages to retain so many capable young men to fill top jobs as senior administrators retire and leave the Agency.

[From the Knoxville (Tenn.) News-Sentinel, Jan. 25, 1966]

JAMES P. POPE

A cotton-picking champion in Louisiana who was elected U.S. Senator from Idaho, an advocate of the liberal money policies of the New Deal who was also an ardent conservationist, a youth who bicycled over Europe and later become a director of TVA—these are but some of the facets of the life of James Pinckney Pope.

Death has come to him at 81 and he will be remembered. For in this age of conformity few who follow him will live as varied a life or take part in as many civic and socially uplifting enterprises.

[From the Birmingham (Ala.) News, Jan. 28, 1966]

JAMES P. POPE

None in areas near or in Tennessee Valley Authority service districts should let pass the death of James P. Pope—not without saying a thank you in obituary.

Mr. Pope, a former Idaho Senator, was a member of the TVA Board of Directors from 1939 to 1953 by appointment of Franklin D. Roosevelt. That was a period when TVA did a very great deal to improve its operations and directly to benefit the peoples of Alabama's Tennessee Valley and other areas.

Mr. Pope had had a distinguished and even a brilliant career before such appointment. But in the TVA area generally he will be remembered as one who understood the authority and sought earnestly to benefit people through it.

WEATHER MODIFICATION

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the State of South Dakota is not the most arid State in the Nation, nor does its economic development and population growth threaten it with serious water crisis as early as some other States with greater average rainfall.

South Dakotans have always lived with water stringency and with a consciousness that water limits our agricultural development and our economic growth. We have never had so much water that we regarded it as a free and inexhaustible resource as air was once universally regarded.

As a consequence of living always with "just enough," and often less than that, the recent scientific reports on weather modification have been of major interest in my State, as was the introduction of the weather modification bill, S. 2875, on which I joined with Senator CLINTON ANDERSON and other Senators.

Indicative of the interest in South Dakota in the proposal is the lead editorial which appeared in the Aberdeen, S. Dak., American-News on February 8. I ask unanimous consent that it appear in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IMPROVED WEATHER WOULD AID SOUTH DAKOTA

South Dakotans, who remember the pioneering work accomplished by the late Senator Francis Case, of this State, in weather modification, are happy that Senator GEORGE McGOVERN is active in the same field.

Senator McGOVERN and Senator CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Democrat, of New Mexico, have introduced a bill to encourage weather modification research. They were both reared in South Dakota where rainfall is sometimes short and hail storms are a threat to crops and property.

The Anderson-McGovern proposal is a congressional response to 2 top scientific panel reports recommending accelerated weather modification studies, one by a group of 11 top atmospheric scientists for the National Science Foundation and the other by a similar panel of 14 scientists for the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.

Although some scientists have in the past disputed the scientific validity of weather modification efforts, the two panels, in their separate reports, unanimously agree that there is now valid and significant scientific basis for claims to increased rainfall and had suppression resulting from cloud seeding. The Science Foundation panel said these re-

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a member of the Alabama Democratic Executive Committee, and in 1920 he was a delegate from Alabama to the National Democratic Convention at San Francisco.

During his service in the House, Miles Allgood was indefatigable in his work for the people of his district, and of Alabama, and the Nation. No one had to question where he stood, because he always stood for the people and for the best interest of our country. Though the range of his interests and efforts was the range of the needs of our people and the strength and progress of our country, Miles Allgood can best be identified with his work to develop the water resources of our country. He served on the House Irrigation and Reclamation Committee every one of the years he was a Member of Congress. During this time, some of the most monumental reclamation programs in the history of our country were either carried out or conceived by our Government. Great projects such as the construction of Hoover Dam to impound the waters of the Colorado River to generate electric power and to serve irrigation and industrial needs, and the legislation to comprehensively develop the Columbia River Basin, including the construction of the mighty Grand Coulee Dam, are two examples of the magnificent accomplishments of the committee while Miles Allgood was a ranking member of the committee and most active and influential in its accomplishments.

From his service on the Irrigation and Reclamation Committee, Miles Allgood developed a special knowledge and understanding of the importance of developing the water resources of Alabama. He recognized that major opportunities for growth and economic progress centered upon the comprehensive development of river basins. He was among those of us who had advocated peacetime generation and disposition of electric power at Wilson Dam and the steamplant and the operation of the nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals, Ala. Miles Allgood and I accompanied President Franklin Roosevelt on his historic trip in 1933 through the Tennessee Valley, which included the inspection of the idle Wilson Dam and nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals. As a farmer and former commissioner of agriculture and industries in Alabama, Miles Allgood could readily foresee the great benefits to our farmers and to American agriculture in the production of fertilizers at the Muscle Shoals properties. As author of the legislation in the House which established the Tennessee Valley Authority, I well remember what a strong ally and supporter Miles Allgood was of the measure and how we stood shoulder to shoulder on the floor of the House in our battle to gain its passage. He was present at the White House when the bill was signed into law, and President Roosevelt presented him with one of the pens used in the signing ceremonies in recognition of his efforts.

We all know how much TVA has meant to the development of the Tennessee Valley and to our country, both in times of war and peace. We know that the capacity of TVA to supply electric power

was a major factor in locating the first atomic fission plant in the valley and our winning the race with the Axis powers to construct the first atom bomb and hasten the end of World War II and our victory.

After leaving the House in 1935, Miles Allgood served as a member of the Farm Security Administration until he retired on December 1, 1943, culminating more than 40 years of public service.

Let me say, Mr. President, that serving one's fellow man is not an unusual characteristic of Miles Allgood and his family; in fact, it could be easily said that service to mankind is the family credo. Miles' great-great-grandfather came from England and settled in Virginia before the Revolutionary War. His grandfather settled in Blount County, Ala., in 1836. His father, Dr. W. B. Allgood, was a Confederate soldier and practiced medicine in Alabama for 50 years. An uncle, Stephen C. Allgood, was a minister of the Gospel. One of Miles' brothers, Will B. Allgood, was State Treasurer and State Auditor of Alabama. Another brother, R. V. Allgood, was an outstanding educator, and his son, Clarence, is today a Federal judge for the northern district of Alabama. His third brother, Homer W. Allgood, practiced medicine in Birmingham for many years and his son, Homer, is also a physician.

Mr. President, Miles has always seemed so young, so active, and so energetic that it is difficult to realize that this year he reaches pier 88 and that next year he and Mrs. Allgood, the former Miss Willie Fox of Montgomery, will celebrate their golden wedding anniversary.

I take great pleasure in warmly congratulating Miles Allgood on the occasion of his 88th birthday, and I know the Senate will wish to join me in sending him best wishes for many more years of continued good health and happiness.

A CALL FOR UNITY

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the people all across this land are backing the administration in its determination to give our soldiers in Vietnam the support they need to win a fight over the aggressors.

Once the Commander in Chief makes a decision, it is the inclination of the people to support him. President Johnson has made it perfectly plain that our fighting men are entitled to get the supplies and the support they need from the homefront. Because air strikes over North Vietnam will cut down on the ammunition that will be shot at our forces and their allies fighting in South Vietnam, it was necessary to resume the bombing.

As Newsday stated clearly in an editorial on January 28:

The President alone knows all the facts and has all the information available. He is well aware of the risk and hazards of war. When he decides, and however he decides, he should have unanimous backing.

The editorial was printed shortly before the announcement on the resumption of the air strikes was made, but because of its clear understanding of the issue it is timely. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the

RECORD for its lucidity and forthright stand on the issues at hand.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Newsday, Jan. 28, 1966]

THE LONELY DECISION

As of this morning, no bombs have dropped on North Vietnam for 36 days. That is a long time, long enough by reasonable standards for any government to decide whether it wants continued war or lasting peace. The Government of North Vietnam apparently has not made the decision to negotiate. Now the question is: should President Johnson order bombing resumed?

The Pentagon, apparently, has reluctantly concluded that bombing should resume, based on evidence that the North Vietnamese are using this pause to repair bridges and highways and to ship more troops and munitions into South Vietnam. Renewal of bombing, of course, is subject to the President's decision as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

On the other hand, some influential Democratic Senators are attempting to organize support in their own party and among Republicans for a continued postponement of bombing, their apparent theory being that time may help convince Ho Chi Minh to negotiate; and that, perhaps, Hanoi has to weigh out the argument between the doves in Moscow and the hawks in Peking before arriving at a decision.

Senator MIKE MANSFIELD of Montana, the majority leader, and Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, have advocated that the bombing suspension continue. Now six other Democratic Senators are pursuing the same course. An Associated Press poll of 50 Senators willing to express their views found them split evenly on the resumption of bombing. Yet, as Secretary of State Rusk has pointed out, the North Vietnam-sponsored Vietcong have kept right on exploding bombs and mines in South Vietnam, and exactly what's the difference?

So, as has been the case in every American war, the lonely moment comes when the man in the White House must weigh out the arguments, balance the alternatives, and make a decision. It appears his decision will be to renew the bombing since the lull has failed to produce any viable evidence that North Vietnam wants to talk peace. Whatever that decision may be, it should have the full support of the American people, including the Members of Congress. The President alone knows all the fact and has all the information available. He is well aware of the risks and hazards of war. When he decides, and however he decides, he should have unanimous backing.

WABASH VALLEY WATER CONSERVATION AWARDS

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, Eli Lilly & Co. was recently cited by the Wabash Valley Association for its outstanding and continuing efforts to prevent pollution of the Wabash River at its Tippecanoe Laboratories in Lafayette, Ind. This is the first time in its 9-year existence that the Wabash Valley Association, which has over 50 chapters in some 80 counties in Indiana and Illinois, has so honored an Indiana industry for its water conservation measures.

Eli Lilly & Co. has constructed waste disposal facilities at a cost of nearly \$2 million and an operational cost of some \$200,000 annually at its Lafayette plant which produces pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals. In addition, it

maintains a waste monitoring system, both upstream and downstream from the installation, checking carefully on the water purity at both points.

In addition to Eli Lilly & Co., the Wabash Valley Association also commended the Ayrshire Collieries Corp. of Indianapolis for its reclamation activities in the strip mines of Clay County, Ind.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed as part of my remarks articles from the Indianapolis News and the Terre Haute Tribune-Star which describe in further detail the awards made to these two Indiana companies.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Indianapolis News, Feb. 5, 1966]

COAL FIRM, LILLY GAIN VALLEY HONOR

OLNEY, ILL.—Eli Lilly & Co. was honored here today for its "outstanding efforts in handling waste materials" at its Tippecanoe Laboratories in Lafayette, Ind., and "its continuing efforts to keep the Wabash River clean."

The Lilly company is the first Indiana industrial concern to be cited for its water conservation efforts by the 9-year-old Wabash Valley Association.

The honor came at the annual meeting of the association at Olney. More than 1,000 association officers and members attended.

Also commended by the association was Ayrshire Collieries Corp. of Indianapolis. It was recognized for its strip mine reclamation work in Clay County.

The Wabash Valley Association has headquarters in Mount Carmel, Ill. It was organized in 1957 in an effort to educate citizens in proper water management and soil conservation. There are 58 association chapters in the 80 counties wholly within the Wabash Valley watershed.

Many Indiana and Illinois Senators and Representatives are charter members of the group. Its president is Robert Gramelspacher, Jasper, Ind., businessman and a former member of the Indiana House of Representatives.

The waste disposal system installed by Lilly at the Tippecanoe facility cost nearly \$2 million, and operational costs total more than \$200,000 annually. The company has an active waste monitoring program, both above and downstream from the plant, and monthly results are submitted to the Indiana Water Pollution Control Board.

The Tippecanoe Laboratories were established in 1954 with 35 employees. Employment today is more than 300. Seven employees operate the disposal system on a round the clock basis. The system is large enough to handle the disposal needs of a city with 60,000 to 70,000 population. This population is roughly that of the cities of Lafayette and West Lafayette combined.

[From the Terre Haute (Ind.) Tribune-Star, Feb. 6, 1966]

ELI LILLY AND AYRSHIRE GIVEN HONORS BY WVA

OLNEY, ILL.—Eli Lilly & Co. was honored here Friday for its outstanding efforts in handling waste materials at its Tippecanoe Laboratories in Lafayette, Ind., and its continuing efforts to keep the Wabash River clean.

The Lilly company is the first Indiana industrial concern to be cited for its water conservation efforts by the 9-year-old Wabash Valley Association. Four other companies with plants in Indiana and Illinois also received commendations.

The awards were made at the annual meeting of the association at Olney. More than 1,000 association officers and members attended the awards program.

The Wabash Valley Association has headquarters in Mount Carmel, Ill. It was organized in 1957 in an effort to educate citizens in proper water management and soil conservation. There are 58 association chapters in the 80 counties wholly within the Wabash Valley watershed.

Many of Indiana and Illinois U.S. Senators and Representatives are charter members of the group. Its president is Robert Gramelspacher, Jasper (Ind.) businessman and a former member of the Indiana House of Representatives.

Association awards were presented by Henry J. Wallace, first vice president.

In accepting the award for the Lilly company, Jerome J. Stefaniak, Ph. D., director of the Tippecanoe Laboratories, expressed his appreciation for the recognition. He pointed out that the achievements were made possible by the efforts of the engineering and technical staff, headed by Robert H. L. Howe, Ph. D., and the full cooperation of the group assigned to waste disposal.

The Wabash Valley Association's citation states:

"Eli Lilly & Co. has performed a meritorious service in its effort to prevent stream pollution to the best of its considerable ability. The design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Tippecanoe Laboratories in Lafayette, which are engaged in the production of pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, are an outstanding example of a modern corporation's efforts to live in harmony with its environment.

"As the laboratories were originally designated, adequate waste treatment facilities were included as part of the building program. As the operations have been expanded, so have the waste treatment facilities."

The waste disposal system installed by Eli Lilly & Co. at the Tippecanoe facility cost nearly \$2 million, and operational costs total more than \$200,000 annually. The company has an active waste monitoring program, both above and downstream from the plant, and monthly results are submitted to the Indiana Water Pollution Control Board.

The Tippecanoe Laboratories were established in 1954 with 35 employees. Employment today is more than 300. Seven employees operate the disposal system on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis. The system is large enough to handle the disposal needs of a city with 60,000 to 70,000 population. This population is roughly that of the cities of Lafayette and West Lafayette combined.

A second Indiana company to be commended by the Wabash Valley Association is Ayrshire Collieries Corp. of Indianapolis. It was recognized for its strip mine reclamation work in Clay County.

Illinois concerns honored for water pollution abatement are Marathon Oil Co.'s refinery at Robinson, Texaco's refinery at Lawrenceville, and American Machine & Foundry's wheel division at Olney.

GI EDUCATION—A GOOD INVESTMENT

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the cold war GI bill, approved unanimously by both Houses of the Congress, is a good "good investment" in the words of a recent editorial in the Billings, Mont., Gazette.

As a cosponsor of legislation in this area, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial in the February 16 issue be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GI EDUCATION A GOOD INVESTMENT

The cold war GI bill just passed by Congress recognizes the sacrifices made by servicemen in undeclared wars such as in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, but provides education, housing and health benefits regardless of whether a man has been in combat or not. The wisdom of the broad scope can be questioned, but education benefits are a way of rewarding the youths who cut short their scholastic career to serve in the Armed Forces.

Most of the \$327 million to be spent the first year is for payments of \$100 per month to cover college or vocational training, and by 1970 the yearly outlay is expected to reach \$494 million. Most young men enlist in their late teens and with only a high school education. The payments will be an inducement to continue their schooling after finishing their service and thus fit themselves for jobs which more and more call for training beyond high school.

An incidental benefit to the country is in the prospect of these rewards making military service more attractive and help the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps compete with private industry for manpower. Education aid is measured by the period of duty and the prospect of getting a college education in exchange for service in the Armed Forces should appeal to many a youth, who otherwise, for financial reasons, couldn't expect to go to college.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET CHESTER W. NIMITZ

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, the people of Hawaii were deeply saddened this past weekend by the death of the admiral of the fleet, Chester W. Nimitz. Hawaii owed this great naval officer a debt which it could never repay. The obligation was assumed at a point in space and time called the Battle of Midway.

But Midway was only one of the stars in Admiral Nimitz' constellation. There were many others—Coral Sea, the Marianas, Turkey Shoot, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, to name a few.

His staff bristled with the names of great fighting men—Halsey, Mitschner, Turner, Spruance, and Kincaid. There were many more. Before World War II ended, Admiral Nimitz commanded a fighting force of 2 million men and a thousand ships. Our Nation called on this man in its darkest hour. He took command of the Pacific Fleet December 31, 1941, but its fighting heart had been stilled at Pearl Harbor. Fortunately for us, Chester W. Nimitz never ran short of adrenalin. Slowly but surely, he began to rebuild our Pacific Fleet until it was able to sweep the enemy from the Pacific.

America will never forget his great deeds. Today we mourn his passing.

LAWYERS AND THE PEACE CORPS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Phillip D. Hardberger, Executive Secretary of the Peace Corps, has recently written an excellent article for the American Bar Association Journal. Pointing to several specific accomplishments, Mr. Hardberger describes the opportunities open to lawyers in the Peace Corps. He cites the work of two lawyers in Ethiopia, where the Peace Corps is now maintaining a law

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er into a walking radio station whose every word is broadcast to the snoopers.

One Government agency made arrangements with Washington trash collectors to turn in all the trash picked up at some 50 addresses. When Representative CORNELIUS GALLAGHER (Democrat of New Jersey), learned about it, he demanded an explanation from the Sanitation Department. Commissioner C. M. Duke wrote back that the trash was segregated "to determine from typical household units the characteristics of refuse for statistical and design purposes." He didn't explain why the trash for this study should be collected only from people under Federal investigation.

The Government also seems increasingly tempted to use its investigative powers to intimidate its critics. Many a newsmen after writing a critical article has suddenly become aware of Federal watchdogs sniffing his trail. Several citizens who wrote to President Johnson expressing sympathy for the Vietnam demonstrators received replies from the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department. A spokesman blandly denied this was an attempt to intimidate anyone. But Jack Ferris, Jr., of Chattanooga, who exercised his inalienable American right to call the President "tyrannical, dictatorial and domineering," was promptly visited by Secret Service agents.

Dr. Carlton Fredericks has felt the hot breath of the Federal Government on his neck ever since he started feuding with the Food and Drug Administration 17 years ago. The agency has called him "a crackpot, cultist, food faddist and dispenser of nutritional nonsense." Yet amazingly, it has never taken him into court to prove the charges but has tried his case instead in the newspapers. The record against him consists almost entirely of press releases. More than once, agents have raided food-supplement producers who had absolutely nothing to do with Fredericks; yet the press releases, announcing the raids, have been devoted almost wholly to attacks on him. Food and Drug officials have warned newspapers and radio stations against him, have enlisted the help of the Federal Communications Commission to drive him off the air and, of course, have initiated an investigation into his taxes. Laments Fredericks: "Food faddists have a right to their beliefs. They have a right to buy the foods they want. They should not be made half criminals."

\$2.35, PLEASE

One of the most insidious Federal weapons is the jeopardy assessment, which is supposed to be used to tie up the funds of taxpayers who might try to skip the country. Agents have used this power indiscriminately to force settlements out of reluctant taxpayers. In Missouri, one agent barged into a bank with a \$2.35 assessment on a businessman's account, though the agent could have collected the money merely by calling on the businessman a few doors down the street.

Noel Smith, a Taylor, Mo., farmer, had his funds tied up for 4 years after he refused to pay a \$570,000 tax claim. He was obliged to live off the proceeds of a business deal in Canada. The Government finally offered to settle the claim for less than 10 cents on the dollar. Though he stoutly insisted he didn't owe anything, he coughed up \$54,000 in order to get access to his own bank account again. He complained that the 4-year ordeal had ruined his reputation, broken his health and cost him \$1 million in lost profits. "If I had it to do over again," he says, "it would be easier to go to jail."

Several Government contractors complained to Parade that some agencies have become obsessed with audits and investigations. They have seized upon technical violations and treated respectable businessmen like criminals. In a case that has become all too typical, the Court of Claims recently

lectured a Federal contracting official for his arrogance and arbitrariness. "He nearly took a shillelagh and struck the contractor down," declared the court.

For many contractors, Government profits are no longer worth the harassment. More than one told Parade they would never bid on a Government contract again. A top General Services Administration official said he doesn't blame them. "We're fighting with every contractor we do business with," he said wearily.

STRONG ARM STUFF

Frequently Uncle Sam holds up payment until the contractor, desperate for money to meet his bills, settles for less than he was supposed to get. One contractor, in order to rush work on the Bomarc missile, lived for 4 months in a trailer and worked around the clock at the missile site. But the Government was in no such rush to pay him. Eight years after the contract was completed, he is still trying to collect what is due him. Worse, Uncle Sam doesn't hesitate to use criminal charges to coerce a contractor into accepting civil settlement. "You will find," said an attorney, "that a fraud investigation almost always follows civil dispute." S. Harvey Klein, a Philadelphia electronics manufacturer, got into a legal hassle with the Government over the termination of a contract. Not until he had rejected the Government's settlement offer did he find himself under investigation for allegedly filing a false claim.

The Brussel Sewing Machine Co. had a Government contract reviewed by the renegotiation board, which concluded that the company's profits had not been excessive. After the case was closed an informer charged that the company had overstated its estimated cost. Investigators immediately swarmed all over the company, and the Government filed a false-claim charge. Unimpressed with the Government's arguments, the court concluded that it wasn't "the intention of the statute [governing such contracts] to make dealing with the Government hazardous, should someone later conceive the notion that the Government had paid too much."

John A. Maxwell, a Michigan manufacturer, was actually fined \$30,000 and sentenced to a 3-year prison term because he followed the Government's own suggestion and filed estimated instead of exact costs. It had been agreed that the exact figure would be determined later. Though the Government had been a party to his act, it brought criminal charges against him for submitting estimated, hence false, figures. The appeals court found the Government's position so outrageous that it set aside the guilty verdict.

Most Americans look upon Uncle Sam as a benevolent big brother, which he usually tries to be. But lately our Federal uncle has been developing an alarming vindictive streak.

DON'T CUT LAND-GRANT COLLEGE FUNDS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the executive committee of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges said it was surprised and shocked at the 1967 budget cut of \$20 million in funds land-grant colleges use for teachers' salaries and research. So am I.

When instituted in 1890, the annual appropriations of funds for teachers' salaries were for the purpose of placing land-grant colleges on a firm instructional foundation "for as long as this Nation shall live," to quote the language of Congress. Seventy years later, in 1960,

Congress tripled the Federal funds, after reexamining the need for substantial Federal assistance. I call upon Congress to make its will felt again by restoring the nearly \$12 million cut from the budget.

Some may think such a small amount can make no substantial difference. After all, is not education a multibillion-dollar business, and have not the universities gotten substantial new Federal funds in recent years?

This thinking neglects the fact that the land-grant colleges owe their existence to the Morrill Act and have made these Federal funds bedrock foundations of their fiscal stability. If they had to get the same money from interest on endowment, an endowment of \$400 million would be required, according to the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges.

In many small colleges, the Federal funds constitute from 10 to 25 percent of the total budget. At the University of Idaho, they constitute about 7 percent of the instructional budget. At a meeting in Lewiston recently the president of the university, Dr. Ernest Hartung, said considerable harm would be done to higher education in Idaho in general, and to agricultural research, in particular.

This latter point is true because of a proposed reduction of \$8.5 million in research funds for the agricultural research stations of the land-grant institutions. The cut comes on top of an even larger reduction in research funds for the Department of Agriculture.

It means that two land-grant colleges, the University of Idaho and Washington State University, which are located within 9 miles of each other and cooperate on agriculture research, would lose more than \$166,000 in research funds at the very time the Western Wheat Quality Laboratory at Washington State is proposed for elimination.

In addition it is proposed that the county extension program which is run by land-grant colleges partly with Federal funds, be retroed to direct more resources to local income areas rather than spread it across each State. That seems like a good idea, but cannot we do both?

This Nation will spend at least \$15 billion this year, and perhaps \$20 billion next year, on the war in Vietnam. And Congress is being asked, at the same time, to authorize a new educational aid bill for foreign lands. I think we can forego new foreign aid programs for improved education abroad, if we must take needed money away from our colleges here at home.

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, in the February 24 issue of the Reporter magazine appears an excellent article by Douglas Pike analyzing the role of the National Liberation Front in the conflict in South Vietnam.

Mr. Pike, who has been actively studying the Vietnamese situation since 1960, points out that:

From an organizational standpoint, one of the great advantages the Vietcong enjoyed

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when the ombudsman takes up the investigation, for he knows that the ombudsman will give the matter his full and fair attention.

Yesterday's Parade magazine featured an article by Jack Anderson entitled "A New and Frightening Trend: Intimidation by Government." Mr. Anderson writes that in too many cases today, the investigatory agencies of our Government—such as the Internal Revenue Service—are using their power to "intimidate, coerce, and strike back at persons who challenge the rulings or oppose the policies of the Government."

Mr. Anderson suggests:

In theory an innocent man has nothing to fear from investigators but few have the resources or funds to stand up against relentless Government prying.

Mr. President, since my subcommittee started its investigation into invasions of privacy by snooping Government agencies, I have come to this very same conclusion. As Mr. Anderson points out, many innocent men have had their reputations ruined because of these investigations. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, I will continue to fight governmental invasions of privacy. But, if we create an American ombudsman, perhaps one of his functions will be to come to the defense of those citizens who have been wronged as a result of a coercive Government investigation. We intend to explore this with Mr. Bexelius next month. In the meantime, I ask permission to insert Mr. Anderson's timely article at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A NEW AND FRIGHTENING TREND: INTIMIDATION BY GOVERNMENT—WASHINGTON IS SWARMING WITH INVESTIGATORS READY TO HARASS THOSE WHO CHALLENGE THE UNITED STATES
(By Jack Anderson)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—In the tradition of the United States the Government's power of investigation is to be used for the good of the taxpayers, to ferret out the dishonest and the disloyal. But in all too many cases today this power is being turned against the citizens. It is being used to intimidate, coerce, and strike back at persons who challenge the rulings or oppose the policies of the Government.

A contractor who won't accept Government terms, a taxpayer who contests a Government ruling, even the associate of another person under investigation—all may now find themselves hounded by gumshoes. In one recent and ominous instance a number of persons exercising their constitutional right to protest the war in Vietnam were ordered investigated. In another case an official used the investigatory power as a club in a private squabble.

Of course, some of the targets of investigation are Reds, racketeers, and others not wholly deserving of sympathy. And in theory an innocent man has nothing to fear from investigators. But few have the resources or funds to stand up against relentless Government prying. Moreover, once investigators have come around questioning a citizen's neighbors and associates, a cloud of suspicion is raised that may never be dispelled. His reputation may be ruined even though he is innocent of any wrongdoing.

The coercive investigation, it should be noted, is not practiced in all cases by any means, nor is it followed by all Government

agencies. The examples remain in the minority. But they are multiplying alarmingly.

One reason is that the Federal bureaucracy is literally crawling with investigators who, if they are to earn their salaries, must investigate someone. Many agencies have become topheavy with investigators. No one can say exactly how many have found their way onto the Government payroll, for they are often camouflaged as attorneys, accountants, or consultants. But a top official of one Federal procurement agency confessed to Parade: "We used to have a large staff of engineers and a few lawyers and investigators. Now we have a large staff of lawyers and investigators and a few engineers."

Additionally, this has become an age of investigation, in which the routine background investigation has become accepted, and other forms of prying and snooping are widespread.

The policy of intimidation by investigation has many facets. A favorite harassment of investigators is to toss difficult cases, no matter how unrelated to taxes they may be, to the Internal Revenue Service. "A lot of other agencies try to use us," Commissioner Sheldon Cohen acknowledged to Parade. "We try to discourage this."

When the Government moved to take over private homes on military bases, owners who resisted complained that they were suddenly besieged by tax agents. The Justice Department's Land Acquisition Section brought tax pressure, for example, on Nashville builder, Edward Carmack, who was unwilling to sell 600 homes at Sewart Air Force Base, Tenn., at the Government's price. Ralph Luttrell, then section chief, admitted to Parade that he had drafted an official letter to Internal Revenue, pointing out the possibility of tax evasion in the Carmack case. The builder was subjected to an intensive investigation, which ended in dismissal of the charges. (A civil settlement is still awaiting the judgment of the tax court.)

One high official even used the Internal Revenue Service to take revenge on a driver whose car bumped his Cadillac at Washington National Airport. The official copied the license number of the other car, traced it to the owner, then ordered an investigation of his taxes.

Parade talked to several attorneys who defended clients in Federal cases. All but one complained of the Government's tactics. The most outspoken was Urbana, Ill., attorney, Joseph M. Williamson, who declared: "The Government is the most unfair and corrupt opponent that you will ever have in a courtroom. Federal agencies have conducted investigations of my clients that were unbelievably improper."

Certainly most Federal officials try to be fair. But the bureaucratic system tends to uphold the abuses of those few entrenched officeholders who regard themselves as the masters rather than the servants of the people. These latter usually are able to summon the massive weight of the U.S. Government behind their rulings and recommendations because most agency heads, unfamiliar with the details of a case, are inclined to accept the judgment of their subordinates.

And once investigators start bloodhounding a case, only the boldest bureaucrat would dare intervene. "This is the Age of Investigator," said one official. "The investigator is king."

"It isn't safe to stick your nose into an investigation," explained another. "What if the guy turns out to be guilty? The next thing you know, the inspectors will be trying to link you to the case."

BUCKPASSING

When one regulatory agency rejected an investigator's recommendation that a Connecticut company be indicted for fraud, the

investigator resubmitted his recommendation in stronger words. The commissioners, nervous that they might be accused of a whitewash, passed the buck to the Justice Department.

The case went to a U.S. attorney, who later admitted there was insufficient evidence for an indictment. But he didn't want to take the responsibility for overruling the agency. Playing it safe, he submitted the decision to a grand jury, which in turn felt he wouldn't have presented the case if an indictment weren't justified. Result: Company officials were duly indicted, though no one except the original investigator thought they deserved to be. The trial jury found them innocent—but not until they had gone through 2 years of mental anguish, Federal harassment, and legal expense.

How many individuals can stand up against the awesome power of the Federal Government? No private bank account can match the bottomless vaults of the Treasury. No private staff can marshal the manpower available to the Government. Once caught in the Federal vise, a private citizen must rely upon the restraint and fairness of the authorities to get an even break.

Some contend that the Government should offer no quarter to Reds and racketeers who will twist every comma in the Constitution to thwart justice. But others warn that any tactics the Government is permitted to use against them could be turned against anyone.

Many attorneys who would like to see Teamsters boss Jimmy Hoffa behind bars, for example, I believe the Government has carried its campaign to put him there too far. His every move has been shadowed, his every transaction scrutinized, his every associate investigated. Even two Congressmen who defended Hoffa on the House floor suddenly had their taxes audited.

The Justice Department has indicted some of his business associates, then offered to drop the indictments if they would testify against him. A Miami banker who had never been accused of anything worse than a traffic offense until he got involved in a deal with Hoffa, was hauled before a grand jury on tax evasion charges. The evidence wouldn't support a tax indictment, so the grand jury indicted him for perjury instead. Even this charge was later dropped. But meanwhile the banker was so discredited that he was forced to sell his banking interests at a sacrifice.

A Baltimore insurance man who did business with Hoffa was so harassed that he told Parade bitterly: "Five years ago I would have been willing to die for my country. Now I hate my country for what it has done to me."

There was sworn testimony, disputed by the Justice Department, that agents had even used voodoo in an effort to persuade Thomas Ewing Parks, an uncle of a Teamsters official, to testify against Hoffa. A Nashville voodoo doctor, Bishop St. Psalm, was allegedly retained to perform the mystic rites. He lit two candles on a portable altar, according to the testimony, then placed upon the altar an article of Parks' clothing borrowed from a dry cleaning shop. But the superstitious Parks, though a believer, apparently didn't respond to the voodoo spell.

Congressional investigators have turned up some astonishing facts about Government snooping. Investigators have planted secret microphones in everything from picture frames and desk sets to lamps and telephones. Listening devices have even been slipped into pillows for eavesdroppers who like pillow talk. Even more remarkable is a set of low-frequency coat buttons that can be fitted to a victim's coat in a matter of minutes. The top button is a microphone, the second a transmitter, the third a miniature battery unit. These will turn the wear-

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in earlier days was a deliberately clouded picture of its true character. Socially, politically, militarily, and diplomatically, Vietnam is one of the most complex countries of the 20th century. Given this condition, the Vietcong was able to build and maintain a reputation abroad for being more or less an "agrarian reform" organization when virtually no one in Vietnam ever regarded it as such.

Another point made in this article that reflects upon the nature of the NLF is the fact that while the Vietminh in their struggle against French colonialism received the support of many religious groups in South Vietnam, including the Catholics, none of these groups have come to the assistance of the Vietcong or the NLF.

And we should also take note of his analysis of any projected referendum in South Vietnam on the issue of a Communist government versus non-Communist rule. His projection that the Vietcong would be "lucky" to get 10 percent of the vote is very revealing in regard to the issue of whether or not this struggle is a bona fide civil war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOW STRONG IS THE NLF?

(By Douglas Pike)

SAIGON.—The Vietcong's National Liberation Front (NLF) received a strong boost from Hanoi on January 24 when Ho Chi Minh dispatched a form letter to leaders of the Communist nations. In it Ho characterized the NLF as "fighting to achieve independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and advancing toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland." He declared that "If the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the NLF as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam." This position is an exact restatement of the position Hanoi has maintained toward the NLF over the years. What it failed to take into account, however, was the changed condition of the apparatus in the south, upon which so much of the Communist effort in Vietnam depends.

On the morning of January 7, an episode took place here that serves to point up this change. A three-man Vietcong terror squad, led by a 36-year-old Vietcong activist named Nguyen Anh Tuan, loaded a 264-pound chunk of explosive plastic with detonator into the false bottom of a three-wheeled cycle cart and pedaled it downtown toward the Alabama Hotel, where several hundred U.S. troops are billeted. A few blocks short of the hotel the three were arrested by suspicious police. At a press conference a week later, Tuan told newsmen that his only regret in the affair was his failure to achieve his mission. Tuan's candid attitude and his unconcern over the danger to Vietnamese children in a school adjacent to the hotel ("Such deaths cannot be helped") struck newsmen here as a refreshing change from the hypocritical posturings of the Vietcong over the years. Here was the enemy as he really was: a true believer acting without remorse for his victims and stanchly refusing to hide behind the standard captured Vietcong prisoner's plea that he had been involved in the whole thing against his will.

Yet Tuan's act, even if he had succeeded, would not really have been responsive to the present needs of the Vietcong cause. A successful explosion at the Alabama would not have moved the Vietcong any closer to victory, but would only have hardened Ameri-

can and Vietnamese determination, as have similar bombings in the past. The Alabama effort, in fact, was an old reflexive response to new circumstances, a failure to consider the changes taking place on both sides. As such, it was symptomatic in many ways of the general condition of the Vietcong as it enters the sixth year of the war.

CHANGES FOR THE WORSE

The Vietcong have lost the close identification with the people that marked their earlier days. The ranks of the older Vietcong cadres (roughly equivalent to officers, but loosely used to set full-time trained professionals apart from local supporters) have been thinned. There is now a dated quality and an inadequacy about their efforts. The idealistic attraction has faded. Vietcong supporters now mutter guardedly about the "revolution betrayed," and splinter groups call themselves "true Communist revolutionaries." Individual cadres complain in reports that the villagers have "lost their revolutionary vigor" or have become "mere bourgeois revolutionaries content only with gains in land reform."

Chiefly this is the result of Vietcong actions: increased taxation, forced conscription, and the brutal and bloody measures stemming from the Vietcong's almost paranoid preoccupation with spies in its midst. The stepped-up air war also has had the effect of turning the villagers against the Vietcong. Instead of being their protector they now regard it as the magnet that attracts bombs and rockets and napalm from the air, and shells from distant artillery posts. The guerrilla war, once rooted in the people, has become a giant slugging match, and the ideals for which it claimed to stand—and which many Americans here in early days regarded with a certain sympathy—have been trampled under foot. Many changes have been taking place, of which the most significant involve Vietcong organization, cadres, and doctrine.

From an organizational standpoint, one of the great advantages the Vietcong enjoyed in earlier days was a deliberately clouded picture of its true character. Socially, politically, militarily, and diplomatically, Vietnam is one of the most complex countries of the 20th century. Given this condition, the Vietcong was able to build and maintain a reputation abroad for being more or less an "agrarian reform" organization when virtually no one in Vietnam ever regarded it as such.

The NLF, founded in 1960, can be traced back through its immediate precursor, the Viet Minh, to the Chinese Communist revolution. There are differences, to be sure, but there are also a host of similarities. The NLF organizers succeeded in enmeshing the rural Vietnamese villager in a network of "liberation associations" from which he has found no escape except to flee his village as a refugee. A pseudogovernment, an administrative liberation-association chain of command, was created, running vertically down from the NLF central committee to the village. At the village there was additionally a horizontal structure of liberation associations (at least six in each village: workers, farmers, youth, women, students, and cultural) as well as a tangled web of other social movements and organizations. All these were created ostensibly in the name of the villager and for his benefit. The farmer, for example, would get his own land, taken from the absentee landlord; women would get social status and equal rights with men, etc. Once recruited, the villager was told by the agitprop cadre that he must fight to defend the fruit of the revolution or lose his gains, which, specifically, meant taking orders from the cadres and contributing—financially and otherwise—to the cause. The villager thus found himself trapped in the organizational web, the victim of a campaign of social pres-

sure, persuasion, indoctrination, intimidation, or outright terror, usually in that order.

Over the years the NLF demonstrated an impressive internal cohesion. The chief credit for this goes to the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which acts like the reinforcing rods in a ferroconcrete wall. The PRP, which publicly refers to itself as the "Marxist-Leninist element of the NLF," was formed in 1962 to succeed the Lao Dong, or Communist Party in South Vietnam. For a graphic representation of their relationship, picture the NLF as a broad-based pyramid with the villages at the bottom and the central committee at the top, and the PRP as a thinner and harder core pyramid within, but also rising from base to apex.

Ample evidence of the nature and role of the PRP exists in its own published materials, captured documents, and defectors' testimony. For example, a "Party Training Manual for Cadres," dated October 1965, declares:

"The People's Revolutionary Party is the party of the laboring class which will lead the people of South Vietnam to final victory. * * * The party's objective * * * is to overthrow imperialism, colonialism, and feudalism, to make or remake a life of peace, prosperity, and happiness with no more oppression and extortion * * * to smash the United States and its feudal servants and liberate the south.

"Once independence is obtained," the manual continues, "the next step is unification [of the two Vietnams], constructed and consolidated in every way to make the country powerful and rich, a stronghold of peace. Then will come the social reorganization work, along Socialist-Communist principles: land without demarcations, cooperative electrification of the rural areas, reeducation of individuals, nationalization of private property, cultural and scientific education for everyone, all progressing day after day to better and better things in all fields. Also, helping other small, weak countries to struggle against imperialism."

The society envisioned by the PRP for South Vietnam is clearly a Communist one. Perhaps this is the reason that the elite in South Vietnam has refused to support or cooperate with it. Not one South Vietnamese political figure of any note has ever associated himself with the NLF, nor has any important member of any Saigon government ever defected. Religious leaders likewise have consistently refused to associate themselves with the movement, whereas the Vietminh was supported by many religionists, including Catholics.

THE KEYSTONE

The NLF leaders are obscure. The chairman of the central committee, Nguyen Huu Tho, was a Saigon lawyer who sat out the Vietminh war and first ventured into political activism in the early 1950's when he led an anti-U.S. demonstration in Saigon. Nguyen Van Hieu, the NLF's first secretary-general and single most important figure, was a Saigon journalist with neither status nor following when he joined the NLF. The present secretary-general, Huynh Tan Phat, an architect, was and still is largely unknown to the general Vietnamese population. The PRP leadership has always been exclusively northern or loyal to the North. Like the NLF, it built a tight cadre structure.

The cadre has been the workhorse of the Vietcong effort since its inception. The cadre is told, and it is true, that "On your shoulders rests the entire burden of the revolution." Even after years of sifting through captured cadre reports, one is still impressed by the incredibly heavy loads which the cadres are expected to carry.

For example, a recent central committee directive to district cadres informed them that during the following month they were to: "(1) Increase recruitment into the Lib-

eration Army by 25 percent; (2) Increase tax revenues in the district by 10 percent. * * * (5) Develop an intensive hate America campaign in your area. * * * (7) Eliminate all spies and reactionary (i.e., pro-government) persons in your area"—and so on, the listing continuing for a total of 17 items, any one of which would have occupied the full attention of a cadre for a month. At the end of the month, back goes the cadre's report, packed with statistics and evaluation. Then, a short time later, back down the line comes the "criticism memo." "Although you achieved your norms in items Nos. 1, 4, 7, 9, 11, and 17," it reads, "you were deficient and therefore must rectify * * * Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6."

The ideal Vietcong cadre is a person who can go into a Vietnamese village and deliver an impassioned speech that will bring the villagers to their feet shouting, an ability as rare in Vietnam as anywhere else. He must also be skilled in guerrilla tactics, especially the ambush. In the hands of the Vietcong, this basic tactical unit has become far more than simply two machineguns pointing down a road. It has emerged as a rather sophisticated form of warfare, involving many elements: a frontal force, a closing force, a reinforcement ambush force, and a pursuit ambush force, all employed according to terrain, weather, size of the enemy force, etc. An ambush becomes a deadly chess game, successful only if you outthink your enemy. It calls for a high order of skill, intelligence, and experience in leaders, again rare qualities anywhere.

Thus the cadre can be the strength and weakness of the Vietcong. And while the principle that by developing good lower level leadership an organization can become efficient and powerful is correct, it also follows that such an organization is extremely vulnerable if anything happens to its cadre structure. And this precisely is what has happened.

Over the past 5 years the Vietcong has lost, chiefly through battle attrition, about 6,000 cadres. This may not be excessive considering the magnitude of the Vietcong effort, but it represents an incalculable loss to the organization. Rank-and-file soldiers can be replaced, but loss of a cadre permanently damages the system. In fact, the genesis of Hanoi's deep involvement in the south can be traced to the cadre shortage. At first these were the so-called "regrouped southerners," Vietnamese who had gone north during Operation Exodus in 1954-55. Soon this relatively small reservoir was exhausted, and by mid-1964 the "pure" northern cadre started appearing in numbers in the south.

But the supply from the north could not keep pace with the rank-and-file buildup in 1965, when the Vietcong's strength was increased by some 20 percent. The overall quality of the cadre has continued to decline, damaging the effectiveness and efficiency of the entire movement. Unskilled, poorly trained leaders have been thrown into the breach, especially in the Mekong Delta. Being unequal to the task they face, they have increasingly alienated the people by what strikes the observer as unnecessary brutality in conscription and taxation.

Cadre morale itself is low, as is the morale of the Vietcong rank and file. The year 1965 had been billed as the year of victory for the Vietcong, but the year's end found the Vietcong further from victory than ever. Shortages in food, medicine, and almost all other supplies except ammunition resulted from the rapid expansion of manpower. Worse, the influx of northern cadres led to marked hostility on the part of the southerners, who resent the high-handed manner of the northerner, a feeling exacerbated by deep and long-standing regional prejudices. In fact, region in Vietnam is as important as caste is in India. Their arrival deeply eroded the

indigenous base of the NLF, for the northerner is totally loyal to Hanoi. Finally, the northern cadre has brought what historians may record as the most significant and disastrous change—that of doctrine.

DOCTRINE INTO MYTH

Vietcong theoreticians have traditionally held that there are three routes to victory: (1) the Khôi Nghia, or general uprising; (2) the famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary guerrilla war; or (3) coalition government.

Khôi Nghia is a social myth, in the Horellan usage. It is similar to and may have stemmed from the myth of the general strike, which was so powerful in early days of the Communist movement.

The myth is this: cadres, working through the various liberation associations and other social movements, arouse the social consciousness of the villager and engage him in a series of activities not unlike the civil-rights efforts in the United States, that is, mass meetings, demonstrations, protest marches, letters to district chiefs, and petitions, all lumped together under the term "struggle movement." Gradually this struggle movement will spread throughout the society and especially into the ranks of the South Vietnamese Army. Then, one morning, the whole country will explode and struggle movements will erupt simultaneously in all the 2,300 villages of the nation. At the same time the final disintegration of the army will take place and the soldiers will join the people en masse. No one will be left but a few imperialist lackeys in Saigon. With no opposition, the people will march to power.

This was the doctrine that dominated Vietcong thinking from 1960 to 1964. Basically a political or social strategy, it was not, however, regarded as bloodless; the Vietcong from 1958 to the present has assassinated or executed an estimated 61,000 Vietnamese village leaders and governmental representatives.

The Khôi Nghia strategy came perilously close to success with the widespread disorders and violence that developed during and after the last days of the Diem government, in late 1963 and early 1964. During that period the Vietcong stood at the gate of victory, but slowly its strength receded. The reasons are complex. Basically they stem from the new alignments and divisions of political power that emerged, involving the Buddhist leadership, students, Catholics, and of course the South Vietnamese military, all of whom had been relatively unimportant under the rigid controls of the Diem government. As a result, Khôi Nghia was abandoned by the leadership, although some of its forms still are practiced.

The doctrinal shift, which came in early 1964, was to the revolutionary guerrilla war of Mao Tse-tung and North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap. It was speeded and reinforced by the arrival of northern cadres, whose great political and military experience had been the Vietnam war against the French. Former southern Vietcong cadres who have quit under Saigon's chieu hoi (amnesty) program have described the transformation. One of them told me:

"The northerners said the idea of Khôi Nghia was all wrong, that the only way we could win was the way the Vietminh won, by building up our military forces, delivering military and psychological blows against the enemy, and finally fighting a new Dienbienphu and driving them into the sea."

FIGHTING THE WRONG WAR

The military doctrine continues to dominate the Vietcong, although chieu hoi returnees report that the whole concept of victory on the battlefield is being called into question in Vietcong ranks. Doubts are being raised as to whether the revolutionary guerrilla warfare techniques that won

against the French are still applicable to face an entirely new technology of warfare.

The Vietcong leadership recognizes the condition but refuses to accept it as serious. Captured documents refer to the problem of the helicopter, whose mobility has transformed the face of the war in Vietnam, or the problem of tactical air support and its ability to concentrate firepower. Or, most frequently, the problem of the high-flying bombers from Guam, against which the Vietcong are totally impotent. At criticism and self-criticism sessions, returnees say, high Vietcong officials try to convince skeptical cadres that these problems can be solved. To deal with the problem of the helicopter, they say to drive 16-foot bamboo spikes into the ground, thus preventing the helicopters from landing. To solve the problem of the B-52, dig air-raid shelters deeper than 15 feet (or, as one American facetiously advised, drive 16,000-foot bamboo spikes into the ground). To solve the problem of tactical airpower, they advise closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, or attacking in small units on many fronts rather than by massed frontal assault.

The Vietcong is obsessed with the airpower it faces. A significant percentage of Vietcong casualties now comes from the air. It was no accident that Radio Liberation, the Vietcong station, called the sabotage explosion at the Metropole Hotel in Saigon last December a blow against airpower: "More than 200 U.S. jet pilots were killed or wounded * * * bloodthirsty pirates who daily sow death in North and South Vietnam" (actually eight persons were killed, six of them Vietnamese; there were no pilots living at the Metropole, which is a billet for administrative and Medical Corps enlisted men).

The advice of the Vietcong officials adds up to little more than to make the best of a bad situation. But new secret electronic devices and other weapons are blunting or nullifying many formerly effective guerrilla tactics. In all likelihood, technology has made a Vietcong military victory impossible. Lower level cadres now know this. Probably the upper levels of the NLF and PRP in the South sense it. But apparently the leadership in Hanoi either cannot or will not face the obvious.

All along, the NLF has had a minority element which argued that the surest route to power was through the establishment of an NLF coalition with a Saigon government. This approach, it was argued, would call for a certain amount of social disorder of the Khôi Nghia type as well as some guerrilla warfare, but basically it would be the entering wedge of a move to bypass the enemy's military strength, use his own political disorganization to disorganize him further, and outflank the American presence. However, for any serious step toward coalition government, timing is all-important.

If the Vietcong had taken this route at the start and stuck to it, it might very well have succeeded. Now, however, after more militant means have failed, any suggestion of coalition government would probably smell of defeat and would be widely regarded as a sign of weakness by the Vietnamese.

All that remains of the idea of coalition government is the slender hope that some leverage for the NLF might be salvaged from a return to the Geneva accords. The possible outcome of any free election that might be held under such circumstances is worth examining. Of South Vietnam's 15 million people, slightly more than half are under 18 years of age, leaving a voting population of about 7 million, of whom perhaps 5 million could be expected to cast ballots. The Vietcong force consists of the following: 55,000 main force soldiers, the full-time, salaried military in formal units; about 115,000 guerrilla regionals or territorials, the so-called part-time guerrilla who fights and lives in

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his home territory; and about 45,000 political agitprop, tax collecting, indoctrination, training, and administrative cadres, many of whom are northerners. In addition there are 15,000 North Vietnamese Army troops in South Vietnam who are now arriving at the rate of about 4,000 a month; presumably some of these might vote. Behind this force are an estimated 500,000 true believers, persons who for one reason or another voluntarily supports the Vietcong cause and are willing to take risks to do so, as in hiding guerrillas, feeding them, and supplying information. This totals over 730,000. If one includes a quarter of a million additional votes from sympathizers, the Vietcong would get less than 1 million out of the 5 to 7 million votes cast.

This is a generous estimate. Others are less generous. A recent study of Vietnamese village attitudes indicates that 10 percent of the villagers are true believers, 20 percent waver between the Vietcong and the Saigon Government, while the attitudes of 70 percent range from a sort of determined neutralism to outright hostility toward the Vietcong. Using these figures, the Vietcong could only count for certain on its 10 percent, or 500,000 votes, plus some portion of the 1 million votes of the wavering 20 percent, depending on the campaign and circumstances. But this would leave it far short of anything like a majority.

Nothing at the moment indicates that the Vietcong leadership is willing to take its chances at the polls. The Vietcong does not have now, and never has had, the majority of the people behind it. It would be lucky to get 10 percent of the votes cast in an authentic election.

In sum, the Vietcong today finds itself in a doctrinal box with all three of its possible routes to victory—the sociopolitical, the military, and the diplomatic—closed to it. Consequently, it has fallen back on the sterile thesis of the protracted conflict that will be won because the enemy, the United States, will tire of the whole affair and withdraw. But this does nothing for its own morale. Guerrillas living in swamps, without adequate food or medical care, far from their families, cannot be expected to fight on indefinitely.

UN WHY WE ARE IN VIETNAM

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has now concluded its present series of hearings. We have heard many arguments for a continuation of present policy and for a modification of that policy.

In considering all the issues involved in the Vietnam conflict, we must never lose track of the central issue—why we are in Vietnam, and why we must stay there. My colleague, Senator McGEE, has had occasion to emphasize this central question. His remarks were hailed in editorial comment by the Wyoming Eagle on February 11.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial cited above be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CENTRAL ISSUE

Wyoming's senior Senator GALE McGEE has described as superficial many points of debate over Vietnam.

He called upon the Senate Monday to zero in on the central issue—"why we are in Vietnam."

He charged critics of the administration conduct in Vietnam were avoiding that issue.

He said they were using a series of "discursive arguments which question the efficiency or efficacy of a tactic or a battle plan or of the response or lack of response of diplomatic maneuvers in any one of a hundred areas."

He said superficial aspects of the Vietnam debate included—

"The question of how, whether, and when to conduct a dialog with the National Liberation Front;

"The question of the resumption of bombing across the 17th parallel;

"The hue and cry over whether or not we have reacted with hospitality and dispatch to the alleged peace feelers from Hanoi;

"Concern over the possibility that our actions will trigger the entry of Red China into this conflict;

"The implication that the efforts of our air arm in Vietnam were something less than effective;

"The contention among some that the Communists relaxed their activities during the holiday cease-fire and that somehow we had not adequately responded to that relaxation;

"The fact that we have, with the exception of New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea, received little in the way of direct help from our friends around the world."

We agree with Senator McGEE that much of the debate on Vietnam is superficial.

Almost daily, the press carries stories quoting someone who objects to some single action or decision, who criticizes some single statement or who finds fault with one little facet of a many-faceted problem, or who has an idea of how one phase of the situation should or should not be handled.

And there is no doubt these many side arguments tend to obscure the central issue of why we are in Vietnam and why we must stay.

In his state of the Union message a few weeks ago, President Johnson said the "most important principle of our foreign policy is support of national independence—the right of each people to govern themselves—and shape their own institutions.

"For peaceful world order will be possible only when each country walks the way it has chosen for itself."

The President observed that, more than 6 years ago, North Vietnam started moving soldiers and supplies into South Vietnam.

"As the assault mounted," he said, "our choice gradually became clear. We could leave, abandoning South Vietnam to its attackers and to certain conquest—or we could stay and fight beside the people of South Vietnam. We stayed.

"And we will stay until aggression has stopped.

"We will stay because a just nation cannot leave to the cruelties of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence on our solemn pledge—a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents.

"We will stay because in Asia—and around the world—are countries whose course of independence rests, in large measure, on confidence in American protection. To yield to force in Vietnam would weaken that confidence, undermine the independence of many lands, and whet the appetite of the aggressor. We would have to fight in one land, and then another—or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists.

"And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest."

The President reminded that "our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace."

There are those, in and out of Congress, who criticize President Johnson's policy in Vietnam.

But every poll that we have seen shows that the vast majority of the American people

are firmly behind him and in full support of his handling of the situation in Vietnam.

We suspect the majority of the citizens of this Nation are more realistic—more aware of the central issue—than many of the critics.

THE NEW PAX AMERICANA

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the obligations the United States has assumed under treaties with over 40 other countries are formidable, but apparently the U.S. obligation goes even further than we thought.

In the law of contracts it is elementary that if a number of people contract to do a certain thing together, and one or more of them default on their obligation, the contractual obligation is no longer binding on the others. Apparently this is not true of the international treaty obligations of the United States, because Secretary Rusk has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the United States has an obligation under the southeast Asia treaty to oppose aggression regardless of what other signatory nations do. One wonders why, if this is true, treaties serve any purpose other than providing a cover of legality for what the United States would do anyway.

This is but one of several aspects of Secretary Rusk's remarkable testimony which Columnist James Reston discussed in yesterday's New York Times. In it Reston writes:

The Rusk doctrine makes the Monroe Doctrine or the Truman doctrine seem rather cheap. Monroe limited his commitments to the Western Hemisphere. Truman wanted to oppose communism primarily by economic means. And even John Foster Dulles, who was not a timid man, thought each alliance should stand on its own terms and depend to some degree on what the other members of the alliance did.

Mr. Reston goes on to point out:

But the Rusk doctrine draws no distinction between powerful industrial democratic states in Europe and weak undemocratic states in Asia. His view seems to be that the United States must redeem the promises of every alliance it has signed regardless of what the other signatories do, and that failure to keep everybody's promise in one alliance will destroy the confidence of the world in all other alliances we have signed.

If this is true, it is odd that most of our allies in Europe, the Middle East and even in Japan are critical of our operations in Vietnam, but this is the thesis Mr. Rusk placed before the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the column, "Washington: The Rusk Doctrine," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON: THE RUSK DOCTRINE

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 19—Secretary of State Rusk has put a grim doctrine before the people of this country. He was a responsive and forthright witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and it is important that we understand what he thinks our duties and responsibilities are in the world.

First, in Vietnam, we are to commit to the battle whatever is necessary to end the aggression and bring about the freedom and security of South Vietnam.

What this means, he conceded, depends primarily on what the enemy commits (the Chinese committed 1 million men to the battle in Korea). He would not say there was no limit to the men and material the United States would send to Vietnam, but he stuck to his proposition that we would maintain military superiority there no matter long it took to stop the fighting.

RUSK'S OBJECTIVE

This objective, it should be noted, was not made conditional on what the South Vietnamese or any of the other allies contributed to the fighting. There is no longer much talk here of victory depending primarily on the South Vietnamese Army. Mr. Rusk discussed the freedom of South Vietnam as a vital American interest, essential to our own security and critical to all the other security commitments we have taken to over 40 other countries. This is a formidable doctrine.

Second, the Secretary of State gave an interesting interpretation of America's obligations as a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In the event of armed aggression against the territory covered by that treaty, he said, America's obligation to oppose the aggression did not depend on all the members agreeing to oppose it, but it was America's duty to do so regardless of what the others did (which in Vietnam is very little).

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

This did not mean, Secretary Rusk remarked, that the United States was obligated to oppose Communist aggression everywhere in the world or that we were going around looking for fights to put down. For example, we did not oppose Communist China's aggression in Tibet or the Soviet Union's aggression in Hungary, for we had not taken any commitment to do so, but this still leaves us with commitments the like of which no sovereign nation ever took in the history of the world.

For the United States is committed to oppose Communist aggression all along the periphery of the Communist nations from the North Cape of Norway through the heart of Europe to Greece and Turkey (NATO); along the southern frontier of the Soviet Union in the Near and Middle East (the Eisenhower resolution); and thence through southeast Asia (SEATO) to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. And if you add our obligation under the Organization of American States and our obligations under the United Nations, you take in most of the rest of the world.

The Rusk doctrine makes the Monroe Doctrine or the Truman doctrine seem rather cheap. Monroe limited his commitments to the Western Hemisphere, Truman wanted to oppose communism primarily by economic means. And even John Foster Dulles, who was not a timid man, thought each alliance should stand on its own terms and depend to some degree on what the other members of the alliance did.

But the Rusk Doctrine draws no distinction between powerful industrial democratic states in Europe and weak undemocratic states in Asia. His view seems to be that the United States must redeem the promises of every alliance it has signed regardless of what the other signatories do, and that failure to keep everybody's promise in one alliance will destroy the confidence of the world in all other alliances we have signed.

THAT BLANK CHECK

If this is true, it is odd that most of our allies in Europe, the Middle East and even in Japan are critical of our operations in Vietnam, but this is the thesis Mr. Rusk placed before the Foreign Relations Committee.

And the interesting thing is that the Senators cannot really do much about it, which accounts for all the frustration they have demonstrated on the TV screens in the last few days. For in the moment of crisis during the Communist attack on our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson asked for a blank check to deal with aggression all over southeast Asia—including the right to use any force "he" deemed necessary—and once he had published that request, the Congress had no choice but to grant it to him or—what was unthinkable—repudiate him in the face of the enemy.

THE SENATE'S DILEMMA

Nor can the Senate do anything to take back this promise under present circumstances. If Senator Morse presses his resolution to withdraw the Tonkin Gulf resolution, obviously few if any Congressmen are going to vote with him and turn their backs on the 200,000 Americans now fighting in Vietnam.

But their helplessness merely emphasizes the transformation that has taken place in American and world politics. The President, if he chooses his time carefully, can obviously get almost any commitment he likes from the Congress in the moment of crisis, and under the Rusk doctrine, we are then obliged to redeem each commitment, regardless of what the other parties to the agreement do, or risk the destruction of the entire system of American alliances created since the last war.

All this goes well beyond Vietnam in space and time. Mr. Rusk has asked the Senate to contain the expansion of communism all along the periphery of the Communist empire, by force of arms and without allies if necessary, and the Congress cannot oppose him in present circumstances without opposing its own men in Vietnam, which it obviously will not do.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business which is S. 2791.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2791) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the difficult problem which we face in southeast Asia, and the complex relationships that problem bears to U.S. foreign and domestic policies generally, is better understood today than it was a week ago, or a month ago. More of our people have an appreciation for the facts of international life than ever before. The high level and well-publicized debates and discussions in recent days have contributed vastly to a new growth of the national consensus that supports the

commitments we have undertaken over the years for peace and humanity.

Now, in my opinion, it is time for the Senate to agree to a rollcall vote, not later than Wednesday, day after tomorrow, on the pending bill which would authorize substantial new funding of the combat operations in South Vietnam. We can have this vote, and I am confident that it will be overwhelmingly favorable to these authorizations, and then get on with other very important business which is before the Congress.

The debate and discussion of our foreign and military policies have proceeded to the point where the voting can reflect the more mature, knowledgeable judgment of not only 100 Senators, but also the 194 million Americans we represent here.

Certainly some of the information developed in the frank discussions between Government leaders and the able committee members gave some information to our enemies we would rather have kept secret. But the value of this full-dress discussion with a few holds barred was worth much more to us than it could have been to the Communists.

To me it revealed that even the severe critics of the President's program in Vietnam had no alternative solution or solutions to offer. The main criticism was directed at the decision to undertake the task of protecting the human rights of the South Vietnamese in the first place. But the case remains overwhelming that we have no other course but to continue the war as we have been doing.

I am sure that the assurances given that no great escalation is planned and that no use of nuclear weapons is contemplated place the administration and its critics in virtual agreement. Much of the differences have been proven, I believe, to have been based on fear of escalation to a high degree.

From very able testimony of both Secretary Rusk and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, I am satisfied that the basic aims of the administration and our military leaders correspond almost identically with those of their critics. Heretofore the critics have been unwilling to accept statements that the administration seeks less—rather than more—war in that area.

Heretofore, the critics appeared to suspect both military and diplomatic leaders of reckless adventure, and with lacking sufficient concern for the possibility of Chinese involvement. Heretofore, the critics have feared needless escalation of the conflict.

The clear answers of both Secretary Rusk and General Taylor before the committee, seen and heard in millions of American homes, should put these fears at rest. A commonsense understanding of our policy in Vietnam has thus been engendered on a much wider scale.

The basic issue is very simple. We are carrying on an extension of an American policy of aiding other nations who are seeking to preserve their governments against aggression and Communist subversion.

It has been North Vietnam—not the United States—that carried the war into South Vietnam. We have been ready—

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we are still ready—to negotiate a settlement of all difficulties, the foremost of which is the right of the people of South Vietnam to freely choose their own form of government and their own leaders in an honest election without fear of murder or violence.

To me, this seems to be the difficult but important duty that America has to assume as a result of her world leadership. If the present Communist effort at conquest in South Vietnam is allowed to succeed because America has been forced by her own people to withdraw, then there is no power in this vast area with its nearly 1 billion people which can keep a Communist wave from engulfing the entire subcontinent.

So, it is time to call the roll on whether we stand for the defense of freedom in Asia—as we have stood for such defense at home and in other parts of the world. Our vote on funds to supply our fighting-men will determine the support of this policy.

To delay a showdown on this issue will serve neither those favoring nor those opposing these authorizations. I am certain that those who have taken the lead in provoking the arguments, and who have been critical of the administration's policies in South Vietnam, will not necessarily oppose these authorizations.

The one big conclusion resulting from the hearings that have been held before the network television cameras is simply that, given the world as it has existed for the past decade, none of us can conscientiously say that we have vigorously identified and proposed substantive alternative approaches to the course of action that has been pursued to this point in South Vietnam.

It has been said frequently that perhaps the debate of recent days should have been held years ago, but few among us will confuse hindsight with foresight in this moment of reappraisal. All of us are aware of the problems that led the United States to risk grave military involvement earlier in Iran, in Greece, in the heart of Berlin, in Turkey, and in Cuba. In each of these areas, the mosaic of the challenge was unlike any other. In each instance, we calculated the odds, weighing them on a scale fashioned from the brutal and terrible lessons learned in World War II.

Only in Korea, within the generation since World War II, have we been compelled to invest American lives in large numbers in order to stand by our commitments. In Korea, it was a sudden and well-defined confrontation. Conversely, in South Vietnam, it has been a slowly and irregularly defined application of our moral, as well as military, resources.

The understanding of our commitment in South Vietnam has likewise developed much more slowly. The American people in this instance have at times seen through the glass darkly, simply because fact and illusion have been intermingled far too frequently in discussions of the issues.

But no American need apologize for being confused by the complex situation in Vietnam. As my distinguished colleague, Senator RUSSELL from South

Carolina, stated a few days ago, even the most sophisticated and reflective Americans have been bewildered by the plethora of fact, fiction, rumor, and speculations generated by the problems in Vietnam.

It goes without saying, because it has been said so often before, that we are fighting a different kind of war in South Vietnam. We are pledged to help the Government of South Vietnam, on its own territory, to fight an insidious, guerrilla campaign directed from North Vietnam. We are fighting alongside the South Vietnamese that they may have the sacred right of self-determination—that the government they have in the future may be a government based on the consent of the governed.

The nationally televised hearings held in recent days by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee focused on the diplomatic and political considerations underlying our activities and our challenges in southeast Asia.

A unique and marvelous feature of our free society has once again been demonstrated. We are blessed with freedom of debate and discussion that strengthens first, our resolve, and second, the forces and effect of our position in world affairs.

It has long been believed that the pen is mightier than the sword. Now the writer, with his pen has strong new electronic allies in the mobilization of intellect that leads to successful decision-making.

As beneficial as the televised Foreign Relations hearings were, I wish it had been possible for the American people to have sat in on the hearings held earlier concerning the pending authorization bill before the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations.

Starting January 20, these two committees held a series of hearings which necessarily were behind closed doors because of the military security involved. We took testimony from 11 witnesses over a period of some 10 days. We heard from the military leadership of this Nation, both civilian and uniformed.

For the past week, the published version of the testimony taken in these hearings has been available to the members of the Senate and to the entire Nation. I regret that it has not been possible for millions of our citizens to have the benefit of the facts brought forward in these hearings, and which are now available publicly in printed form, for I am convinced that our inquiries produced significant new data concerning technology and tactics applicable to the new type of warfare in South Vietnam.

It was the feeling of the members of the two committees that these were the best hearings on the military aspects of our current worldwide posture that we have ever had.

Much has been made in columns and commentaries concerning the doubts that exist regarding the "legality, morality and feasibility" of our posture in South Vietnam. General Taylor, with millions of Americans across the Nation as witnesses, steadfastly asserted that our military objectives possibly can be

achieved without an all-out war. He admitted the risks, and they are obvious. But he also pointed out the tremendous increase in the Vietcong attrition rate, now estimated between 16,000 and 17,000 men a month. With such losses continuing, the Vietcong could be hard pressed within a few months to maintain the pressures on local South Vietnam political and social structures that in the past have been the difference between winning and losing in that part of the world.

Both Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in the closed hearings of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees that with the mobility and firepower we have been able to bring to bear in South Vietnam, the ground rules of guerrilla fighting, the classical concepts that the Vietcong borrowed from the Red Chinese, are now being revised. American expertise and technology can alter long-standing concepts.

I especially recommend to the Members of the Senate who are concerned about the size of the commitment we will have to make in South Vietnam, a further examination of the colloquy between Senator MANSFIELD and Secretary McNamara appearing on pages 140 to 145 of the printed hearings that are now available on your desk.

One can, with some confidence, deduce from this discussion that while no positive limitation of our manpower needs is possible, we can control and we can subdue the Vietcong in South Vietnam without gravely gambling on an all-out ground forces confrontation with Red China.

The ingredients of our success in South Vietnam are new tactics based on new technology, emphasizing mobility, and overwhelming firepower. In addition, time can now be utilized in favor of a steady buildup within South Vietnam of the social and economic structures required to prevent Communist takeover in the years ahead.

In this connection, I would recommend to the Senators that they review the testimony that Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, gave as a result of questions from Senators RUSSELL, and SALTONSTALL, on Monday, January 24. This testimony appears on pages 248 to 259 of the printed hearings.

General Johnson's statements reflect the realistic understanding that our military leadership has for the social and economic problems of our South Vietnamese friends. The testimony of this soldier who is responsible for the successful conduct of combat operations in South Vietnam, was reassuring to me personally. Let me quote to you one statement which appears in the published record on page 253, when Senator ELLENDER was inquiring of General Johnson about the effectiveness of our anti-insurgency tactics.

General Johnson said you have to look at the philosophy of the insurgent. The general said:

It is necessary for him to create an instability that will cause the government to fall. He must maintain some minimum level of turbulence in order to bring pres-

tures to bear on the government that will cause that government to fall and another government to come to power in which he hopefully will gain some part, and begin to subvert from inside rather than outside.

So, therefore, all of the actions that they can take against the forces of law and order contribute to this level of turbulence that they must maintain and the more effective we are in suppressing this turbulence, and the more presence that we have, it seems to me, the more he must increase his turbulence in order to force an overthrow. I think that is what has happened to him, so that the actions that he has taken in the course of the last 6 months to a year are now coming to be counterproductive for his purposes.

He is no longer the friend of the peasant, because he is putting greater and greater burdens on the peasants.

Many, many other points were made in these hearings on the pending authorizations that serve to reinforce my conviction that we must pursue vigorously our military actions against the guerrillas in South Vietnam and must continue bombing their supply lines outside populous areas in North Vietnam.

Even within the last 24 hours, we have seen encouraging developments within South Vietnam that would indicate a continuing buildup in internal stability there, a stability that the Vietcong has been dedicated to prevent. The announcements of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky of several steps to strengthen the internal organization of his government, leading toward popular elections in 1967, are the direct outgrowth of the recent conference at Honolulu. At that conference, President Johnson demonstrated once again that we have no selfish or imperialistic ambitions in southeast Asia or in South Vietnam.

May I respectfully suggest that some of my colleagues who have been quarreling and criticizing, but who have been shy of positive alternative approaches, take special note of the continuing efforts to provide economic, social, and political stability for this troubled part of the world. Premier Ky's responses to the President's suggestions are further evidence that the South Vietnamese are vigilant to the complex internal problems they must grapple with in addition to the aggression of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese.

May I suggest further that we demonstrate equal vigilance here in the Senate. Many complex domestic problems as well as other international situations await our attention. We should proceed without further delay to schedule a vote on the pending military authorizations not later than Wednesday of this week.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, one of the lofty purposes of our involvement in Vietnam is said to be to make a stand against tyranny and slavery in favor of democratic self-determination. We can prescribe no less for ourselves. Ours is no monolithic society, but one in which divergent views may be aired, in which discussion is free and open, and in which the minorities are protected.

Thus, many of us who had reservations and questions about the involvement sought an opportunity to be heard and to promote the free and open discussion

we value so highly. Our opportunity was the presence before the Senate of an authorization measure to supplement what has already been voted.

The present authorization measure calls for \$4 billion plus for the war effort, a part of more than \$12 billion in supplemental funds for Vietnam fighting. I support these appropriations. I support our fighting men and have no wish to deprive them of anything.

There has been no effort to speed up the approval of the remainder, which is now pending. On the contrary, the Senate moved with its customary pace for this time of year.

The members of the minority were accorded the privilege of time off for Lincoln Day dinners. The great debate on section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act came and went without any charges that debaters were impeding the war effort.

The official administration position is that debate on the conduct of the war and on the degree of involvement is correct and worthwhile. Two administration witnesses so testified before the open hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee last week.

Yet we have been exposed, in more recent days, to the spectacle of a high administration official apparently attempting to muzzle Senate debate by using representatives of veterans' organizations.

Debate and discussion bring into the open what has been whispered and rumored. Talking about issues not only is proper in the American system, but performs a worthwhile purpose. When this free and open discussion is conducted in the Senate, the greatest deliberative body in the world is performing its constitutional function to advise upon foreign policy.

When we muzzle discussion we do a disservice to our system of representative democracy. The right of the people to know and the right of dissent is inherent in our system. When we lose those rights, we no longer have freedom and self-determination for ourselves, much less for export.

Fruitful results already have come from this kind of discussion.

The Vice President has been both promoting moral aid for our war effort and seeking additional troops from allies.

The maritime union's voluntary effort to refuse to load ships bound for North Vietnam is another step in tightening a noose on our adversaries without resorting to further troop commitments or nuclear war.

Some other positive steps in backing our fighting men and promoting our principles and goals have occurred since the debate began. Muzzling debate, impugning the patriotism of fellow Americans, are not positive steps in backing our men or our effort. Indeed, they undermine our system.

TRAPPED BETWEEN THE IMPOSSIBLE AND THE INTOLERABLE

It has been said that in Vietnam we are "trapped between the impossible and the intolerable."

These are the horns of our dilemma. Yet, I do not subscribe to such a wholly

pessimistic view. To conclude that a solution is impossible is to despair alike of military and peacekeeping efforts. We do not share the outlook of the suicide who finds life so intolerable that the effort to continue is entirely useless.

Yet, the possibilities for success in our venture in Vietnam are extremely dim.

It is not "impossible" for our own great Nation to furnish 600,000, 800,000, or a million men for military action and support. But it may be literally "intolerable" to our Nation and its citizens to do so.

It is not, strictly speaking, intolerable to live with a weak and chaotic government in Saigon which controls no more than a quarter of South Vietnam. But it may prove literally impossible to provide through its single agency an effective and democratic government. Should Saigon secure a measure of control over the quarter now dominated by the Vietcong, and over the half in dispute between them, the difficulties will become even greater, and even more impossible.

The ingredients of our problem are so many that they confound and confuse not alone the so-called doves and the hawks, but even the owls.

The military problem alone is enough to give us pause. But we are told that its solution in Vietnam's internal life is effected.

Further, the political problem, bad as it is in South Vietnam, is not confined to the scene of strife in that one small country. It involves also the other half of a divided people together totalling 32 million in a land half the size of Texas which is North Vietnam. It involves the Communist giants, China and Russia. It must be a concern of the 40 Nations with whom we have bilateral and multilateral treaty relationships. It involves, now, nearly three times that number who are members of the United Nations. The cast of characters and the scope of the action outdo the vast concepts even of Tolstoi in his classic novel, "War and Peace." Beside the reality of war and peace, even the fiction of genius must pale.

Others have spoken out, all with concern, many with wisdom. None has an immediate solution, and neither do I. But I, and most Americans, hold the deep conviction that the birth of solutions is best accomplished through the midwifery of discussion. As a Member of the Senate, I feel a deep obligation to contribute to the utmost extent of my ability, even though it may draw charges—and these have already been made against me in the public print—of moving in an area which may exceed my competence, or of giving comfort to Communists by criticism, no matter how well-meaning or constructive in intent.

"DEBATE MUST NEVER CEASE"

But let us not be afraid of discussion. Let us examine every aspect of public policy in Vietnam. This an issue involving the lives of our sons, and also our daughters, for the outcome may keep them from being burned. This is a question calling for the most lavish expenditure of our treasury. Affected deeply are

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the relationships we hold with other nations. Even the basic question of the justice and morality of our cause must not be exempt from examination.

Nothing in American policy should be sacrosanct from public scrutiny. It is not only the privilege but it is the duty of the Congress, and of the Senate in particular through its constitutional role of advice and consent, to examine, to think, to ponder, to suggest, to be an active and stalwart force in helping to shape the Nation's foreign policy in such a time as this.

It is pertinent to quote to the words of a great leader of this Nation who is in high office today:

The primacy of the executive branch in foreign affairs in no way lessens the moral and legal responsibility of the Congress to work for national policies which come to grips responsibly and realistically with urgent demands of the world crisis. * * * Responsible debate must never cease, even in wartime.

These words appeared over the signature of our Presiding Officer, Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY, in the July 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs. In a discussion of the Senate in Foreign Policy, the final paragraph of an excellent exposition by the Vice President of the Senate's role in such a time as this concludes:

Congress was not created to govern, and it should not attempt to do so. Yet this is no time for Congress to submit meekly to the Executive will. In fact, it could not submit even if it were so inclined, because there is not one Executive will, but a number of conflicting wills which have not yet surrendered to the authority of an overriding national purpose.

What is our national purpose in Vietnam?

Is our purpose military victory? If so, what will constitute such a victory? What will be its cost in lives, in the destruction of a countryside which already needs rebuilding, in the continuation of warfare already continuing for two decades, in the ever-expanding homelessness of refugees? Will military victory assure political democracy? Will it aid economic development?

Behind the military goal, is our deeper purpose to contain the international aspects of communism's ambition? Will our deeper involvement lead us to the dangerous trap of a land war in Asia against the Chinese? Will we then succumb to the temptation to use the fantastic engines of atomic destruction and loose thermonuclear warfare upon the world?

After many years, we have achieved some measure of a stable relationship with the other Communist great power and the other great nuclear power, Russia. Is our policy jeopardizing the future there irreparably?

Or is our purpose for Vietnam a viable settlement which will meet the aspirations of the population of that divided country, a settlement in line with our often-announced and longstanding policy, so often honored in the breach, of self-determination? Is our purpose after all broader than military victory? Is not it the achievement of a sound peace, one

perhaps which does not fully satisfy any one participant but with which all can live?

Emil Ludwig, the famous German author and biographer, whose work included a noteworthy life of Napoleon, once produced a little parable in which he depicted a small boy asking questions as he saw men going off to war.

"Why," he said, "are they going to war?"

"They go to fight the enemy," he was told.

"Why do they fight the enemy?" asked the boy.

"So they can win the war," was his reply.

"And why must they win the war?"

To that came the answer: "So we can have peace."

To the boy, the answers added up to a great riddle. "I do not understand," he said. "They leave peace to go to war to win a victory so they can have peace. But they have peace in the first place."

There is a strange illogic in all wars, and the war in Vietnam is no exception. Perhaps the greatest illogic in every war is the very existence of the conflict. There is only one end to every war, and that is a gathering at the peace table. It is far more logical to hold those meetings, as we are seeking to do, long before we destroy the economy, the people, and the liberties of the warring people.

FOUR ASPECTS FOR CONSIDERATION

Today I hope to discuss four aspects of our complex situation. There are many more, and even a long speech can only scratch the surface. But these are the questions I wish to explore to some extent.

First, with all the discussion that has taken place, there are still points needing clarification about the history of our involvement. The present never stands without relationship to the past, and our view of the future is clarified by a better knowledge of the progression of events leading to it.

Second, we need to take a good hard look at where we stand now. We are perhaps at the most critical point in the history of our Vietnam involvement. Decisions made now may affect the history of our Nation and of much of the world for the next 10 or 15 years, possibly more.

Third, after looking at the crossroads where we stand in history, we must try to see what lies down each of the alternate routes before us. One of these is the road of escalation. What are the implications of a decision for steadily expanding troops, installations, bombing raids, perhaps mining of harbors, and strikes against powerplants or even agriculture and food supplies? Where does this lead us in Asia? What does it do to us in America? Where will it take us in our relationships with the rest of the world?

Finally, I want to examine the other fork of the road, to see where a go-slow military policy, combined with continued and intensified efforts at nonmilitary solutions, may lead us.

First, then, to history:

THE VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT BEFORE 1954

Many informed Americans know that the Chinese ruled Vietnam for a thousand years, the French for 80, and the Japanese during World War II. But there are in the history of the Vietnamese search for nationhood some little known factors which have an enlightening bearing on our plight there today.

The nationalist movement became intense in opposition to the French rule in the 1930's. Of the many movements and programs aimed at securing independence for Vietnam, which was then one of the three associated states comprising Indochina, the one which gained the most prominence before World War II was the Independence League, also known as the Vietminh. Its leader was the Communist, Ho Chi Minh.

Thus Ho Chi Minh's appearance on the scene, which many may not realize, was many years before any U.S. involvement. He opposed the French as a nationalist revolutionary seeking to throw off colonial rule. In 1940, when the Japanese threatened to take over control from the French, as they soon did, the French Governor General asked if the United States would supply 120 planes and some antiaircraft guns. We refused.

Ho Chi Minh continued to oppose the new masters of Vietnam, the Japanese. The United States entered the war. The Vietminh leaders worked with American agents of the Office of Strategic Services. U.S. military forces in China during the war supplied arms to the Vietminh and there was hope, and even expectation, on the part of Ho and other Vietminh leaders that the United States would back Vietnamese independence rather than support the return of French colonialism.

The Japanese surrendered in August 1945. The Vietminh forces, under the same General Giap who commands now in North Vietnam, moved to Hanoi and the Emperor, Bao Dai, agreed to abdicate in favor of the Vietminh. On September 2, 1945, in the train of these events, Ho Chi Minh announced the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence. Communist though he was, and Communist though he is today, Ho read as the opening sentences of that declaration, words taken from our own American Declaration of Independence:

All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

American political stock, says Ellen Hammer in "The Struggle for Indochina," had reached a peak in which "the name of the United States evoked associations with the Declaration of Independence, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and the Atlantic Charter; and American OSS agents had not hidden their sympathy for Vietnamese aspirations."

But Ho and his Vietminh associates were Communists. The United States, it soon became clear, would not do anything to help them. The people, how-

ever, were not so concerned, and are not to this day, with Ho's communism as they were his nationalism. By his leadership they had, as the declaration put it, "overthrown the monarchic constitution that had reigned supreme for so many centuries." The Emperor Bao Dai had become Citizen Ban Thuy. Vietnam seemed united under Ho Chi Minh.

In January of 1946, elections were held for a national assembly. There were irregularities, and apparently some fabrications of returns, and elections came out as they were expected to. But there is no doubt that Ho Chi Minh was at that time, as he was about to launch a typical Communist organization in the country, the most popular leader in the country and a genuine hero.

Ho had established himself in the north, but the British had accepted the Japanese surrender and the task of maintaining order in the south. There the people shared the demand for independence which the Vietminh had achieved in the north. But the British were sympathetic to the French. French troops formerly under Vietnamese guard re-armed, and the counterrevolution began.

Soon Saigon was again French controlled. Skirmishes and atrocities went hand in hand with a long series of negotiations with the Vietminh until in late 1947 the French set up in Saigon a "nationalist" counter to the north with its handpicked leader, and, incredibly, none other than the ex-Emperor Bao Dai.

The struggle for Vietnamese independence, achieved under Communists in the north, thus became a part of the cold war with the advancement of Bao Dai in Saigon as the nationalist counterleader in the south, the discredited former monarch who had been pliant to the French and whom the Vietnamese so generally detested. The failure of this, and the succeeding political regimes in the south was, in the words of Robert Scheer's report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, entitled "How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam," a failure because:

It overlooked the internal history of the country and proposed to create a nationalist government by fiat of a foreign nation. It was a program based primarily on the needs of America's anti-Communist foreign policy. A revolution to rival that of the Communists would have had to respond to the felt needs of the Vietnamese people. The preoccupations of U.S. policy were never those of a majority of Vietnamese, and this has been at the root of the failure.

It should be noted, however, that at this time there was no official U.S. involvement with the French-backed Bao Dai nationalist regime, but the support of such individuals as former Ambassador William C. Bullitt was interpreted as U.S. backing.

THE U.S. RECOGNIZES BAO DAI

To March 1949, an agreement known as the Elysee accords gave Bao Dai recognition as chief of state in Vietnam, which thus became the bone of contention between two competing governments. A great many concessions were given to the French in the accords, such as that the French nationals would still be tried under French law. It is small wonder that

Bao Dai was viewed by most Vietnamese as merely a French puppet and in no sense a nationalist leader worthy of respect, such as that so largely linked to the name of Ho Chi Minh, Communist or no. And he was a Communist then, but they still liked him.

Now we come to the crucial point in this early history of Vietnam in its post-war, post-French days of nominal independence. This is where we came in.

Bao Dai, our State Department found, was making sincere efforts to unite all truly nationalist elements in Vietnam, and on February 7, 1950, the United States recognized the Bao Dai government. We have never, of course, recognized the government of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi.

What was the next step? Predictably, it was military aid.

Personally, I have now come to the conclusion, and I have several times stated publicly, that I shall never again vote for military aid to other nations. That conclusion is based on other situations, particularly the struggle between India and Pakistan, on whose border I saw burned-out Patton tanks we had furnished Pakistan, whose defeat was by Sherman tanks we had furnished India. We have furnished Israel with arms and we have furnished Jordan with arms. Turks and Greeks, clashing on Cyprus, have both received our military largesse. In Vietnam guns and materiel we furnished to the south have now been turned on our own boys by opponents from the north.

To return to the theme, recognition of Bao Dai in February was followed on June 27, 1950, by President Truman's announcement of "military assistance to the forces of France and the associated states in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces."

Between that time and the fall of Dienbienphu in May of 1954, the \$2.6 billion worth of military and economic aid to the French in Vietnam paid for 80 percent of the cost of the war against the Vietminh. We were already quite heavily committed in the Truman administration; the help we gave them soared higher as we drew closer to French collapse; but to his credit, there was a reluctance by President Eisenhower to make the massive effort some would have liked for him to have made then. In "Mandate for Change" General Eisenhower has written of this period, when the people supported the Vietminh in their fight against the French and saw Ho Chi Minh as their hope for independence:

The enemy had much popular sympathy, and many civilians aided them by providing both shelter and information.

The French and the Bao Dai regime could not draw support from the people, and they could not induce the regular Vietnamese soldiers to fight with any heart on their side.

HOW DEEP IS ALLEGIANCE TO SAIGON?

It would contribute little to review again the story since 1954. For those who are familiar with it, it must be obvious that the earlier period in which Ho Chi Minh became for so many Viet-

namese the great liberator figure does much to explain what happened and what followed. To many Vietnamese, Ho's communism is secondary; it is his nationalism and his leadership against the unwanted interloper from outside which counts above all. First it was the French, then the Japanese, then the French again, and now the Americans whom he has opposed. Would anyone dare judge how solid underneath is the commitment of the South Vietnamese against Ho Chi Minh even today?

Compare two statements, one about the situation in 1953-54 and the other about the situation in 1965-66. The first is a further quotation from President Eisenhower's book:

I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting (i.e., before Dienbienphu), possibly 80 percent of the populace would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.

Those are the statements of President Eisenhower. Now let us go back to 1965 and 1966.

The second statement is that of General Westmoreland and General Stilwell, as cited by Senator Young in his January 14 speech to the Senate:

General Westmoreland stated to me that the bulk of the Vietcong fighting in South Vietnam were born and reared in South Vietnam. General Stilwell, in Thailand, went further. He stated that 80 percent of the Vietcong fighting in the Mekong Delta area south of Saigon, were born and reared in that area. They were not infiltrators or Communists from the North.

So we see that President Eisenhower says that as much as 80 percent of the people would have voted for Ho Chi Minh in 1954; General Stilwell says that 80 percent of the Vietcong fighting in the delta today are native to the area.

Mr. GRUENING. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. HARTKE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. This evidence of what many of us have long been convinced to be a fact, that this is a civil war taking place in South Vietnam, and that a majority of the people are against the Government, and against intervention of all kinds, is very significant and very important.

In a speech made at Northwestern University, the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Ball—whose speech was reprinted in the Washington Post a week ago Sunday—stated very definitely that if this were a civil war, we had no business there.

That was a very important admission, because I believe the facts show clearly that we did intervene in a civil war, that we took and are now taking the unpopular side, whose rules would not last for a moment were it not for our vast military and financial support. I think it important that that issue be brought home to the American people.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank my friend from Alaska. I think there is no question that this civil war is being directed by the Communists to a great extent. I think there is no question that the Com-

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munists are doing everything they can to prolong the civil war. Communists have a long history of moving in on either side in a situation of national unrest and confusion; it does not make much difference to them which side they support. That is a fact we need to realize over in this part of the world. To deny it is to deny to the people of the United States a significant factor they are entitled to know. Whether they agree with the Senator from Alaska, with what the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] stated a few moments ago, or with what the Senator from Oregon says, the American people are entitled to know what the facts are. They are also entitled to know the opinions of the Members of the Senate. If they wish to be persuaded by the opinions of the Senators, that is another thing; but they certainly are entitled to be in possession of the facts; and I think they should insist, through the press, the radio, and television, on more public exposition of what our national policy is to be.

I know that the Secretary of Defense says he does not wish to testify, and there is no possible way we can force him to, but I think in good conscience, he should want voluntarily to come before the committee and tell the American people, "This is the situation, this is our policy, these are our goals, and these are the facts."

No one wishes him to tell how many troops will land on a certain beachhead, or how many will be in a certain valley today, or how many helicopters are going in.

I know that I can go to my television set every morning and hear a complete military review, probably much more informative and complete—which is a compliment to the press of this country—than what I probably could find out if I had an official military briefing that same morning.

No one wishes to interfere with that. No one wishes to jeopardize the life of one single American boy. What we want to do is save lives. We do not win wars with dead American soldiers; what we win them with is live boys, and I, for one, wish to keep them that way.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I hesitate to interrupt while the Senator delivers this historic speech—and it is a historic speech—but the colloquy he has just had with the Senator from Alaska with regard to getting the facts to the American people causes me to make this observation and comment.

As I look around the Senate Chamber, I see five Senators on the floor and one in the chair, a total of six, 1 hour after high noon, discussing, in a great historic debate, some issues the solution of which, in my judgment, will determine whether hundreds of thousands of Americans will die in the next 24 to 36 months. I fear this will happen unless our country changes its course of action and follows a procedure that will result in an honorable, negotiated settlement of this war.

I think it is very important that this Government be brought much closer to the American people than it is at the present time. We move at such a terrific pace, in this modern age, in the operation of the Government, that I wish to renew here, so that it may be a matter of record, the expression of a view which the Senator from Oregon has held for a long time. As I have said before there is no good reason why the small number of people sitting in the gallery should be the only people in the country who have the opportunity of hearing the Senator's speech.

We are living today in a great age of technology. Television and radio have developed to such a degree that it is possible for the people to be continuously informed, through those media, without causing the slightest interruption or inconvenience to the operation of any agency of the Government including the Senate. I say that the American people are entitled to learn of a historic debate such as this, and the contents of such a great speech as is now being made on the floor of the Senate, from a medium more direct than the press gallery. Therefore, the senior Senator from Oregon renews his suggestion that every major debate in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives should be made available to the American people through television and radio. The mechanics could be so arranged that they would not in any way interfere with the operation of the Congress. I realize that the old bromide argument will be brought forth again, namely, that there would be grandstanders in the Senate and the House who would try to steal the show.

The American people will take care of grandstanders. But the American people are entitled to know from their elected representatives what is going on in our Government.

The President of the United States has only to whisper a suggestion that he would like to take to television, and all the channels are open to him. The executive branch of the Government has those media at its beck and call. I say that the Congress should be brought close to the people. The people should demand that we adopt the necessary changes in the rules of the Senate and of the House of Representatives so that major debates such as this could be brought directly to the people.

I do not suggest that every hour of our sessions should be available to television and radio, but I am saying—and that is why I support a rule of germaneness for the so-called formal part of each day's session—that debates on pending business should be available to radio and television, if they wish to use them for broadcasting. If such arrangements were made, there would be a quick change in the policies of this Government, because the people would insist upon it. The people ought to be able to turn the dial and take a look at the floor of the Senate. They do not have the hundreds of dollars it takes to come to Washington and look in person. We need to bring the Congress close to the

people. I say that if the Congress had been close to the people in the last 3 years, American boys would not be dying in South Vietnam today. The American people would have stopped it before the holocaust started.

I wish to say that I am greatly indebted to the Senator from Indiana for his speech, and I am glad that he has raised his voice today to point out how important it is that we get the facts to the people. And once again, I acknowledge my indebtedness to my teacher, the Senator from Alaska, with whom I have stood shoulder to shoulder in the debates of the last 2½ years, as we have tried to stop this shocking, unconstitutional, illegal war of the President of the United States in southeast Asia. Is it a war that is sending increasing numbers of American boys to their slaughter.

I want the American people to be able to get the facts, and not be dependent so much on the handouts from the White House, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. That is why I would open up the Congress, as far as its availability to the people is concerned, by seeing to it that our major debates are broadcast by television and radio to the American people.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank my friend the Senator from Oregon. There is no question that the Senate does not have an opportunity to make the real, final, decisionmaking process available to the American people. In the Senate, we open up committee hearings where debate and discussion are being held, but the final debate and the final decision, the final course which America will take is determined on the floor of the Senate, not in the Senate hearings. Sometimes, as the Senator from Oregon well knows, the committee may not represent the mood of the Senate. Frequently it does, but sometimes a committee finds itself unable to persuade the Senate even with its majority opinion—sometimes an overwhelming majority opinion—as it reports to the Senate floor. The issue comes to the floor, and there we find new issues, new questions, new items constantly being raised, not on this issue alone but upon domestic questions, upon the question of what to do about medicare, about what to do on adult education, fields in which the Senator from Oregon has been a leader so many times. In all of these things, as well as in the field of foreign affairs, the people are entitled to make the final decision based upon the facts. As the Senator from Oregon has stated, if there are any grandstanders, any who wish to go out and make a mockery of the situation, the people will take care of them by means of the election process. That is the American system. It has worked very well for a long time. It has produced the strongest nation in the world. I should like to see it keep on going in that same direction.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. Let me say, first, that if the policies which the Senator

from Oregon has just advocated, of allowing all news media—television, radio, and so forth—to reach the American people, had been followed from the beginning of our involvement, we might not be in the tragic mess we are now in, because, long since, American public opinion—which is just now beginning to be informed—would have exerted its influence on the actions of the President and Congress and we would not be in this situation today. I very much hope that his suggestions will be followed, that we will see the fullest exposition of the arguments made in the Senate and House so that the American people can finally be informed.

Second, of all the many important statements which the Senator from Indiana has made, none is more pertinent than that he and the Senator from Oregon, and the rest of us who are trying to slow down this disastrous course are trying to reverse this course of action, are trying to save American lives. That is the essence of our objective.

Our objective is to save American lives, to try to prevent the wanton killing in a cause which is not good. We are not proceeding in a way that will achieve a satisfactory result. It is alleged that we are in there to stop communism. This is not the way or the place to do it. The whole presentation of the administration is based upon a misconception—perhaps not deliberate, but it is not based on fact.

The old story that we were invited there by a friendly government, and that we have a solemn commitment there made by three Presidents is not true. This can be demonstrated again and again, as the Senator from Indiana is now demonstrating, and as has been discussed on the floor, to those who would listen. If the American people could only know that, that we are wantonly sacrificing our boys for a cause that is not as represented to them, they would be heard from much more definitely than they are at the present moment.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank my friend, the Senator from Alaska, for his observations. To those who care to listen to the speech which the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] is going to deliver later today—in which he analyzes the administration's position step by step—they will find it to be a fine exposition. I commend it to the Senate. I have read the speech, and I thought it was excellent. I thought the Senator from Alaska would like to follow the speech later when it is delivered.

Mr. GRUENING. I have read it. I was privileged to be with the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] on television last Sunday, when he expounded on some of the points in this speech, showing how mistaken administration policy is. His exposition may not be quite like that of the Senator from Oregon, or myself, but it is a very important contribution to an understanding of the mistakes which the administration is making today.

Mr. HARTKE. That is at the heart of what we are talking about. Certainly, the mere fact that Senators disagree should not be enough to excite anyone,

or to get anyone upset or feel disappointed with our American system.

If we are going to have a Senate which is going to do nothing except rubber-stamp all policies, or make a bloc vote on every single issue that comes before it, we might as well abolish the Senate. It would serve no useful purpose. That is not the function of the Senate. The Senate is a living and a vital institution which, under the Constitution, definitely has special responsibilities. If there are 100 varying points of view, that would be no discredit to the Senate. It would be a credit to the thinking people of America that they elected individuals who represented so many different viewpoints, and not the monolithic kind of thinking so prevalent in many parts of the world today—and not alone in the Communist world.

Mr. GRUENING. Especially on an issue which is so crucial and vital to everything in which we believe. Also to the lives of our young men who are now being needlessly sacrificed.

Mr. HARTKE. I cannot permit this occasion to go by without commenting upon the mission undertaken by the chairman of the delegation which I had the privilege of serving with during the latter part of November through December, for about 5 weeks, under the able chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], when we went into Japan, Hong Kong, India, and other parts of the East. There we had the opportunity to listen to the opinions of those people at firsthand, and there we found out that no matter how hard we tried—and I suppose the Vice President is finding the same thing to be true—no matter how much we asked them to join us, they turned their heads and said, "This is your problem. This is your concern."

Any thinking American knows that these people are living within a stone's throw of being threatened by this same Communist aggression; yet they say, "We are not concerned. We are not going to put one soldier beside your soldier. We are not going to send any materiel for you."

I know that we did receive a hospital truck from Spain. I believe that West Germany—where a quarter of a million of our boys are stationed, helping to defend their system—is going to send one team of medical experts.

This is, in some way, a measure of the confidence they have in our program in Vietnam. Unfortunately, I believe it is also a measure whose meagerness I decry and believe to be shameful; but, this is it. We have to face the facts. We cannot keep our heads in the sand like an ostrich and say these facts do not exist. The fact is, these people are not going to help us there. They are not going to do so, at least so far as I can see.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator is aware that these tokens have been given to us only after great pressure from the administration, and only because the givers of these tokens are recipients of our lavish foreign aid, aid which is used as a method of persuading them to give these tokens for this cause.

When I was in South America a year

ago, I found that every American ambassador had received instructions from his Government to go to the President of the country and request that it give aid to the cause in Vietnam. They were reluctant to do so. Some of them refused to do so. Some came up with a token as a matter of compliance, a token paid for out of the lavish foreign aid which we give them. That is the kind of support they are giving us.

Mr. HARTKE. The number of 40 nations has been referred to in relation to anti-Communist aggression pacts, referring to our bilateral agreements. As to those 40 nations, what if they would all send, not a big share of their regular army, not great quantities of their volunteers, but what if they would send even a thousand men each? That could release 40,000 American boys who would not have to be drafted. That would at least be a declaration of the support which we claim we have throughout the world. I believe that we have a right to question why we do not have that kind of support.

Australia, where the Vice President is making his appeal right now, has not sent one single drafted Australian boy to Vietnam.

Who is paying the bill for the South Koreans in Vietnam? The South Korean Government is not paying for it. It is all in the hearings here. The Secretary of Defense makes the plain and outright statement that we are paying the bill. We are paying for the soldiers from South Korea who are now fighting.

These are facts which are known.

Mr. GRUENING. We are paying all of it—in blood and in money.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wonder whether our paying the bill for the South Korean soldiers might possibly meet the definition of mercenary?

Mr. HARTKE. I will leave that question because I believe the answer is implicit. The headlines, however, in the newspapers in South Korea state how they were able to put the squeeze on America to get the bid "upped" so that we would pay them enough for sending Korean soldiers to Vietnam. Those were the headlines in Korean newspapers. I know that the Senator from Oregon will agree with me that in Pakistan—where we were treated wonderfully—the press there, which we know is controlled by the Government, admit they are pro-Chinese in relation to our war effort in Vietnam. All we have to do is read the press. It is written down in English. The same thing is true of India. They are pro-Russian there. Thus, we have Pakistan which is pro-Chinese and India which is pro-Russian. These people are on their doorsteps.

Mr. GRUENING. And they are co-signers of the SEATO Treaty.

Mr. HARTKE. I think there should be a thorough review of the SEATO Treaty, and when the time comes—

Mr. GRUENING. I am referring to Pakistan.

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Mr. HARTKE. It might be a good idea to go into that treaty, but I am not going to take the time to do it now.

HOW MUCH CONTROL?

To resume my statement, here, where 5 million of the south's peasants harvest three quarters of the nation's rice, the people are hundreds of miles from the border with North Vietnam. Yet, 60 percent of them "at a conservative estimate," says an on-the-spot correspondent of the Washington Post, Ward Just, recently on January 23, "give their allegiance to the Vietcong."

In short, from the beginning we have supported a regime which has continued to exist, from the days of the French on down, only by a constant shoring-up process. It has been said that the present government in Saigon could not last 2 weeks without our presence and support. At the beginning of 1965 it was reported that the rate of desertion among new recruits for the South Vietnamese Army stood at 30 percent.

Since 1960 the grip of the Saigon government upon the area and the people of South Vietnam has not expanded, but, frankly, apparently has deteriorated. At least this is the conclusion to be drawn from a study published by the U.S. operations mission in Saigon. In this "Analysis of Property Tax Compliance in Vietnam," our AID agency—this is the U.S. Government agency—there reports that 165, or 71 percent, of the 234 districts into which Vietnam was divided in 1964 did not even reply to a central statistical tax inquiry. A map giving the results appears on page 89 of the February 1966, issue of Current History. Obviously a large part of the blank area which did not respond is the same as the area in firm control of the Vietcong, or under contention. The areas replying include some of those around Da Nang, Nha Trang, in a part of the central plateau area, some portions of the Mekong Delta and the Camau Peninsula, and most of the area around Saigon and a hundred or more miles north.

But for the reporting areas, the figures show progressively more and more tax delinquency in every year from 1960 on. In that year, in these areas over which Saigon held some sort of tax collection control—a function which reflects government control, and about which we have heard much as to the Vietcong and their tax collections—property taxes to the Saigon government were 44 percent delinquent. That was in 1960. From there the delinquency went to 47 percent, then to 51 percent, and in 1963 to 57 percent. But by 1964 the ability of the Saigon government to collect taxes in these districts, comprising less than a third of the total, had so slipped that 74 percent of all taxes for the Saigon government were delinquent.

Is this governmental control?

ANTICOMMUNISM IS NOT DEMOCRACY

Is this the condition of a country which has the solid support of its citizens? At the very least, there is the administrative chaos which must accompany a civil war. There is some support,

of course, for the government of General Ky. But can anyone be sure that the situation indicates that the support of the majority of the people, if it could be accurately measured, would go to Saigon? Or is it possible that millions more than we would like to think believe that whatever government exists in Saigon is necessarily only another puppet of a foreign power?

General Edward Lansdale has said this:

The harsh fact * * * is that * * * the Communist subversive insurgents have grown steadily stronger, in numbers and in size of units, and still retain the initiative to act at their will * * *. The Communists have let loose a revolutionary idea in Vietnam. It will not die by being ignored, bombed, or smothered by us. Ideas do not die in such ways.

"The government exists for the people" is one of the Communist slogans. Its nationalism appeals, as does nationalism everywhere, to people whose history has been replete with a government existing for the sake of privilege, for the benefit of foreigners—whether Chinese, French, or—as they misunderstand our motives—Americans. We say we want to bring them democracy. We have not succeeded, because we are outsiders. We have brought them anticommunism, but that is not democracy. Indeed, it is a poor substitute for democracy.

Yet ours is a revolutionary origin. Our goal for many years was "no entangling alliances." We were warned by George Washington against such ventures, and we have never sought colonial empire. We have built our own democracy in which we believe. It has attracted to our shores millions who have seen in the shining torch of the Statue of Liberty a welcome to a way of life filled with respect for each individual, with hope for release from oppression rife in other countries.

We still hold to those ideals. They are the reason for our antipathy to the collectivist philosophy we know as communism. We are still concerned for the welfare of every person, and our conscience has been more stirred in recent times than for many years past over the plight of the poverty stricken, in our country, and overseas, the undereducated, the elderly poor, the racially disadvantaged, and all those who have not fully shared in our great economic abundance.

Our motives in Vietnam are laudable. But the frequent fate of good intentions even there may be but one more illustration about the old adage of the road whose pavement they provide. Where are we going? What must our policy and our strategy be?

EXAMINATION IS OVERDUE

We are now, belatedly, in the midst of an examination of our course which should have long since been made public as the Senator from Oregon has just said. Too long we have acquiesced in apathy to unexamined policies without realizing where they were leading us. It is good that at last the white light of public attention has been thrown upon

Vietnam. We in the Senate are exercising the right of advice and consent in our discussions, late in the day as they come to some.

My concern is not of recent origin. More than a year ago, on February 6, 1965, I made a plea for the kind of determinations and clarification in Vietnam which we are seeking now. In a speech which I made a full year ago to the Jacobi Society dinner in the Statler Hilton Hotel here in Washington, and which may be found in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for February 16, 1965, I said—I might mention that that was the day when nine of our men were killed in Pleiku. That was the most that had been killed up to that time. That event took the headlines—not that my speech would have taken the headlines, but I want Senators to know what took place on that day.

I said:

President Johnson * * * must clearly enunciate his goals and how he intends to reach them * * *. The President should and must tell America, first, and the rest of the world what our posture is; what our aims are; what our interests and commitments are; how we intend to meet those commitments. We must know where we are going and what we are going to do in Vietnam.

I also said:

Leadership by consensus cannot be applied to foreign policy * * *. Yet, vacillation and indecision can be confused with weakness. Discussion of the alternatives in Vietnam can, in the absence of clear policy from the architect of policy, be mistaken for strife.

These were my words of a year ago. So let us not be deceived. Discussion of alternatives is not dictation of policy. Dissent may be as much a function of advice as is consent. Consideration of alternative steps which may be taken, publicly conducted in a responsible manner, is an obligation of democracy.

On the other hand, manipulation of public opinion to fit support to decisions already irrevocably taken is the style of totalitarianism, whether Fascist or Communist. Among us, dissent can never be treason or we shall have forfeited our birthright.

IS THE HONOLULU DECLARATION UNLIMITED COMMITMENT?

On Lincoln's Birthday the headline of the Washington Post read, "L.B.J., Reassures Critics on Escalation." The subordinate headings interpreted the President's press conference statement as meaning: "Rules Out Wider War or Pullout" and "View Differs Little From Kennan's or Gavin's, He Says."

I hope the headline writers have not misunderstood or misinterpreted. The declaration of Honolulu only 3 days earlier, on February 8, did not seem to take such a position when it said:

We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil * * *. The defeat of that aggression is vital for the future of our people of South Vietnam.

To this statement of purpose by the Government of Vietnam we assented by a pledge to prevent aggression. The Honolulu declaration as a whole was characterized by Walter Lippmann,

whose judgment is certainly no official assessment, as a commitment "to win the war and to defeat and liquidate the enemy forces, and then to reconstruct the country as it is regained for the Saigon government."

I do not believe we can have it both ways. We cannot simply dig in and hold the line in a refusal to escalate, even pulling back to consolidate our strong points in the strategy of General Gavin, and at the same time do what the declaration of Honolulu indicates. To quote Mr. Lippmann further:

The big objective which the words of the document declare is a total victory for General Ky. To accomplish this enormous objective, very large forces will be needed. The declaration must therefore be read as a commitment of American forces limited not by considerations of policy but only by our ability to break the logistical bottlenecks which hold down the number of troops we can land and support.

If these are not the political and military decisions on which the Honolulu conference agreed, no time should be lost in making clear to our people what in fact the commitments are.

General Ky made the statement today that the difference between the President's position and his position is not great, as the President indicated, but General Ky added, "Let me make it clear that we do not intend to negotiate with the Vietcong."

THE ROADS BEFORE US

I said that I want to explore the direction of each of the ways leading from the crossroads in history where we stand. In fact, there are not two but at least three roads and probably many more down which we can go. Each of them must eventually come out at the same general destination—a peace based on a cease-fire and the conclusion of some *modus vivendi* under which North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese can coexist.

One of these roads, which I hope only a very small number of Americans would wish to take, is capitulation. This might not be impossible, but it would indeed be intolerable. We have already, in too many ways to make such full retreat possible, committed ourselves to one of the other two roads before us.

The first of these, to which I now turn, is the one which Mr. Lippmann paints in such stark terms. It is the road of unlimited escalation, with American troops commitments rising to 400,000, 600,000, 800,000, 1 million if necessary, as one member of the military said.

It is a road upon which our chauffeur will be named military necessity and upon which we would travel at a faster and faster speed, throttle to the floor, and never mind the backseat jouncing, the terror and pain of either the pedestrians in the way or the backseat passengers who must take the ride willy-nilly. Nor does the road of faster and faster escalation provide necessarily more safety than comfort. There may be other traffic coming out to meet us, China for example, or even Russia. At such speed a head-on collision could be fatal not only to the driver but to us in the back seat as well.

The second road, to which I shall return later, is the one which General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan have pointed the way. It, too, has pitfalls and potholes, and it will put a heavy strain on our shock absorbers. To the casual mapreader it may appear the longer of the two, but sometimes the longer way around is the better way home. Let us now look at each in turn.

THE ROAD OF ESCALATION: CASUALTIES, MORE MANPOWER

What can we expect along the road of escalation?

First, as the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] ably pointed out, increasing casualty lists. Escalation breeds escalation on the other side. That is what happened during 1965 as we increased our troops, began our bombing, started to search and destroy with American forces. Here is what Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch writes in the February issue of *Current History*:

At the beginning of 1965, the 500,000 or so South Vietnamese men under arms were still fighting a counterinsurgency war with the support and advice of about 20,000 American troops. The war was being lost. The Vietcong had a solid hold on a half dozen base areas that the government troops did not dare try to invade. In more than half the country, they could roam at will by night, collect taxes, draft recruits, and obtain intelligence information.

By the end of 1965, the B-52 planes were pounding reported Vietcong concentrations every day, and American forces had mounted to 165,000, plus another 50,000 on Navy ships deployed off the coast. The U.S. buildup quickly outdistanced the North Vietnamese infiltration, which exceeded the American forces in Vietnam through 1964 and until the spring of 1965.

And then what happened? Mr. Dudman continues, and this needs emphasis:

Rapid Vietcong recruitment in the south, however, more than kept pace with the influx of U.S. forces. The troop ratio fell from about 5 to 1 (anti-Communist to Communist) to less than 3 to 1 by the end of 1965. Most authorities have considered that a ratio of 10 to 1 or better is needed to defeat an insurgent army.

As recent months have progressed, the war has become more and more a conflict between the Americans and the Vietcong. We have taken over the fighting for several reasons. Some of them are related to the fact that the principals in the war, the Vietnamese themselves, have been by policy shut out from American planning and informed of big engagements only at the last moment.

Mr. Dudman further writes:

When the Vietnamese participated, the chances were greater that the Vietcong would learn of the action and slip away before it began.

In smaller engagements, U.S. forces are more likely to meet up with the enemy than are South Vietnamese troops. Last November, a Pentagon weekly summary showed, American efforts resulted in enemy contact more than once in every 10 tries; the South Vietnamese efforts made contact only once in every 250 tries. The figures were 11.3 percent for U.S. troops, 0.4 percent for Vietnamese; I repeat, four-tenths of 1 percent

for the South Vietnamese. Some of the other results, the casualties, can be seen any day by going down to Walter Reed Hospital.

Second, even leaving aside the jump in casualties as we pour in more and more men, there is the very serious matter of the manpower which is involved.

We congratulate ourselves on our steadily advancing economy. We have brought the unemployment figure below 4 percent for the first time in years. Where are we to get another quarter of a million troops for Vietnam? Or a half a million more? Or still more than that?

Nor is the manpower problem simply that of supplying these numbers as bodies delivered to the area of combat. Behind them must stand the logistic support of more and still more service personnel. Beyond that lies the increasing drain from civilian industries to the deadweight tasks, which generate no economic multiplier effect, of producing military supplies and equipment.

ESCALATING INFLATION

Third, there is the vast adverse economic effect upon our homefront. Foremost among economic consequences is the real threat of inflation.

Here again, the potential inflationary effect is greater than it was at the beginning of World War II, for example, because we are starting in a tight economy. The present high level of employment in conjunction with the high percentage of plant capacity in use has been accompanied by increased consumer demand, as witness the amazing sales figures in the automobile industry in the last 2 years. Twenty-three percent of American families now have two cars. As competition for workers grows, wages are bound to grow as well. More are able to afford a second car, to continue with the one example. The demand for civilian goods, which we are unable fully to meet in an escalated war economy, builds up price pressures.

The result is the familiar wage-price spiral which feeds inflation. As the economy has tightened in recent months, we have seen signs that it lies dangerously before us even without the increased economic pressures of Vietnam.

One reaction to those fears of inflation has been the increase in the discount rate. I have no quarrel with the good intentions of the Federal Reserve Board and Mr. Martin. But, I do not believe this action is achieving the beneficial results they intended, and it has already introduced some adverse side effects into the economy. But if we go down the road of unlimited escalation in Vietnam, with the vast costs that are not only foreseeable but inevitable camp followers of war, that change in interest rate will feed the inflation and complicate the Federal effort to finance the costs.

Where do we get the money to run a war? It has to be financed by the Treasury, which means borrowing, since tax income can not begin to meet the big added strains. Are we going to finance a huge military venture, escalation unlimited, at a 5-percent rate by the Treasury? Are we going back to the days of the 6- and 7-percent Liberty Bonds of

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World War I with the resultant scandals and the depression that follows?

We are seeing now an increase for military purposes of \$12.7 billion in a supplementing authorization and appropriation because of Vietnam. This is not the end. How large will the increase in our debt become? \$20 billion? \$30 billion? \$50 billion? Suppose it costs us 5 percent interest on a \$30 billion total before we are through. That is an annual burden of \$1.5 billion, as much as the cost of our antipoverty program today.

We have no forecast, and certainly none which is reliable, as to the duration and ultimate cost of what lies ahead. True, we did not have that in World War II either, but then the issue as to whether we should join in defense of the free world against open, large-scale aggression entailed no doubt. We had to do it, no matter what the cost, and we did it gladly. Here we do not have the same kind of absolute compulsion, nor the same kind of glad support for the effort. Yet, many see us becoming drawn into an escalation not only of cost and manpower, but of time—5 years, 10 years, 15 years. An all-out military effort may shorten the active military phase, but how long will it take to repair the scorched earth, to build a viable economy, and whose expense will bear the burden? Who will carry the burden?

Historically, such enormous drains on the treasury of any country paying the cost of war have led to inflation—inflation whose virtual absence has contributed so greatly to the past 5 years of our unprecedented growth and prosperity. The only real effective alternative in wartime is controls, with all that they entail. These we had to impose even in the Korean war, where we had the support of other nations as we do not have today, and scarcely expect to have. Do we want to go down the road of controls again?

EFFECTS ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

On Monday of this week Secretary of the Treasury Fowler discussed the progress of our balance-of-payments program, in a press conference which he shared with Secretary of Commerce Connor and Federal Reserve Chairman Martin. He presented an estimate that the balance of payments would worsen in 1966, the press reported, "as a result of stepped-up operations in Vietnam." I quote from the article by Frank C. Porter in the Washington Post on Tuesday, February 13:

Before escalation, the Defense Department estimated that its overseas operations would contribute \$1.4 billion to the minus side of the ledger in 1965, he said.

The estimate was raised to \$1.65 billion after the step-up, Fowler continued, and how it appears that the current annual rate is closer to \$1.8 billion.

The Secretary said the last guess now is that the foreign exchange impact of Vietnam could add another \$300 billion during 1966, bringing the total Defense Department bite on the payments balance to \$2.1 billion. This would not include overseas economic aid.

But we cannot omit the overseas aid estimates from the financial picture. We are now asked to embark on a vast program for the benefit of the people in

South Vietnam, not simply as a humanitarian effort, but because the theory is that this vast outpouring will bring support for the Saigon Government, which is so essential if our total propping-up program is to succeed. If past experience is any criterion, Secretary Fowler's estimates are bound to be on the side of minimizing, rather than maximizing, the Federal costs.

Even the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] has repeatedly warned us of that. Frankly, his estimates of the costs of this war have been somewhat scary, but they are accurate.

So among the economic effects are increased inflation, perhaps to be accompanied by controls of various kinds; a war financed at high interest rates; an increased balance-of-payments problem; all geared to the unknown and perhaps unpredictable.

ESCALATION AND TAXES

And how about taxes?

We have already seen the request. At this time, when escalation has reached only a portion of its probable ultimate, should we take that road, for a rescinding of the excise tax reduction voted last year? We are asked to reimpose the 10-percent excise tax on telephone service and to defer the relief we provided by removing the tax on new automobiles.

In addition, there are other "one shot" tax measures called for right now. This, too, is only a beginning if we turn up the road of escalation. Such measures are demanded in proportion to the magnitude of our efforts; as the cost increases, so does the need for tax changes which hit, directly or indirectly, every American and his family. They are inevitably dictated by two necessities—to fight inflation by withdrawing in taxes the spendable income of the people, and to raise the revenues so far as is feasible, thus paying as we go to the extent possible, and reducing dependence on deficit financing.

Where will this course lead us? Two years ago we reduced personal and corporate income tax rates by \$11½ billion. We did it on the theory that it would stimulate the economy and do so, paradoxically, with benefit to the Federal Treasury in increased receipts based on the jump in gross national product. Frankly, that course worked. We have seen the beneficial results. They were good.

But a wartime economy is a different animal from a peacetime economy. It is a rapacious consumer of goods, of manpower, of resources, and its end products move to far-off fields to be spent as mortar ammunition and napalm bombs, as shot-down helicopters and expended material of all kinds. These economic products do not add to but rather drain the national wealth. The peacetime economy is a tiger in your tank; the wartime economy is a tiger in the jungle, a marauding depredator in the same category as sheepkilling wolves of the Old West. We may indeed have both guns and butter, but we shall have to pay for both. If we spread the butter thinner, it will be because we are paying for the guns. Let us make no mistake about it: pay for them we must.

Furthermore, the road to escalation is open ended. No one, because the imponderables are so great, can offer us a firm estimate of the amounts about which we are talking. We have a strong economy, but we can base it upon gains that will eventually set back the unprecedented growth we have been making.

Casualties, manpower, inflation, balance of payments, taxes—these are among the baggage we will have to carry if we take the road of escalation. But what of the things we will have to leave behind? The things we cannot take with us?

Chief among them, of course, is a whole broad range of domestic programs. All across the budget spectrum they lie. For instance, consider the so-called Great Society programs. I supported them wholeheartedly last year. In fact, I supported the medicare program a little more than the others. We left an open end in that program. We should have provided for the hospitalization of old people for as long as they needed to remain in hospitals, not merely for 90 days.

These programs, too, are casualties. Already many of them are wounded. We will tend them, bandage them, try to heal the amputations, and probably save them from death. But they are suffering sore blows, shot down by our own military efforts on the road to escalation. We shall shortly look at some of these in specific terms.

THE VIETNAM GREAT SOCIETY

In more general terms, we are now committed to a Great Society program, so to speak, in South Vietnam. The declaration of Honolulu says in part III under "Purposes of the Government of the United States" that the United States is pledged "to give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight. We have helped and we will help them, to stabilize the economy, to increase the production of food, to spread the light of education, to stamp out disease."

I would far rather fight a war on these enemies of mankind in Vietnam than to fight a military war there. In normal times our commitments to economic aid of this kind are determined by relating them to the needs of others throughout the world as well. Now we are linking the reason for and the cost of this expanded effort in Vietnam to our military effort. The total of our AID funds requested for all of the world put together for fiscal 1967 is \$2,048 million. For Vietnam the amount is \$550 million, well over a quarter of the total, and this does not count military aid, nor another \$98 million in Public Law 480 funds.

How much will this additional Honolulu declaration task cost us, over and beyond the military effort? Is this to be, under planning for escalation, another open-ended program? An inquiry of the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations to learn what may be the prospect brought the reply that the figures they have on economic aid to Vietnam at the moment are classified. So I cannot state them to the Senate, and the American people cannot have them.

OUR OWN GREAT SOCIETY CASUALTIES

Meanwhile, what are the casualties of our own programs, which escalation will increase? Some of the answers are in the budget.

The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation program is cut by \$140 million.

In agriculture also, the sum available for rehabilitation of land and property because of natural disaster is reduced by \$20 million.

The entire amount of funds available for loans through the Rural Electric Administration to cooperatives is cut out—\$462 million.

A \$100-million figure has disappeared from the Rural Housing Insurance Fund. The Farmers Home Administration loses \$650 million in loan funds. The Small Business Administration drops out \$309 million in guaranteed loans. The same is true of \$450 million in "Fannie Mae"—FNMA—of the Housing and Urban Development program.

All of these last, however, plus others which make a total of \$4.7 billion, are not strictly speaking cuts in the same sense as some of the others. At a later time I want to discuss this separately. The plan is to put all of these loan funds into a pool and to sell government participations, which will be bought by public investment—an idea which may have considerable merit. To do so will require new legislation. But to include this figure as a cut in the budget is a \$4.7 billion distortion which in fact is doubled by its accomplishment. Not only can the budget show a drop of this enormous amount, but also when the participations are purchased, the Treasury will have an equal sum available for expenditure now with its own obligation deferred for later payment to those who have purchased them. The net result is an availability of more than \$9 billion in this one-shot effort which will not at all appear in the budget.

To continue, the budget drops out \$175 million in National Defense Education Act loan funds to students in higher education, on the theory that these loans can be absorbed by the new private capital in the guaranteed loan program of the Higher Education Act. But this overlooks vital problems of transition which create grave difficulties in some States, including my own State of Indiana. There is a serious possibility that the result will be inability for many students now receiving National Defense Education Act loans to secure the money they need next fall for continuing their education.

Then there is the much discussed cut in the school milk and school lunch program money. The Vietnam war can be directly charged with the reduction of the school milk money by 80 percent, from \$103 million to \$21 million. The funds for school lunches are also reduced by \$19 million.

Yet we say that we are going to provide breakfast as well as lunch. Many of us know that the only warm meal some of these children have is furnished by the school lunch program. And all of us recognize that the reduced price of milk for the school lunch program is one of

the greatest builders of a healthy and strong America that we have today.

Health research facilities are cut by \$35 million. Twenty million dollars has been cut in instructional and research funds for 68 land-grant colleges. Yet these are the very institutions upon which the greatest demands will be made under the new GI cold war bill which has just been enacted into law.

These are some of the costs at home for which we are trading the escalation we face in Vietnam. We cut our schoolchildren in lunch and milk money by \$101 million—because Vietnam currently costs us that much every 3 days. We slice \$20 million from rural disaster rehabilitation so that we can do more to rehabilitate the South Vietnamese lands suffering man-made rural disaster there. We delete \$164 million in school district funds for the so-called impacted areas—enough to pay for killing a little more than 400 Vietcong at the estimated cost of \$400,000 each.

STANDING STILL IS FALLING BEHIND

There are other potential economic casualties on our homefront society besides the direct cuts. These consist not in the direct cuts, but in the reduction to the status quo from the envisioned progress which we should instead be making. Wherever we fail to advance we are not just holding our own—we are falling behind, for our population will continue to grow, as it has by 15 million persons since the last census, that of 1960.

Can you think of better uses for our money than spending \$3,500 just in ammunition alone for each Vietcong who is killed? There has been talk of helping the hard-pressed States through returning some of the Federal income for their tax use, and I have sponsored such a bill with Senator JAVRS. Is anyone willing to predict that we will share Federal revenues, much as we need to do so, while we are straining our sinews to raise Federal revenue for escalation?

There has been talk, not altogether utopian either, about instituting a negative income tax to help lift our most poverty-stricken out of their stultifying degradation. An article in last Sunday's Washington Post discussed this under the heading, "Guaranteed Income Gains Acceptance." It notes that Congressmen of the Democratic Study Group have proposed serious examination of the idea. So has the President's Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress in its report of only 2 weeks ago. While we are pouring out open-ended billions in Vietnam through following the road of escalation, this too will not get off the ground.

Likewise there are other unfulfilled economic needs whose accomplishment must of necessity be delayed—extension of the Interstate Highway System; increase in the minimum for social security beneficiaries; extension and concentrated effort upon the next frontier of education, adult education; addition of drug payments to the medicare program. The list could go on and on.

WHAT IS THE COST-BENEFIT RATIO?

In listing budget casualties, I did not mention public works. We do not have

available how much these may suffer. I do know that when the Army Corps of Engineers considers a new project it makes a careful cost-benefit study. If the ratio of costs to benefits is too high, if the price turns out to be too great for what will result, the project is dropped.

Is escalation going to yield us a satisfactory cost-benefit ratio? If the Army Corps can scrutinize civilian works on this basis, should not the entire military involvement be weighed likewise against the possible benefits in Vietnam? It is my studied conclusion that by this test, escalation fails.

I have been examining the terrain we shall have to cross if we take the road of escalation. I said that we will face increased casualties, a manpower shortage, and economic problems which include inflation, worsening balance of payments, increased taxes or economic controls. Nor are these all of the costs which we must consider in computing a cost-benefit ratio. There are the costs I have pointed to in our Great Society programs—budget cuts, deferment of projects until later, all manners of economic casualties.

There are other costs which escalation will bring, costs without a price tag. Among these, and they have formed the center of great amounts of discussion, are those based upon our relation with other nations, our standing in the eyes of the world. Some people do not want to consider our standing in the eyes of the world, but this will be part of the cost.

Dr. Eugene Carson Blake has long been one of the Nation's foremost Protestant churchmen and a great leader of the ecumenical movement. He has just been elected general secretary of the World Council of Churches, which makes him as close to being the Protestant counterpart of the Pope as the world provides. Dr. Blake says, from the standpoint of world Christian leadership, that any U.S. victory in Vietnam will have "a racial stigma" because of "the bombing of a less developed nation of colored people by a large, rich, white one."

HARSH COMMENT FROM FRANCISCANS

From France a publication of the Franciscan Order, *Freres du Monde*, views our position in these rather severe and harsh terms:

In Vietnam, peace is not a football game between two equal teams.

Somewhat I gain the impression that some people believe that the debate taking place here concerns whether Army is going to beat Navy or whether Notre Dame is back in the days of the Knute Rockne teams. They seem to believe that this is an athletic contest we are discussing. I did not utter these words. These words were written in a publication of the Franciscan Order.

I continue to read:

On the one side there is an aggressor, the United States, and on the other, a people who are continually being oppressed, bombed, and decimated.

If you do not see the matter in this light, it is because you have admitted that anti-communism is an end that justifies all means, including torture, napalm, and dozens of daily bombardments against North Vietnam.

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It is the United States which implacably practices the dangerous policy of escalation, but for a small consideration we shall instead blame the Vietnamese patriots who insist upon gaining their freedom. It is the United States which daily is menacing the world peace, but for a small consideration we shall come to thank them for building peace in the shadow of intercontinental missiles.

This is not the effusion of Communist propaganda from Russia. It is the comment of a Catholic religious order's publication, the same order whose brown robes with knotted cords about the waist may be seen as they lead Jerusalem pilgrims along the Via Dolorosa to the high altar in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, which, as the senior Senator from Oregon knows, we visited 2 days before Christmas. What price good will throughout the world if it brings such comments as these from such a source?

I shall not attempt details, which have been repeatedly discussed by others including many experts, concerning the escalation policy in our international relations. We all know that this is not Korea. We stand virtually alone, in a unilateral action taken without the blessing of the United Nations—which the Senator from Oregon has repeatedly requested—and without the partnership of most of the 40 nations with whom we have formal treaty relationships.

I have said before that our great danger in escalation is that by this means we may move toward the very thing we must avoid, a land war with Asia. Every U.S. military leader that I know of, from Eisenhower and MacArthur on down—or up, according to how we look at it—has warned us against getting bogged down in a land war in Asia. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, as Walter Lippmann noted in his Tuesday column, "has recognized that the prospect of a land war with China is today our greatest worry." I opposed, as did many Senators, resumption of bombing, because I fear that this escalation will lead to greater likelihood of that war we do not want.

Let me say that if the discussion and debate has in any way taken us off that course, it has been that much to the good, at least.

Finally, having looked down that fork in the road, and having cast up the cost-benefit ratio, I find that it does not warrant the project of escalation. The costs are too high, and although I have not spelled them out, I believe the nonmilitary costs, the noneconomic costs, are in themselves too great even without reference to dollars and cents cost, or to the cost in casualties.

DOWN ANOTHER ROAD

I have said earlier that, like all but possibly a few dedicated pacifists, I likewise reject the notion that we can suddenly and completely withdraw from Vietnam. Probably there is but one road left for us to choose—possibly more, but at least that one—and that is a road whose choice has been made by a growing number of Americans, led by General Gavin, Ambassador Kennan, and hopefully, I think, by President Johnson himself. Here is a policy which makes as much sense as anything can in this situa-

tion. It is one which can stop what Emmet John Hughes in Newsweek recently called "The Diplomacy of Drift" as the title of an article in which he said that our globe-traveling peace missionaries "can have little to say about Vietnam that could not have been said a year ago at least as persuasively. For a year's massive show of American force has armed American diplomats with neither new argument nor new advantage. Never in this generation of Americans has so much power been spent so lavishly to gain so little."

This is from the man who sat at the right arm of President Eisenhower in the White House for so many years.

It is time to cease lavish spending of our power for little gain. At the same time, even though we have made a mistake in getting in deeper and deeper in the middle of what is to so large an extent probably a civil war, and because we have no smallest wish to see Communist control and influence extended in Vietnam or anywhere in the world, we cannot withdraw immediately from South Vietnam.

We have, all too inadvertently, come to the point where we have on our hands first of all the major responsibility for a military operation of great magnitude and difficulty, in support of a political structure which has also somehow become accepted as our responsibility. We are attempting, as Ambassador Kennan put it, "not only to defend the frontiers of a certain political entity against outside attack, but to assure the internal security of its government in circumstances where that government is unable to assure security by its own means." That is a monumental task, one far beyond the normal obligations of a military alliance.

I do not say we are incapable of doing so. I do say that the cost is too great for the benefit. We have a great military establishment, capable of performing, as the men who are there have so well shown, with the greatest of ability. Our ultimate aim should not be escalation, but extrication. But extrication must come in the only valid way it can be done, and that is by means of negotiation. We are going to have to bring those boys home, and the only way we can do it is by negotiation.

For this, the prospects are best if we resist the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese sufficiently to prevent them from any closer approach to their goal of military victory as a route to political domination, keeping the pressure on in the proper places but not seeking to widen the war in North Vietnam with the attendant risks and dangers that entails. I think we need to bear in mind the words of Mr. Kennan, with which I agree:

I see in the Vietcong a band of ruthless fanatics, partly misled, perhaps by the propaganda that has been drummed into them, but cruel in their purposes, dictatorial, and oppressive in their aims. I am not conscious of having any sympathy for them.

I think their claim to represent the people of South Vietnam is unfounded and arrogant and outrageous. A country which fell under this exclusive power would have my deepest sympathy, and I would hope that this eventuality at any rate would be avoided by a re-

strained and moderate policy on our part in South Vietnam.

But our country should not be asked, and should not ask of itself, to shoulder the main burden of determining the political realities in any other country, and particularly not in one remote from our shores, from our culture, and from the experience of our people.

This is not only not our business, but I don't think we can do it successfully.

TOWARD A CEASE-FIRE

We can hold them in check, and continually explore every avenue for bringing about a conference which will end that stalemate in a military sense by a realistic settlement in a political sense.

This, I believe, is what the country wants. This is the tenor of the vast majority of the letters I receive. It was in support of my position, and today it is 89 percent. This is the position of an increasing number of public persons, of writers with background and expertise in Far Eastern affairs, of editorial writers, of such interpreters of America as the editorial writer in the Saturday Evening Post who, in the issue of January 15 written long before the Foreign Relations Committee hearings, had this to say:

We say we are fighting for the liberty and independence of the people of Vietnam. The Communists say they are fighting for the liberty and independence of the people of Vietnam.

We say we will stop the bloodshed if they will stop their aggression. They say they will stop the bloodshed if we stop our aggression.

We say we want to negotiate on the restoration of the 1954 Geneva Treaty, interpreted our way. They say they want to negotiate on the basis of the treaty interpreted their way.

We are convinced we must "teach them a lesson." They think they are teaching us a lesson.

As is often true, each side can argue its case reasonably and believe in it passionately. What is at stake here is not a matter of moral rightness but rather a deadly conflict of national interests. As long as each side takes "negotiation" to mean that the enemy must confess his sins, there will probably be no peace—for years. Is it what the people of Vietnam want?

On Friday, February 11, Ambassador Goldberg stated:

President Johnson believes there might be a reciprocal reduction of hostilities, without negotiations, which could be a significant step toward peace.

It was our hope that cessation of bombing in North Vietnam would lead to a reduction of activity by North Vietnamese. In Honolulu, General Westmoreland told a press conference, that, although terrorism had increased, attacks by large units, battalion size and up, were fewer recently than during November and December. A south Vietnamese Army spokesman has been quoted as saying that Vietcong activity during the first week of February was the lowest in 18 weeks. For the first time in 10 months an entire week went by without attacks or sabotage in the Saigon region. According to General Westmoreland at Honolulu, again, infiltration remained at about the same level "before, since, and during" the bombing pause—about 4,500 per month.

The first thing to achieve is a reciprocal reduction of hostilities such as Ambassador Goldberg speaks about. Re-

duction of Vietcong activities such as those I have reported should be met not by escalation on our part, but by similar hulls, accompanied by the greatest vigilance but without provocative initiation of attack.

The first formal essential to full peace talks is cease-fire. We have had cease-fires by mutual agreement recently. There was one at Christmas, and there was another for the New Year, Tet. Admittedly, a cease-fire would be a stalemate, from the military standpoint. But it could bring about the needed respite, whenever it can be achieved, on which a fuller settlement can eventually be reached.

Belligerency evokes belligerency, and we cannot expect escalation to bring the peace we need, the peace we seek, the peace we must secure. There is no question of suing Hanoi for peace, of "groveling," to use the word so recently misapplied by Barry Goldwater to our stance. We are big, we are powerful, and they know it as well as we do, as well as the rest of the world. We need not bully in order to be firm. Out of our strength we can afford to be magnanimous. To fear loss of face in our position is ridiculous. To give the governments of both Saigon and Hanoi a means toward peace without loss of face may appear difficult, but surely it cannot be impossible.

Our resolution offered to the Security Council called for "discussions without preconditions" in order to arrange a conference "looking toward the application of the Geneva accords." North Vietnam is not a United Nations member and objected to the United Nations route, but North Vietnam is a signatory to the Geneva accords and has made a great point of resting its case upon them.

The Security Council resolution which we desired adopted spoke of using all appropriate means, "including the provision of arbitrators or mediators." The words are those of our draft. The possibility of mediation, if not by officially designated United Nations members as mediators, is still one which exists. There are other countries, friendly to us, who are also in relationship with Hanoi, such as India, who could be of potentially great service in helping achieve that first step, the important cease-fire which would halt the shooting war and start the peacemaking process.

Finally, as leaders of the world, and in particular of the free world, we should be too far down the road of civilization to find no other way possible than war, and that against a small Asian nation through whom we might become exposed to conflict with the masses of Communist China. As long ago as the Kellogg Pact we disavowed war as a means of national policy. The fact that we have not declared this to be a war makes it no less a violation of our pledges over the years, to the United Nations, and to support the Geneva Conference. At that time, on July 21, 1954, although we did not sign the accords, we made a "unilateral declaration" which stated:

Our Government declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (1) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance

with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain from the threat or use of force; and (2) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

Despite all that has occurred since the Geneva accords, if for no other reason than the declaration of ours, freely made on our own initiative, we must take a position with regard to our actions there, as the editorial heading in the February issue of the *Idler* puts it, to "elevate them a little lower."

I am not discouraged. If it is worth the cost of one life to fight in Vietnam, how much is it worth to fight for the peace table? The way is not easy, but neither is the way of escalation, and we come out both ways at exactly the same point which puzzled Emil Ludwig's apocryphal small boy:

Why do they leave peace to go to war to win a victory so they can have peace?

I am not a pacifist, but I am proud to be a peaceseeker. When the times demand all-out military effort, as they did in World War II, I count it a privilege to have been a member of our Armed Forces. I will support them with all that I can to provide for their protection, wherever they are. But their best protection is to get them out of the line of fire, to arrange for negotiations, and to apply more faithfully than we have done our own repeated proclamations of the right of self-determination for the people of the troubled land of Vietnam.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in my opinion, there has just been made in the Senate one of the truly great speeches of this historic debate on the issue of American foreign policy.

I am only sorry that all Americans who would like to have heard it could not have heard it. That is why I said a few minutes ago that I believe we should give serious consideration in the Senate to changing our rules of procedure so that these great debates can be made available to the American people through their radios and television.

I congratulate the Senator from Indiana for his great speech. Of the many points he raised, I am so glad he also raised the point of the moral issue that is involved. I am particularly glad that on page 20 of his speech, he cited the position taken by the Franciscan Order in France.

Having made reference to the views of that religious order, I wonder if the Senator, with the consent of the Senate, would permit me to supplement his statement and add to it by reference another document involving the position of men of religion in regard to the issue that confronts the American people vis-a-vis this war and our moral obligations with relation to it. It is a document of a page and a half that I want to relate to the Senator's speech on this issue. I spoke in Madison, Wis., at a general meeting dealing with our foreign policy issue involving the war in Vietnam. I spoke at

1 o'clock in the afternoon, and I was told by those in charge that I spoke to something like 3,600 people who were in attendance. There were two closed television circuits to other auditoriums necessary to accommodate the audiences. It is such interest that I have found characteristic at the grassroots of America. But that morning I was invited to attend a breakfast of some members of the clergy in Madison, Wis., some 30 of them.

I was filled with great humility as a result of a letter that these members of the clergy presented to me, which relates directly to the Senator's speech with regard to the moral issues involved in this war.

I think I should put this letter into the *Record*, having given the background. These pastors of various churches, which I shall name after I complete reading the memorandum, presented this letter to me:

To the Honorable WAYNE MORSE.

From the Madison Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned About Vietnam.

Honored by your presence in Madison, we are drawn together to share with you our acute distress over the war in Vietnam. We confess that we have not wanted to face up to the tragedies of this war. We have preferred to keep our churches unsullied by the painful controversies of our day. Most of us have been silent while bombs have begun to fall once more onto the Vietnamese countryside. We have said little from the safety of pulpits while American and Asian young men are killing each other with increasing dispatch and in alarming proportion. Few of us have let our President know of our disappointment that the peace offensive has withered and of our urgent hope that his approach to the United Nations may effect reconciliation among the combatants.

All too often, we have hidden behind our failure to become informed about the situation in Vietnam. We have been afraid to risk opinions that are not fortified by expertise and by firsthand knowledge of the military, political, economic, and sociological data. We have sought comfort in ignorance and have been willing to let affairs of the world be ordered by the power of information, rather than by the power of moral insight. We admit our political naivete, and we are tempted to bewildered inaction.

We are heartened, however, by your outspoken attempts to bring an end to the conflict and to halt escalation of the war. Recognizing the ambiguities that must be weighed in formulating national policy, we seek your continued leadership in sorting out clouded issues and in offering clear alternatives to the course being followed by our Government. We appeal to you and to our other elected representatives to guide our Nation out of the inevitable morass which increased military involvement in Vietnam promises, into a passionate struggle for peace which dares to be rebuffed and which does not give up when met with apparent failure.

We pledge ourselves to support the waging of peace and to lift up before the public conscience those moral issues raised by the conflict in Vietnam. In our effort to grapple with the complexities of technical fact and strategy, we are deeply troubled:

1. By our overwhelming military presence in a foreign land, without convincing evidence that our action there is supported by the peoples whom we presume to protect.

2. By the irreparable damage which our weaponry is dealing to the homes, crops, and other resources of a country struggling for economic subsistence.

3. By the inflexibility of military conscription whereby ethical dissent from this particular war is not considered valid

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grounds for being absolved from military duty.

4. By the implications of a wartime public mentality which does not grant that efforts to end the war may be a genuine exercise of patriotism and of concern for American fighting men.

5. By the staggering loss of life and the enormous financial commitments to this war when the enemies of all mankind—hunger, disease, and poverty—stalk our Nation as well as the rest of the world.

6. By the fact that human beings continue to resort to arms in an age when nuclear chaos is always present.

We commit ourselves to foster moral sensitivity, and we ask you to instruct our political imaginations—to the end that war may no longer be the instrument by which nations seek to resolve their differences.

Andrew Davison, First Baptist Church; Manfred Swarsensky, Temple Beth El; Billy F. Bross, Bethany Methodist Church; Gary Des Jardin, St. Matthew's Lutheran Church; Winslow Wilson, Methodist District Superintendent; James LaRue, Baptist Student Center; Lowell Messerschmidt, Church of the Divine Saviour (Evangelical United Brethren);

Charles K. Paton, Messiah Lutheran Church; Donald Bossart, Methodist University Center; Clifford Fyelling, Plymouth Congregational Church; Oscar Fleishaker, Beth Israel Synagogue; Myron M. Teske, Lutheran Campus Ministry (NLC); Arnold Levern, Covenant Presbyterian Church; Ellsworth Kalas, First Methodist Church; Richard Wichlei, Southwest Wisconsin Association, United Church of Christ;

Elizabeth Gwynn, University YWCA; Robert Trobaugh, Wesley Methodist Church; Robert C. Shaw, St. Andrews Episcopal Church; Donald D. Fenner, First Evangelical United Brethren Church; T. Gordon Amphlett, Director of Christian Education, West Wisconsin Conference of the Methodist Church;

Richard Winograd, B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation; Amos Shinko, Ashbury Methodist Church; Anthony A. Farina, Our Master's Church (Evangelical United Brethren); Edwin Beers, Campus Minister, United Church of Christ; Ray E. Robinson, Sherman Avenue Methodist Church; Willard W. Schulz, Conference Superintendent, Evangelical United Brethren; Gomer Finch, Bethany Methodist Church; Connie Parvey, Lutheran Campus Ministry (NLC).

The following ministers wish to express their support of this statement, except for item 3, above relating to military conscription:

James W. Jondrow, University Presbyterian Church; Sarah Ellis, Church of St. Francis (Episcopal); Richard E. Larson, Bethel Lutheran Church.

I think the Senator will agree with my feeling, which I just referred to, of deep humility. In my judgment, there is a growing interest, at long last, on the part of religious leaders, men of the cloth, of this country to consider the great moral issues that are involved in this war.

In my judgment, there is a great need for an acceleration of spiritual concern about the immorality of this war, because I happen to think that, when all is said and done, it is a moral issue more than any other issue that is involved.

As I have said for two and a half years and repeat again today, in my opinion, my country's course of action in Asia is

immoral and cannot be reconciled with the teachings of a belief in a supreme being.

I am glad that this group of clergymen has seen fit to take the position that they have taken in this great statement they have issued.

Mr. President, if we do not measure up to our moral obligations, in regard to which I believe we are sorrowfully wanting at the present time across this Nation, it will not be too long before, figuratively speaking, the church bells of America will be tolling, tolling, because we have caused a death blow to what has always been a great record of moral values in our country. I believe we are walking out on those moral values in these troubled days.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I wish to thank my good friend, the Senator from Oregon, for those warm words.

With regard to the message from these ministers, I would imagine that if most of the Members of Congress, both the House of Representatives and the Senate, examined their mail closely, they would find that they possibly receive proportionately more mail from ministers on this issue than on any other subject. This is so even though frequently these people are hesitant to write on political matters for fear that it will be misinterpreted. I know that my mail is that way.

Most letters that I receive are not only saying, "Do this, do that." They are very thoughtful letters. They go into all the issues.

The people have been following the debate, which I believe is so good. They have been listening. They have been hearing things. They say they have been hearing things that they never knew before. They say, "I never heard that before." They say, "This is news to me."

I should think that the news media would want to continue to feel that they have a place in this situation where there is a moral responsibility. In a democracy, there is not only the right of freedom of expression but a duty of expression and a duty to express oneself fully and then to let the people decide.

I really have no fear of the result. I believe I know what they think. But even if it turned out that they did not think the way I thought they should, I believe that they should be permitted to make their own determination. But they should do it on the basis of all the facts.

It is for this reason that I hope all of those who feel they must hide behind some secret door, would express themselves fully in public, except for those matters which are, of necessity, truly touching national security. They should speak out not alone in open debate, or on the radio and television, where sometimes the time is limited, but in front of the representatives of the people, in front of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

I wish to say again that I thank my friend from Oregon for giving me the opportunity to participate in a very educational trip in that section of the world, a trip which made it possible for me at least to have a firsthand opinion of what

those people over there want for a better way of life, not a better way of death.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. As the chairman of that delegation, I wish to thank each member of the delegation for the cooperation I received at all times in carrying out my administrative duties in the handling of that trip.

I became very interested in the observations that the Senator from Indiana made along the route as he saw firsthand the cost we have paid in many, many ways for our mistaken policy of military aid.

I shall never forget the day in New Delhi, when the Senator from Indiana and the head of the professional staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. Marcy asked me a question. I could not go with them one afternoon on a trip to the front, but they saw to it that I had the same experience the next day. They said to me that night, "Senator, do you know the best known American name in India?"

I started to ponder and the Senator from Indiana said, "Come on and guess."

After a little reflection I said, "I suppose the best known American name in India is Chester Bowles, our very able Ambassador here in New Delhi."

The Senator from Indiana and the others laughed at me and said, "No, you are wrong. The best known American name in India is Patton. We will prove it to you tomorrow."

Then, the Senator from Indiana told me of the experience he had had that day and which I had the next day in stopping and talking to Indians in villages along the highway, assisted by an interpreter. When asked what the name Patton meant to them their almost invariable response was a response of anger. Sometimes they would shake a fist, point a finger, and say, "Patton, Patton. American tanks you sent to kill us."

We had a graphic experience as to what military aid means in India among the masses of the people. We are either going to win the masses of the people or the cause of freedom is going to be lost in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

They recognize that our military aid, serving Pakistan and India, put them in a military position where they could carry on a war against each other with our equipment.

What kind of moral position did that leave us in?

As the Senator heard me say on the trip, it left us in a position of moral bankruptcy. Our military aid, time and time again in place after place in the world has left America morally bankrupt. That is why I shall continue to oppose the military aid on the format we have been conducting it, financing it, and giving it.

I am glad that the Senator from Indiana in his speech today announced, as he told us before we got back to the United States, that he had had his fill of American military aid.

I wish to thank him for the statement that he made today.

Mr. HARTKE. I wish to say to the Senator from Oregon, along with the masses, as the Senator knows, we were the last Senators that visited with the Prime Minister, who went to Tashkent with Shastri. We were not invited to his birthday party. We were guests of the entire government. They treated us in a royal fashion and they tried to make life for us as comfortable as possible.

Mr. Shastri's birthday was during that time. On his birthday cake there was a replica of the Patton tank, as an indication that they had conquered the great American military machine in the battlefield of Pakistan, and they had taken them over with World War II Shermans and Centurions. It was a matter of military pride for them and contempt for us and contempt for the aid we have given there.

There are a lot of people in India, according to the information they gave us, and I have no reason to doubt it. The population of India, in which we have a vital stake, is more than Africa and South America combined.

I do believe, with all respect to the efforts we made there, that we have a long way to go in establishing the type relationship with India which can bring stability to that part of Asia.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Indiana spoke about the Patton tank graveyard, where the Indians were showing our destroyed Patton tanks. Tanks which were perforated with holes caused by the shells of the Shermans and the Centurions that the Indians had placed in ambush to use as artillery. The RECORD ought to show today that the Senator from Indiana and I, and the other members of our delegation, saw busload after busload of Indian schoolchildren being brought day after day to that so-called Patton tank graveyard to see for themselves how U.S. military aid had caused them the great trouble that resulted from the war. Implanted in the minds of those schoolchildren was anti-American resentment of the course of action that this country had followed by supplying military aid. In my judgment, that was one of the most dramatic, one of the most disturbing sights we saw in our 5-week tour of Asia.

The Senator from Indiana has said that we received nothing but lip service in support of U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam, but no sincere support for our aid anywhere. Leader after leader told us that he hoped we could get the war over with as soon as possible, and without involving the rest of Asia in a war with China. It is a war with China that the nations of Asia and their leaders fear.

Mr. HARTKE. I might emphasize that point further. I asked one of the Indian ministers, "Do you object to our offering aid to Pakistan?" I did not mean that I was proposing an offer of aid to Pakistan; I was only making a suggestion. I said, "Suppose we provided you with all the military equipment you

need to defend yourself against the 'Paks.' Suppose we provided you with all the economic aid you thought was necessary to start rebuilding your country, and also provided Public Law 480 food, which we are now providing, to relieve the starving people. What if we cut off all our aid to Pakistan, of whatever nature whatsoever, and made sure that you had enough military equipment to defend yourselves against Communist aggression, which exists on the Chinese border? Would you be willing to join us in Vietnam and help to oppose the Communist aggressor?"

The answer to that was very clear and very quick: "That is your problem; that is your concern. We are neutral."

I hope the Vice President will obtain more satisfactory results from his briefings and interviews. I shall be much interested in the outcome.

Perhaps I have said enough for today.

WHAT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION THINKS ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF OUR POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in Chicago today passed a resolution stating that the position of the United States in Vietnam is in accord with international law.

The resolution, received from the ABA's Council on International Law, was passed unanimously, 279-0.

This resolution stated:

The position of the United States in Vietnam is legal under international law and is in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty.

A copy of the resolution was sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Said resolution stated:

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter preserves the right of any U.N. member to engage in self-defense and call on other U.N. members to help.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to say good-naturedly to my friend, the Senator from Missouri, that apparently what the American Bar Association needs is a freshman refresher course on both international law and constitutional law.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TOWARD A NEW ASIAN POLICY

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, 3 weeks ago Under Secretary of State George W. Ball defined and defended the present foreign policy of the United States in an address before the Northwestern Univer-

sity Alumni Association. He did so ably and articulately. His speech conforms closely to the testimony Secretary Rusk gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Friday. Both dwelt at length on the policies which brought us into Vietnam, as well as the conflict itself. It is here, with the premises which underlie our policy, that the issues must be joined if there is to be meaningful debate on our Asian policy for the future.

Mr. President, in fairness to Under Secretary Ball, I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of his address, as published in the Washington Post of February 6, 1966, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE HANOI MYTH OF AN INDIGENOUS REBELLION

(Address by Hon. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, delivered last week before the Northwestern University Alumni Association at Evanston, Ill.)

The beginning of wisdom with regard to Vietnam is to recognize that what Americans are fighting in the jungles and rice paddies of that unhappy land is not a local conflict—an isolated war that has meaning only for one part of the world.

We can properly understand the struggle in Vietnam only if we recognize it for what it is: part of a vast and continuing struggle in which we have been engaged for more than two decades.

Like most of the conflicts that have plagued the world in recent years, the conflict in Vietnam is a product of the great shifts and changes triggered by the Second World War. Out of the war, two continent-wide powers emerged; the United States and the Soviet Union. The colonial systems through which the nations of Western Europe had governed more than a third of the people of the world were, one by one, dismantled. The Soviet Union under Stalin embarked on a reckless course of seeking to extend Communist power. An Iron Curtain was erected to enclose large areas of the globe. At the same time, man was learning to harness the power of the exploding sun, and technology made mockery of time and distance.

The result of these vast changes—compressed within the breathless span of two decades—was to bring about a drastic rearrangement of the power structure of the world.

A WESTERN DAM

This rearrangement of power has resulted in a very uneasy equilibrium of forces. For even while the new national boundaries were still being marked on the map, the Soviet Union under Stalin exploited the confusion to push out the perimeter of its power and influence in an effort to extend the outer limits of Communist domination by force or the threat of force.

This process threatened the freedom of the world. It had to be checked and checked quickly. By launching the Marshall plan to restore economic vitality to the nations of western Europe and by forming NATO—a powerful western alliance reinforced by U.S. resources and military power—America and the free nations of Europe built a dam to hold back the further encroachment of Communist ambitions.

This decisive action succeeded brilliantly. NATO, created in 1949, stopped the spread of communism over Western Europe, and the northern Mediterranean. But the world was given no time to relax. The victory of the Chinese Communists in that same year posed a new threat of Communist expansion against

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an Asia in ferment. Just as the Western World had mobilized its resistance against Communist force in Europe, we had to create an effective counterforce in the Far East if Communist domination were not to spread like a lava flow over the whole area.

BALANCE MAINTAINED

The first test came quickly in Korea. There the United Nations Forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea, supported by materiel from the Soviet Union. They stopped a vast Chinese army that followed. They brought to a halt the Communist drive to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the whole Korean peninsula.

The Korean war was fought from a central conviction: That the best hope for freedom and security in the world depended on maintaining the integrity of the postwar arrangements. Stability could be achieved only by making sure that the Communist world did not expand by destroying those arrangements by force and threat and thus upsetting the precarious power balance between the two sides of the Iron Curtain.

It was this conviction that led to our firm stand in Korea. It was this conviction that led America, in the years immediately after Korea, to build a barrier around the whole periphery of the Communist world, by encouraging the creation of a series of alliances and commitments from the eastern edge of the NATO area to the Pacific.

The SEATO treaty that was signed in 1954 was part of that barrier, that structure of alliances. It was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1.

Under that treaty and its protocol, the United States and other treaty partners gave their joint and several pledges to guarantee existing boundaries—including the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam established when the French relinquished their control over Indochina. Since then, three Presidents have reinforced that guarantee by further commitments given directly to the Republic of Vietnam. And on August 10, 1964, the Senate, by a vote of 88 to 2, and the House, by a vote of 416 to 0, adopted a joint resolution declaring their support for these commitments.

A GREEK ANALOGY

Today we are living up to those commitments by helping South Vietnam defend itself from the onslaught of Communist force—just as we helped Iran in 1946, Greece and Turkey in 1947, Formosa and Korea in 1950 and Berlin since 1948.

The bloody encounters in the highlands around Pleiku and the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta are thus in a real sense battles and skirmishes in a continuing war to prevent one Communist power after another from violating internationally recognized boundary lines fixing the outer limits of Communist dominion.

When we think of Vietnam, we think of Korea. In Vietnam, as in Korea, the Communists in one part of a divided country lying on the periphery of China have sought by force to gain dominion over the whole. But in terms of tactics on the ground, Greece is closer analogy. For there, 20 years ago, as in South Vietnam today, the Communists sought to achieve their purpose by what is known in their lexicon as a "war of national liberation."

They chose this method of aggression both in Greece and Vietnam because tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion, give a great advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly where—as in those two countries—the physical terrain made concealment easy and impeded the use of heavy weapons.

But the Communists also have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation an element of confusion, a sense of ambiguity that can, they hope, so disturb and divide freemen as to prevent them from making common cause against it.

This ambiguity is the central point of debate in the discussions that have surrounded the South Vietnam problem.

SUBVERSION SINCE 1954

Is the war in South Vietnam an external aggression from the north, or is it an indigenous revolt? This is a question that Americans quite properly ask—and one to which they deserve a satisfactory answer. It is a question which we who have official responsibilities have necessarily probed in great depth. For if the Vietnam war were merely what the Communists say it is—an indigenous rebellion—then the United States would have no business taking sides in the conflict and helping one side to defeat the other by force of arms.

The evidence on the character of the Vietnam war is voluminous. Its meaning seems clear enough: The North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi systematically created the Vietcong forces; it provides their equipment; it mounted the guerrilla war—and it controls that war from Hanoi on a day-to-day basis.

The evidence shows clearly enough that—at the time of French withdrawal—when Vietnam was divided in the settlement of 1954, the Communist regime in Hanoi never intended that South Vietnam should develop in freedom. Many Communists fighting with the Vietminh army were directed to stay in the south, to cache away their arms and to do everything possible to undermine the South Vietnamese Government. Others—80,000 in all—were ordered to the north for training in the North Vietnamese army.

The evidence is clear enough also that the Communist rulers of the north resorted to guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam only when the success of the South Vietnam Government persuaded them that they could not achieve their designs by subversion alone.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Vietnam—held its Third Party Congress in Hanoi. That congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Vietnam. Within 2 or 3 months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war.

NINE REGULAR REGIMENTS

Beginning early that year, the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate across the demarcation line the disciplined Communists whom the party had ordered north at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, those men had been trained in the arts of proselytizing, sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of southerners who had gone north. Since then, the greater number of men infiltrated into the south have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the south.

I mention these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because they are fundamental to our policy with regard to Vietnam. These facts, it seems to us, make it clear beyond question that the war in South Vietnam has few of the attributes of

an indigenous revolt. It is a cynical and systematic aggression by the North Vietnamese regime against the people of South Vietnam. It is one further chapter in the long and brutal chronicle of Communist efforts to extend the periphery of Communist power by force and terror.

UNACCEPTABLE CONDITION

This point is at the heart of our determination to stay the course in the bloody contest now underway in South Vietnam. It also necessarily shapes our position with regard to negotiations.

The President, Secretary Rusk and all spokesmen for the administration have stated again and again that the United States is prepared to join in unconditional discussions of the Vietnamese problem in an effort to bring about a satisfactory political solution. But so far, the regime in Hanoi has refused to come to the bargaining table except on the basis of quite unacceptable conditions. One among several conditions—but one that has been widely debated in the United States—is that we must recognize the National Liberation Front as the representative—indeed, as the sole representative—of the South Vietnamese people.

Yet to recognize the National Liberation Front in such a capacity would do violence to the truth and betray the very people whose liberty we are fighting to secure. The National Liberation Front is not a political entity expressing the will of the people of South Vietnam—or any substantial element of the South Vietnamese population. It is a facade fabricated by the Hanoi regime to confuse the issue and elaborate the myth of an indigenous revolt.

History is not obscure on this matter. As I noted earlier, the creation of the front was announced by the North Vietnam Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after the North Vietnam military leader, General Giap, announced that "the north is the revolutionary base for the whole country." But the Hanoi regime, while applauding its creation, has taken little pains to give the front even the appearance of authenticity.

The individuals proclaimed as the leaders of the front are not personalities widely known to the South Vietnamese people—or, indeed, to many members of the Vietcong. They are not revolutionary heroes or national figures. They have little meaning to the ordinary Vietcong soldier who fights and dies in the jungles and rice paddies.

Instead, the names he carries into battle are those of "Uncle Ho"—Ho Chi Minh, the President of the North Vietnamese regime—General Giap, its military hero. When Vietcong prisoners are asked during interrogation whether they are members of the National Liberation Front, they customarily reply that they owe allegiance to the Lao Dong—the Communist Party of North Vietnam—which is the equivalent of the Hanoi Communist regime.

The front, then, is unmistakably what its name implies: a Communist front organization created to mask the activities of Hanoi and to further the illusion of an indigenous revolt.

The name of the organization was carefully chosen. It bears the same name as the National Liberation Front of Algeria. But there the resemblance ends, for the Algerian front did, in fact, represent a substantial part of the Algerian population. It played a major role in an insurgency that was clearly an indigenous movement and not an aggression imposed from outside.

The Algerian front, moreover, commanded the respect and, indeed, the obedience of the people. When it called a strike, the city of Algiers virtually closed down. By contrast,

the front in Vietnam has shown its fictional character by revealing its own impotence. On two occasions it has called for a general strike. These calls have been totally ignored by the people of South Vietnam.

The Algerian front was a vital force in the Algerian community. It secured the overt allegiance of the old, established Moslem groups and leaders. As the revolt progressed, Moslems serving in the Algerian Assembly and even in the French Parliament announced their support for the front.

But the front in Vietnam has utterly failed in its efforts to attract the adherence of any established group within the society—whether Buddhist, Christian or any of the sects that form substantial elements in Vietnamese life.

Quite clearly, the people of South Vietnam—if they are aware of the front at all—know it for what it is: the political cover for a North Vietnamese effort to take over the south—in practical effect, the southern arm of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.

REINFORCING A FICTION

To be sure, the Vietcong military forces include a number of indigenous southerners under northern control. Neither the United States nor the South Vietnamese Government has ever questioned that fact. But the composition of the Vietcong military forces is not the issue when one discusses the role of the front. The issue is whether the front has any color of claim as a political entity to represent these indigenous elements.

The evidence makes clear that it does not. It is purely and simply a fictitious organization created by Hanoi to reinforce a fiction. To recognize it as the representative of the South Vietnamese population would be to give legitimacy to that fiction.

The true party in interest on the enemy side—the entity that has launched the attack on the South Vietnamese Government for its own purposes, the entity that has created, controlled and supplied the fighting forces of the Vietcong from the beginning—is the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi. And it is the failure of that regime to come to the bargaining table that has so far frustrated every effort to move the problem of South Vietnam from a military to a political solution.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not taken—nor do we take—an obdurate or unreasoning attitude with regard to the front. The President said in his state of the Union message, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points, or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group"—and that, of course includes the front along with other groups.

As the President has also said, this false issue of the front would never prove an insurmountable problem if Hanoi were prepared for serious negotiations. But we cannot, to advance the political objective of the Communist regime in Hanoi, give legitimacy to a spurious organization as though it spoke for the people of South Vietnam.

EVERY BOUNDARY IMPORTANT

A European friend once critically observed that Americans have "a sense of mission but no sense of history." That accusation is, I think, without warrant.

We do have a sense of history and it is that which enables us to view the war in South Vietnam for what it is. We Americans know that it is not, as I have said earlier, a local conflict; it is part of a continuing struggle to prevent the Communists from upsetting the fragile balance of power through force or the threat of force.

To succeed in that struggle, we must resist every Communist effort to destroy by aggression the boundaries and demarcation lines established by the postwar arrangements. We cannot pick and choose among

those boundaries. We cannot defend Berlin and yield Korea. We cannot recognize one commitment and repudiate another without tearing and weakening the entire structure on which the world's security depends.

Some thoughtful critics of our Vietnamese policy both in Europe and America challenge this. They maintain that the West should not undertake to defend the integrity of all lines of demarcation even though they may be underwritten in formal treaties. They contend that many of these lines are unnatural since they do not conform to the geopolitical realities as they see them. They contend in particular that—since the passing of colonialism—the western powers have no business mixing in the affairs of the Asian mainland. They imply that—regardless of our commitments—we should not try to prevent Red China from establishing its hegemony over the east Asian land mass south of the Soviet Union.

INACCURATE PREMISE

Proponents of this view advance two principal arguments to support their thesis.

They contend that the very weight of Chinese power, its vast population and its consequent ability to mobilize immense mass armies entitles it to recognition as the controlling force of southeast Asia.

As a second reason for acknowledging the Chinese hegemony, they contend that for centuries China has maintained a dominant cultural and political influence throughout the area.

They claim, therefore, that southeast Asia lies within the Chinese sphere of influence and that we should let the Chinese redraw the lines of demarcation to suit themselves without regard to the wishes of the southeast Asian people.

This argument, it seems to me, does not provide an acceptable basis for U.S. policy.

The assertion that China through hundreds of years of history has held sway over southeast Asia is simply not accurate. Successive Chinese empires sought by force to establish such sway, but they never succeeded in doing so, except in certain sectors for limited periods. For the people of southeast Asia have, over the centuries, shown an obstinate insistence on shaping their own destiny which the Chinese have not been able to overcome.

To adopt the sphere-of-influence approach now advocated would, therefore, not mean allowing history to repeat itself. It would mean according to China a status it had never been able to achieve by its own efforts throughout the ages. It would mean sentencing the peoples of southeast Asia against their will to indefinite servitude behind the Bamboo Curtain. And it would mean turning our back on the principles that have formed the basis of Western policy in the whole postwar era.

Nor can one seriously insist that geographical propinquity establishes the Chinese right to dominate. At a time when man can circle the earth in 90 minutes, there is little to support such a literal commitment to 19th century geopolitics. It is a dubious policy that would permit the accidents of geography to deprive peoples of their right to determine their own future free from external force. The logic of that policy has dark implications. It would rationalize the greed of great powers. It would imperil the prospects for developing and maintaining an equilibrium of power in the world.

The principles of the United Nations Charter are doctrinally more in tune with the aspirations of 20th century man.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

This does not mean, however, that the political shape of the world should be regarded as frozen in an intractable pattern: that the boundaries established by the postwar arrangements are necessarily sacrosanct and immutable. Indeed, some of the lines of de-

marcation drawn after the Second World War were explicitly provisional and were to be finally determined in political settlements yet to come. This was true in Germany, in Korea, and South Vietnam as well.

But those settlements have not yet been achieved, and we cannot permit their resolution to be pre-empted by force. This is the issue in Vietnam. This is what we are fighting for. This is why we are there.

We have no ambition to stay there any longer than is necessary. We have made repeatedly clear that the United States seeks no territory in southeast Asia. We wish no military bases. We do not desire to destroy the regime in Hanoi or to remake it in a Western pattern. The United States will not retain American forces in South Vietnam once peace is assured.

The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral, depending on the will of the people. We support free elections in South Vietnam as soon as violence has been eliminated and the South Vietnamese people can vote without intimidation. We look forward to free elections—and we will accept the result as a democratic people is accustomed to do. Yet we have little doubt about the outcome, for we are confident that the South Vietnamese who have fought hard for their freedom will not be the first people to give up that freedom to communism in a free exercise of self-determination.

Whether the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam will wish to unite is again for them to decide as soon as they are in a position to do so freely. Like other options, that of reunification must be preserved.

A SHARED INTEREST

In the long run, our hopes for the people of South Vietnam reflect our hopes for people everywhere. What we seek is a world living in peace and freedom—a world in which the cold war, with its tensions and conflicts, can recede into history. We are seeking to build a world in which men and nations will recognize and act upon a strongly shared interest in peace and international cooperation for the common good.

We should not despair of these objectives even though at the moment they may seem rather unreal and idealistic. For we would make a mistake to regard the cold war as a permanent phenomenon. After all it was less than two decades ago that Winston Churchill first announced in Fulton, Mo., that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." And two decades are only a moment in the long sweep of history.

During the intervening years, major changes have taken place on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A schism has developed within the Communist world. The Soviet Union has become the second greatest industrial power. The Soviet people have begun to acquire a stake in the status quo, and after the missile crisis of 1962 the Soviet Union has come face to face with the realities of power and destruction in the nuclear age and has recognized the awesome fact that in the 20th century a war between great powers is a war without victory for anyone.

The changes taking place within the Soviet Union and among the nations of Eastern Europe are at once a reality and a promise.

Over time—and in a world of rapid and pervasive change the measurement of time is difficult indeed—we may look forward to a comparable development within Communist China—a maturing process that will deflect the policies of Peiping from bellicose actions to a peaceful relation with the rest of the world.

After all, it is not the American purpose simply to preserve the status quo. That was not our history and that is not our destiny. What we want to preserve is the freedom of choice for the peoples of the world. We will take our chances on that.

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Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, so first of all, let me make clear that I shall hazard no miracle cures for Vietnam; some omelets may prove indigestible, but none can be unscrambled. President Johnson's options there keep narrowing. He searches for the rudiments of an acceptable settlement, for the diplomatic door that might lead to the conference table, and for effective ways to wage the war, while confining it within manageable limits. In these endeavors, he has my fullhearted support.

He will also have my support when it comes time to vote the money necessary to carry on the fight. Our men are fighting bravely and well. Whatever funds they need should be provided by the Congress. We are committed and we must not make a difficult position worse by failing to support our fighting men.

In voting the funds necessary to support our soldiers, I do not mean to imply support for the policy which got them there, or endorse similar policies in the future. Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, made it quite clear that no endorsement of policy was implied by voting for an authorization or appropriation bill. He said:

I think it is important that the Senate and the Nation clearly recognize this bill for what it is: an authorization of defense appropriations. It could not properly be considered as determining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the past, or as endorsing new commitments.

Consequently, my purpose today is to look both behind and beyond Vietnam; behind it to the concepts on which our present policies rest, and beyond it toward a future policy for Asia. I realize this is not an easy time to take the long view, embroiled as we are in a hard jungle war. Nations, like soldiers, seldom plan their futures from foxholes.

And yet our present agony summons us to scrutinize the premises which led American troops into Vietnam in the first place. What role are we assuming on the mainland of Asia? What does it portend for the future?

Even to pose such questions these days invites rejoinders of abuse—broadside volleys of "appeasement," "neoisolation," or just plain "Munich." So let me say, at the outset, that I regard myself as a very practical internationalist. I believe the United States, as a great world power, has global responsibilities to discharge. Our present interests compel us to shape a workable foreign policy which will first, contain Russia and China, and second, discourage the further spread of communism. It is not with these goals, but with our current approach to them in the underdeveloped world, that I must register my dissent.

Mr. Ball's speech underscores the basic flaw in our Asian strategy: he draws no distinction between the problem of Red Chinese aggression and that of general Communist expansion. It is evident that the State Department still views communism as one big octopus, and the United States as the diver groping to cut off its tentacles, whenever the monster stretches them beyond its present lair.

This mission is taking us down into dangerously deep and murky waters.

Consistent with this view, Mr. Ball makes three main points. First, that a barrier has been fixed around the Communist world and that it has become the responsibility of the United States to hold it intact—alone if necessary. Second, that the war in South Vietnam is not a revolution but a disguised aggression from the north, the purpose of which is to extend international communism beyond the fixed barrier. Third, that the concept of spheres of influence is out of date, and that mainland China has no claim to any special influence in southeast Asia.

Let us begin by considering Mr. Ball's first point. The war in Vietnam, he contends, "is not a local conflict," but "a part of a vast and continuing struggle in which we have been engaged for more than two decades." The struggle is the bitter harvest of World War II, out of which the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two great powers. The Soviet Union, under Stalin, then "embarked on a reckless course of seeking to extend Communist power." In response, the United States and its allies in Western Europe formed NATO as a "dam to hold back the further encroachment of Communist ambition." But, with the coming to power of the Communists in China in 1949, the world faced "a new threat of Communist expansion." To meet it, "we then built barriers around the whole periphery of the Communist world through a series of alliances and commitments." Through the SEATO Treaty, we undertook to "guarantee existing boundaries including the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam." Our intervention in Vietnam is, therefore, but another battle in the "continuing war to prevent one Communist power after another from violating internationally recognized boundary lines fixing the outer limits of Communist dominion."

Underlying Mr. Ball's analysis, and administration policy as well, is the assumption that the system of alliances which worked in Europe will also work in the vast region which has just thrown off European rule—in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Yet, even in Europe, NATO did not, strictly speaking, "stop the spread of communism." NATO held fast the Iron Curtain; it stopped the westward movement of Russian aggression. It is true, of course, that the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Red Army led to the imposition of Communist regimes in these countries. But behind the NATO defense line, communism continues to exist. It still claims the second largest political party in Italy, and the fourth largest in France. To repeat, NATO did not "contain communism," it prevented the Soviet Army from marching into Western Europe.

Behind the NATO shield, we have not faced violent Communist wars of national liberation. The reason is that internal conditions of the NATO countries gave no root to revolt. Only in Greece did the Communists try it, in a guerrilla war which Mr. Ball compares with Vietnam.

True, we extended aid to the Greek Government, but we did not intervene with combat troops. The Greeks put down the revolt themselves.

Moreover, moving American forces into European countries is not at all like sending them to Asia. When our armies remained in Western Europe, following World War II, it was to forge a vital link in a collective chain of defense that had real substance. We were welcomed by people with whom we shared a common culture and civilization. Most of them, having experienced our kind of freedom, willingly did their part in manning the NATO line, drawn against the Soviets.

Unfortunately, we seem to have been mesmerized by the success of our post-war European policies, NATO and the Marshall plan. With the emergence of Red China in Asia, our diplomats reacted like generals determined to fight the next war the same way they had fought the last. Military alliances were hastily formed to "contain communism" in Asia, served up with American Foreign Aid on a global platter, a Marshall plan writ large. Communist China, we determined, was to be stopped in Asia, as Russia had been in Europe.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield at that point, or would he prefer to finish his speech first?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania at this time.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend. First, let me compliment him on the fine speech he is in the process of making. He was courteous enough to give me a copy of the speech before he began. I have had an opportunity to read it and I believe that it makes an excellent contribution to the important debate which is presently going on.

I am interested in the Senator's analysis of George Ball's speech of some weeks ago, and in particular the point which the Senator is now discussing—with which I agree—that there is a vast difference between the situation in Europe, particularly as it existed some time ago, and the situation which now exists in southeast Asia.

The Senator will recall that the Secretary of State and other administration spokesmen have made a great point of the alleged analogy between the Chinese position and our response to it, and the reaction of the Chamberlain government to Hitler's expansionist actions before World War II. I take it that the Senator is of the view that the analogy is not an apt one. I wonder whether that is correct?

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct. The threat which faced Europe, posed by Hitler's Germany, was the threat of German conquest—Hitler's vision of a Germany which would stretch from the Rhine to the Urals. In his "Mein Kampf," written much earlier in his life, he presented a blueprint for German conquest.

China is both a bellicose and a dangerous nation. I would place no confidence whatever in the present Peiping regime. I believe that we must take care to prevent any attempt by China

to conquer neighboring lands in Asia. But, thus far, the Chinese have not embarked upon the naked conquest of Asia.

The much discussed treatise of Chinese Marshal Lin Piao, for example, is not a "Mein Kampf," prescribing Chinese conquest of Asia, but, rather, as I later mention in this address, a kind of "do it yourself kit" which analyzes the Chinese revolution and recommends Chinese methods to Communists in other Asian lands.

It strikes me that this is a very important distinction, Mr. President. There is a difference between the problem posed by the Chinese effort to spread communism through revolution, and that posed by frontal Chinese aggression. Our present policy tends to blend the two together; it confuses the Asian situation with the European situation in the days preceding Hitler's attempt to conquer Europe.

Mr. CLARK. I agree with the Senator. I wonder whether he would be willing to pursue this alleged analogy a little further, because while there is a certain superficial resemblance between the European situation at the time before Hitler struck, and the situation in southeast Asia today, my own view is that the analogy is fundamentally unsound, that we should approach the South Vietnamese-American-Chinese situation, really, almost "de novo," or on an "ad hoc" basis, without placing much reliance on alleged analogies at other times and in other places.

I would ask my friend this. A good deal of emphasis has been placed by administration spokesmen on the fact that perhaps we are being confronted with another Munich and if we do not stand up and fight now, all of southeast Asia will fall and Chinese communism will prevail in all that part of the world. There is, of course, a surface similarity between nazism and fascism on the one hand and Chinese communism on the other. They are all totalitarian doctrines.

I wonder if the Senator would not agree with me that in each instance the ideology is merely a cloak of idealism thrown over a policy of expansionist nationalism.

The trouble is that we Americans, with our democratic tradition, become so mesmerized with opposition to any form of totalitarianism, that we are not astute enough to recognize, as perhaps we should, that what we are dealing with in both cases is expansionist nationalism, but expansionist nationalism in vastly different areas and under vastly different conditions.

Mr. CHURCH. First of all, let me say that I find Fascist and Communist totalitarianism equally repugnant. Second, with respect to the present war in Vietnam, I think it cannot honestly be maintained that this is a struggle between the forces of tyranny on the one hand and the forces of freedom on the other.

Mr. CLARK. Can the Senator expand on that?

Mr. CHURCH. I mean that neither the government in Hanoi nor the government in Saigon is in truth a free government. It is just possibly the rea-

son why we are told that most of the people in Vietnam are uninterested; they find they have little choice.

Mr. CLARK. And actually neither is a democratic government.

Mr. CHURCH. That is true. There is no democratic government in either part of Vietnam today.

Mr. CLARK. There is none in southeast Asia, with the possible exception of the Philippines.

Mr. CHURCH. There are free governments in Asia today. India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan are the best examples. I want to give them full credit. Particularly the Indians, I think, deserve credit for tremendous determination against odds—conditions of great adversity—in maintaining a democratic government. But most Asian and African governments are not free. They are not democratic governments. Certainly, this applies to the present regime in Saigon supported by the United States.

So I think, if we are going to approach the war in Vietnam on a purely ideological basis, then we must be careful to recognize that the struggle there is presently between two despotisms. I hope the Government in Saigon will one day become a true democracy, that it will find a wider basis of popular support, and that it will come to foster a broadening freedom. But that is not the case at the present time.

If I may go to the third point the Senator from Pennsylvania raised, which was the point of expanding nationalism, I say again, relating the Senator's question to the situation in Vietnam, that the expanding nationalism we face there is not Chinese nationalism, but Vietnamese nationalism. Oftentimes the Secretary of State has referred to the war in Vietnam as Ho Chi Minh's war. When he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I asked him if the aggression he kept referring to was not the aggression of North Vietnam rather than of China, and he admitted this was so.

I think, given the history of this struggle, the facts are that Ho Chi Minh was the original revolutionary leader who led the Vietnamese people successfully in their war for independence against the French, and that the division between North and South Vietnam which emerged from that war at Geneva, in 1954, was meant to be temporary, and that the elections on the question of unification for the entire country, which were supposed to have taken place 2 years later, in fact never occurred.

Mr. CLARK. And why did they not occur in the south?

Mr. CHURCH. The regime in South Vietnam at that time, Diem's regime, was opposed to the elections. President Eisenhower, in his book, makes the statement that the best opinion he could marshal indicated that, had the elections occurred, perhaps as many as 80 percent of the people would have voted for Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. CLARK. So we have either actively encouraged or acquiesced in preventing a democratic solution of the governmental problems in South Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCH. I may say to the Senator that there were good reasons to question whether an election at that time—in the north as well as the south—would have been a free expression of popular opinion, but that begs the point, I think, because part of the Geneva Pact of 1954 was the agreement that elections would be held, and that agreement was broken. Either side has kept the agreement, as the Senator well knows. But the question of determining whether or not the line of demarcation between north and south would remain as a common boundary, or would remain as it was, was never put to the test of ballots. So, 10 years later, it is being put to the test of bullets.

If there is in this situation an element of nationalist expansion, it is Vietnamese in character. It is the attempt of Ho Chi Minh, the original revolutionary leader, to lay claim upon the whole country, and it comes after a failure of the Geneva Pact to permit the elections which were to settle that issue 10 years ago.

Mr. CLARK. Does it not also include a failure on the part of the Diem government and its successor to go to the people of South Vietnam in a democratic way to determine what they wanted to do with their own destiny?

Mr. CHURCH. I can only say the elections were never held. The reasons given have been several.

The most frequently heard has been that no meaningful elections could have occurred in North Vietnam because it was a closed Communist society and everyone would have had to vote way.

Mr. CLARK. I agree with that statement.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree, too.

But, at the time the agreement was entered into in Geneva, it was known that North Vietnam was going to become a Communist country. Nevertheless, the elections were agreed to. But they were not held. Then Ho Chi Minh began his effort to bring down the South Vietnamese regime by force.

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will yield further, I suggest that the principal reason for not holding an election in South Vietnam was that Diem's government would have gotten licked.

I take it from something that was said earlier by the Senator that we still have a totalitarian government in South Vietnam which we are supporting, so that unlike the situation with Hitler and his aggression against the democratic nations of Western Europe, we find ourselves intervening on the side of one dictatorship against another dictatorship.

Would the Senator care to comment on that?

Mr. CHURCH. In all honesty, this is the existing situation. We do it upon the grounds that the north is attempting to forcibly seize the south, and that we are committed to the Saigon regime to prevent the success of an aggression being perpetrated by Hanoi.

I believe that there is much evidence to sustain the supposition that the Hanoi Government is in fact giving all possible help, encouragement, direction, and assistance to the Vietcong rebels in the

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south. I have no quarrel with that fact. It must be recognized. The evidence makes it quite irrefutable.

The distinction that I am trying to draw is one between North Vietnam and China. Here, it seems to me, is an obvious attempt by Ho Chi Minh to complete the revolutionary war in Vietnam, which began against the French, and which now continues against the Americans.

From the standpoint of Hanoi, this is one continuous effort to achieve Vietnamese independence by driving the Western nations out.

We do not see our role as remotely corresponding to that of the French because, as the Senator knows, the French purpose was to restore French control over Vietnam and reestablish the French colony there.

Our purpose is quite different. We have no interest in establishing an American colony in South Vietnam.

We know that our purpose is quite different.

The important question is: How does it appear to the Vietnamese? After so long and bloody a struggle on their part to drive out the French, it must seem to many Vietnamese that this is but a continuation of that war, looking to the eventual establishment of Vietnamese independence after Western nations have been driven from the land.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct. This situation is fundamentally different from the Nazi aggression in World War II where, I take it, the Senator would agree with me unquestionably that freedom and democracy were at stake.

The Western democracies, which were of the same philosophical bent as ourselves, were fighting for their lives against totalitarian and nationalistic German aggression. We, in my opinion, justly, rightly, and necessarily, went to their assistance.

But is that not an entirely different situation from the situation which confronts us in Asia today?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes; the struggle in Vietnam is essentially a civil war between groups of Vietnamese to determine which government they shall have, and whether the division line shall remain in effect. When I went to school that was a civil war.

We keep asserting to the world that this is not a civil war in Vietnam. But, no matter how one divides the Vietnamese, north and south, Communist and non-Communist, they still remain Vietnamese. We are the only foreigners to have intervened, apart from the small numbers of Australians and New Zealanders, and the one combat division of Koreans that we have summoned there.

So, to Asians this war does have a very different appearance. In no case is it comparable to the situation that confronted us when Hitler sent his armies across Europe in an attempt to conquer the continent.

If the Chinese were sending their armies south into Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Malaysia; then we would have a comparable situation, with the Peiping government undertaking to conquer

other Asian lands. That, in my opinion, would be a situation similar to that which we faced in Europe in the days of Hitler.

Mr. CLARK. I would like to make one more distinction with respect to the alleged analogy to Hitler and Munich, and then I will let the Senator return to his speech.

There is no doubt in my mind—I wonder if the Senator agrees—that Hitler's Germany represented a military menace which, if not stopped, would have overrun not only Western Europe but also Great Britain and would in the end have posed a very real threat to both Russia and the United States. It possessed a military machine, the efficiency of which probably has not been equaled since the days of Napoleon.

The Senator makes the point, and it is a good one, that this is a war of North Vietnam against South Vietnam. But we both know that North Vietnam is being enormously encouraged to mainland China.

I ask the Senator if the administration spokesmen who argue the Hitler-Mao Tse-tung analogy might not consider this distinction:

China has no airpower. Hitler had enormous airpower. China has no seapower. Hitler had a great fleet of submarines and pocket battleships in the Atlantic. Hitler had enormous firepower in terms of tanks and heavy artillery and eventually in V-bombs and rockets.

China has very little of that. China is a primitive nuclear power, a country having very little heavy artillery and, so far as I know, an insignificant rocket capability. In vast contradistinction to Hitler, China's military might lies almost entirely in its large land army.

Its capacity for offensive action is limited to the perimeter of mainland China, although it might include North Vietnam, and even South Vietnam. The withdrawal of Chinese troops from India leads me to believe that the State Department has vastly overemphasized the threat arising from the offensive military capacity of mainland China. There can certainly be no comparison with the aggressive military capabilities of Nazi Germany.

Mr. CHURCH. I would agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania that modern, highly industrialized Nazi Germany represented a military threat of a different dimension than that presently posed by China. The important thing, however, is to recognize that—whatever may be the threat of Chinese aggression in Asia today—we are presently engaged in a war that concerns the Vietnamese. If we press that war far enough north toward the boundaries of China, a point will be reached—no one knows exactly where; but a point will be reached—a point where the Chinese will come down into Vietnam, just the way they came down into Korea. Then, of course, we would find ourselves engaged in a war of an entirely new character.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I stress this point because when we fail to distinguish between

the problem of China, on the one hand, and the problem of North Vietnam, on the other, we get ourselves into a frame of mind which is all too prevalent: that is, in the name of defending Asia against China, we fight against North Vietnam. This, of course, leads us to confusion; and what we need is more clarity and less confusion if we are to fashion a workable policy in Asia.

I now yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. In an effort to help to clarify that policy, I wonder if the Senator from Idaho would agree with this observation: If we push mainland China to the point of coming in with her ground army in defense of North Vietnam, and to assist the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in their aggression, we have only two choices. The first is to pour hundreds of thousands of additional American troops into that area to stop that ground warfare. The second is to use nuclear weapons to destroy China. I ask the Senator to comment briefly on what he believes Russia might well be expected to do under those circumstances.

Mr. CHURCH. If that tragic sequence of events were to occur, the danger of a general nuclear holocaust would be very grave.

Mr. CLARK. There is no doubt about what that would mean to the people of the United States of America.

Mr. CHURCH. No, indeed. The stakes are mortal. This is the reason the Committee on Foreign Relations came out from behind closed doors to examine the issue of Vietnam. The American people are entitled to know how grave might be the circumstances of a widening war in Asia. I believe the public hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations have performed a vital service. The American people were invited to witness our deliberations. As a result, the people of the country are better apprised of the war in Vietnam, its present implications, and the possible consequences that might attend a widening war in southeast Asia.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania for emphasizing the differences between the problem we faced in the days preceding the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe and the problem we now face in Asia. Unless we understand these distinctions, we have no chance of fashioning a policy that is designed to deal with the realities in Asia today.

The gulf that separates Europe from Asia is immense. Most of the newly independent Asian governments—like those in Africa—contend with internal upheaval. Most are hard pressed to satisfy the demands of their suddenly unfettered peoples. Most lack democratic traditions, and have instead "strong man" regimes under one-party rule. Their people wretch in poverty and often bear the yoke of ancient wrongs. "Capitalism," not "communism," is the ugly word, conjuring up images of a hated colonial past. Socialism prevails by force of circumstances, since adequate private capital is unavailable.

With these countries, the United States enjoys no close communion, no cultural, political, economic, or ethnic bond. We are an alien in Asia, a suspect rich Western power, the only one that remains after the others have fled.

In these circumstances, it is meaningless to talk about military alliances which have raised a "barrier" against communism around the rim of Asia. If the SEATO and CENTO alliances bar communism, then a sieve bars water and plate-glass window bars light. SEATO has not responded to the Communist threat in Vietnam; the United States takes its stand there practically alone. Apart from the regime we sustain in Saigon, the only military allies we can honestly claim in Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand—account for less than 5 percent of the Asian people. Rather than flaunting our meager alliances as evidence of a sound Asian policy, we should view them as shocking proof that we lack one.

Given the grievances of most Asian peoples, future revolutions are inevitable. So, too, the Communist determination to take them over. In Eastern Europe, the Red army implanted Communist regimes; in Asia Chinese troops have not penetrated neighboring lands to thrust up Communist governments.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. INOUE. Would the Senator from Idaho describe the Chinese military occupation of Tibet?

Mr. CHURCH. The occupation of Tibet was the laying of forcible control upon an area over which the Chinese have long asserted dominion, and which most of the rest of the world has also acknowledged as being within traditional Chinese claims.

I do not, for a moment, condone the methods that were used by the Peiping government to assert that dominion, but I am fully aware that Chiang Kai-shek, who is, as the Senator from Hawaii well knows, the presiding head of the Chinese Government recognized by the United States, a government presently situated on the island of Taiwan, also claims Tibet as a part of the traditional land area over which the Chinese have asserted dominion.

I therefore believe that Tibet falls in a different category than other independent nations which lie beyond the traditional boundaries of China. I do not believe that Tibet can be compared, let us say, with Burma, Thailand, or Vietnam, which are generally recognized as sovereign and independent nations.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I thought the comment of the Senator on Tibet was a very good answer to an extremely intelligent question. However, it was largely put on political and diplomatic grounds.

I point out that, from a military point of view, the situation in Tibet was vastly different because there was no feasible possibility there of Indian forces or

American forces or other forces opposed to the mainland Chinese Government delivering a military counterpunch to drive the Chinese Communists out of Tibet.

The situation existing there is very much like that which existed in Hungary in 1956. We had great sympathy for the people of Tibet. We had great sympathy for the freedom fighters of Hungary. However, we came to the reluctant, but I believe the correct, conclusion that that was not a place in which one could intervene.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, As I have stressed, a distinction must be drawn between the threat of Chinese aggression, on the one hand, and the problem of communism, fostered by revolution, on the other. American policy keeps blending the two together, presumably because the two threats were synonymous in Europe.

This leads me to Mr. Ball's second point, that the Vietnamese war is not "an indigenous rebellion," but a case of "external aggression." The evidence shows clearly enough, Mr. Ball writes, "that the Communist regime in Hanoi never intended that South Vietnam should develop in freedom." From the start, we are told, the Vietcong rebels have been trained, directed, and supplied from the north in "a cynical and systematic aggression" which Secretary of State Dean Rusk describes as "Ho Chi Minh's War."

While citing the evidence, Mr. Ball might also have mentioned—but did not—that the line of demarcation, separating North and South Vietnam, as agreed upon at Geneva in 1954, was not intended as a permanent boundary, and that the elections on the question of unification which were scheduled for 1956, never occurred. The reason, widely accepted at the time, was that "Uncle Ho," the revolutionary hero who had won independence for both parts of Vietnam, would have garnered as much as 80 percent of the total vote.

So what was not settled with ballots 10 years ago, is now being settled with bullets, in a civil war among the Vietnamese, northern and southern, Communist and non-Communist. We can portray this war as a case of external aggression, but most Asians are not likely to see it that way. After all, we are the foreigners in Vietnam today. The North Vietnamese are not foreigners; they are Vietnamese. There are no Chinese troops fighting in South Vietnam. The only non-Vietnamese soldiers there are American, along with some of our Australian, New Zealand, and Korean allies. And race is a factor, on a continent whose people have so recently thrown off the domination of white, Western nations. We are engaged in a war in which we, a Western power, are fighting Vietnamese who are oriental, and we are fighting them in Vietnam. As Harvard's John K. Fairbank, a noted American authority on Far Eastern affairs, so graphically put it in a recent article:

We are sleeping in the same bed as the French slept in even though we are dreaming very different dreams.

They are dreams indeed if we think that by interjecting American troops

into ex-colonial lands we shall stifle the spread of communism for long. No nation—not even our own—possesses a treasury so rich, or an arsenal so large, as to quench the smouldering fires of revolution throughout the whole of the emerging world.

Violent convulsions are bound to occur in many countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, wherever injustice lacks a remedy and progress must spawn on force. Should suppression of revolt abroad become an American obsession, we will yield to the Communists the one prize they most covet, an uncontested claim upon every incipient revolution. If we do not attempt through our diplomacy and by our example to guide these currents toward democratic ends, rather than trying in vain to stem them, the Communists will be left to ride their crest.

Worse still, the importation into Asia of troops from the Western World, furnishes the Communists with an issue of great popular appeal; it invariably condemns the challenged government to the contemptible charge of puppetry.

We would do well to remember that, despite our massive intervention in South Vietnam, the war persists and intensifies. Far from being extinguished, it spreads now into Thailand.

Yet the Burmese Government, without our intervention, snuffed out a Communist insurrection. U.N. Secretary General U Thant recently said about Burma:

The Burmese Communist Party is still underground after 17 years and still illegal. Burma has over a thousand miles of land frontier with mainland China. If the Burmese Government had decided at some stage to seek outside military assistance, then I am sure that Burma would have experienced one of two alternatives: either the country would be divided in two parts or the whole country would have become Communist long ago.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I believe that the Burmese analogy is well worth stressing, and I hope that it will receive appropriate attention in the press reports of the Senator's speech. To me, it is quite convincing.

Is it not true that in another Asian country, Indonesia, an anti-Communist movement—with some overtones which I must say I am not very happy about—succeeded in getting rid of the Chinese Communist Party and reestablishing control of Indonesia for the Indonesians? It was perhaps a totalitarian control, but I draw the tentative conclusion that we do better in the fight for freedom and against Chinese communism if we keep America out of it, than we do if America goes in.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the Communists are not doing very well in their effort to seize control of the underdeveloped world.

Mr. CLARK. Except where we try to move in.

Mr. CHURCH. On the whole, they are making very little progress. In Vietnam they had the momentum of nationalism to carry communism forward.

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Unhappily, the revolutionary leader there who secured Vietnamese independence was a Communist. However, only in those cases where communism has latched onto nationalism, has it become a formidable force in the ex-colonial regions of the world.

We should take heart from that. We should be careful not to inject ourselves in such a way that the Communists can then exploit our presence to make themselves the champions of the nationalist cause.

I am afraid that this is what has happened in Vietnam. I believe this is the reason that, despite the enormity of the assistance which we have given to the Saigon government and despite the tremendous superiority of the firepower we possess in that country, the war persists and the Vietcong continue to grow in number in South Vietnam.

Again I say we must differentiate between the problem of containing China, on the one hand, and the problem of discouraging the spread of communism through revolution, on the other. There is just one great force that, in the long run, can prevail against communism in the underdeveloped world. It is not the primacy of American arms. It is indigenous nationalist resistance to communism; and if we are insensitive to that force, and intervene with mighty Western armies in a region of the world which has just managed to throw off the colonial dominion of the Western nations, then I am afraid we will permit the Communists to exploit nationalist aspirations, and give them the one cause that can rally popular support to their standards. We will thrust the nationalist banner into Communist hands. They could not ask for more.

Mr. CLARK. I agree completely with what the Senator has just stated. It occurs to me there is another aspect of this case—I do not know whether the Senator will agree or not—and that is that our best defense against communism is the support of such programs as President Kennedy's Alianza para Progreso and other foreign aid programs which enable the people of the underdeveloped countries of the world to move out of the condition of misery, of starvation, of inadequate shelter; because those conditions are breeders of communism, and that is where, in my judgment, our major effort should be placed.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree wholeheartedly with the Senator, and I hope that we shall perfect a new policy in coping with the problems posed by guerrilla warfare. This is what we desperately need in Asia, and our failure thus far to devise such a policy, including some measure of discretion and restraint, is one of the reasons for the difficulties that we now face in that part of the world.

I am now happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, first of all I wish to commend the Senator from Idaho for the statement which he is making today, in following up an article he prepared for the Washington Post, published on yesterday, which I understand was an answer to a previous

speech made by Under Secretary Ball at Northwestern University 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Secretary Ball's statement, in my judgment, is the best single statement of the administration's position on Vietnam that has come to my attention. Mr. Ball, as the Senator knows, is one of the most able men ever to serve in our Government.

But I also think that the answer which the Senator from Idaho is giving today, which follows roughly what he had to say in the Washington Post yesterday, is the finest critique of the administration position that I have heard.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. McGOVERN. From now on when constituents write my office for a clear statement of the pros and cons on administration policy on Vietnam, I shall send them the statement by Under Secretary Ball and the answer by the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is very generous, particularly when one considers the very lucid and effective arguments he himself has made in constructive criticism of our Asian policy.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator. During the celebrated debates between Vice President Nixon and the late President Kennedy in the 1960 presidential campaign, one of the news commentators asked each candidate to state what he regarded as the most important qualification that he could bring to the Presidency.

Vice President Nixon said he felt that his most important asset was his experience. Senator Kennedy replied that he felt the most important quality that he brought to high office was his sense of history.

I believe that the Senator from Idaho has indicated in all of his statements on the problems that face us in southeast Asia a very clear understanding of historical forces.

I believe that the greatest single mistake we have made in southeast Asia, in the years after World War II, has been a tendency to see the revolution of that area as another manifestation of Hitlerism.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. McGOVERN. In other words, we learned the lesson of Hitler, as the Senator from Idaho has said, but we applied it to the wrong situation; and, having done that, we have offered the wrong medicine for the problems of that part of the world.

It is my own feeling that even if there had never been a Soviet Russia, even if there had never been a Red China, we would have seen revolutions in Asia in the years after World War II. The Japanese shattered the old colonial empires of southeast Asia, during World War II. The people in southeast Asia, once freed from control by the countries of Western Europe, were not about to submit placidly to imperial control again after the defeat of Japan in 1945.

I think our policymakers, for the most part, understood the historical forces that were moving in the world at that

period. We perceived the forces of nationalism and the aspirations for a better life being asserted. As a consequence, we urged our British friends to get out of India and Malaya. We told the Dutch that in our judgment it was imperative that they withdraw from Indonesia, and we exerted considerable pressure to see that that was done. We ourselves pulled out of the Philippines.

The only area where we decided to buck powerful historical forces was in French Indochina; and we have been in trouble ever since. Does the Senator agree basically with that analysis?

Mr. CHURCH. I agree completely with the distinguished Senator from South Dakota. I am afraid that we have failed to take our own advice.

We understood and encouraged the nationalist aspirations of Asian peoples when they were directed against the European colonial powers. The one blind-spot was Vietnam. When, for example, the Indonesians pressed for independence against the Dutch, we encouraged the Indonesians, and we discouraged the Dutch; and in the end, the Dutch recognized that there was no way they could enforce their dominion over the resistance of a 100 million people in Indonesia. We also stood with the Indians when they claimed their right to independence against the British.

Now the European powers have yielded their empires. Independence has come to all these Asian lands. The only western nation that remains is the United States, curiously enough the one power that never seriously engaged in empire-building during the previous 100 years.

We know that our role has nothing whatever to do with colonialism; and I would be the last to question our motives in Asia. We do hope to see an independent South Vietnam created, and certainly we have no colonial ambitions there.

But motives are one thing. The appearance of war to other Asians is quite another. I am afraid that choosing Vietnam as a place to make a stand, and importing, from the opposite side of the globe, a vast Western army to fight against the revolutionary leader who secured Vietnamese independence from the French, reflects a failure to comprehend the great historical forces which have been at work in Asia. I am sorry that we failed to see for ourselves what we so clearly saw where others were concerned, in the years that preceded our involvement in Vietnam.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have a brief comment to make. I am unable to remain in the Chamber to listen to the remainder of the speech of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], but I read it this morning and I wish to commend him on it.

There is no one in Congress, in my opinion, who has made a more consistent and thoughtful contribution to this dialog in the field of foreign affairs than has the Senator from Idaho.

The speech the Senator is making is a most creative evaluation of our posture

in the world, particularly in the Far East. I wish to commend him for his excellent contribution to the significant discussion which has been going on in the area of foreign policy in the last few weeks.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator very much for his generous remarks.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. McGOVERN. To continue my colloquy with the Senator from Idaho, having suggested that we do not have a monopoly on virtue, it is somewhat encouraging to know that neither do we have a monopoly on mistakes, particularly in the underdeveloped countries of the world.

As the Senator has stated so well in his remarks on this subject, the Chinese have gotten into all kinds of trouble in those areas of the world where they have intervened in a heavy-handed manner. They have been rebuffed in large parts of Africa. They have got into difficulties in Cuba recently, and they have certainly had setbacks for their cause in Indonesia; in fact, in every area where they have intervened in a clumsy and heavy-handed manner, there has been a backfire.

The reason is clear: In those areas, their interventions have run counter to strong nationalistic aspirations. It seems to me the one place they have had notable success, as the Senator has stated in his speech today, is in the area where we have been most heavily involved; namely, in Vietnam. There are no Chinese soldiers fighting in Vietnam. The foreign forces involved in that conflict are from our country—not from China or Russia.

We are involved in a constantly disappointing effort to impose an outside Western solution on a problem which is basically Vietnamese. It is clear that neither we nor the Communists can easily counter the tide of nationalism without grave costs.

We have been the beneficiary of national aspirations when our policies have been intelligent; likewise, we have had to pay for our mistakes where we have been too heavily involved as in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

So I commend the Senator for his superb address today on the challenge of Asia. It is another of a series of brilliant statements he has made in the field of foreign policy.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, If the Senator will permit me, I might say to the Senator that some time ago I wrote an article for the New York Times magazine on the very question the Senator has raised, that is, on the error of intervening too much in countries that have just won independence. The Russians have made that error. The Chinese are also making it. And, alas, we, too, have made it.

Wherever this happens, the consequences are predictable. The Nationalist feeling reacts strongly against the intervenor. I could cite examples in Africa, and I think in Asia, too, where this has happened.

Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator has referred to his article that appeared in

the New York Times magazine on November 28, 1965. He also delivered a very fine statement before the Economic Club of Detroit on February 22, 1965, entitled "Are We Too Deep in Africa and Asia?"

Because there is a certain continuity in the Senator's thinking in his previous articles and the speech he is making today, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the speech of the Senator from Idaho this afternoon the two previous articles referred to may be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MORSE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McGOVERN. I might say that that trilogy of articles should comprise a very good textbook for any citizen who is interested in reviewing not only the problems and hazards we face in that part of the world, but also the opportunities that are open to us if we seize upon them with imagination and intelligence.

Before I yield the floor, I should also like to take this opportunity to commend the junior Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] for the statement he made over the weekend, calling upon our Government to be realistic in the negotiating prospects that are ahead in Vietnam. I think we have to face up to the facts. We must recognize that we are up against an indigenous guerrilla force in Vietnam, headed by the National Liberation Front. To negotiate, we must be prepared to talk with the people who are doing the fighting and with the leaders who are directing them in both North and South Vietnam. The Senator from New York emphasized that negotiations must include the guerrilla leaders. Secondly, he recognized that they must be given some role in any provisional government that is established. We may have complete confidence in the integrity of the government of Saigon, but the fact remains that when the Vietminh laid down their arms in 1954, they did so with the understanding that an election would be held in 1956. For various reasons that election was not held and they were frustrated in their hopes of winning it. It is not hard for me to guess why they are skeptical about getting into negotiations without reasonable assurance that they will have some part in setting the ground rules for future elections.

So I again commend the Senator from Idaho, as well as the Senator from New York, for the contribution they have made to this historic debate.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I can speak with enthusiasm of the really splendid contribution which the senior Senator from Idaho has made on this occasion and on several occasions in recent months which have been alluded to, and which I am glad to see are being placed into the Record by the Senator from South Dakota.

I think this is a profound analysis of

what is our basic approach. It is done without any caustic criticism. It is a constructive approach. I hope it will be taken seriously by those who are responsible for our mistaken policies.

I am glad to see the reference made to the statement of Under Secretary Ball. It so happens, in connection with the statement made by Secretary Ball, that it has some serious flaws. He made the analogy between Vietnam and Greece. In that connection, George C. Vournas, who was in the U.S. service in the Middle East during the difficulties there submitted an article which I ask unanimous consent be included at the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from Idaho along with some other material. It is entitled "Is Vietnam Another Greece?", which points out some errors and challenges the statements of Mr. Ball. There are also several editorials and articles bearing on this general subject from the New York Times and the Nation that I ask unanimous consent for inclusion.

Another point which I think should be emphasized in reference to the statement made by Secretary Ball is that if the Vietnam War is a civil war, an indigenous rebellion, we would have no business being in there. That is an important admission to which I have alluded before. This review is also borne out by the statement of former President Kennedy, who referred to it as a civil war. He was elected to the House in 1946 and became a Member of the Senate in 1953. He called it a civil war. That fact was also confirmed by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Young] who was there and received assurances from Generals Westmoreland, Stilwell and others there that it was essentially a civil war in South Vietnam.

I think one of the most important aspects of this issue is the fact that the information which has been emanating from official sources is incorrect.

I ask that there also be printed at the conclusion of the speech of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] an article by James Reston from the Sunday New York Times of February 20, entitled "Washington: The Rusk Doctrine," in which it is pointed out that the Rusk doctrine will stretch us so thin that we will have nothing left.

I also ask that there be printed at the end of the speech of the Senator from Idaho a letter to the editor published in the New York Times of February 21 entitled "Error in Vietnam Policy," an editorial published in the New York Times of February 21, entitled "The Vietnam Commitment," and three consecutive editorials from the February 14 issue of the Nation, entitled "Everything But Peace," "The Economics of It," and "AID for Whom?"

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. I again wish to commend the Senator for the fine statement he made and for his stimulating and important contribution to this great debate which, at long last, is now being had on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator.

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It was my privilege to have lunch with our Secretary of State today, in the course of which we went into the ramifications of the Rusk doctrine, as Mr. Reston described it in this morning's New York Times. My difficulty with the Secretary's position is that he bases our participation in the war in Vietnam upon the obligation that we assumed under the SEATO Alliance.

It seems perfectly evident to me that the SEATO Alliance has not responded to the Communist threat in Vietnam. An alliance is a collective undertaking. The purpose of an alliance is to secure binding covenants of two, three, four, or more governments, with the objective that all will act in common concert if the aggression toward which the alliance is directed should occur.

It cannot be persuasively maintained that the other signatories to the SEATO Alliance have responded to the Communist threat in Vietnam.

Pakistan is a member of SEATO. France is a member of SEATO. Neither of these countries has responded in any way. The Philippines is a member of SEATO but we still await any contribution by the Filipinos of combat troops for the war in Vietnam.

In other words, the undertaking of the SEATO Alliance has never been fulfilled. The parties are in default. It is an extraordinary doctrine that, when other parties to an alliance default upon their obligation, the alliance nonetheless remains intact, and that commitments undertaken by the United States remain obligatory.

There is no such doctrine in the ordinary law of contracts. To my knowledge, there never has been such a doctrine before in the law of international relations. It is a strange, if not unique, interpretation to insist that the United States continues to be obligated by a treaty which is otherwise in default.

There may be good reasons, quite apart from the SEATO Alliance, to account for our presence in Vietnam. This is a separate and arguable question. But, it is self-evident that the SEATO Alliance has not functioned. Other major signatories are simply not present in Vietnam. Therefore, it seems extraordinary for the Secretary of State to contend that our obligation under the treaty required us to intervene in Vietnam. It is a doctrine quite without precedent to my knowledge in the history of diplomacy.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. In my view we are in violation of the SEATO Treaty. In the first place, article I provides:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

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When we use force we are in violation of article I, and we are using force now.

Article IV, which was invoked, provides:

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate.

There has been no unanimous agreement, as the Senator pointed out. The case of the administration grows weaker and weaker. Every time U.S. spokesmen come up with a justification it falls to the ground after one checks the pertinent documents.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator. We find ourselves in the position of justifying the war on a higher plane, but that is unfortunate if it leads to doctrines which are not tenable.

I question the validity of a continuing obligation of the United States under a treaty that is in default. That is exactly what has happened to the SEATO Treaty. It has failed to respond to what we regard as Communist aggression in Vietnam.

As I have tried to stress, it is nationalism, not communism, which is the dominant force in the ex-colonial regions of the world. Outraged nationalist indignation in Indonesia is putting the Communists to the sword. We have no conspicuous presence there for the Communists to exploit. Fortunately for us, Sukarno asked us out many months ago.

If we had a better sense of history, we would scoff at the notion that Vietnam is some sort of test case, where Communists must be taught to abandon their resort to force. Regardless of the final outcome in Vietnam, guerrilla wars will continue to break out in the future whenever internal conditions in any country seed revolt. We can draw no battle-line—in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, or any other foreign country—which will either put an end to future revolutions, or cause the Communists to quit trying to take charge of them.

Rather than rushing in with our troops, whenever a guerrilla war in some distant country takes a bad turn, we should begin to exercise prudent restraint. The Communists are doing badly in the underdeveloped world. Only where they have managed to seize hold of nationalist aspirations, have they gained the upper hand. The lesson for us, in dealing with Communist rebellions in Asia, should be to hold our distance, extend our aid at arm's length, and avoid implicating ourselves so openly as to convert these struggles into American wars.

This brings me to the third, and final, point in Mr. Ball's presentation, that southeast Asia does not lie within the Chinese sphere of influence. Furthermore, that the whole sphere-of-influence doctrine is "19th century geopolitics, a dubious policy which would permit the accidents of geography to rationalize the greed of great powers and imperil the

prospects of developing and maintaining an equilibrium of power in the world."

This is sheer sophistry. If anything should be clear, it is that the present equilibrium of power between the United States and the Soviet Union rests upon an implicit recognition of our respective spheres of influence. We did not dispatch an American Army into Hungary in 1956, not because we lacked sympathy for the freedom fighters, but because we calculated that our military penetration of the Iron Curtain would lead to war with Russia. The Soviet Government had reasserted a longstanding Russian influence in Eastern Europe, formerly exercised by the czars. We may trade with these countries, and even encourage their governments to be more independent, but we may not garrison our combat troops in them.

Likewise, with the proclaiming of the Monroe Doctrine, we have long asserted an American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. The Russians are permitted normal dealings with Latin American countries, but they may not convert them into Soviet military bases. Khrushchev made the mistake of trying it in Cuba. We drove him out with an ultimatum that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

In the face of these realities, it is astonishing to argue that spheres of influence have gone out of date. It just is not so. We pretend otherwise, because current American policy in southeast Asia refuses to concede to China that which we claim for ourselves in the Western Hemisphere and implicitly acknowledge to the Russians in Eastern Europe. The relative weakness of China today permits this. But what of tomorrow, when China has achieved real nuclear capability? Is it not the duty of diplomacy to look ahead?

The tragedy is that we resist the quest for a rational relationship with mainland China. By this I do not mean that we can expect to be friends. Peiping is feuding with most of the world, including the big majority of the Communist countries.

The reasons go much deeper than the Communist complexion of the Peiping regime. Arnold Toynbee, the renowned historian, reminds us:

From 1840 to 1945, China was attacked, stamped on, humiliated, and fleeced by one warlike foreign country after another—first by Britain, then by France, and finally by Japan, a parvenu country which had borrowed its civilization from China. A century of such treatment would be enough to make a saint turn savage.

Recognizing the historic roots of China's defection does not, of course, eliminate our need to deal with any consequent threat of Chinese aggression. We cannot permit Communist China to conquer Asia, for this would indeed upset the equilibrium of power upon which stability and peace depend.

But we do not defend Asia against China by fighting against North Vietnam. Mr. Ball himself admits it:

The people of southeast Asia—

He assures us—
have, over the centuries, shown an obstinate insistence on shaping their own destiny which the Chinese have not been able to overcome.

It is not communism in Hanoi, but the unremitting pressure of the war itself, which makes North Vietnam increasingly dependent on China, thus eroding away her hard-won independence.

Neither is China contained in Asia by an American buildup of the military forces of South Vietnam. It would make as much sense to argue that the United States could be contained in the Western Hemisphere by a Communist Chinese buildup of the military forces of, say, Guatemala.

Fortunately, the equilibrium of power in Asia that can effectively contribute to the containment of mainland China is not a matter of exclusive concern to the United States. The chess-playing Russians, with greater reason than we to fear Chinese expansion, practice containment in the king's row, by strengthening at Tashkent the peace between India and Pakistan; we play the game in the pawn's row by innocently waging in Vietnam what appears to Asians to be a neo-colonial war. Is it any wonder that Japan flinches; that the Philippines balk; that India lectures; or that Mao Tse-tung gloats.

I totally disagree with the Department of State: to view Ho Chi Minh's war as no more than an extension of Stalin's postwar aggressions in Europe—to regard communism still as a seamless web—is not "the beginning of wisdom." It is the denial of wisdom. It is a view of the world as rigid and doctrinaire as that of the most credulous Marxist. It is a myopia reminiscent of the Bourbon Kings of whom it was said:

They have learned nothing, and forgotten nothing.

The beginning of wisdom for American diplomacy in Asia is to stop confusing the problem of Communist guerrilla wars with the problem of Communist China. The two may be related, but there still remains a fundamental difference between aggression and revolution. Chinese Marshal Lin Biao's militant treatise is not a "Mein Kampf," prescribing a blueprint for Chinese conquest of Asia, but a do-it-yourself kit for the use of Communist revolutionaries in other Asian lands.

Likewise, there is a difference between preventing China from invading neighboring lands, and attempting to impose a quarantine on Chinese influence. With our arms, if need be, we can accomplish the former, but not the latter. As long as China looms above the little countries bordering her in the Balkans of Asia, her influence will fall over them like a shadow. If this historic sphere of Chinese influence is unacceptable to the United States, we can deny it—not by stabbing at the shadow in Vietnam—but only by striking down, and then dismembering, China itself.

The price of war with China, as other nations have discovered, would be higher than any we have ever paid before. Those who think that our national in-

terest requires a showdown with China anyhow, and that now is a better time to fight than later, would do well to ponder the words of our former Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. In his memoirs, he writes:

But I challenge any thesis that destroying the military might of Red China would be in our own long-range interest. We could create there, by military means, a great power vacuum. Then we would have to go in there with hundreds of thousands of men to fill that vacuum—which would bring us face to face with Russia along a 7,000-mile frontier. If we failed to go in, then Russia herself would fill it, and the threat to our own security would not have been abated by one iota.

It is not likely that China will bring such a hideous war upon herself. Peiping speaks fiercely but acts with caution. Chinese troops are neither stationed nor engaged outside her borders. Her volunteers have long since been withdrawn from North Korea. Chinese troops marched across the disputed boundary line into India, but quickly withdrew again.

Yet, American troops still remain in South Korea, and engage, in ever larger numbers, in the war in Vietnam. However difficult it may be to achieve a satisfactory settlement in southeast Asia, we must not permit South Vietnam to become another Asian garrison for American forces. Our country has no need for fixed footholds on the Asian mainland so close to China. These enclaves mire us down, inhibit our mobility, and exacerbate against whatever prospect there may be for an eventual accommodation with Peiping.

The American interest calls for a *modus vivendi* with China which is as viable as the one we have found with the Soviet Union. To search for it is the task of statesmanship.

A sound Asian policy would pledge American assistance to countries threatened by Chinese attack, taking full advantage of the mobility of our sea, air, and island-based military deterrent in Asia. More important still, any enduring containment of China must rest upon the resistance of stable Asian governments, which command sufficient internal support, regardless of the ideology they profess, to form a counterbalance to Chinese power.

A sound Asian policy would also distinguish between the prevention of Chinese aggression and the repression of Communist insurrection in other Asian lands. In dealing with guerrilla warfare, we must develop a sense of discretion and restraint, if we are to encourage, rather than impede, indigenous resistance, which alone can prevent the banner of nationalism from falling into Communist hands.

Toward such goals, the Vietnamese war, in which we are caught fast, is a poor starting place. But we have no other. And the hour is late.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator on what in my judgment is one of the soundest and

ablest speeches which has been made in this continuing debate of Vietnam.

The Senator has penetrated the weaknesses of the State Department policy as expounded by Under Secretary Ball.

I am particularly impressed with that part of his speech in which the Senator speaks of a sound Asian policy for America. I entirely concur with him that the Vietnamese war in which we are caught fast is a poor starting place for a sound Asian policy.

In the judgment of the Senator, what effect with further unilateral American escalation of the war in Vietnam, whether by land, sea, or air, have on a sound American-Asian policy?

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, to the extent that the war in southeast Asia widens, it becomes less manageable. I believe it is therefore in our interest to do all that we can to confine it within its present limits. Fortunately, the fulfillment of our pledge to the Saigon government can only be achieved in South Vietnam. It is there that the war is being fought.

Mr. CLARK. With the exception of our bombing of North Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct. However, the thrust and purpose and the war is to overthrow the Saigon government. This obviously can only be accomplished in South Vietnam itself. Therefore, I should hope that we would not permit our frustration over the continuing struggle in the south to lead us toward striking ever outward, upon the theory that by bombing Hanoi or Haiphong, or by eliminating the cities or industries in North Vietnam, we will somehow put an end to the insurrection in South Vietnam.

I think it is well to remember that North Vietnam is an agrarian country. Only 10 percent of its economy is industrial. We can destroy the industries there and level the cities and inflict great casualties. But I do not think this will cause the North Vietnamese to give up, any more than the bombing of North Korea ever caused the North Koreans to give up.

It is more likely that such bombing will merely harden the resolve of the Hanoi Government to persist in the war, thus making it more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement.

I hope that we will concentrate our military effort in the south where the insurrection must be put down and where, alone, we can keep the pledges we have made to the Saigon Government.

Mr. CLARK. I take it that the Senator would agree with me that, under the present circumstances, and for very good reasons, we cannot afford to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCH. I am in complete agreement with the Senator. As the Senator knows, I have never advocated a precipitate unilateral withdrawal of American troops. But I hope that we can reach a satisfactory settlement which will permit an eventual, orderly American disengagement.

The President has himself emphasized that we desire no permanent foothold in South Vietnam, that we ask for no alliance with the South Vietnamese Gov-

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ernment, that we are willing to recognize the neutrality of that government—and, indeed, that entire region—and that we want no military bases there.

In all of these respects, I am in full agreement with the President. However, I am troubled that, 13 years after the end of the fighting in Korea and 10 years after the Chinese have withdrawn all of their troops from North Korea, and without any kind of guerrilla war to justify our continued presence in South Korea, we nonetheless keep an army of not less than 50,000 American troops stationed in that country.

We must not permit the same thing to happen to us in South Vietnam. The American interest is not served by such military footholds in southeast Asia. They are unnecessary from the standpoint of our own security. They tend to mire us down and to impede our mobility. I hope that we avoid in South Vietnam what we failed to avoid in Korea.

Mr. CLARK. I take it that the Senator would also agree with me, that if the Hanoi government were to commit the remainder of its well-trained army—and I take it that he would also agree that there is a substantial part of its well-trained army which has not yet been committed to South Vietnam—and particularly if the Chinese should come into the war with "volunteers," we might then of necessity be required, in order to stay where we are and not be driven out by force, to further increase our ground forces in South Vietnam, this being counterescalation on the other side.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree with the Senator. We shall have to take the necessary military steps to prevent the Hanoi government from forcing us out of South Vietnam. Whether we ought to have gone there in the first place, or whether it was in the American interest to make pledges to Saigon in the aftermath of the French defeat is quite another question.

We did so, and having made those pledges, we must honor them. We cannot permit the Hanoi government to force us out of South Vietnam.

I think it should be evident that there is no disagreement on this score. None of us who have criticized American policy in southeast Asia, no member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, to my knowledge, no Member of the Senate, has advocated an American withdrawal from South Vietnam in repudiation of the pledges we have made to Saigon.

Mr. CLARK. I say to the Senator that I am in complete agreement with that statement, and further, that I intend to address myself, on the floor of the Senate, to the broad questions of our policy in Vietnam later this week.

I will make an observation, and ask the Senator to comment on it: Assuming that the forces ranged against us in South Vietnam are not drastically increased by either the commitment of additional regular North Vietnamese troops or the commitment of Chinese volunteers, does the Senator agree with me that it would be a tragic mistake to further increase substantially the American forces in South Vietnam, to make an ef-

fort to conquer the real estate which we have lost, and pursue a policy of search and destroy in areas which have not been held by ourselves or our allies for months if not years, with the result that the American casualty rolls will necessarily increase? Does the Senator agree that the wiser policy would be to follow the advice of General Gavin and former Ambassador Kennan, to make do with what we have, to encourage our South Vietnamese allies to press with their troops to recover the ground which they have lost, remembering the injunction of President Kennedy, given only a couple of months before his assassination, that this is their war, that they must win it or they will lose it, that we can help them with arms and with advice, but that in the end if there is not the will to win by the South Vietnamese, to pacify their own country, we should not attempt to do the job for them?

Mr. CHURCH. I say to the Senator that if we had remembered the Kennedy injunction, we would not have 200,000 troops in Vietnam today. We have gone beyond that point.

We decided, when it became evident that the South Vietnamese were unable to overcome the rebellion, that we would move in our own combat forces and undertake to do so ourselves. To be sure, we fight alongside the South Vietnamese. They have suffered heavy casualties: I do not mean to make light of their gallantry. But increasingly, the burden falls upon American troops, as the size of our army there grows. We are told now that perhaps there may be 300,000, 400,000, half a million, or 600,000 American troops in South Vietnam by the end of this year. I do not know.

I do not wish to leave the impression, however, that I believe in the enclave theory. I think that under the present circumstances, we cannot afford to hole up in fixed position along the seacoast, and still retain much chance of securing a satisfactory settlement.

We are there. We have converted this struggle into an American war effort; and now I think we must pursue a dynamic strategy in South Vietnam. I am not a military man; I cannot pass upon the requirements of that strategy, but I think that we must look for guidance to our officers in command, who are on the ground, know the condition and the situation, and have to deal with it there.

I do wish to stress, however, that I think the American military effort must be concentrated in South Vietnam, and that whatever the difficulties are, whatever the strategy we pursue in the south, we must not let the frustrations of this war lead us toward widening the battle ever northward toward the boundaries of China. I think that there will come a place, if we do, where the Chinese will come in, as they did in Korea.

Mr. CLARK. One final question—and in advance of asking it I again thank the Senator for indulging me in this colloquy, and also express again my admiration for the splendid speech he has made.

It is still official State Department and Defense Department doctrine that the major burden of this war is being carried by the South Vietnamese. We are told

again and again that four out of every five military incidents in the South are South Vietnamese initiatives, and not American initiatives. We are told of the upward of a half million South Vietnamese men under arms, fighting, we are told, for the defense of freedom in their country.

I refer again to the Kennedy statement of 2 or 3 years ago. If that is the fact, as the State Department and the Defense Department continue to insist it is the fact, why do we not let the South Vietnamese win this war, with the support which we can give them with the 200,000 troops and with the untold treasure we are pressing in there; why do we have to make this an American war?

Mr. CHURCH. I say to the Senator, the question is a poignant one, but it is no longer a timely one. The war has become an American struggle. American troops are now committed to it in such numbers that I think this reality must be faced.

I believe, however, that the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania underscores the fact that guerrilla warfare, in the last analysis, depends upon the internal situation within the country victimized by Communist insurrection. In the long run, the Government challenged will prevail, or will be toppled, depending upon the willingness of the people of the country to rally behind it.

The Greek Government was able to put down a Communist rebellion, one that the State Department itself likens to the war in Vietnam. The Greek Government had aid from the United States, to be sure, but not American combat troops. The Greeks put down the rebellion with their own troops.

The Philippine Government put down a somewhat comparable insurrection, involving Communist elements, without the intervention of foreign troops. It was done by Filipinos.

The Burmese were able to snuff out a Communist-led insurrection in their country, despite a thousand miles of common frontier between Burma and mainland China.

On the other hand, the Batista government in Cuba was unable to put down a Communist-led rebellion.

I think, Mr. President, that we must get used to the fact that we live in a generation of revolution; that many governments are going to be challenged, in many countries in the underdeveloped world, from Asia to Africa to Latin America, and that the United States simply cannot intervene in all of these situations for the purpose of imposing American solutions. If we try to do this, our country will soon be regarded as the sentinel of the status quo, as the self-appointed defender of governments despised by their own people. Thus, we will give to Communists everywhere the banner they most want to uphold; namely, an unchallenged claim upon every incipient revolution, the compelling assertion that they alone are the champions of change.

Mr. President, it will not work. It cannot work. I hope and pray that we will find the wisdom to avoid any policy so foredoomed.

From the lessons of the present and the past, we must begin to find the guidelines for a new policy much better suited to the problem of revolutionary wars in the underdeveloped world.

If we summon a sense of restraint, I do not despair for the future because, unlike many others, I am not afraid of communism. I have been in Communist lands. The system has little to commend it. It is inefficient. It is tyrannical. It is bureaucratic. It is not possessed of any dynamic attraction that is likely to ensnare and subdue the world.

Mr. President, the great quest of men everywhere is for freedom. Not many countries have achieved it in full measure, but people everywhere yearn for it. It is the very force working within the Communist world to change the Communist system itself. It is the force working outside the Communist world, the very force which produces revolutions.

In the long run, the ancient yearning of mankind for freedom will prevail. Communism will never inherit the world.

EXHIBIT 1

ARE WE TOO DEEP IN AFRICA AND ASIA?

(By the Honorable FRANK CHURCH, U.S. Senator from Idaho, before the Economic Club of Detroit, Feb. 22, 1965)

In 1957, his first year in the Senate, it was CHURCH who modified the jury trial amendment to the civil rights bill, to assure Negroes the right to serve on Federal juries, a procedural safeguard which opened the way for the first Senate action on civil right in nearly a century.

FRANK CHURCH has not been content to assess the international situation from his Senate office in Washington, but has traveled extensively throughout the world. He was a delegate to the economic conference of the Organization of American States in Argentina in 1957, and to the International Parliamentary Union at Warsaw, Poland in 1959. He led a delegation on a 5-week factfinding tour of Africa in 1960, and then made a personal inspection of American bases and trouble spots in the Pacific area late in 1962.

The senior Senator from Idaho has been outspoken in his belief that our key to Asia is a satisfactory settlement of the political war in Vietnam. It is a pleasure for me to present to you the Honorable FRANK CHURCH, U.S. Senator from Idaho, who will discuss "Are We In Too Deep In Africa and Asia?" Senator CHURCH. [Applause.]

HON. FRANK CHURCH. Thank you very much, Joe Hudson, for an extremely nice introduction, Mayor Cavanagh, General Bork, and gentlemen of the Economics Club of Detroit.

Our time is limited but let me just say in the way of amenities that I am very proud to be here. I know your two fine Senators, PAT McNAMARA and PHIL HART, very well. They are good friends of mine and I respect them highly. It is a special privilege to come and address so distinguished an audience in the great State they represent in the Senate of the United States.

PART I. FROM ONE EXTREME TO ANOTHER

"We can never again stand aside proud in isolation," so spoke Lyndon B. Johnson at his inauguration.

All Americans should agree with the President. Head-in-the-sand isolationism died a generation ago. It isn't likely to be resurrected.

As a confirmed internationalist, I favor strong American support for the United Nations, and I believe in a sensible foreign aid program.

But the pendulum of our foreign policy can swing from one extreme to the other.

Once we thought that anything which happened abroad was none of our business; now we evidently think that everything which happens abroad has become our business. In the span of 30 years, an excess of isolationism has been transformed into an excess of interventionism.

Since the days of the Marshall plan, the United States has constantly expanded the scope of its commitment to foreign governments. From Western Europe, we have moved into Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, until the dimension of our involvement has become global. Our troops are now stationed in no less than 30 countries, we are pledged to defend 42, and we are extending aid, in one form or another, to nearly 100 nations.

Why have we spread ourselves so thinly? What compulsion draws us, ever deeper, into the internal affairs of so many countries in Africa and Asia, having so remote a connection with the vital interests of the United States?

The answer, I think, stems from our intensely ideological view of the cold war. We fancy ourselves as guardian of the "free" world, though most of it isn't free, and never has been. We seek to immunize this world against further Communist infection through massive injections of American aid, and, wherever necessary, through direct American intervention. Such a vast undertaking has at least two defects: first, it exceeds our national capability; second, among the newly emerging nations, where the specter of Western imperialism is dreaded more than communism, such a policy can be self-defeating. As a seasoned, friendly foreign diplomat recently put it: "The United States is getting involved in situations where no one—not even a nation of saints—would be welcome."

This is not to say that we should write off Africa or Asia. It is to say that a foreign policy of intervention, which was right for Western Europe, is apt to be wrong for those continents which have just thrown off European rule.

We were welcomed back to war-devastated Europe in 1945 to be a nuclear sentinel against further Russian aggression. It was the expansion of hostile Russian power which summoned us, not the color of the red banner, or our distaste for the way of life inside the Soviet Union. There was no confusion among the NATO allies as to the identity of the enemy. As long as the Russian threat remained imminent, we all faced in the same direction, united by a single will.

There was still another reason for the success of our intervention in Europe—a condition so obvious that it is often overlooked, and yet so fundamental that its absence in Africa and Asia accounts for most of our setbacks on those continents. In Europe, we stood among people with whom we shared a common ancestry, whose political and economic systems were similar to our own, and whose traditional values derived from the same mainstream of historical experience that we call Western civilization. This cultural bond meant that most European generally shared our aims and our point of view.

But if the inhabitants of Western Europe tend to see the world as we do, as a global arena in which free people are arrayed against Communists, it does not follow that Africans and Asians share this view. They have been participants in a different revolution, more potent and widespread than the Communist brand—a revolution foreshadowed two centuries ago, by the American War for Independence, and whipped into flame by Woodrow Wilson's ringing reaffirmation of the right of self-determination. Neither Marx nor Lenin fathered the revolt against colonialism, and we needn't permit their successors, in Moscow or Peking, to exploit the colonial issue to Communist advantage.

To avoid this, we must understand that,

for most Africans and Asians, our concept of self-government and individual freedom is totally unreal, having never been experienced. In many, if not most, of these emergent lands, it is colonialism, not communism which is the ugly word.

Because these facts are so well known, it puzzles me that American foreign policy in Africa and Asia has not been tied to them. We have plunged into these former colonial regions as though we had been designated on high to act as trustee in bankruptcy for the broken empires.

First of all, we strained relations by trying to induce governments to line up with us in the cold war, a struggle in which few felt any real interest. Forgetting that we ourselves had insisted upon our right to stay neutral for most of our history, we assailed neutralism as a kind of Communist trick. Later, having painfully learned that cold war neutrality always served as a badge of independence and sometimes even as an umbrella for it, we changed tune, but, even then, we kept on administering our aid programs in ways designed to freeze out the Russians and Chinese.

In regions craving aid from any source, our freezeout policy was bound to give rise to cries of undue interference. Soon, African and Asian governments were demanding aid without strings attached, while accusing the United States of practicing neocolonialism. Worse still, sensing that we feared competition from Communist sources, many a government craftily raised the ante on us, threatening to go to the Reds for help if we failed to meet some new demand.

Worst of all, we have permitted ourselves to be drawn into the internal political affairs of so many African and Asian countries that anti-American feeling is rising at an alarming rate. Our Embassies are being subjected to increasingly frequent attacks, our information libraries are being sacked, and demagogues from Cairo to Djakarta court popular favor by rebuking us. Afro-Asian delegates at the U.N. castigate us with words of extraordinary violence. Clearly, the policy of intervening too much in the volatile ex-colonial regions of Africa and Asia, is backfiring on the United States.

PART II. MISTAKES IN AFRICA

Much of this could have been avoided. I visited Africa in 1960, immediately after John F. Kennedy's election, in company with two of my colleagues and the President's youngest brother, Ted. Wherever our presence became known, eager crowds would gather to shout, "Kennedy, Kennedy." The word had spread through Africa that the newly elected President of the United States had, as a Senator in 1957, spoken up for Algeria in her war for independence against France. For the first time our country was being identified, by Arab and black alike, with legitimate African aspirations. Opportunity was beckoning our way.

If we had continued to champion African nationalism, the cause that counts with the people; if we had declared ourselves strongly in favor of rightful independence for the Portuguese territories, the flaming issue in Africa today; if we had held ourselves at arm's length from the shifting factional fights for power within the seething young African countries, regardless of the labels chosen to solicit outside support, I have no doubt that our influence in Africa would have kept on growing.

But we haven't yet managed to harness our zeal. Rational restraints give way to emotional involvement, which, in turn, leads to more intervention. Fortunately, the Russians have made the same mistake in Africa, and now the Chinese seem eager to repeat it. Here are two examples, one Russian, one American, which constitute, in my judgment, showcase illustrations of how not to conduct a winning foreign policy in Africa:

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Six years ago, Nikita Khrushchev scurried to the rescue of Sekou Touré strongman of Guinea, after this little west African country had been stripped bare by the departing French. It seemed a perfect marriage, since the Guinean leaders, raised in the radical tradition of the French labor movement, were Marxists anyway, and anxious to establish a model Marxist state.

When I arrived in Conakry, the country's capital, in December of 1960, Guinea had taken on all the appearances of a satellite. Communist advisors sat beside every government minister. Numerous Red-donated projects were under construction, including a big printing plant, and the place swarmed with Communist technicians, transplanted from countries behind the Iron Curtain. Guinea had plainly been taken over.

Into this captured country, President Kennedy sent a young Ambassador, Bill Atwood. His instructions were to play it cool. He was to say it was their business, not ours, to choose the system they preferred; that we were interested only in helping them, in a modest way, with some of their problems of human suffering. Kennedy felt, if we didn't press too hard, that Guinea would soon discover the Russians weren't 9 feet tall.

And so it happened. It wasn't long before Guinea began to resent the heavy-handed interference of the Russians. Relations became so strained that the Soviet Ambassador was declared persona non grata, and ordered to leave the country. Meanwhile, Guinea began to reassume control over her own course. Today, her attitude toward the United States is much improved, and her ties with the West are growing again.

The mistake of too much intervention, which the Russians made in Guinea, we seem determined to duplicate in the Congo. Africans wonder why the United States, having no historic, economic, or security interest in the Congo, should so involve itself in that country's civil war. I also wonder why.

I know, of course, that the State Department regards the Congo rebels as a Communist front, even though our own envoy in Stanleyville, whose long agony with the rebels was climaxed when they forced him to eat an American flag, declared, after his rescue, that he believed the rebellion to be purely African, not Communist, in character. His statement was met with stony indifference by the American press.

For the fact is that our embrace with Moise Tshombe is popular in the United States. We see him as a vociferous anti-Communist. What matters, however, is how the Africans see him. To most of them, he is the African equivalent of an "Uncle Tom," a puppet of the imperialists who uses white mercenaries to subdue his own countrymen. I doubt that Tshombe will ever win African acceptance. Our identification with him serves only to turn the tide of African opinion increasingly against us.

PART III. THE LESSON OF PAKISTAN

Regrettably, we are creating similar problems for ourselves in Asia by the same excess of interventionism. Pakistan is a classic example. At fantastic cost, we undertook to enlarge and modernize the armed forces of Pakistan. Our theory was that this assistance would bolster the country's defenses against Russia, but it was India, contesting with Pakistan over Kashmir, which felt threatened.

Still, we persisted. After all, hadn't Ayub Khan appeared before a joint session of the Congress, and addressed us in the reassuring accents of a British country squire. On the Communist issue, the Indians seemed much too conciliatory, but we felt sure Ayub Khan could be depended upon, come what may. He himself said so. To the Congress, he intoned: "Let me tell you, that if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The

only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan."

That's past history now. Having used us for his purpose, Ayub Khan was the first to flirt with Red China, when India was attacked. The fervent courtship of Pakistan only lost us favor there. In the recent elections, the main issue between the two presidential candidates was who was the most anti-American; Ayub Khan won.

PART IV. OUR DILEMMA IN VIETNAM

To the case against excessive American intervention in Africa and Asia, the State Department has a stock answer: the Communists won't let us quit. South Vietnam is pointed to as the proof of our dilemma. If we permit the Vietcong to overthrow the Saigon Government, then the gates are open, so the argument goes, to successful Communist subversion of all the other governments in southeast Asia.

But the hard fact is that there are limits to what we can do in helping any government surmount a Communist uprising. We can give arms, money, food and supplies, but the outcome will depend, in the final analysis, upon the character of the government helped, and the extent to which the people are willing to rally behind it.

The Saigon government is losing its war, not for lack of equipment, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied than Saigon, but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported; it must come from within. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite the spilling factions. A family feud is never settled by outsiders. Only the Vietnamese themselves can furnish the solution.

As to the other governments in southeast Asia, they are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support, and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. The Malaysians, with British help, because of their own determined resistance to communism, successfully put down a long and bloody insurrection. Guerrilla wars—even when nourished from without—can be won by sitting governments, but only in countries where shelter for the rebels is not furnished by the people.

Our reason for being in the Orient isn't that of fashioning Asian governments. It isn't communism, as such, which accounts for our presence in the Far East, but rather the containment of Peiping. This can be best accomplished if China is ringed with stable, independent governments, which refuse to be the pawns of Chinese ambition. As Yugoslavia has proved in Europe vis-à-vis Russia, even a Communist government can play such a role.

It would be to our national advantage then, to seek an international agreement for the neutralization of the whole great region that used to be French Indochina. The transitional phase of such a settlement might be policed by the United Nations, or by a special high commission set up to preside over a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and to maintain order, while an independent and unaligned new government is formed by the Vietnamese themselves.

The neutrality of the whole region could be guaranteed by the signatories to the international agreement. Thus, the military might of the United States would remain available as a deterrent against Chinese aggression from the north, which is—or ought to be—our governing national objective in southeast Asia anyway.

In like manner, we may find it in our national interest to pledge our armed might behind the defense of India, or some other Asian government, against a future Chinese

attack, that these governments might avoid the need for developing nuclear shields of their own, while we avoid the dangers of further nuclear proliferation. This kind of guarantee, which would be a real deterrent to Chinese military aggression, lies within our capability, and would preclude a power vacuum in Asia, so feared by the architects of our present policy.

To those who protest that such a course would fail to protect against growing Chinese influence in such countries as Laos, Cambodia, Burma, or Vietnam, brought on through intensified Communist activity within these countries, I submit that the scoreboard on our present policy of direct intervention in southeast Asia shows that we are now losing this contest. Burma and Cambodia, though both non-Communist governments, have been moving steadily closer to China. Laos is limbo, after an American involvement, at heavy cost, in that country's internal affairs, turned sour. The war, in Vietnam, despite Saigon's preponderant military advantage, is going from bad to worse.

This somber truth is underlined in the events of the past fortnight—the stepped-up Vietcong attacks upon American bases in South Vietnam, and the consequent loss of more American lives. We must hope that our retaliatory bombings of military installations in North Vietnam, intended to demonstrate the strength of our will and purpose, may persuade Hanoi and Peiping that the United States is not, and never have been, a paper tiger. Having made a solemn commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep it. The military might we can bring to bear upon North Vietnam is formidable indeed, and so it would behoove the Communists to explore with us the way to a peaceful solution in southeast Asia.

All of us recognize the heavy burden of decision which our President bears. And we would do well to remember that the seal of his office is an American eagle, clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw and an olive branch in the other. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch represents our best hope for avoiding a widening war in Asia.

Those who would use the arrows alone are actually calling for war. The systematic and sustained bombing of North Vietnam, unattended by any proffered recourse to the bargaining table, can only lead us into war. North Vietnam, lacking air and sea power, must answer on the ground. Her response, in the form of added military pressures against the south, Saigon can hardly be expected to withstand. As a consequence, the next step will be to send American land forces into battle, thus converting the struggle into an American war on the Asian mainland. That China will, sooner or later, enter such a war, I have no doubt.

To those who say that we must not parley now, because we would bargain from a position of weakness, I reply that they take too restricted a view of our strategic position in southeast Asia. They look only to the plight of the war in South Vietnam, forgetting that American power in southeast Asia rests not upon the weakness of Saigon, but upon the strength of our own possession of the sea and air. Our recent retaliatory blows should make it clear to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not quit under fire, nor withdraw, nor submit to Communist coercion. We can strike back with relative impunity, from floating bases which are beyond Communist reach, and inflict heavy punishment upon them. Ours is not a position of weakness from which to deal.

PART V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Although it is natural for our attention to be fixed upon the gathering crisis in Vietnam, I nonetheless commenced this address with the purpose of undertaking a general review of American foreign policy through-

out the whole of the excolonial world. My thesis has been that we have allowed ourselves to become overinvolved in both Africa and Asia. In saying this, I fully recognize that the United States cannot withdraw to seek refuge within some happy hunting ground of our own choosing.

But it is mandatory, in these former colonial areas, that we establish foreign policy goals which are not beyond our reach; that we observe priorities which correspond with our real national interests; that we concern ourselves less with other peoples' ideologies, and that we adopt techniques which are sensitive to, and compatible with, the prevailing sentiment of the people in each great region of the world. Measured by these criteria, we are too deeply involved in the internal affairs of the emerging nations in Africa and Asia.

I believe that President Johnson intends, in a prudent and responsible way, to redress the balance. His emphasis on attending to the neglected problems at home is sensible. The long-run influences we exert abroad will hinge, in large measure, upon the kind of society we build in our own land.

In any reappraisal of American foreign policy in the underdeveloped world, so recently freed from colonial bondage, we would do well to recall the wise words of President Kennedy, spoken in November of 1961. "We must face the fact," he said, "that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that we cannot always impose our will on the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse every adversity, and that therefore, there cannot be an American solution to every world problem." [Applause.]

JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR. Thank you very much, Senator CHURCH, for such a complete exposition of your opinion. We have a tradition in the Economic Club to ask questions about various affairs relating to your talk. The first one:

(Reading question): "What are the chances of ending the Vietnam war by proposing a united neutral Vietnam under U.N. protection?"

I interpret that to mean united of North and South Vietnam under U.N. protection.

HON. FRANK CHURCH. Well, I would say that, in this area of the world, the U.N. cannot really give protection. Still the U.N. could play a very useful role in administering whatever agreement the major powers might reach that would underwrite the neutralization of this region, immediately to the south of China. That is why I said, in my address, that I think such an agreement must be backed up by a commitment on the part of the signatory powers to uphold, with the full military power that the signatories possess, the integrity of the region against any outside attack. This would mean that the American military power would remain as a deterrent against actual Chinese expansion into this region.

Gentlemen, as things are now going, the likelihood of Chinese expansion—actual Chinese intervention, possession, and occupation of large parts of southeast Asia—is becoming ever more real. That would mean that we would eventually have to deal with a situation much worse than the one we are now facing in southeast Asia.

JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR. (Reading question): "Does not your public advocacy of negotiation weaken our bargaining position if negotiation does actually occur?"

HON. FRANK CHURCH. Any kind of public advocacy involves certain risks. But gentlemen, when the stakes are so great, then I think it is incumbent upon all of us who hold public trust to open a discussion of the alternatives, so that the American people, who will be asked to fight the war, will have some knowledge of what is basically involved. What this question presumes is closing our

society in the name of conformity of opinion. Now we either run a free society or we don't, and if we're all going to keep quiet and march in step to whatever official tune is played in Washington, then we have relinquished the most precious prerogative we have as Americans, and we have forsaken the processes of freedom, because of our fear of the consequences that flow from freedom. I would not accept that condition and remain in the U.S. Senate. [Applause.]

JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR. (Reading question): "Why should Peiping accept a neutralized southeast Asia? What do you suggest we do if Peiping will not accept truce terms acceptable to us?"

HON. FRANK CHURCH. If it's not possible to negotiate an acceptable settlement, then, of course, it follows that we do not settle. In Korea, negotiations preceded an end to the fighting by 2 years. But in the end we reached a truce. I remember that you all remember it, too. The elections of 1952, when Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged to go to Korea to arrange a settlement of the war. Eventually, we will settle in southeast Asia at the conference table. Now, I can't tell you when Hanoi or Peiping may be willing to deal, or on what basis—but I'd like to find out.

Moreover, it is with Hanoi that we are now principally concerned. The Chinese are not occupying North Vietnam. Their armies are not there. In fact, Chinese physical presence in North Vietnam is much less substantial than our own physical presence in South Vietnam. This is today still a war between the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese and between the South Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese. Hanoi has a great deal at stake in this. She does not want to be occupied by China. Her historic sense of independence, the popular resistance of the Vietnamese toward the Chinese, finds its roots over centuries of past history. While this still remains essentially a Vietnamese conflict, our prospects for settling it on a satisfactory basis are best. If it is transformed into a Chinese conflict, with a Chinese occupation and possession of the area, then, of course, it will become more difficult to find satisfactory answers. That is the company this stepped-up military effort—of which I approve—with a tandem diplomatic effort so that both the arrows and the olive branch are used. That would represent, in my opinion, our best chance for avoiding widening war in Asia.

JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR. One more question on Vietnam and then we'll have a few other subjects to cover.

(Reading question). "How much more prestige is there to lose if we pull out of Vietnam?"

HON. FRANK CHURCH. Well, gentlemen, I happen to be one who never thought we should have gone into Vietnam at the end of that long, painful, and futile French war. But we did. And it is true that when a nation does make a commitment, then, of course, it invests prestige with it. I do not minimize the need to protect that prestige in southeast Asia as much as possible. Therefore, I have never advocated a unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam, or quitting under Communist pressure, or breaking our pledge to give assistance to the Saigon government.

On the other hand, the surest way I know to turn this country back into a country of isolationists is to tell the American people that wherever we go to assist a sitting government in this big world in some struggle to put down a rebellion in which the Communists are engaged—that every time we do this, we have a guarantee the outcome of that struggle with our own troops, as though the very life of the United States depended on it, then, believe me, we're in deep water, and the American people, with their great commonsense, are going to get very tired of it very soon.

With respect to South Vietnam, three American Presidents have said: Our purpose is to help the Saigon government try to win its war. But they have also been careful to say it's not our war and ultimately it's a war that only they, themselves, can win. I agree. Most Communist guerrilla wars have been successfully suppressed, like in Greece, like in Malaya, like in the Philippines, but we can't guarantee that result every time.

If, every time the point is reached where a guerrilla war may be lost, we're going to convert it into an American war, and do as Mr. Baldwin of the New York Times said yesterday—send out a million Americans to fight a war that God knows how long it's going to last, or where it's going to end, or what settlement will follow that would be as good as what we've got to work with today—then we're going to turn this country into a citadel of isolationists again. We've got to keep our wits about us and remember that we serve our national interest—our national interest—by our commitments abroad. And when a situation develops as this one has, we must assess the cost in terms of our real national interest.

I'm for fighting wars when our vital interest is at stake and we've never flinched. But I'm not for getting this country engaged in folly, in futile wars, way out on the other side of the world, over questions to which we cannot furnish any durable answer. That I think is what we're in danger of doing if we now embark upon the path to widening war in the jungles of southeast Asia.

JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR. Two more questions. (Reading question): "Should we do away with the United Nations and organize a group of world powers based on population?"

HON. FRANK CHURCH. I'll make the answer very short. No, I do not think we should do away with the United Nations. The United Nations has been an extremely useful instrument in many places like Suez, like Cyprus and other places. It has served the interests of peace. But there is no international organization, at this stage of world history, that can give us any cure to the problems of war, when the major interests of the major powers are involved. This is too much to expect from the United Nations. So I would say, let us strive to keep the United Nations in as strong and healthy condition as possible, because it serves as a very useful instrument for the human race in the settlement of many peripheral wars that could become extremely dangerous in the absence of a United Nations.

JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR. Our last question relates to foreign aid.

(Reading question): "American business has a big stake in the foreign aid program in that 85 percent of aid-financed purchases abroad must be made with American firms. Is this one of the freezeout features of the foreign aid program you would like to repeal, and how would this affect the chances of passage of the foreign aid bill?"

HON. FRANK CHURCH. That's true. It is running at between 80 and 85 percent. Is this one of the freezeout features of the foreign aid program I would like to repeal?

No, no. I think that one of our most dangerous problems today, gentlemen, is the pressure on the American dollar in the international market. Do you know how much we've spent in the Congo? We spent \$400 million there. Just think of that.

We've got to begin to exercise some discipline upon our emotions. This tremendous outflow of American money, in all of its forms, and a part of it is foreign aid because, although 80 percent of the money is spent here, 20 percent of the money is not, and this does constitute a part of the outflow of American dollars.

Our military installations abroad are another open gate for the outflow of American dollars. I think that, unless we redress the balance of payments, we're going to have

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the American dollar devaluated in the course of time. The Federal Government and the President are determined to avoid that. But unless my knowledge of economics is very insufficient, it can't be avoided indefinitely unless we finally redress the balance-of-payments deficit.

Now, if the dollar collapses—and I don't mean to suggest that there is any imminent danger of that today—but it's under pressure and we know the seriousness of the problem if the dollar were ever to collapse. The British pound collapsed in 1931 when that was the principal currency of the world, and a devastating worldwide depression followed. We could see the great economic strength of the Western World weakened immensely if this were to happen. The only way we're going to see that it doesn't happen, in the long run, is to turn our adverse balance of payments around. And that's got to be done, both through the adoption of the recommendations of the President, and through some curtailment of the outgo of American dollars in the programs we have undertaken abroad I hope that both actions will be responsibly pursued in Washington. [Applause.]

L. S. BORKE, Senator, we are indebted for this very informative explanation of your views, and to you, Joe Hudson, for handling the duties of presiding officer so capably. The meeting is adjourned.

Adjournment.

HOW MANY DOMINICAN REPUBLICS AND VIETNAMS CAN WE TAKE ON?

(By FRANK CHURCH)

Throughout the country there is uneasiness about our foreign policy, coming from such different quarters and expressed in such divergent ways that the underlying reason for the apprehension is often obscured. Americans are always prepared to fight when their country is threatened; no foreign power can intimidate us. The doubt and the disagreement relate to how deeply we should involve ourselves in civil wars of other countries. Young idealists protest our efforts in behalf of so many tottering governments afflicted by decadence and despotism and frequently despised by their own peoples. Scholars warn that the United States must not function as the global sentinel of the status quo.

These are merely different ways of questioning American military intervention as a means for coping with guerrilla wars in foreign lands. People are wondering: Are we to be self-appointed firemen scurrying to quench every revolutionary blaze, no matter how repugnant the government that sounds the alarm?

This, many suspect, is the mission we are embarked upon. Since it is an unaccustomed role that clashes with our own revolutionary origins and our natural reluctance to furnish a shield for any kind of despotism, we seek refuge in soothing semantics. We downgrade freedom by equating it with the absence of communism; we upgrade a host of dictatorial regimes by dignifying them with membership in what we like to call the "free world." We tell ourselves that the remedy for their hungry and oppressed is a ration of foreign aid, with which we seek to buy a little reform, some small measure of relief, as a substitute for revolution. Finally, we suppress any lingering doubts with a heady dose of evangelical zeal.

Thus we appear to have launched ourselves upon the most far reaching American crusade of this century. Dissenters are not apt to be forgiven for their heresy, but hotly branded as "appeasers" held up to scorn for being either "soft on communism" or sold on surrender. Plainly the course of prudence is to march in step.

Nevertheless, there are dissenters who will not be silent. Among them are senior law-

makers in the Senate who, for differing reasons, harbor misgivings about the apparent trend in American foreign policy. These men cannot be lumped together and dismissed as "neoisolationists." Seasoned Senators like FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas, RUSSELL, of Georgia, AIKEN, of Vermont, and MANSFIELD, of Montana are not escapists who yearn for the return of bygone days when we behaved as though we could keep out of all foreign wars.

Such an interpretation profoundly misconstrues the nature of the current anxiety in the Senate, where even the most outspoken foreign policy critics—Oregon's WAYNE MORSE and Alaska's ERNEST GRUENING—are anything but a new breed of isolationists.

Senators such as McGOVERN, of South Dakota, CLARK, of Pennsylvania, GORE, of Tennessee, and the author of this article are confirmed internationalists—strong supporters of the United Nations, of sensible foreign aid programs, of the Peace Corps and of vigorous U.S. support for the NATO alliance. We have upheld the President's quest for a settlement in Vietnam and opposed any unilateral withdrawal of American forces.

The skeptical mood in the Senate derives, not from nostalgia for the past, but from a searching examination of the present—this age of ferment in which we live. In a brief 20 years, rampant nationalism has swept like a tidal wave over the once-imposing colonial empires. Half a hundred newborn countries struggle for life, hard pressed to satisfy the demands of their suddenly unfettered peoples. Everywhere the remnants of the old order are being challenged. Instability is inevitable. An erupting volcano cannot be capped. No nation—not even our own—possesses an arsenal so large, or a treasury so rich, as to damp down the fires of smoldering revolution throughout the whole of the awakening world.

Even our most militant interventionists concede that the United States alone cannot protect every tottering government from violent overthrow. Our purpose, they say, should be to abstain from interfering with "good" revolutions, while suppressing the "bad."

But since insurgencies these days usually include Communist elements, forecasting the end result becomes a very chancy business. When Batista was overthrown in Cuba, we gambled on Castro and lost; when the military junta in Santo Domingo faced rebellion in the streets, we decided not to gamble. Instead, we dispatched 20,000 troops to put down the revolt, and thus assumed the responsibility for an occupied country.

How many Dominican Republics and Vietnams can we take on? What if revolutions should now occur in Bolivia, Nigeria, and Iran?

The question, we are told, will somehow find its answer in Vietnam. This is our trial-by-ordeal, the third and final test of our capacity to resist Communist aggression. Having taught the master plotters that outright invasions will be beaten back (Korea), that nuclear intimidation will fail (Cuban missile crisis), the United States must now teach the Communists that managed uprisings from within, guerrilla "wars of national liberation," are also in vain. Then the prospects for peace will brighten again.

This is a form of self-delusion. Guerrilla wars, after all, are not the links of a single chain that can be broken in any one place. They can be better compared to a contagious disease, the germs of which are carried on the winds of change. The danger of infection is universal with immunity confined only to countries enjoying good internal health.

So we have seen guerrilla wars, often infected by the Communist virus, erupting in scattered, unconnected countries around the globe, wherever infirmity within invites revolt. Even as we struggled to end the insurgency in Vietnam, rebellion broke out in

the Dominican Republic, on the opposite side of the world. At this very moment, there is serious danger of similar uprisings in a score of countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The causes of these impending revolutions are essentially indigenous, whatever the name of the ideology proclaimed or the colors of the banners unfurled. Regardless of the outcome in Vietnam, we shall have to live in a world beset with guerrilla wars for many years to come.

In these circumstances, we should start to exercise a prudent restraint and develop a foreign policy more closely tied to a sober assessment of our own national interests. For too long we have tilted with windmills in world affairs.

As President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson can no more protect the world from insurrection than Woodrow Wilson could make it safe for democracy.

Emphatically, this does not mean that we should ignore Communist-infested guerrilla wars in the future; rather, it means we should keep our intervention commensurate, in each case, with what we as a nation really have at stake. From our current involvements, we should learn some lessons, and apply them as guidelines in the future.

In the case of the Dominican Republic, for example, the potential threat of a Communist takeover occurred in a region of prime strategic importance to the United States. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which brought us to the brink of nuclear war, decisively demonstrated how much is at stake for the American people in the Caribbean. We will not abide another Castro-type regime so close to our southern shores. Although we can debate whether or not Communists had actually seized control of the uprising in Santo Domingo, the President's decision to send in American troops sprang from his most fundamental responsibility as Commander in Chief—the defense of the country.

In Vietnam, on the other hand, the security of the United States is not the issue. Saigon doesn't stand guard over Seattle. By defeating Japan in the Second World War, we conquered the Pacific Ocean. We police it, patrol it and reign over it with unchallenged naval and aerial supremacy. There is no way for the land-locked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific.

In all honesty, we are fighting in Vietnam, not to defend Honolulu or Seattle, but to defend our national reputation. We have promised much, and now we must make good or risk a loss of confidence in us. The specter of a spreading desertion of the United States around the rim of Asia—not the threat posed by a Communist government in Vietnam—is the real fear thrusting us into the jungles of Indochina.

The lesson to be learned from Vietnam is that when the outcome of a guerrilla war does not threaten the vital interests of this country, we had better deal with it at arm's length. If we decide to give money, food or guns, the aid should be rendered from afar. Every precaution should be taken to avoid implicating ourselves so deeply as to convert the conflict into an American war.

Military intervention on our part, even where it cannot be avoided, is always an expensive and protracted adventure. Already we are finding it much harder to get out of the Dominican Republic than it was to get in. In South Korea a dozen years after the truce, we still have more than 50,000 American troops on duty and the country is sustained by a yearly injection of a half-billion-dollar American dole.

Unless we can discover an acceptable way to extricate ourselves from Vietnam, the price will go even higher there. Our annual bill, once \$200 million, now exceeds

that figure tenfold. Next year, according to present estimates, the total will surely pass \$5 billion. Others in a position to judge are forecasting an outlay closer to \$12 billion. If each guerrilla war which takes a bad turn is to become an American responsibility, there will be no end to the mounting burden—in lost lives and spent treasure.

Accordingly, we must recognize the folly of trying to impose an American solution upon every insurgency abroad. The turmoil of our time will last for generations; some Communist-tinged guerrilla uprisings will succeed, others will fail. Challenged governments may fortify themselves with weapons from abroad, and seek help in other ways, but the ultimate decision will depend on the government's own character, and the willingness of the people to rally behind it. Political, social, economic, ethnic, and religious factors will weigh more heavily in the balance than primacy of arms. The French Army never lost control of the war in Algeria, but the Algerian people were so alienated in the process that the colonial government lost its capacity to govern. It was then that De Gaulle bowed to the inevitable.

Faced with the same sort of popular test, non-Communist governments overcame rebellion in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya and Burma, while Communist-led rebels won out in Cuba. That some governments will fail the test should be no reason for us to panic, or on that account to intervene with American troops. Nationalism, not communism, is the dominant influence of the age. Even when the two combine, communism has become the servant of nationalist aspirations.

As an international force under one directorate, determined to take over the world, communism is a bust. China and Russia are bitter enemies, while the smaller Communist countries are proving surprisingly independent, evolving their own national versions of Marxism. The Communist world is unraveling; it bears no resemblance to a monolithic mass.

Therefore, we must escape the trap of becoming so preoccupied with communism, as such, that we dissipate our strength in a vain attempt to enforce a global quarantine against it. Our first concern in foreign affairs is not the ideology adopted by other peoples, but the threat that other governments may pose to the United States.

In Asia, the potential threat is Peiping, not Hanoi. Had we stayed out, Ho Chi Minh might have forced the reunion of South Vietnam, but Hanoi will never conquer Asia or threaten the world beyond. When we took up the wreckage of empire left behind by the departing French, we ensnared ourselves in a Vietnamese war of secondary importance.

Our involvement, however, has proved so useful to Red China that the Peking government, above all others, wants to see the war prolonged. It is Mao Tse-tung, among the Communist leaders, who most adamantly opposes a settlement, exhorting Hanoi to keep up the fight and taunting us to do likewise with "paper tiger" insults.

Our failure to comprehend, long ago, Mao's shrewd appraisal of the war in Indochina, has proved a great misfortune. It has enabled him to use us as a tool to further Chinese ambitions in Asia.

Just as the Communist leaders in the Kremlin, following the defeat of Hitler, reimposed the Russian sphere of influence over the Balkans which had existed earlier under the czars, so the Reds in Peiping, after 1954, have sought to reestablish over Indochina the influence so long enjoyed by the Chinese emperors. This region, in fact, is not unlike the Balkans, consisting as it does of small, bordering countries over which China looms like a dragon over a handful of lizards.

In the natural course of events, we cannot hope to deny China her influence in south-

east Asia, any more than China can deny us ours in the Caribbean. The containment of China can best be accomplished, not by wars pitting imported Western troops against orientals, but by the resistance of stable Asian governments, which command sufficient popular support to maintain an effective internal order.

Unfortunately, the American involvement in a lengthy war in the "Balkans of Asia" undermines this objective. As most Asians are inclined to see it, the United States has intervened in a war that is primarily a Vietnamese affair regardless of whether the struggle is viewed as an insurrection in the south or a covert war by the north against the south. Either way, American troops, not Chinese, are engaged in the fight; American planes, not Chinese, are doing the bombing.

So it is that the extended American participation in the Vietnamese war works against our larger interests in Asia. The longer it lasts, the more convincing China is apt to appear as the self-styled champion of Asia for the Asians, and the faster Chinese influence in neighboring lands is likely to grow.

Even now, Burma and Cambodia move toward China. Sturdy friends of the United States like the Philippines and Japan grow increasingly restive. Worse still, India and Pakistan, whose flank we thought we were protecting against Communist envelopment, plunge into war with one another. Behind our battleline in Indochina, Singapore separates from Malaysia, and Sukarno, despite a Communist uprising in Indonesia, still makes us his favorite whipping boy. Even as we hold on in Vietnam, the dominoes wobble all about us.

Peiping also gains in other ways. The Vietnamese have historically opposed Chinese domination, but prolonging the war makes Hanoi increasingly dependent upon China for support, compromising her hard won independence. Within the divided Communist camp, the continuing war can be pointed to as proof that the Russian doctrines of peaceful coexistence with the West are demonstrably false, while within China itself the daily tongue lashings administered to the "American devils in Vietnam" furnish the Red Government with a convenient shibboleth to rally the people to greater labors at home.

Beyond southeast Asia, on the broad global front, a protracted struggle in Vietnam could yet lead to a shotgun marriage—or Chinese terms—between the feuding titans of the Communist world. The hopeful thaw in our relations with the Soviet Union would then give way to a full-scale resumption of the cold war, our adversaries welded together again by our own hand. This may still be part of the price we shall pay for the corner into which we have painted ourselves in Indochina.

None of this is written in criticism of Lyndon B. Johnson. Like Kennedy before him, Johnson inherited an American commitment in Vietnam, and he intend to honor it. At the same time, he is moving American policy in the right direction, toward the conference table. His arm's-length treatment of the war between India and Pakistan, coupled with his immediate resort to the United Nations, suggest that he sees the need for restraint in the use of American forces. Once freed of the war in Vietnam—whether through a settlement or the suppression of further resistance by a massive American military occupation—Johnson may endeavor in the future to avoid dispatching American troops whenever it appears that a revolution in some distant place may not be going our way.

For the United States in the 20th century is not the replacement of 19th-century Great Britain. The colonial house of Western Empire has been taken over by its former subjects, and we shall not be welcomed in as a

new master. Nor should we want to be. What more dismal, self-defeating role can we assume than that of voluntary protector of every privileged potentate and petty tyrant who happens to claim tenancy?

Yet, in order to escape this trap, we must discard the prescription of "not another inch," which places a premium value on all real estate and fails utterly to take into account that there are areas where the assumption of governing responsibility is much more of a liability than an asset. Moreover, in the former colonial regions of Africa and Asia, where resentment of the white man still festers, the application of too much American muscle could easily prove ruinous, spreading Communist expansion instead of thwarting it.

Finally, as we grope with guerrilla wars in this age of revolution, let us understand that there is no American breastwork that can successfully contain them. The NATO defense line, on which we do sentry duty, has held fast in Western Europe because stable governments, commanding strong internal support, joined together for a mutual purpose. Our intervention there, moreover, was welcomed by people with whom we shared a common ancestry, culture, and civilization.

In the recent direction of our diplomacy, we have made no mistake so fundamental as the assumption that American military intervention, which was right for Western Europe, would be right also for those continents that have just thrown off European rule.

Violent convulsions are bound to occur in many of the emerging countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, wherever injustice lacks a remedy and progress must spawn on force. Should suppression of revolt abroad become an American obsession, we will yield to the Communists the one prize they most covet, an uncontested claim upon every incipient revolution. If we do not attempt through our diplomacy and by our example to guide these currents toward democratic ends, rather than trying in vain to stem them, the Communists will be left to ride the crest.

Why have we been so reluctant? As a people who proudly proclaimed our right to revolution in the years of our infancy, why do we so recoil, when others assert the same right, in these years of our maturity and strength? The Communists haven't changed the rules of revolutions by meddling in them. Never have such wars been fought in splendid isolation, not even our own. There were as many Frenchmen at Yorktown, when George Washington accepted the surrender of Cornwallis, as there were American Continentals.

Senator FULBRIGHT, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, believes that our own attitude toward revolution has profoundly changed as our circumstances have improved.

"It is not surprising," he writes, "that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable."

There is much truth in FULBRIGHT's appraisal. In dealing with guerrilla wars of the future, the President will find it hard to temper a fear-inspired passion for American intervention, should he choose to try. But if he submits to the siren songs of the new crusaders, he may well forfeit the great place in history he desires, for it will ill serve our interest, as it lies beyond our power, to impose a Pax Americana upon an unwilling world.

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EXHIBIT 2

IS VIETNAM ANOTHER GREECE?

(By George O. Voumas)

The speech of the Honorable George W. Ball before the Northwestern University Alumni Association at Evanston, Ill., published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of January 31, 1966 (vol 112, No. 15), deserves some comment, if not elucidation.

The writer concedes at the very outset that his knowledge of Asian affairs would hardly qualify him to either offer suggestions or observations on Vietnam or the related question of Chinese containment. However, the analogy of U.S. intervention in Greece, if allowed to go unchallenged, may lead us to dangerous assumptions. Both premise and conclusions are based on error and do violence to the truth, giving validity to the often repeated charge abroad that the United States has a "sense of mission but no sense of history." Mr. Ball states:

"The Soviet Union under Stalin embarked on a reckless course of seeking to extend Communist power."

And further:

"But in terms of tactics on the ground, Greece is a closer analogy. For there, 20 years ago, as in South Vietnam today, the Communists sought to achieve their purpose by what is known in their lexicon as a war of national liberation."

"They chose this method of aggression both in Greece and Vietnam because tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion, give a great advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly where, as in those two countries, the physical terrain made concealment easy and impeded the use of heavy weapons."

The past 20 years have separated fact from fiction on this subject, and the facts are well established. First honors for dispelling the fog must go to Winston Churchill's "Triumph and Tragedy" (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953); second, Vladimir Dedijer's "Tito" (Simon & Schuster, 1963); and last, but not least, Milovan Djilas' "Conversations With Stalin" (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962).

1. There was not a question of war of national liberation in Greece. The Greek war for national liberation was fought in 1821-27, receiving acclaim and support from freedom-loving persons the world over.

During World War II the Greeks, after a magnificent resistance to the German-Italian occupation, followed closely on the heels of the retreating Germans, and occupied the entire Greek territory. Since the EAM (national liberation front) was in control practically of the entire country, no question of liberation was involved. The issue over which tens of thousands lost their lives was the form of government to be established.

The EAM, to which the overwhelming majority of the Greek people belonged, was suspicious of English motives—particularly after Churchill's insistence upon the return of King George II. The resistance fighters opposed it. They knew that the Greek dynasty and its local retinue were the instrument and symbols of what the Chinese now call "neo-colonialism." It is an historic fact that the Greek dynasty was imposed upon Greece by British diplomacy. (King George I, a Danish prince and founder of the Glyksburg dynasty in Greece, was in the pay of the British Exchequer from the day he first set foot on Greek soil in 1863 to the day he was assassinated in Salonica in 1913.) George II, after an exile of years, returned to Greece in the middle thirties. Soon thereafter he sanctioned the Metaxas quasi-Fascist dictatorship—a regime that filled old Greek jails and forts with political prisoners and the waterless islands of the Aegean with exiles.

2. The issue which caused the clash in Athens in 1944 was settled by the Varzika Agreement, the King—then in London—having agreed to the appointment of a Regent, General Scobie, while ordaining Greek Cabinet with a liberal facade, armed and countenanced rightist gangs (known as "X"-ites) and otherwise promoted a reign of terror at the countryside, presenting all former participants in the EAM with the choice to either be slaughtered like lambs or be shot like wolves. Under such provocation "even a saint would turn savage."

The world did not know then what Mr. Churchill proudly records in his history ("Triumph and Tragedy," p. 227) that he and Stalin had agreed on the division of the Balkans on October 9, 1944:

(Churchill) * * * Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have 90 percent predominance in Rumania, for us to have 90 percent of the say in Greece, and go 50-50 about Yugoslavia? While this was being translated, I wrote out on a half sheet of paper:

Rumania:	Percent
Russia.....	90
The others.....	10
Greece:	
Great Britain (in accord with United States).....	90
Russia.....	10
Yugoslavia.....	50-50
Hungary.....	50-50
Bulgaria:	
Russia.....	75
The others.....	25

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down."

Mr. Churchill was elated with this agreement. Referring to it years later, he declared: "I made an agreement with Stalin, and he kept it."

Then we have Tito's biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, who, after enumerating the various acts and deeds of the British in Yugoslavia and the support given by Churchill to King Peter, etc., states (page 250):

"For those reasons Yugoslavia's early postwar attitude toward events in Greece was dictated by the danger which threatened its independence and free development from that quarter."

Mr. Dedijer attributes the Tito-Stalin breach to the Greek revolution and Stalin's suspicion that Tito supported it.

Then we have Milovan Djilas' (both Djilas and Dedijer have been jailed by Tito) "Conversations With Stalin." He states (page 131):

"In Greece a civil war was being fought. Yugoslavia had been charged in the United Nations with giving it material aid and inspiring it; while Yugoslav relations with the West, and especially with the United States, were strained to the breaking point."

"When I think back, it seems to me that the Soviet Government not only looked with satisfaction at this sharpening of Yugoslav-Western relations, but even incited it, taking care, of course, not to go beyond the limits of its own interests and possibilities. Molotov almost embraced Kardelj in Paris after the shooting down of two American planes in Yugoslavia, though he also cautioned him against shooting down a third. The Soviet Government took no direct action with respect to the uprising in Greece, practically leaving Yugoslavia to face the music alone

in the United Nations, nor did it undertake anything decisive to bring about an armistice—not until Stalin found it to his interest."

And on page 181:

"Stalin then turned to the uprising in Greece. 'The uprising in Greece has to fold up.' (He used for this word 'svernut', which means literally to roll up.) 'Do you believe'—he turned to Kardelj—'in the success of the uprising in Greece?'"

"Kardelj replied, 'If foreign intervention does not grow and if serious and political and military errors are not made.'"

"Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj's opinion: If, if. No, they have no prospect for success at all. What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States—the United States, the most powerful state in the world—will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea. Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, as quickly as possible."

3. To say, "The Soviet Union under Stalin embarked on a reckless course of seeking to extend Communist power," on the basis of the Greek experience, is totally untenable. All the polemics, releases, and communiques by the White House and State Department at the time notwithstanding, the established fact remains that Stalin—as far as the Greek revolution was concerned—was on the side of Truman. (On this very point it would be pertinent to quote a paragraph from an article which appeared in the Nation magazine—issue of January 17, 1966, written by Howard Zinn under the title, "Setting the Moral Equation," p. 62, 2d col., 5th line:

"A political scientist doing strategic research for the Government told me recently with complete calm that his institute decided not too long ago that they had been completely wrong about the premise which underlay much of American policy in the postwar period—the premise that Russia hoped to take over Western Europe by force.")

The United States did not intervene in Greece until after Great Britain threw in the sponge. In other words, the aim of the Greek fighters—elimination of British neo-colonialism—was realized. When the United States intervened, the conflict could be negotiated and amicably settled if political conditions in Washington permitted it. We must not forget that the reservoir of goodwill in Greece is great, indeed, going back to 1821, the struggle for Greek independence from the Turks, and the aid America gave to the cause. The United States is looked upon not only by Greeks, but by the better-informed the world over as the fairest daughter of Greek classicism. In addition, present-day America is the host country to many hundreds of thousands of erstwhile Greek immigrants who are part of the American Commonwealth. (Every fifth family in Greece has a close relative living in the United States.) However, McCarthyism at home, growing daily into hurricane force, permitted no such ending. "Anticommunism" became a substitute for policy, with the result that soon thereafter U.S. presence was extended to Turkey, then Iran, etc., etc., around the periphery of the Soviet Union. That is how and when the cold war was born.

4. U.S. intervention, being free of neo-colonialism, succeeded where Great Britain failed. King George II was restored to the throne and Greece, thanks to American aid, recovered to an extent from the ravages of war, occupation, and civil strife. The past 20 years or so have been more or less tranquil. The last elections—the first truly free since the pacification of the country—gave an overwhelming majority to Papandreou's Center Union. This government was booted out of power on July 15, 1965—evil tongues

say with U.S. connivance—by the King, before the expiration of its term, Greece being governed since by a coalition of minority parties with royal blessing. The fragile Greek economy, however, saddled as it has been with back-breaking financial burdens to maintain a military establishment under NATO, is tottering. As a result, inflation has raised its ugly head. This, in turn, has added to the hardships of the working people, with the result that strikes by workers in private industry, government employees, schoolteachers, etc., are on the daily menu. Unemployment and underemployment is rampant. As a result, mass immigration (more than 400,000 workers have gone to West Germany) is denuding the country. There are those who already see foreboding clouds in the horizon. When the inevitable storm breaks out, whom are we going to blame?

I do not pretend to know what the ultimate outcome will be in Greece or Vietnam—which, naturally enough, constitutes today the primary concern of the United States from the Commander in Chief to the most lowly private or citizen. The signs of the times point, however, that in the nuclear age U.S. security will best be served not through the reiteration of discredited past myths, which will hardly contribute to keeping the Soviet Union and China apart, but if day-to-day policies of the United States are brought in harmony with American heritage as envisaged by Jefferson and the Founding Fathers. U.S. policies have heretofore championed Kings, Pashas and Economic Potentates. The field of social justice for the peoples of the world have been left entirely too long to the Communist side to exploit. The Honolulu declaration of President Johnson and the Vietnamese leaders issued on February 8, 1966 does not come one moment too soon. To paraphrase Mr. Ball: "After all, it should not be * * * the American purpose simply to preserve the status quo."

[From the New York Times, Feb. 20, 1966]

WASHINGTON: THE RUSK DOCTRINE

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 19.—Secretary of State Rusk has put a grim doctrine before the people of this country. He was a responsive and forthright witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and it is important that we understand what he thinks our duties and responsibilities are in the world.

First, in Vietnam, we are to commit to the battle whatever is necessary to end the aggression and bring about the freedom and security of South Vietnam.

What this means, he conceded, depends primarily on what the enemy commits (the Chinese committed 1 million men to the battle in Korea). He would not say there was no limit to the men and material the United States would send to Vietnam, but he stuck to his proposition that we would maintain military superiority there no matter how long it took to stop the fighting.

RUSK'S OBJECTIVE

This objective, it should be noted, was not made conditional on what the South Vietnamese or any of the other allies contributed to the fighting. There is no longer much talk here of victory depending primarily on the South Vietnamese Army. Mr. Rusk discussed the freedom of South Vietnam as a vital American interest, essential to our own security and critical to all the other security commitments we have taken to over 40 other countries. This is a formidable doctrine.

Second, the Secretary of State gave an interesting interpretation of America's obligations as a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In the event of armed aggression against the territory covered by that treaty, he said, America's obligation to oppose the aggression did not depend on all

the members agreeing to oppose it, but it was America's duty to do so regardless of what the others did (which in Vietnam is very little).

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

This did not mean, Secretary Rusk remarked, that the United States was obligated to oppose Communist aggression everywhere in the world or that we were going around looking for fights to put down. For example, we did not oppose Communist China's aggression in Tibet or the Soviet Union's aggression in Hungary, for we had not taken any commitment to do so, but this still leaves us with commitments the like of which no sovereign nation ever took in the history of the world.

For the United States is committed to oppose Communist aggression all along the periphery of the Communist nations from the North Cape of Norway through the heart of Europe to Greece and Turkey (NATO); along the southern frontier of the Soviet Union in the Near and Middle East (the Eisenhower resolution); and thence through southeast Asia (SEATO) to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. And if you add our obligations under the Organization of American States and our obligations under the United Nations, you take in most of the rest of the world.

The Rusk doctrine makes the Monroe Doctrine or the Truman doctrine seem rather cheap. Monroe limited his commitments to the Western Hemisphere. Truman wanted to oppose communism primarily by economic means. And even John Foster Dulles, who was not a timid man, thought each alliance should stand on its own terms and depend to some degree on what the other members of the alliance did.

But the Rusk doctrine draws no distinction between powerful industrial democratic states in Europe and weak undemocratic states in Asia. His view seems to be that the United States must redeem the promises of every alliance it has signed regardless of what the other signatories do, and that failure to keep everybody's promise in one alliance will destroy the confidence of the world in all other alliances we have signed.

THAT BLANK CHECK

If this is true, it is odd that most of our allies in Europe, the Middle East and even in Japan are critical of our operations in Vietnam, but this is the thesis Mr. Rusk placed before the Foreign Relations Committee.

And the interesting thing is that the Senators cannot really do much about it, which accounts for all the frustration they have demonstrated on the TV screens in the last few days. For in the moment of crisis during the Communist attack on our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson asked for a blank check to deal with aggression all over southeast Asia—including the right to use any force he deemed necessary—and once he had published that request, the Congress had no choice but to grant it to him or—what was unthinkable—repudiate him in the face of the enemy.

THE SENATE'S DILEMMA

Nor can the Senate do anything to take back this promise under present circumstances. If Senator Morse presses his resolution to withdraw the Tonkin Gulf resolution, obviously few if any Congressmen are going to vote with him and turn their backs on the 200,000 Americans now fighting in Vietnam.

But their helplessness merely emphasizes the transformation that has taken place in American and world politics. The President, if he chooses his time carefully, can obviously get almost any commitment he likes from the Congress in the moment of crisis, and under the Rusk doctrine, we are then obliged to redeem each commitment, regardless of what the other parties to the agreement do,

or risk the destruction of the entire system of American alliances created since the last war.

All this goes well beyond Vietnam in space and time. Mr. Rusk has asked the Senate to contain the expansion of communism all along the periphery of the Communist empire, by force of arms and without allies if necessary, and the Congress cannot oppose him in present circumstances without opposing its own men in Vietnam, which it obviously will not do.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1966]

ERROR IN VIETNAM POLICY

To the Editor:

Perhaps the most significant remark made by George F. Kennan in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10 was that "From the long-term standpoint, therefore, and on principle, I think our military involvement in Vietnam has to be recognized as unfortunate, as something we would not choose deliberately if the choice were ours to make all over again today."

This, in substance, agrees with Senator FRANK CHURCH's recent assertion that "In Vietnam, the security of the United States is not the issue. * * * In all honesty, we are fighting in Vietnam not to defend Honolulu or Seattle, but to defend our national reputation."

Here we have the bare, blunt facts before us; that if we had the choice to make over again, we would not follow the course we did and involve ourselves in affairs in Vietnam. Does anyone doubt that truth of this? We admittedly made a mistake in involving ourselves again in a land war on Asian soil, for which error in judgment American lives and resources have been and are now being paid, with no knowing what the future holds in store in the way of continued sacrifices, and the possibility of an ensuing nuclear war with its catastrophic consequences.

Under such circumstances, is it any wonder that there has been so much adverse criticism regarding our policy in Vietnam? I believe that what the President and the American people are going to have to decide is: Shall we be stubborn and remain in Vietnam not for the sake of our national security but for the sake of our national reputation? Or shall we swallow our pride, recognize the mistake we have made, and withdraw? We have no other choice—it is one or the other.

NO ADVERSE EFFECT

I believe we are big enough and strong enough to withstand any adverse effect that a withdrawal might engender. In fact, I believe we would gain in stature in world opinion, rather than the reverse, by doing so, just as I believe Pope Paul VI and Secretary General U Thant would applaud and commend such action on our part.

While it may be that there is a moral issue involved in a withdrawal from Vietnam, is there not a far greater moral responsibility on our part at stake, when to remain can lead to a devastating nuclear war, entailing, as it would, the possibility of a virtual wiping-out of civilization? Certainly, doing so will save American lives, and would leave the onus of war upon others.

The Soviet Union's relation with Communist China would not be improved were the latter to become too aggressive in Asia. The issue of war should be allowed to lie between them, not with us.

EMERSON C. IVES.

PAWLING, N.Y., February 12, 1966.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1966]

THE VIETNAM COMMITMENT

Secretary Rusk's argument that the United States has an obligation to defend South Vietnam under the 1954 SEATO Treaty

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hinges on the claim that, prior to American intervention, there was an armed attack from North Vietnam, rather than subversion. Against subversion, the only American commitment in the treaty is to consult the other signatories. "We have no obligation to put it down," Secretary Dulles said at the time.

But this discussion before the Fulbright committee is hardly worth nursing, since the United States has committed itself to the Saigon Government unilaterally—without real support from many of its SEATO partners. The issue is not whether the United States is committed, but whether it is overcommitted.

The overcommitment has come in the Johnson administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam and send massive American forces into South Vietnam to engage in offensive combat. Until recently, the American obligation had been simply to provide economic aid, weapons and advice to a South Vietnamese Government that was able and willing to defend itself and to make the main effort in so doing.

An even more important issue now is whether this commitment should be further expanded by lifting the American presence from 200,000 to 400,000 or 600,000 troops. That move would not only mean a quantum jump in escalation, but would fundamentally alter the character of the war. Such escalation would turn the conflict into an American war with South Vietnamese auxiliaries. It would implement an offensive strategy that, in effect, means the destruction of the South Vietnamese countryside in an effort to annihilate Vietcong forces. It would mean an end to the normal counter-insurgency approach, which hinges on defensive action to win over the population, protect the villages and cut the guerrillas off from their source of food and recruits so that they wither on the vine. It would mean a vastly increased number of American casualties in an overmilitarization and over-Americanization of what is essentially a Vietnamese political conflict.

A further massive build-up—which would surely be matched by the other side—would hinder the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. It would probably result in a new military stalemate at a higher level of commitment.

Meanwhile, with inflation, destruction of villages, hundreds of thousands of additional refugees and American control of the war, the Saigon Government and its provincial administration structure would lose authority, coherence and sense of responsibility for the Nation's future.

The question is whether South Vietnam is to be treated as a friendly country or, in effect, an enemy country to be bombed into submission with the consent of its unrepresentative national government, and then reconstructed. Is the American commitment the limited one of helping a viable government or the unlimited one of taking over the war to seek an American victory? And will the vital flexibility needed to achieve a compromise settlement by negotiation be enhanced or destroyed by the strategy of escalation?

[From the Nation, Feb. 14, 1966]

EVERYTHING BUT PEACE

If President Johnson was trying to emulate the Stephen Leacock character who jumped on a horse and rode off in all directions, his Honolulu conference could not have been better conceived. Since his election in 1964, Mr. Johnson has been improvising moves in the Vietnam war for publicity effect, with apparently no concern that each policy contradicts the preceding one. In perspective, the Honolulu meeting will be seen as merely another venture in diplomacy by showmanship, a technique which may work in domes-

tic politics but which is ill suited for dealing with international problems.

To appreciate the full absurdity of the Hawaiian spectacular, one must read the entire text of the joint communique and the bombastic declaration of Honolulu, which together occupy half a newspaper page. Such a farrago of pompous nonsense is rarely achieved by official proclamation writers, who generally manage to cloak duplicity in fewer words. In this instance, obfuscation was heightened by the pronouncements of the principals before and after the formal gathering. Mr. Johnson prefaced the negotiations with a bellicose speech in which he described his domestic opponents, who are rapidly becoming a majority in the Senate, as a "group that has always been blind to experience and deaf to hope." For his part, the self-appointed South Vietnamese Premier, Nguyen Cao Ky, appealed at a post-conference press conference for an extension of the bombing to Halphong, and declared that he would never negotiate or enter a coalition with the National Liberation Front. By the end of 1967 he expects to win the glorious victory that for 20 years has eluded the French, the Americans, and his own Vietnamese.

Ky's stand on negotiations raises a vital point. In all his offers of unconditional discussions, President Johnson has never gone beyond suggestions that the National Liberation Front would encounter no difficulty in having its views considered at a peace conference. This was widely construed as meaning that the NLF could attend as part of the North Vietnamese delegation, thus conforming to the American position that the conflict in Vietnam was not a civil war but a war of aggression waged against South Vietnam by the Communists of North Vietnam and China.

On February 6, however, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, presumably speaking for the administration, gave some ground with the suggestion that the NLF could attend as an independent group. The obvious idea was to make a peace conference possible without antagonizing the South Vietnamese Government. Consistent with Harriman's move toward a compromise on the question of NLF representation, Walter Lippmann (New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 8) expressed the hope that the President was "talking turkey" to Premier Ky in Honolulu and telling him to "get ready for the readjustment of U.S. policy in accordance with the real military prospects in Vietnam." Judging by the outcome, it was Ky who talked turkey and, as far as Mr. Johnson is concerned, the United States is now committed to conquering all of South Vietnam for Ky or his successors.

What hypnotic power does the premier of South Vietnam, who came to power by a putsch, extend over the President of the United States? It cannot be the specter of a separate peace between the Communists and Ky's government that perturbs Mr. Johnson, for Ky has ruled that out in the only bit of hard news that emerged from the whole affair. A reasonable inference is that Mr. Johnson feels Ky's Government must be shored up at all costs, since another putsch at this juncture would shatter the image of a selfless American defending the Vietnamese against Communist enslavement. How else explain why Mr. Johnson, who is so lion-hearted when telling Senators where they get off, lets the Vietnamese generals dictate the politics of a war in which Americans are doing the decisive fighting and paying all the bills?

Promises of a Great Society for Vietnam are such stuff as dreams are made of. The Vietcong and the peasants among whom they live may be harried from the air, but they hold three-fourths of the country. The NLF is more of a government than the cabal in

Salgon. The bomb detonations drown out Mr. Johnson's promises. The gift that must precede all others is peace, and after Honolulu that seems further off than ever.

THE ECONOMICS OF IT

Every war has its economic aspect, but rarely is savagery so well matched with rapacity as today in Vietnam. Last December, Takashi Oka, a correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, reported that for Americans "with the right combination of patriotism, venturesomeness, and hardheaded profit seeking," investment in Vietnam could be most rewarding. The AID guarantees American investors up to 100 percent against losses through war, expropriation, insurrection and current incontrovertibility, and up to 75 percent against all other risks, including commercial risks. So far the boys have been doing fine. Both the Monitor and Newsweek—(Jan. 31) report 20 to 30 percent annual returns on investment in South Vietnam.

The Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette received a sour comment on this idyllic situation from a Charleston lawyer described as a moderate to conservative Republican and a firm believer in the benefits of free enterprise. "If this isn't economic imperialism, what is it?" exclaimed the lawyer. "Since when are exploiters guaranteed against loss, entitled to a return of 20 percent or more? Are such people pioneers or racketeers?"

Big as well as small business follows the flag. The two largest U.S. banks, Bank of America and Chase Manhattan, have asked for licenses to open branches in Saigon, and First National City and American Express are also studying the opportunities. Fifteen banks are already operating in South Vietnam, with the French and British in dominant positions. While doing a job on the Vietcong, shouldn't we be correcting this situation too? Henry M. Sperry, a National City Bank vice president, thinks we should. After cordial visits with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Vietnam officials, Sperry declared that it would be "illogical" to permit the French and British to "monopolize" the banking business, because South Vietnam's economy "is becoming more and more U.S.-oriented."

And with so many big spenders around it is also becoming more and more inflationary. The Newsweek story pointed out that the United States has been pouring vast amounts into South Vietnam—\$600 million a year in foreign aid alone, or more than one-fourth of that country's gross national product. The current \$500 million military construction job is not being done by organizations like the Seabees of World War II—that wasn't free enterprise. A consortium of U.S. construction companies is handling the job this time, with a payroll that will rise to 65,000.

Of course if the Vietcong should win the war and get back their own country, the boom would collapse. But the American business community is confident that nothing so calamitous will be allowed to take place. As one big construction official said, "Johnson certainly wouldn't build all this for the Communists."

AID FOR WHOM?

If nothing else, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam are making painfully clear how hard it is to get a sensible response from a bureaucrat. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, told Senator J. W. Fulbright's group that the \$2.7 billion in economic aid pumped into Saigon's corrupt economy since 1954 has left the country in "much better" condition, with "considerable agricultural improvement"—although in the next breath he had to admit that Vietnam, which used to be the rice bowl of southeast Asia and as such a great exporter of the commodity, now is in such terrible economic

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shape that it must import \$21 million worth of rice each year. To some extent, of course, this is because U.S. troops and airmen have burned their ricefields.

Bell said he felt that the AID program had done a lot of good. For whom? For the Saigon crooks? For the North Vietnamese? Bell admitted that one of AID's very significant problems is the ease with which Vietcong agents can go into stores in South Vietnam, buy U.S.-supplied medicines and groceries, and, with a little cautious dodging, take them to North Vietnam or even China. The Saigon merchants, imbued with the patriotism we hear so much about, will sell to anyone, especially if he is willing to pay black-market prices for the goods we gave their transient rulers for nothing. Senator JOSEPH CLARK pointed out that more than 10 years ago President Eisenhower insisted that economic aid to Vietnam be dependent on the reform of the Government. Had this policy been followed? No, Bell conceded, it hadn't.

Sometimes the cheerful recitation of multi-billion-dollar mistakes brought pained outcries from Senators who cannot understand such smug waste. "There is a \$37 billion backlog of unmet needs in communities in this country," ALBERT GORE remarked, "yet this year alone we will spend half of that in Vietnam." Yes, said Bell, and that's too bad; but he thought GORE might be overlooking the brighter side, which is that Korea has sent a division of troops to the war. (He said this in earnest, as if he did not mean to mislead, as if he could not see the shining irony of it—that we have two divisions of U.S. troops stationed in Korea, whence one division of their troops come to our assistance.)

It is not likely, with the administration staunchly resisting any conversation with the American people, that much information of consequence will come out of these hearings. Indirectly, however, the administration's efforts to suppress news is already having the desired and expected reaction—a flurry of exposés by newsmen such as the Washington Star's Richard Critchfield, four of whose articles from Saigon placed in the Record by Senator CLARK gave the first session of the Foreign Relations Committee its only meaty information. "Though the United States has spent billions in Vietnam, it has invested only \$4 million in land reform from 1954 to 1960, nothing from 1960 to 1965 and is spending only \$1 million this year," writes Critchfield. "The United States gives goods, the goods are sold to people with money to buy them and the money goes to support the war. But the effect is to nourish an urban economy in which the middle and upper classes prosper but does almost nothing to improve the life of 80 percent of the peasant population."

It would take FULBRIGHT's group 3 hours to drag that much information out of a man like Bell, and then it would come forth wrapped in misleading excuses. Critchfield is not the only reporter on the scent. Richard Harwood of the Washington Post writes, "Of the total AID package of more than \$600 million for the current fiscal year, less than \$2 million is earmarked for schools and school supplies in the villages, only \$1.1 million for rural water systems, \$1.8 million for 6,000 rural self-help projects, \$12.8 million for public health, and \$5.8 million for agricultural development. The total for these projects—about \$24 million—is less than the \$27 million AID will invest this year in a desperate effort by the national police force to curb the misuse of U.S. aid and to stop the flow of contraband to the Vietcong."

This kind of tough honesty, which is seen with encouraging frequency in the American press these days, is going to make the art-sound all the sillier.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHURCH in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to highly commend the Senator from Idaho for the brilliant speech he has just made, in which I associate myself not only in connection with his policy statement on foreign policy but also in connection with his legal analysis of the situation.

Later in the week, I shall supplement his speech with a further answer to Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary of State Mr. Ball in connection with their allegations that the SEATO Treaty, in some way, somehow, is supposed to justify the unconstitutional and illegal war in southeast Asia.

I shall also make that speech for the benefit of the delegates of the American Bar Association.

Mr. President, I also wish to say that I enthusiastically support the general policy expressed by the junior Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] in his proposals for seeking to obtain a negotiated settlement of the war. For a long time, I have stated that it cannot be settled on any bilateral negotiation basis between the United States and South Vietnam on the one hand and North Vietnam on the other. It must be settled with multilateral negotiations, with the noncombatant nations sitting at the head of the table, making clear to the combatants that negotiations will have to be arranged through third party intervention.

I am satisfied that unless that course of action is followed, the odds are in favor of the United States going down in history as being more responsible than any other nation in the world for leading mankind into a third world war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain communications which I have received on the subject of the war in Vietnam. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed the article by Jean Facouture, which appeared in the New York Review of Books for March. Mr. Facouture is author of "Vietnam Between Two Truces." He also wrote a biography of Ho Chi Minh and a book on the Geneva Conference of 1954. He was on the staff of General Leclerc in 1945 and was a correspondent in Vietnam for Le Monde. He is now a fellow of the Center for Near Eastern Studies at Harvard.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Suggest imposing economic blockade on countries supplying North Vietnam. Keep up the good work.

GEORGIA LEE HARDY,
Chairman, HOW Housewives Opposing War.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

The hopes of American honor and world survival rest upon you and your brave colleagues.

RALPH and PHOEBE FRIEDMAN.

EUGENE, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God for this great service you are doing for us, the American people.

DORIS and WINDSOR CALKINS.

ALBANY, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

HON. WAYNE E. MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We wish to commend you for the courage with which you are pursuing your convictions regarding the situation in Vietnam. We are in complete agreement with you and pray that you will be given the strength to pursue this vital service to your country.

Mr. and Mrs. ELDRED T. COBB.

MEDFORD, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Your outspoken opposition of our unfortunate Vietnam policy makes you one of the most important men in public life. Stay with it.

JAMESON D. SELLECK.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

While at variance with you on many occasions, I wholeheartedly support your attitude toward our position in Vietnam. Speaking only as a private citizen I feel compelled to make my views known. As a Marine Corps veteran of World War II and an off-and-on member of the American Legion my attitude is undoubtedly unpopular with many former and current comrades and friends. However, I feel I must make my personal views known to the one person who in my estimation makes more sense and is doing more to try to bring about a reasonable solution, or enlightenment at least, in our current situation.

DALE JOSEPHSON.

EUGENE, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Complete support for your view. Please send copies of recent Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Thanks.

Mr. and Mrs. ALBERT B. CULVER.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You spoke well our sentiments exactly to the general today. Great going. Keep it up.

AL and LOIS BALTEAU.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I am very proud of you.

EMERY HOOVER.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE of Oregon,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: As a fellow teacher I admire your courage on behalf of labor and your opposi-

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tion to the Vietnam fiasco. You are a man I would like to be.

Fraternally,

GEORGE J. ACKO.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Support your stand on Vietnam 100 per-
cent.

Mr. and Mrs. C. R. MOE.

JUNCTION CITY, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: Congratulations on your stand on
Vietnam.

CLARENCE M. MORE.

PORTLAND, OREG., February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Fully support your fight to bring peace to
Vietnam.

FRANK FULLER.

PORTLAND, OREG., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
You are doing a superb job. We endorse
you completely.

Dr. and Mrs. ROBERT D. GOLDMAN.

EUGENE, OREG., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Behind you. Insist on McNamara in
public hearing.

DOROTHY DANN.

PORTLAND, OREG., February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
As an Oregon Republican I support you
now and in the future.

Mrs. WILLIAM B. GRUBER.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Ten thousand percent support Vietnam
sanity fight.

WALTER FRANCIS,
TINA MICHAEL,
PETER SIMCICH.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Room 417, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Respectfully urge you have at Friday's
Senate hearings the 11 interim reports issued
by the International Control Commission be-
tween 1954 and 1960. Bless you.

Mr. MASON DRUKMAN.

CORVALLIS, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Ask Rusk how many North Vietnamese
have been killed or captured in the current
fighting.

KERMIT ROHDE.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
You have my vote of confidence on Viet-
nam. Keep up your knowledgeable convic-
tion. Opposition is using emotionally
charged language that is Johnson programed.

D. MEEKER,
Encyclopaedia Britannica Films.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
After reading the Journal "Viet War Row
Boils in Senate" continue the fight and get
this question for debate onto the floor of
the Senate. Keep up the good work.

FREDERICK G. RILL.

MEDFORD, OREG.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on your stand against the
Vietnam war.

EDWARD SICKLES, M.D.

SAUSALITO, CALIF.,
February 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Applaud your courageous forthright stand
on Vietnam. Please continue your noble
effort. Many people support you.

ROBERT FRICK.

MOUNT VERNON, N.Y.,
February 21, 1966.

Senators MORSE and FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
We admire you, support you, love you.
Please continue your valiant peace efforts.

ELAINE and RICHARD KUNTZ.

PRINCETON, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Rusk stated this morning that we are not
fighting communism. I thought we were.
Can that be explained to the public more
fully?

NATALIE M. CARROLL.

TOLEDO, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Hearings Committee,
Washington, D.C.:
Ask Rusk why, if Hanoi is a motivation
power behind the Vietcong, why don't we
bomb it and stop that power. Also ask him
if free elections are held in South Vietnam
and it goes Communist then what do we do?
I agree with you completely and hope you
can convince enough of Congress to vote the
pending appropriation bill down.

DENNIS HEFNER.

PASCAGOULA, MISS.,
February 18, 1966.

WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations for your courageous stand
toward public review of our Vietnam fiasco.
It would be more desirable for us to fight
pinks and fiscal irresponsibility in Washing-
ton.

JOHN SMITH.

PITTSBURGH, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE L. MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
You are voicing the sentiments of millions.
More power to you, Senator, and thank God
we have you.

FRANK J. SCHORR.

FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
We back you 100 percent in Vietnam.
Mr. and Mrs. ROBERT L. BOWMAN.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
We are 1,000 percent behind you. Please
continue to fight for freedom for Vietnam.
You are truly the voice of the liberal in the
United States.

Gratefully yours,
Dr. and Mrs. GERALD SCHREIBER.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on your foreign relations
hearings. The spectacle of the most powerful
Nation waging undeclared war on a little one
is absolutely disgusting.

GEORGE P. HILL.

JAMAICA, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Caucus Room,
Washington, D.C.:
The gratitude and admiration for your
courage, sincerity, and frankness. Carry on.

ANNE M. CORBITT.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Caucus Room,
Washington, D.C.:
Ask Secretary Rusk why didn't we inspect
Cuba as we said we would. Why haven't we
gone into Cuba as we have gone into Viet-
nam? I think Cuba is just as important
or more so. I will be listening to TV for
you to ask these questions. I think they are
highly important.

L. G. SHEARON.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
DEAR SENATOR: I listened on TV to the Sen-
ate committee investigating Vietnam and I
believe that you among all those who spoke
met the issue squarely. The President, I
believe, has usurped the powers of the Con-
gress in sending American troops to Viet-
nam and committing American resources to
Vietnam in other countries with congress-
sional approval.

JOHN J. SULLIVAN.

SCARSDALE, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
We support your cry. What can we do?

Mrs. B. A. FELDMAN.

MIAMI, FLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Watched you yesterday, today. God bless
you. Don't stop. Six and one-half years
Army, 15 years police sergeant. Love Amer-
ica. Repeat don't stop.

JACK ATWOOD.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on your criticism of John-
son administration war hawks. Vietnam
war is a disgraceful chapter of American
history, should be stopped immediately.
Most Americans support your position. Keep
up good work.

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February 21, 1966

NEW YORK, N.Y.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We fully support your efforts to stop the brutalizing and dehumanizing Vietnam war. May you succeed in these efforts.

Dr. and ERIC RISS.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up your fight against our commitments to 40 countries.

HARRY T. MORRISSEY.

SAN DIEGO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I believe in your philosophy. Thank you very much from the 50 people at Gue Ranch.

JOCELYN GUE.

NORTH HAVEN, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

This is our first fan message though we have all along supported your position on Vietnam. Your televised presentation was great. You have our support 100 percent.

JAMES and HAZEL McNEAL.

CLEVELAND, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

YOUR HONOR: You are the best man in Washington, D.C., to protect us but where is my son now? He joined the Army at 17.

GUS GRUZIS.

RIVERTON, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senators MORSE and FULBRIGHT,
Congressional Investigating Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your Vietnam policy investigation. I also agree completely with your reservations about this conflict. Go to it.

PAUL T. MARTIN.

ATLANTA, GA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Care of Senator FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.:

Many Georgians are proud of you both. God save America.

JAMES EPPS MOODY.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Hawks flying scared. Hurray. MORSE for President in 1968. Only regret are not my Senator.

E. G. LEWIS.

ORLEANS, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Ask Dean Rusk, Oxford classmate, whether administration policy consistent with Christianity. In God we trust. We are not marching unchristian soldiers as to war and not to peace. Quote Jesus: "If your enemy hungers feed him, if he thirsts give him to drink, then you will be heaping coals of fire on his head." Am all for you. Senator MORSE keep up the good work.

AXEL B. GRAVEM.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for expressing views of millions of patriotic Americans about Vietnam and exposing shameless falsehoods we have been told.

F. D. WILLIAMS.

SAN MATEO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Utmost thanks and respect to you for helping shed light on this ridiculous situation.

Mr. and Mrs. LOUIS BELKIN.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Future generations of America will thank you for opposing our misguided action in Vietnam.

MILTON J. POLISSAR.

OGDEN, UTAH,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We are behind you all the way in our struggle in Vietnam.

JUSTIN F. GROVER,
K. M. GROVER.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please don't end hearings. Find more witnesses. Don't abandon us now. Keep going.

Mrs. STUART HORNE.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Chambers,
Washington, D.C.:

Strongly support Senate hearing and urge continued efforts to end this morally and militarily indefensible war.

Dr. and Mrs. ABRAHAM WHITE.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo to you. Please keep opposing this undeclared war.

DIXIE BERRY.

ELIZABETH, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Best wishes on your efforts for peace in Vietnam.

BENJAMIN GELSAND.

MADISON, TENN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Your fearless voice gratefully heard by many. Please continue fight.

GENE STALEY.

MARYVILLE, TENN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are a valuable man. I congratulate you on your courage and good judgment.

HUGH YAKUM.

CALAIS, MAINE,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are certainly correct in your statement that the American people do not want war, but they feel helpless. Eight to ten percent of our people who are abnormal mentally may crave any kind of excitement, but power is extremely dangerous to put in the hands of a nouveau riche. It is often abused. Our country has not learned to use its power correctly and there are those persons in Washington in that category. The tremendous power of one of our lobbies determined on war with China is another factor which will push the way. This war makes just as much sense as does the queen in Alice in Wonderland when she screams "off with her head." Keep up your good work for the sake of America and its people. They are worth it.

L. MURCHIE TODD.

HERSHEY, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Just back from Philippines. Agree with you. Militarists selfishly motivated. Need hearings.

JOHN M. HUME.

DENVER, COLO.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo. Continue the good fight on Vietnam. You have my wholehearted support. The hope of this Nation rests with you.

WILLIAM HANNAH.

TOLEDO, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senator from Oregon, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

I support your recently expressed eight-man policy differences with General Taylor and the administration. Congratulations.

J. McLEOD LITTLE.

OAK PARK, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your brave and enlightened attack on the war mongers your dumb opposition again demonstrates the old proverb that a fool defends his mistakes while a wise man corrects his errors.

Mr. and Mrs. J. A. HENRICKS.

MIDLAND, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for defending the Constitution and for your antiwar efforts. Please keep it up.

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE.

TOPEKA, KANS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are with you all the way.

LESTER SILK.

KINGMAN, ARIZ.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Hearing,
Washington, D.C.:

Please ask Secretary Rusk if the administration is willing to have NFL-Vietcong as

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well as Hanoi representatives sit at Vietnam conference table. Thank you.

JOHN F. MACPHERSON.

KINGSTON, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Greatly admire your attitude committee hearings as covered by NBC-TV. Major yet untouched subject U.S. billion-dollar tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. Tactical nuclear artillery ammunition is available according to past Executive reports. Why could not this type of nuclear power be used at once until North Vietnam sees futility of continuing conflict?

American lives are worth saving now.

Respectfully,

JOHN H. UHL.

OWENSBORO, KY.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

SENATOR: I have been very concerned about our assisting Britain in defeating the Rhodesian Government and at the same moment the British are shipping supplies to North Vietnam. Why do we spend so much money, men, and material in South Vietnam under the pretext of trying to free one small nation while enslaving even a smaller one. Would you please ask Secretary Rusk about this. I'll be watching. I have, do, and will continue to support you 100 percent.

OWEN HEMBREE.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We stand behind you. Vietnam hearings beneficial. Youth must be saved. War must stop.

IDA MESSINGER.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations for expressing the viewpoint of most American people. We need more Senators like you.

Mrs. HELEN HAMMOND.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Hundreds of thousands of us are sleeping better because of your courage and that of Senator FULBRIGHT. Please prevail.

F. BUTLER.

LINCOLN PARK, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

God bless you, Senator MORSE, for the wonderful words you are speaking out for us American people. We are praying for you every day and night. God give you strength to go on and others like you.

Mrs. JOSEPHINE SALLIOTTE.

YONKERS, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SIR: More power to you in your fight against the Johnson war and Taylor, et al. The only way we will ever win this war in Vietnam is by losing it.

CHARLES G. MEYER, Sr.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

All people who support the values of freedom and humanity applaud your noble spirit.

RICHARD R. HOLT.

J.P.K. INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo and congratulations. Support your views, keep up the good work.

D. M. TUCKER,
Pilot, Trans Caribbean Airways.

WEST PALM BEACH, FLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please ask supporters of Vietnam killing how they relate this to their church going.

ANNETTE ROBERTS.

TUCSON, ARIZ.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We wholeheartedly support your courageous stand in current Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing all truly patriotic Americans should be grateful for your rational analysis of our foreign policy.

ROY M. EMRICH,
ROBERT M. KALPACH,
HORMOZ M. MAHMOUD,
CARL T. POMIZUKA,
Department of Physics,
University of Arizona.

ENGLEWOOD, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

You are America's hero and savior, remarkable man.

Mrs. A. MAIWALD.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I support your stand on Vietnam if neither North, South Vietnam are sovereign states, how can any nation claim treaty obligations to either of them?

SAM WAINWRIGHT.

SAN JOSE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We welcome your frank and persistent questioning of the administration South Vietnam policies. We wish California had a Senator of your courage and patriotism.

RAUL PIMENTEL.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Why isn't McNamara on as a witness and why hasn't a committee gone to Peking? Mao Tse-tung is not a despicable character. Having lived in Peking for 25 years and knowing the Premier of China, we know that he and Chou en Lai are not despicable characters but are interested in the National People's Republic of China and are not interested in war with the United States.

MISS DELIGHT SALTER.

ASBURY PARK, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Millions of Americans are grateful and bless you for your valiant efforts for peace in Vietnam.

L. & H. MANUFACTURING,
LOUIS RUBEL,

President.

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Deeply appreciate your views on Vietnam, you have greatful support here.

Mrs. FRANCES PIERCE.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

You have stated your views this morning in an articulate and lucid manner. It is my hope that you gain more support for your position as you have gained mine.

ELIZABETH L. PACKER,
Mother, Housewife, Teacher.

ST. PAUL, MINN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Though not of your constituency we feel compelled to express our gratitude for your persistent attempts to arouse the conscience of all Americans, we regret that there are not more Senators who are willing to speak so honestly, nevertheless we want you to know there are other Americans who share your concern.

GEORGE BOWEN and PAUL SONTAG.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

It was encouraging to know you intend to do what you can to place a reluctant Senate on record in regard to the war in Vietnam.

EDWARD M. COLLINS.

FRAMINGHAM, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Ask Secretary Rusk what Hanoi's escalating was that in turn makes us escalate. Good luck.

Mrs. ATHUR CROWE.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Your courage in seeking peace and challenging military cant is deeply appreciated. Thank you,

JOHN DUFFY.

RIVERSIDE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Investigating Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Ask investigating committee why they go 3,000 miles away to fight the Communist when they won't fight them when they are all around us here.

Mrs. CALLIE DOBENZ.

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SACRAMENTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

We want you to know that we are behind you in your opposition against the senseless and useless war in Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. E. J. RUNKLE.

BIRMINGHAM, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

My congratulations to you on your stand yesterday with General Taylor. Ask Taylor where our peace and freedom of choice is drafting our childless fathers to fight this stupid war.

PEGGY DAWSON.

CAMPBELL, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Why not try prayer to almighty God in your sessions.

Rev. HAROLD BEESON.

LA HONDA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Admire your courageous stand re Vietnam involvement.

Sincere best wishes,

Mr. and Mrs. Ed McCLANAHAN.

DALLAS, TEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.:

Suggest asking Dean Rusk what effect Red China admittance to the United Nations would have on ending Vietnam war.

CARL BRANNIN.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please get into hearing record OKA article, Christian Science Monitor, January 26, denying consensus behind Ky.

JOHN W. DARR, JR.

GAINESVILLE, FLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations and our heartfelt thanks for your courageous stand in the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

BRENT WALLIS.

HELEN WALLIS.

JAMES SAJOVIC.

MICHAEL GEISEN.

WILLIAM GREENHOOD.

PATRICIA MCGANN.

GREAT FALLS, MONT.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Your voice is needed. Thank you for millions of Americans.

Mrs. F. MITCHELL.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for being America's conscience. You express our hopes and needs to stop war.

Mr. and Mrs. S. A. MYERSON.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Don't weaken. Stress Vietnam one country we're outsiders. Start negotiations including Vietcong now.

JERRY SCHNITZER AND FAMILY.

FLUSHING, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Hearing Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

HONORABLE SENATOR MORSE: I enjoy hearing your comments on Vietnam and I agree with you. I only have one fault with you that you are not the Senator of Michigan.

Mrs. WILLIAM MAZZARRE.

BAKERSFIELD, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Public has your backing. Demand why Nationalist China not allowed to fight.

JACK M. WHITE.

LA JOLLA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please push idea United Nations not United States must become policing agency of world. Congratulations.

Mrs. CYRUS RICHTER.

CLEVELAND, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SENATOR: I have four questions that I would like Mr. Rusk to confirm.

1. How weak could this war in Vietnam make our country over a period of 1 or 2 years?

2. How many thousands of our boys lives would be taken?

3. How could we possibly excavate a war of this kind with no allies?

4. Is it true that a President can make a mistake?

Mrs. S. EUCLID.

WOODBURY, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Congressional Hearings,
Washington, D.C.:

Please ask under what conditions the North Vietnam are now living. What is their status?

EAST LANSING, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Call Donald Duncan, ex-master sergeant, U.S. special forces, to testify before foreign relations. I support you entirely.

MICHAEL ROSENSTEIN.

ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I completely support your courageous, ethical stand on Vietnam.

WILLIAM DODD.

SHEBOYGAN FALLS, WIS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Chambers,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep tailoring. We pray that more forthright men like you and FULBRIGHT bury awake

to help us recover from our misguided political accident. It gives us hope that our Senate has not yet reached the baseness of Rome that Cicero opposed for two decades before the end of the Roman empire.

Rydberg and Healy clans who had hundreds in uniform in World War I and II and whose sons and grandsons are now being uniformed to free the Asian swamps from everything, with respect and best wishes.

DOUGLAS MOTT.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are the greatest American. We're very proud of your stand on Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE WITTNER.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your forthright position on Vietnam tributes to highest American values and tradition. Congratulations.

Mr. and Mrs. RONALD S. CLEMENS.

NAPA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We are supporting your policy.

CLARENCE SAGER.

GAINESVILLE, FLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

In complete accord with you and Senator FULBRIGHT and your intelligent, patriotic, and courageous efforts.

Mrs. JENNIE BRATLEY AND FAMILY.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are the greatest American. I'm very proud of your stand on Vietnam.

HARRIET WASSERMAN.

HOUSTON, TEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

My congratulations to you on your clear and concise report to the Nation via television media. Although I am not one of your constituents, I congratulate you.

FLORENCE GERINGER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your courageous stand yesterday represents the voice of the people. Keep up the good work.

ALMA ALLYN.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I strongly support your criticism American Vietnam policy. Extricate us from colossal misguided blunder.

PETER W. CAREY.

February 21, 1966

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TUCSON, ARIZ.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We express full support for your stand on United States Vietnam policy and congratulate you on your performance in the face of strong opposition.

Byrd Schweitzer, Mr. and Mrs. George Papeun, Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Perlman, Mr. and Mrs. William Goldblatt, Mr. and Mrs. George Maxwell, Doris Stanislauski, Dr. and Mrs. James McDonald, Marian Martin, Susan Hibbs, Mr. and Mrs. Walter Smith, Dr. and Mrs. Correllus Steelink.

WILTON, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for your role in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings. I support your views unconditionally.

Mrs. HENRY H. NEWELL.

TACOMA, WASH.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I have watched your outstanding statements on television concerning the Vietnam war. My husband is a seasoned military officer now serving in Vietnam. He is in complete agreement with your views and 100 percent behind you. We read your Senate speech and lawyers committee report and it is very much to the point. Please keep up the good work. There are thousands of lives depending on the outcome of what is decided at these hearings.

Our major oil companies are paying the Vietcong to leave their trucks and storage areas alone. It may be added that none of these oil facilities have ever been attacked or damaged.

I am remaining anonymous on the advice of our attorney, Mr. Rex Roubush. However, if you wish, I would be delighted to talk to you personally and privately.

Bravo, Senator MORSE, you are most respected for your efforts.

By REX S. ROUBUSH.

METHUEN, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God and thank you. We believe you are right and sincere. Please don't give up your effort.

MAXINE WALLACE,
JOAN SEGGIN.SAN MATEO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Applauding your efforts to reveal the truth about United States Vietnam involvement. Keep it up.

ANNE and GEORGE CARTER.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God for Wayne Morse. You are on the moral side. We are with you in your unremitting efforts to contain the mad men in Washington. We don't want our children sent to Vietnam to be slaughtered.

ROSALIND DANN,
ETHEL LEVENSON,
ROBERT LEVENSON.STORRS, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.Senator MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your eloquent statement this afternoon has our full support and sympathy.

Dr. and Mrs. JOSEPH CARY.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Please keep up your excellent efforts on behalf of our long-range best interests.

A. J. HORN BURLINGAME.

CENTRAL VALLEY, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.:

Thank God for you and Senator FULBRIGHT in this present critical point in mankind's history.

FRANCES and JOHN ADLER.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for your brave and patriotic fight against war hawks Johnson, General Taylor, and Rusk.

GEO. PERMAN.

ORINDA, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SENATOR: I've always taken a dim view of you. I apologize. You were magnificent during the hearings representing the minority with great dignity and restraint, though I don't necessarily agree with you.

Sincerely,

Mrs. WOODBURK LAMB.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We endorse your inquiry into our country's involvement in Vietnam. Keep punching.

JOHN DUGGAN.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on hearings, especially your comments on final one today. Hope administration policy takes heed.

Rev. HOWARD G. MATSON.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I support and encourage your opposition to our action in Vietnam.

Mrs. ADA RAE WALTON.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Applaud and concur in your statements on Vietnam this afternoon. Please continue your magnificent resistance.

Mr. and Mrs. JOSEPH PASSEN and SON.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please continue in your courageous stand. Knowing you are in Washington gives me some hope.

MARY SUE PARDINGTON.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 19, 1966.Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Hope you will continue important probe of dangerous Vietnam policy. Are you inviting Walter Lippmann?

Mr. and Mrs. JOSEPH E. CADDEN.

LOS GATOS, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are one of the most courageous men in the world today. Thank you, Senator.

Dr. and Mrs. ALAN CLARKE.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Watched you on TV and behind you 100 percent on your stand. Don't give up your fight for constitutional government.

MARGUERITE ENGH.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We endorse your inquiry into our country's involvement in Vietnam. Keep punching.

JOSEPH RHINE.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for fearless and patriotic stand in challenging the administration's Vietnam policy.

C. K. DUNBAR.

NEW YORK, N.Y., February 19, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
The Senate, Washington, D.C.:

We thank you for your courageous and wise stand.

LIPMAN and MARY BERS.

VENTURA, CALIF., February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulate you on your firm stand against war in Vietnam and support you wholeheartedly in your efforts against appropriation for escalation. Thank you for alerting the American people to the grave danger facing them.

Mr. and Mrs. EARL LOUGHBORO.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF., February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

To a wonderful Jeffersonian. We are back of you 100 percent. Stop the war in Vietnam.

Dr. PAUL and MARY WESCHER.

BAKERSFIELD, CALIF., February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks to your courage on opposition to military commitment in Vietnam. You speak for millions.

BETH WILSON.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We endorse right of inquiry into our position in Vietnam. Endorse views also please continue.

DAVID S. LEVINSON.

February 21, 1966

SAUSALITO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks. Keep going. Urge calling Donald Duncan. Expose faults analysis. Urge ground nuclear armed planes.

MARGARET B. PORTER.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SIR: Our gratitude for your criticism of policy in Vietnam.

Prof. HOWARD HOLTZER.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I fully support your position on deplorable Vietnam situation.

ISAAC ZAFRANI.

SYRACUSE, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your stand. It's about time somebody stood up to President Johnson on the Vietnam stand.

PHILIP RIZZO.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the fine work. We are behind you. Mr. and Mrs. WALTER J. STACK.

OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.:

Just watched you on TV Canadian Broadcasting Co. Congratulations on your magnificent stand on Vietnam. We are right behind you. Expecting large demonstrations in Ottawa first week of March with Staughton Lynd and many others.

Mrs. WALTER JOSEPHY,
Canadian Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament.

PHILADELPHIA, PENN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We are with you a hundred percent. Mr. and Mrs. JOSEPH E. MCGEE.

OAKLAND, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I am on your side.

ANNA MAE ALLEN.

MADISON, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for TV hearing. We support you fully

Mr. and Mrs. EEE QUINLAND.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you, Senator MORSE for logically defending our country's welfare against administrative dangers foreign policy.

Mr. and Mrs. CLARENCE WRIGHT.

SAN DIEGO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I support you 150 percent. You are a courageous man, performing outstanding service for the overwhelming majority of Americans, who don't want this horrible Vietnam mess continued another day. Your comments to General Taylor—gutter devastation. Let me repeat you're an outstanding man.

Sincerely,

V. LYLE SCHAEFER.

WHITTIER, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you, Sir, for all your effort and may God give you the strength and the courage to continue. I support you and I am behind you and I believe as you do that all Americans are equal to any task if we understand it. I urge you to continue in your endeavors because I trust you implicitly and may God give you the strength and the breath to speak for us, as long as one American speaks, all is not lost.

Thank you again, sincerely.

FLORENCE C. INOWITZ,
A Soldier's Mother.

THULY, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

My hope is with your grave and forthright stand on Vietnam. You are a patriot and the finest example of American courage. I am telegraphing Senator KENNEDY to support you.

ANNE L. REESE.

GREATNECK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Whole heartedly with you on Vietnam. Please continue your courageous fight.

JEAN CHRISTIE.

SPOKANE, WASH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Hundreds of us agree with you. Good luck to you, keep up the good work.

AGNES CHRISTOPHERSON.

TRENTON, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Your policy regarding Vietnam has our complete support.

THOMAS and JANICE KUMMER.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God for your courage and intelligence.

MARY FOLEY GROSSMAN.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You give great joy—great relief. A fine statesman speaking out for peace.

FRANK LANSDOWN.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SENATOR: Our wholehearted support for your position on committee hearings. Thank you.

DAVID and FRANCES SEBOLD.

MARSTONS MILLS, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You have given us back our faith in democratic government. Your questions were brilliant and we are proud you are a fellow American. Liberations fronts cannot be built anywhere unless there is justified discontent. One cannot eradicate discontent with napalm bombs and impose reactionary generals to preserve the status quo. Our respects and admiration for being a spokesman for a thinking American people.

LOUIS and RUTH DEVOLDER.

SAN LEANDRO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the good work.

GEORGINA SELLERS.

SAN ANTONIO, TEX.,
February 18, 1966.

The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Although warmongers and speculators capture headlines, majority of intelligent, compassionate Americans are horrified and dismayed at prospects of feeding the cream of our youth and breeding stock of America into the maw of the most senseless war in our history, which, apart from indescribable misery, suffering and anguish, strengthens the gleeful Chinese and Russians and weakens us. You are the champion of millions of silent supporters in a just and righteous cause.

B. F. PITMAN, Jr.

CANTON, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

For your courageous stand on the Vietnamese issue we extend to you our support, our admiration, and our heartfelt gratitude. We should be ashamed of being Americans these days if it were not for statesmen like you.

EDMOND and DORIS FRANKLIN.

STAMFORD, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Truly American mothers are thanking God for one truly American Senator. Please persevere.

GRACE O'CONNER.

OGDEN, UTAH,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations. Beautiful Job. If help needed, let me know.

RAY W. LONDON.

CORONADO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your splendid tribute to Senator FULBRIGHT expressed my own appreciation of his

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remarks, and the importance they have to our future. Your own contribution is of gigantic value and my gratitude is unlimited. Be assured of my support.

HEDWIG THOMPSON.

HARTSDALE, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your courageous stand opposing the totally unwarranted remarks of General Taylor yesterday. They were all too reminiscent of certain remarks made by German military figures after World War I. Keep up the good work for peace.

Prof. ERWIN SINGER.

SAN JOSE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for your great courage, we are with you word for word.

BERNIE and LISA KALVELAGE.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up good work. Vietnam war increasingly unpopular here.

WALTER PACKARD.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We greatly respect your courage and integrity in the Vietnam debate. This family wholeheartedly supports you.

Mr. and Mrs. JOSEPH SARGENT,
and CHILDREN.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Ninety percent of people we talked to strongly commend your courageous stand against Vietnam war.

Mr. and Mrs. CARL M. LEVIN.

WILMETTE, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your exposition and analysis on this afternoon's hearings deserve highest gratitude and praise.

HARRY, RUTH, and DAVID BARNARD.

ATLANTA, GA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you, Senator, for your view on Vietnam. You're the real guardian of world peace.

DOROTHY C. YANG.

WESTMINSTER, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C.:

Informed Americans with you all the way. Do not waiver. Country's survival depends on it.

Mrs. MARILYN A. POTTER.

DREXEL HILL, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

My congratulations and gratitude.

Mrs. DONNA LUCCI.

SANTA ANA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

All hope for peace depends on people like you and Senator FULBRIGHT. Our humble thanks.

AGNES H. BARNES.

OVERLAND PARK, KANS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Support your position on Vietnam, like hundreds more in Kansas City. Admire your courage.

JOHN and BETTY PELOT.

CLARENCE, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Have followed all Foreign Relations Committee hearings. We agree with all your statements.

Mr. and Mrs. H. R. LENZ.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senator Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

If democracy survives in this country it will be due to courageous men like you.

Dr. and Mrs. MARC VOSK.

DALLAS, TEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Certainly appreciate your firm stand on our policy in the Foreign Relations Committee.

J. E. MOORE.

JANESVILLE, WIS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your viewpoint and discussion with Rusk. Stand fast to your convictions. We are all with you.

Mrs. CHARLENE KLEIFOTH.

EAU GALLIE, FLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

All good Americans support you in your courageous efforts in exposing the evil that permeates our Government today with respect to our foreign policy and in particular to the debacle in Vietnam.

THEODORE G. DELL.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We want peace. Support you all the way. Keep fighting. Our prayers are with you.

THE STRANGER FAMILY.

SACRAMENTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the good fight. We need you to help us stop this fight in Vietnam.

Mrs. ANGELO MELIN.

WARREN, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

My full support to a man who does not confuse morality with patriotism. Many are with you in your struggle to restore civilian control of the Military Establishment from Commander in Chief to the impassioned "gentleman" from Louisiana.

WILLIAM KLOSS.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are grateful for your courage. Please keep opposing the war in Vietnam.

ANNA NACKE.

ROCKAWAY BEACH, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You have already earned a place in history as the American spokesman for sanity. You were brilliant today against wooden Rusk. For sake of humanity please continue your efforts toward negotiations and elections. Otherwise our bombs on nuclear sites in Sinkiang within few months.

THE STUDENT MECHANICAL ENGINEERING.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please continue wisdom and rationality and reinstate Congress arbiter American welfare.

SHAN STEWART.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo. Keep up the fight you must make them see the light of day. We admire and respect you.

FLORENCE W. RAKOWITZ.

HAVERFORD, PA.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

As one of the many who share your doubts about the wisdom and morality of postwar U.S. foreign policy I wish to thank you for superbly representing the United States with courage and determination.

DAVID BRESLER,
Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr
College.

BALTIMORE, MD.,
February 19, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

God bless you and give you strength to help lead the American people out of the misguided wilderness. We must somehow find a civilized way to live with all people.

WILLIAM and ESTHER CYLUS.

We are with you all the way in your views on treaty and Vietnamese conflict. We repudiate Johnson's policy in southeast Asia.

RUDY and IRENE MEYER.

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NORTH BEND, OREG.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Please investigate any American companies who pay money to Communist Vietcong and take necessary action against said companies.
LAVONNIE BRIMHALL.

HIGHLAND PARK, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator W. MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We are 100 percent, especially your stand on Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. BEN GELFAND.

OAKHURST, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your courageous fight. You are earning the respect and support of every decent American.

MARK DORIO.

SUFFERN, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on questions today re Geneva agreement denial free elections 1956 suggestions for role U.N.

Mrs. ROBERT GRANT.

DECATUR, ALA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR SIR: Have been watching the committee meeting today and thoroughly convinced you are 100-percent correct. Please, for the good of all true Americans pursue your present course.

Very truly yours.

Mr. and Mrs. M. D. RICH AND SONS.

OAK PARK, MICH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE and Senator FULBRIGHT,
Senate Foreign Committee Investigation,
Washington, D.C.:

You are the only ones that can stop Big Brother from making 1984 a reality for mine and all children. There must be checks and balances.

NAOMI GUNSAULUS.

SACRAMENTO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for your courage. Twenty-five people who agree.

J. MONTALDO.

SEATTLE, WASH., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

What would the Northwest, the Nation do without you.

WILLIAM HUNT.

PACIFICA, CALIF., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Care of U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, D.C.:

Please accept my deepest gratitude for your courageous action during these most difficult times. As a father who is raising three sons, who prays that they may live in a world of peace and realizes that we are draining our precious resources, I ask that you continue your great work.

MARVIN SCHNEIDER.

JAMESTOWN, N.Y., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Thanks be to God for forthright men like you. Support you. Thanks.

Mrs. ANN CUSIMANO.

DALLAS, TEX., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Hearing Room,
Washington, D.C.:

Taylor claims Vietcong losing 16,000 per month. Since strength of Cong is set at 200,000, is Taylor predicting Cong defeat within year? If not, why not? Since administration spokesmen refer to North Vietnamese fighters as foreign aggressors, why does northerner Ky govern South Vietnam? Keep up good work.

Mr. and Mrs. L. E. KLAR.

PITTSBURGH, PA., February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Room,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God for you and men like you. Good luck.

Mrs. HETTY SCHU.

VENTURA, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We salute and support your strong stand in the committee. We are 100 percent behind you.

DAISY and WALTER HASSALL.

NORTH HOLLYWOOD, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Our fullest support for your courageous stand on Vietnam. Please continue your efforts.

NORMAN LEVINE GEORGE MORRIS, M.D.

SANTA ANA, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for your leadership in exposing governmental halftruths and double-talk on Vietnam.

DONNA and NEAL NEWBY.

CROTON ON HUDSON, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your courageous voice on behalf of sanity and humanity is deeply appreciated.

SOPHIA and RICHARD BOYER.

SAN BRUNO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations to you, sir, and to your distinguished colleagues who are courageous enough to dissent.

ARLENE R. TRUMAN.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Regarding today's hearing. Also your other positions. Hooray for you.

Mr. and Mrs. JOHN HEDRICK.

HOLLYWOOD, FLA.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Caucus Room,
Washington, D.C.

Honorable Senator WAYNE MORSE, Sir: I have noticed none of the Senators have asked why the great armies of Chiang Kai-shek have not been used in place of our boys; after all we are fighting her war. Keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Mrs. THOMAS J. BREENAN.

PLATTSBURGH, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You were magnificent today and we support you.

JAMES D. ARNQUIST.

ROANOKE, VA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Am with you all the way. God bless you.

Mrs. KENNETH KEOUGH.

BROOKLINE, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations. Your voice is heard. More Senators should have the courage of you and Senator FULBRIGHT.

W. FITZPATRICK.

VANCOUVER, WASH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
U.S. Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulation to the voice of the American people, keep up the great and courageous work.

BARBARA DEMING.

FRESNO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Applauding course of your questioning of General Taylor.

LOUISE ERICKSON.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Regarding your interview with General Taylor and your efforts in general bravo my little pressure group a wife 6 children and myself thank you for earnestly representing us in the Asian matter.

EDWARD A. JONES.

ALLENTOWN, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Hearings,
Washington, D.C.:

"Congratulations." You truly are a man in the eyes of God, and the world.

Keep up the good work.

May God bless, guide, protect, and direct your paths; and all others there; and elsewhere, who are fighting for truth and righteousness.

Please read: Job, 40th chapter; 10th to 14th verses.

Please read this to the Assembly.

Prophetess ADELINE G. SMITH.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 21, 1966

MEMPHIS, TENN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please do not any of you get angry and blow up leave that for our poor boys on the battlefield to do for you. By all means be cultured and refined.

Mrs. RUBY HASSELL.

HADDONFIELD, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

May you survive all the vicious attacks against your loyalty and be vindicated in your faith in the American peoples distrust of administrations war in Vietnam at the polls, carry on.

ELIZABETH FARR.

NEWPORT NEWS, VA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

My name, Howard L. Jackson, Army 5 years lacking 12 days. Senator, sir, ask one question would you sacrifice one just one American for all Vietnam ask that one question to General.

Respectfully yours,

HOWARD L. JACKSON.

CENTERPORT, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

What about, Geopolitik, Maj. Gen. Hanse Haushofer, the father of Geopolitik southeast Asia. For more call RL 7-0749.

VICTOR MAHNKEN.

CONCORD, CALIF.,
February 10, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.:

I hope this letter reaches you personally, although I have never met you I have heard much about you all my life mostly from my grandfather, Russell W. Harrison of Portland Ore., and more recently from my husband, Sgt. R. M. Omalley, USMC with whom you had dinner on Thanksgiving Day, 1965, at USNH at Yokuska, Japan, he was there recovering from wounds received in Vietnam. Until my husband was wounded I had not paid much attention to our U.S. foreign policies, since that time I want to learn the reasons my husband has to fight and risk his life, I have now read and listened about the war as much as possible during the Foreign Relations Committee hearings. I am in full agreement with you and the other Senators who are against our foreign policy in Vietnam. I also feel that the U.S. Government has no right to give our money and aid to Communist nations which in turn support the governments which are killing our men. I feel that U.S. policies need a good looking at, what can I do to express my opinion and help change our policies. My husband is also against this military action. Requested me to get information on the Senate debate and forward them to him. Can you help me to do this again. I want to say I am 100 percent behind you and thank you for the stand you are taking. Someday I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you.

Mrs. VIRGINIA OMALLEY.

KENT, OHIO,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Call your attention to 1956 report by International Control Commission as quoted, page 172, in Vietnam edited Marvin Gettle-

man. "The degree of cooperation given to the Commission by the two parties has not been the same while the Commission has experienced difficulties in North Vietnam. The major part of its difficulties has arisen in South Vietnam."

DOLORES NOLL.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo. You are wrong. The American people as a people have already repudiated this meddling murder of American and Asian people but have had no representation to express their feelings heretofore, and why don't you expose the interests who are perpetrating this war? Copy to Senator PAT McNAMARA.

R. C. HILL.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Important technical difference between undeclared war in Vietnam and action in Korea not so far mentioned in hearings; letter action under U.N. mandate not unilateral action by United States. Insistence on declaration considered unfortunate since possibly affirmative, thus stifling dissent. More and more dissent needed.

DOROTHY L. THOMAS.

SAN JOSE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are the conscience of our foreign policy.

ROBERT W. BICK.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Regarding today's testimony and limited war. Taylor understandably refused to specify limitation of means. Why not question him or Rusk on limited objectives. It will accept legally elected coalition government in return for protection of minorities. Compare our 14 points with Vietcong program printed as appendix to Bernard Falls' "Two Vietnams."

STANFORD COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM, STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

DAYTONA BEACH, FLA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I never heard Mutual Broadcasting radio mention you once today whilst giving long coverage to Maxwell Taylor. None of NBC. Same coverage to Maxwell Taylor, no mention of Senator Morse, of ABC. Every half hour, long arguments by Maxwell Taylor, Senator Morse mentioned feebly once and once fairly. [Applause from gallery.] Alex Dreier tonight was very fair to you. This is honorable broadcasting, is it? It is a national disgrace. Whilst our "patriots" were taking over a thousand million dollars (I can say billion) of German alien property in 1919, the American free press printed German atrocity stories, to confuse the American people so they would not protest the theft of the German properties.

GEORGE EDWIN ENGLISH.

HOLLYWOOD, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Well done. The Senate and House are the legislative, the President executive. Generals

are under Senators in the United States. Congratulations.

JAMES F. HYLAND.

LA JOLLA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I honor your efforts to bring sanity into Vietnam madness. We must put rational limits to our objectives.

ROBERT C. ELLIOTT.

SHERMAN OAKS, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are firmly behind you in your stand against the war in Vietnam, and we wish to congratulate you upon your magnificent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Thursday. Keep up with it.

ROBERT T. WILKERSON,
MARIAN SULTAN.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Applaud your patriotic, courageous, far-sighted role in Thursday hearing.

Please ask Rusk Friday, Does he support novel Maxwell Taylor doctrines that we may unilaterally intervene when legitimacy of government is unclear (as in Saigon successive coup d'etats), because our commitment is to people?

If so, would he apply elsewhere? Particularly China Government not recognized by us?

JOHN DASCHUACH.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo.

Dr. EUGEN EAGLE.

SAN RAFAEL, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Senator MORSE: Congratulations on your stand regarding Vietnam. Practically speaking, we stand, with General Gavin, and morally, with the World Council of Churches. You, however, are our spokesman. Further, it is perhaps time that the President be reminded of his moral responsibilities to the world as well as his legal restrictions under the U.S. Constitution. A war is a war is a war. Time was when aggressive military exercise was legislated not executed. A twist of semantics seems to have taken this legality right out of the laps of Congress and placed it in the hands of a paranoic megalomaniac. I only pray that you, Senator Fulbright, and men such as Mr. Kennan, and General Gavin can persuade your colleagues of your own honest concern and to show up intellectual bigotry and political blackmail wherever it may occur.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. R. BARRET MINEAH.

WILLIAMSTOWN, W. VA.,
February 17, 1966.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You render our Nation a tremendous service exposing tragedy of Vietnam to public scrutiny. Why are we sending boys 8,000 miles to die in Vietnam jungles and swamps after betraying Cubans at Bay of Pigs? Have McNamara testify open hearings. You know

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of course he has been shockingly wrong heretofore.

GERALD W. TRANER.

BUFFALO, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Watching hearings on TV we both believe you are right. Please continue as representative of sanity and honor.

Mr. and Mrs. R. GOLDSMITH.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We the people love and thank you for your outspoken, humane, and courageous defense of truth.

Mrs. LUBA ADELSON.

BLOOMINGTON, IND.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep it up. Congratulations on good job by you and Senator FULBRIGHT in Senate hearings.

Mrs. RAY HEFFNER.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you.

Mr. and Mrs. JEAN LEON.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

My husband and I are in complete accord with your position on Vietnam. I would like to add that most of friends have the same viewpoint and so do many of our acquaintances. It seems to be a prevailing fear to oppose any viewpoints of our President's position, probably due to the usual smear tactics.

Mrs. CHARLES NAMSON.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MORSE: I thank you very much. It's a courageous battle you're fighting, I thank you very much.

KIM STANLEY.

CORTLAND, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks and congratulations for the service you have rendered the country in airing the Vietnam mess in committee hearings made public on television. In my opinion there are millions of Americans who are very concerned about our Viet policy past and present and who are apprehensive about the future. Let the good work go on and let the will of the people prevail through Congress to resolve this issue in a sensible Christian manner.

H. B. BURNHAM.

COLUMBIA, S.C.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I believe the bulk of America supports your stand in questioning the legality of our

being in Vietnam. Certainly I do. I trust you will continue to oppose such action, especially our becoming more and more involved in our ultimate questionable goal.

Sincerely,

WALTER PRUITT.

EAST LANSING, MICH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Our admiration, respect, and gratitude for your long continued reasoning in the Vietnam debate.

Dr. and Mrs. THEODORE GUINN.

SPRINGFIELD, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We admire you for stating your honest opinion and the true reflection of opinions of many people who are taxpayers and loyal Americans in this country. With reference to daily headlines, why not suggest at the present hearing a provision for security, the safety and welfare of the citizens of this country, who paid Federal taxes and deplore the waste of lives and goods in a foreign issue which cannot be resolved by the expenditure of either.

ARCHIE THOMAS.

STOCKTON, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your stand on Vietnam.

STANLEY STEED.

CLEVELAND, OHIO,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Greatly appreciate and strongly endorse your efforts for peace Vietnam. Please continue.

Dr. VONEIDA.

YPSILANTI, MICH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I highly commend your efforts in the Foreign Relations Committee.

WILLIAM A. HARJU.

BOULDER, COLO.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo. These hearings make us proud that we have thinking men of your high caliber representing us. It also makes us aware that a good democracy must be constantly watched and tended. Your comments and committee activity were outstanding. Keep up the excellent work.

GLENN D. ALBERG,
G. WILLIAM ALBERG.

WASHINGTON, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

The courage and tenacity displayed by you and Senator FULBRIGHT to regain control of our Government has the profound gratitude of thinking Americans. Cut off the draft and stop authorizing blank checks for the joy boys to use and waste as they desire. All over-told shipping American boys to die in Asian fever-ridden swamps without declaration of war illustrates need for Congress to stand on its own feet.

L. H. McMAHON.

BRIDGEPORT, CONN.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on Vietnam stand taken with Taylor today. I applaud your great courage.

STEVEN JONAS, M.D.

LA FAYETTE, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I deeply appreciate your clarity and courage in today's hearings on Vietnam.

DON SANFORD.

WOODS HOLE, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We back your statements in committee today and your stand on Vietnam completely. Mr. and Mrs. J. OSTERGARD.

OSSINING, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Strongly support your Vietnam stand and efforts to inform Senate and public.

Mr. and Mrs. E. J. WALKER.

EDINBURG, TEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

The Nation as well as the gallery applauded your forthright and firm reply to General Taylor's implied smear "that you were giving comfort to Hanoi" in asserting that millions are opposed to the administration's Vietnam war policy. Congratulations for putting a moral stance above a sham patriotism, keep pitching.

Respectfully,

ANDREW OSTRUM.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Glad of your incorruptible good sense, grateful for your courage.

Mr. and Mrs. WILL TURNER.

RIVERTON, N.J.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We appreciate your efforts and the open hearings on Vietnam. Keep up good work. Mr. and Mrs. LYLE TATUM.

LOXLEY, ALA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Great work you doing up there. Hold it to them, big boy.

JOHN W. FINCH.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I have always considered you the greatest political figure in the world. Your devastating rebuke to the military mouthpiece of the Pentagon gutter pipeline will be an immortal tribute to you.

L. I. LOUNSBURY.

February 21, 1966

BALTIMORE, MD.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senator Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We support your stand on Vietnam.

JOHN and SUSANN MITCHELL.

MIDDLETOWN, CONN.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senator Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thousands of us here in Connecticut are with you on the Vietnam mess. Keep up the good work.

RICHARD and EDNA REPASS.

GLENDALE, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear SENATOR MORSE: Thanks for yesterday and today. With you all the way. Respectfully,

Mrs. DOROTHY REID.

ROYAL OAK, MICH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Part-time Consultant Taylor had few definite, specific, unqualified answers. Please tabulate ratio of unhedged answers to total questions and read into RECORD. Ask Rusk exactly, definitely, specifically total tonnage and men coming over trail. Pentagon wants specific amount of money to do a job not specific at all.

GERALD SIGMAN.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Continue to represent the truth, sir. 1968. ROBERT P. DE ANGELIS.

CLEVELAND, OHIO,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your stand against General Taylor's outrageous tactics. Keep up the fight for democracy.

Dr. E. W. PFEIFFER.

NORTH HOLLYWOOD, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We support your belief as expressed at the hearing today

The FAEMARK FAMILY.

GREAT NECK, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your sharp questioning of Gen. Maxwell Taylor. We consider you a fine American patriot and a great Senator.

Mr. and Mrs. MILTON SHALLER.

HARTFORD, CONN.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

In my opinion you are one of the most respected men to have tried to give the American people the facts on the Vietnam situation, etc., Taylor, Gavin, sing the same song, and they are all out of tune. I

want you to keep me personally informed. Please confirm.

WILLIAM DELOREY SULLIVAN.

HICKORY, N.C.
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations. Keep up the good work. We are with you 100 percent.

Mr. and Mrs. CLAUDE REED.

SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on magnificent presentation at Vietnam war debate in committee hearings.

Mr. and Mrs. ROBERT H. SOLLEN.

YUMA, ARIZ.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank goodness Senator MORSE we have an interested citizen as well as an honest statesman in Washington. Even though there are problems concerned with Vietnam I think you are pursuing the right course. Having served on Senator Keagle's publicity committee I feel secure in saying that America in general is with you. Certainly China has too many people unless we explode our nuclear weapons over their land. Therefore, let's seek to settle it at the conference table as you suggest. Permission granted to use as is.

CHRISTIE G. TURNER.

WOODSTOCK, Vt.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your splendid stand. What can we do to help?

Mr. and Mrs. R. E. MERTENS.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Continue fight against Pentagon, State Department idiocy. MORSE for President, '68. Need Democratic foreign policy.

ANTONY FAIBERG.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You and Chairman FULBRIGHT were magnificent today.

MORRIS WATSON.

SKOKIE, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We applaud your efforts at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings. You speak for all loyal Americans.

HUGH EDWARDS AND FAMILY.

LIVINGSTON, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep fighting with the same courage and intelligence for a course of reason and sanity.

Mr. and Mrs. LEONARD FYLER.

OGDEN, UTAH,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the good fight. We are behind you.

HUGH and ROSE KELLY.

ROSEWELL, N. MEX.
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We are gratified by your wisdom and courage. Reference Foreign Relations Committee and heartily concur with your opposition to present governmental policies regarding Vietnam. Please express our thanks to your many colleagues.

Mr. and Mrs. A. LEO MUELLER.

SIERRA MADRE, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for your voice on the television hearings. Your concern for truth comes through.

MARION D. BEARDSLEY.

MILL VALLEY, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Vigorously agree with your courageous stand on Vietnam and determination to let the people know.

EVELYN HANNAY.

CHAMPAIGN, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I thoroughly agree with your stand not to escalate the war in Vietnam. The Asian problems seem to be mainly concerned with food. I don't see how a larger war will solve these problems.

JOHN H. BARR.

RIVER EDGE, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

You have my full support in opposition to this Government policy on Vietnam.

LEO UMAN.

GREAT NECK, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up your valiant campaign for peace and no escalation Vietnam, despite all smears. We believe your actions in best traditions of American democracy.

RICHARD PACK AND FAMILY.

FREEPORT, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

On behalf of my two grandsons thank you for your efforts for peace.

Mr. and Mrs. SAMUEL HARRIS.

MERIDIAN, MISS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

As a citizen of the United States, a mother and a voter, I thank you for trying to end the war in Vietnam. I am in complete agreement with the stand you have taken.

Mrs. HICKMAN PARR.

February 21, 1966

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MILTON, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations for excellent retort to
Taylor. Continue battle against forces which
resort to massive falsehoods.

L. H. RASMUSSEN.

BROOKLINE, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
All honor to you, Senator MORSE. I agree
with you to repudiate present Government
course in Vietnam. Urge stopping bombing
and negotiate end of war with Vietcong.

ROY BROWN.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
My gratitude for your courageous stand
and hopes it will prevail.

JUDY SMITH.

AUGUSTA, GA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:
You are right.

J. H. BRYAN.

COLUMBUS, OHIO,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations. America is behind you
all the way. There is no substitute for total
victory.

CHARLES and EVELYN JONES.

CROTON ON HUDSON, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on showing great courage
which is much needed in your encounter with
Maxwell Taylor. Our country needs more
men who are sensible.

DAVID and ELAIN DISICK.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations. The only red-blooded
American left in this country. Keep up the
good work.

ROY RIECK.

STATE COLLEGE, PA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
I, too, am frightened. Through your lead-
ership and courage may you block every move
of my Government of escalating this war. I
wish tomorrow was election day 1968.

Mrs. LEON FRANKSTON.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Keep up the persistent work in Foreign
Relations Committee debate. Televisе con-
gressional sessions as well.

VARTKES YEGHIANYAN.

BLOOMINGTON, IND.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on your stand against
illegal war. An immediate national referen-
dum should be taken to determine what the
American people want.

ROSE NASH FREEDMAN.

WELLESLEY, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building:
Strongly support your position regarding
Vietnam war.

Dr. and Mrs. T. R. DAWBER.

COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:
Thank you. We have three sons. We
don't care to have our three sons die to pro-
tect the political issues of the Government
of Vietnam. Please continue to help keep
our American children for America. We will
watch for your guidance to lead us in 1968.

DAVID and BETTY POLHEMUS.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
We support your Vietnam views and ad-
mire your courage.

HELEN KARANIKAS.

WEST HEMPSTEAD, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
War is monstrous in a civilized society.
We must find a saner way to settle our dif-
ferences. Continue your good work. Thank
you.

Mrs. SYLVIA UMLAS.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
As parents of draft age son, we thank you
for your fight for peace in Vietnam. We say
support our troops by bringing them home
alive. We back your resolution rescinding
President's blank check.

Mr. and Mrs. DAVID WEIKEL.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
God bless you. Keep up the good work.

C. E. JOHNSON.

RICHMOND, VA.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
Please continue to oppose the war in Viet-
nam. I served 42 months in World War II,
serial No. 02047477.

HAROLD P. ROSE.

ROOSEVELT, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Our sincerest thanks for your outspoken
efforts in defending the cause of morally
and democracy.

ROBERT and DIANA MUELLER.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
In full accord with your stand on Viet-
nam. Public hearings must continue.

JAMES CUMMINS.

JACKSON, MISS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Keep up opposition to Vietnam war. You
are wonderful.

Sincerely,

BARBARA BRANDT.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on your vigorous and ef-
fective criticism of the administration's po-
licies regarding Vietnam. Keep up the good
work.

VIRGINIA A. and JOHN K. LANGUM.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Thank you for the service to our coun-
try.

Mrs. H. W. SHIELDS.

PUEBLO, COLO.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations. I would be proud to be
a resident of Oregon.

ARTHUR L. LEWIS.

CLEVELAND, OHIO,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Thank you for expressing our views. May
God bless you and stop this war.

ARLENE SMITH.

ANN ARBOR, MICH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
To one who may bring peace, bravo.

JODI PERLMAN.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
God bless you, a true disciple of God, for
peace and humanity.

GRACE LOCKE.

LOS ALTOS, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
I am deeply grateful to you, as are millions
of Americans in growing numbers, for your
patriotic, nationalistic stand on our Vietnam
involvement and your concern about asking
our American youth to die fighting in a coun-
try that has done us no harm, nor could.

H. B. HERRON.

SAN JACINTO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Caucus Room,
Washington, D.C.:
Senator WAYNE MORSE, I love you. Tell
Maxwell that the American Indians are still
around and that they are not in favor of

planting any more corn outside the stockade. We question the legality of the war in Vietnam and we don't wish any more boys sent over there.

CHARLOTTE KINCAID.

FALMOUTH, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Speaking for myself only as a woman, I appreciate our Nation's dilemma confronted with this complex situation. Can only say that I support your committee's deliberations completely. Only hope that God will give you and the committee members good judgment for our many sons, husbands, and relations in the Armed Forces confronted with this dilemma.

Mrs. NANCY M. BAUGH.

FORT WAYNE, IND.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are the kind of American we need to hear from. Congratulations for your courage and honesty. Keep on with the investigations.

Mr. and Mrs. JACK SCHRICK.

TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations. Keep that mustache bristling. We hope that you will continue to make the facts available to the American people.

MOIRA ARMOUR,
FIONA ST. JOHN.

EAST NORWALK, CONN.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We and all our friends are solidly behind you.

MARY W. WYKOFF.

BATON ROUGE, LA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I pray that you are deluged by messages from the people of the United States praising you for your sensible and undaunting stand in your Vietnam policy. God bless you and your colleagues who voice your sentiment. Respectfully,

DORALICE FONTANE.

ROWAYTON, CONN.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Support your view Vietnam.
Emphatically.

HARRY MARINSKY.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo for your honesty, courage, and determination. We pray for a return to truth, sanity, and peace. You have the support of my family and many friends. We are listening to the hearings with renewed hope for peace.

CECELIA REIF.

SAN JOSE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

We support your declaration of war from the President or out of Vietnam. Good work, Senator.

HON TAYLOR.

SEWICKLEY, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep after them with your questions. Right or wrong, it always keeps people on their toes. Good luck.

R. H. COE.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We gratefully support your patriotic stand for peace in Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. MORRIS DORSKY.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

You have our total support in present congressional debate.

Dr. and Mrs. GEORGE FELDMAN.
Mr. and Mrs. LESTER TRIMBLE.
FRED WILHELM.
LOUISA HARRIS.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your stand. Will you ask this question for me? Is not the Vietcong poration on the enclave theory and thus being so successful?

Mrs. DAVID WELLS.

LAWDALE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Myself and all true Americans applaud and support your patriotic and statesmanlike stand regarding America's involvement in Vietnam. History will accord you the true status you deserve and we feel much better being Americans knowing there are Americans like yourself protecting the honor of our country.

THAD S. SHIRLEY,
Real Estate Broker.

SOUTH GATE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I support your statements before Senate hearings today. You are giving the good fight

KENNETH W. ROTTGER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Just a little old housewife OSU graduate who knows what's keeping it on. I'm a registered Republican. Keep diggin'. keep it up.

Mrs. WILLIAM KUMLER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

You were beautiful. They must see the truth for all of mankind. Please continue.

RICHARD LEVIN.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Our deepest gratitude for your unflinching courage. We fully support your efforts to end our cruel involvement in South Vietnam. You are perfectly correct in predicting popular refutation of this doomed national policy. Please continued your leadership.

QUENTIN D. YOUNG, M.D., and FAMILY.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Sir you have rendered a great service to your country in these televised committee hearings and by your attitude one doubts if you care you're the one who will be repudiated by the people of the great State of Oregon.

LOREN GRESHAM.

ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are deeply indebted for your courageous exposure not only of the illegality but of the futile butchery of the Vietnam war.

DWIGHT SPENCER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your courageous stand. Many silent Americans pray your prodigious efforts will bear fruits.

Mr. and Mrs. KENNETH O. MILLER.

GROSSE POINTE PARK, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You are correct in predicating our Nation repudiates the Viet war. Please be assured millions of Americans are with you.

Mr. and Mrs. C. E. BRADLEY.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for your enacity and integrity—you truly are our voice. We are grateful.

The NICOL FAMILY.

AKRON, OHIO.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Supporting you on your stand about Vietnam. Tell the chairman and the rest of the committee if you like.

JAMES E. BENNETT.

DETROIT, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We whole heartedly support and appreciate your stand in the current Senate hear-

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ings on our Vietnam policy. We also regret that we are unable to directly support you with our votes.

Mr. and Mrs. ORIAN WORDEN.

LINCOLN PARK, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building, Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations to you, GRUENING, and
FULBRIGHT. Don't lose courage.

ANNE P. WOOLERY.

NORTH HOLLYWOOD, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
You are thwarting executive usurpation
of congressional prerogative, and spiking the
guns on unbridled militarism. I am proud
to be your countryman.

GEORGE DREXLER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
You are really getting people thinking
about injustice and folly of our Vietnam war
bravo.

WALDEMAR AND MARIAN HILLE.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
I strongly support your position on foreign
policy in Vietnam and Dominican Republic.
Thank you for your conscience and courage
you can help us regain our self respect.

ROBERT G. PUTNAM, M.D.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Admire your great courage and dedication
to best interests of United States know that
we earnestly support you.

Mr. and Mrs. MONROE RUDE.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
We fully support your courageous fight
against the war in Vietnam. To you and
your colleagues we may owe our lives. We
urge you to run for President next election.
We believe there are millions who feel as we
do about this issue.

CARL and NELL RANTA.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Entire family united in support of your
position opposing President's war in Viet-
nam. Give 'em heck; we will mobilize sup-
port for your position.

RUTH and HOWARD GOTTSTEIN.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
My Dear Senator: I uphold your stand
with regard to U.S. policy in Vietnam. I
have thought very highly of you as a Sena-
tor and wish I could vote for you. If you run
for President. I will.

Yours sincerely,

ELEANOR R. HELTZEL.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Support for your policy is
growing. Keep up the good work. Keep
fighting for the constitutional government
and speaking for the little people.

CHARLES DEAN.

AMARILLO, TEX.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Never has so much been owed by so many
to so few. I humbly thank you for your
stand. You cannot count the cost but only
the reason, and reason is the only sense that
separates us from animals. For us who weep
for the loss of freedom you are a small quiet
voice that echos the thoughts of tomorrow—
a tomorrow of God and country—they must
live.

Your obedient servant,

RON SMITH.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We support your efforts in the Vietnam
tragedy and urge you to intensify all endeav-
ors for an immediate peaceful settlement.

IRVING and MARIAN TILIN.

NORTH HOLLYWOOD, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo. We support your position on Viet-
nam completely.

ISRAEL and CAROLINE BAKER.

DENVER, COLO.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up debate and with dissent on Viet-
nam. Dialog necessary for clarification our
Nation.

MARGARET HALEY.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

God bless you for your stand on Vietnam.
Keep up the battle.

Mrs. ROSEMARY DOLGIN.

BAKERSFIELD, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

You are absolutely right on Vietnam and
other stands you have taken. You are one of
the very few true statesmen of this century.

G. H. SLACK.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

U.S. Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for representing our hope for
peace and rational open conduct of govern-
ment. Please continue telling the truth.

Mr. and Mrs. HOWARD ALK.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

We want to express our admiration for your
strong stand today questioning retired Gen.

Maxwell Taylor. We watched the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on
television and we admire you courage. Pres-
ident Johnson has bypassed Congress,
United Nations, and the opinions of the peo-
ple of this country. We want you to know
that you are not alone in upholding the
ideals and belief in freedom of choice for all
people whatever their circumstances.

June Lathrop, Tad Lathrop, Kevin La-
throp, Ross Coates, Agnes Coates,
Meghan Coates, Arwyn Coates.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for speaking so eloquently the
thoughts of so many of us.

Mrs. DAVID SOLOMON.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are proud of you, keep up the good
work.

ANNA WEISS.

SANTA ROSA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Today you distinguished yourself as one
in the American tradition of free debate. In
contrast General Taylor appeared as Madison
Avenue propagandist, we are with you.

HAROLD and SUSAN HILL.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations, commend your courageous
stand Foreign Relations Committee. Keep
working for peaceful solution Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. LEON OLSON.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We are with you.

ROBERT and NANCY HAMILTON.

BUFFALO, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You are right, keep fighting.
Thank you.

Mr. and Mrs. DONALD ZANGERLE.
Mr. and Mrs. JOHN MARZIANO.

SUNNYVALE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.:

We wish to add our wholehearted support
re your courageous position in opposing the
administration's policy in Vietnam. It is a
sorry situation when Americans' right to dis-
agree is called unpatriotic. With men like
you there is still hope.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. LEWIS DUCKOR.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the good work, WAYNE. And help
the salvation of us boobs sitting in the side-
lines who can't be heard, were not able to
express our voices on the meat of the subject;
namely why are we in Vietnam. And stick
by your stand of our constitutional govern-
ment.

ALLEN PETERS,
Democratic Precinct Committeeman.

OAKLAND, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for your courage, dedication, and true patriotism. And mostly for having stood alone.

Prof. ARNOLD MECHANICS.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I thank you. I do not propose to be governed by generals.

ILSE POLITZER.

CLEVELAND, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE and Senator FULBRIGHT,

Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you for asking the questions that concern all Americans. Why do we allow communism in Cuba and we fight it thousands of miles from home. It's wonderful that we have these sessions to inform us.

Mr. and Mrs. ERNEST KOENIG.

SAUSALITO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE B. MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You speak for humanity. We support you fully against the war escalation.

The MOSTLER FAMILY.

SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We fully support and agree with your stand on Vietnam situation. Letter follows.

Mr. and Mrs. JOSEPH L. MCENULTY.

FLUSHING, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I support your position on Vietnam wholeheartedly.

Mrs. VIRGINIA ROBINSON.

FIREPORT, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Deeply appreciate your forthright position during hearings. Your views reflect our profound hope for peace.

Mr. and Mrs. MARTIN HARRIS.

BOSTON, MASS.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

God and truth are on your side.

RICHARD METAFORA.

GARY, IND.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bless you. Keep up the good work.

ELSIE WENDT.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Guard your health, human race needs you for its survival.

Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE M. PIKSER.

FARMINGDALE, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,

Washington, D.C.:

Saw TV channel 7 in Farmingdale, L.I., tonight. Thank you.

G. ZAHN,

Assistant Professor of Mathematics, State University.

MORGANHILL, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I agree with you wholeheartedly. Wish there were more like you.

Mrs. LOUISA FLAHERTY.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Standing alone in support of unpopular causes is not new to you. I join many others who thank God each day you are a Member of the Senate.

ELIZABETH M. BROUSE.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Don't lose heart. Continue the fight. Grassroots are with you and growing.

Mrs. JEAN HARRISON.

ANN ARBOR, MICH.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep talking, people are starting to listen. Your courage and your conviction in Vietnam gives a new definition to American patriotism whereas the militarist would suffocate decency and reason under the weight of blind allegiance to a bad policy. Your voice rings clear where opinions are. Truth will prevail.

WILLIAM V. HANEY.

MORGAN HILL, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

I am one of the millions you spoke about. Keep up the good work.

SID FLAHERTY.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

We want to compliment you and to thank you for your service to this democracy and to the cause of world peace in the present hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Please keep up your good work and let us know if we can help in any way.

Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE A. SAGE.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

With other writers I want to express my gratitude for your courage and wisdom.

H. KONINGSBERGER.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Don't lose heart. Continue the fight. Grassroots are with you and growing.

H. N. BRODERSON, M.D.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We support your Vietnam policies. Keep punching. You represent the hopes of many people outside Oregon.

Mr. and Mrs. IRVIN SEGALL.

NAPA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Saw you on TV tonight; agree with you 100 percent. Keep up the good work. Johnson war is unconstitutional. Was once in Saigon for 10 days. Telegraphed Johnson last June: "Your foreign policy bringing on world war No. 3. When they drop the first atom bomb on America may you be among the toll."

GUSTAD F. JACOBSEN,
Merchant Marine Radio Officer.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for your magnificent position in hearing today. Keep up the good fight for peace.

Mr. and Mrs. HERSCHEL SOLOMON.

SUNNYSIDE, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations on your remarks in the hearings today. Please continue to fight for peace.

DAVID JENKINS.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Applaud wholeheartedly your dealing with General Taylor. My heart is with you and efforts for Vietnam peace.

PAUL THEK.

BOSTON, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are grateful to you and the committee for the vital importance of Vietnam hearings.

Mr. and Mrs. CHARLES NACKEY.

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Deeply appreciate your courage as a statesman and your stand on Vietnam. I am from a family that had relatives in the Revolutionary War with England; not a recent arrival. The United States needs more statesmen like you.

CORA SWEET.

LAVERNE, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Give 'em hell, old buddy. Millions of us believe we should go all out or get out. Please get with Curtis LeMay, even the gulls of an Eisenhower bluff would end it. You'll remember our horrible grassroots attempt to get bombers 15 years ago. Someway or another, that worked. Step up to it, boy. We all love a 16-caliber man and you're still

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not too old to be President. Believe it or not, still kicking hard. Formerly from Medford, Oreg., and never waved a flag since.
JOE R. NEIL.

COSTA MESA, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

As longstanding admirers of your forthrightness and honesty we support your stand on Vietnam.

GENE and MYRTLE WAGGONER.

MONTEREY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Give 'em hell, Senator. We're with you.
F. S. and E. J. MCFARLAND.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are grateful to you for your efforts for peace. Please continue. Thank you.
Mr. and Mrs. ARTHUR D. MILLER.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your challenge to General Taylor magnificent, keep up the good work. Congratulations.

Mr. and Mrs. PEARSON B. SELK.

LOS GATOS, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the good work. Do not let them intimidate you. Millions pray for you.

Mr. and Mrs. ALAN CLARKE.

PALTO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We support you. Keep it up.

LEWIS J. SILVERS.
HERBERT KENNEDY.
WILLIAM WALKER.
FRANK DUNN.
ANTHONY KRAPS.

BURBANK, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations for your courageous fight to inform people of Vietnam situation.

MERRILL and CAROL JACKSON.

PALTO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Heartfelt thanks for your courageous stand on current issues. We are with you, you millions strong and the polls will so record sincerely.

S. WILLIAMS.

PORTOLA VALLEY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Although a Republican businessman, I am 100 percent for de-escalation, the United Nations, and WAYNE MORSE.

ROBERT V. BROWN.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We support your effort to defend American people against the conduct of an illegal war.
Mr. and Mrs. HUGH TUSMAN.

ST. LOUIS, MO.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Care Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Bravo, all thinking humane Americans are indebted to you for your courage and honesty.
MORRIS S. WORTMAN.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please press Rusk on whether we now will accept Geneva agreement.

CHRISTIAN BAY.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are very proud of you. Keep up the good work in the Senate hearings.

FRANCES W. SHIPPEY.

EVANSTON, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Enthusiastically support your efforts to bring the war in Vietnam to the conference table. Your courage and candor are in the best tradition of American patriotism.

Sincerely,

Dr. and Mrs. WALTER MASUR.

ST. PAUL, MINN.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

God bless you. This country needs more men like you.

L. H. WHEELER.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are in full support of the hearings you are conducting into the Vietnamese war. The spirit that you are carrying on is in the interest of all humanity. The bombing and the napalming of women and children must be stopped.

Mr. and Mrs. CHARLES WILSON.

GADSDEN, ALA.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Agree with you 100 percent in your Vietnam stand. Never thought we would ever agree with you on anything. Suggest we abide by Geneva accord of 1954.

Dr. and Mrs. JOE ROGERS.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Good work. You're wonderful. A great demonstration of moral courage. Please keep it up.

Admiringly,

BETTE L. STERN.

WINNETKA, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God for men like you in the United States.

Dr. and Mrs. RICHARD MARCUS.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

You speak for the majority of people we know. We admire your integrity.
ROBERT and PEARL PORTERFIELD.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Stand pat where you are—definitely on the right side of the Vietnam debate.

ANN SANCHEZ.

STAMFORD, CONN.,
February 18, 1966.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Saw on TV your exchange with General Taylor. We support you 100 percent. Congratulations for your courage.

Mr. and Mrs. MORRIS ROTHENBERG.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Senator Morse you are a great man.

JOSEPH PROCTOR.
DOUGLAS HALL.
ROBERT GARDNER.

EVANSTON, ILL.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please continue speaking out against our policy in Vietnam. Applaud and concur your stand.

Dr. and Mrs. H. HIRSHFIELD.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORRIS,
Washington, D.C.:

I watched you on TV today. Practically all the M.D.'s I talk with daily are all for you. You are our spokesman; keep it up.

RAYMOND H. TROTT, M.D.

WEST HYATTSVILLE, MD.,
February 17, 1966.

WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your comments to Taylor reflect the feelings of many silenced Americans. Please continue speaking out.

NATHA and PAMELA WOODRUFF.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Tomorrow when Rusk testifies you will be openly fighting a dictatorial President whose disregard for international law, the United Nations and his people's constitutional rights has disgraced my country throughout the world. Most of all you will be fighting the cynicism and despair now overtaking idealistic youth everywhere.

EDWARD BERNSTEIN.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
We support you stand for sanity in Vietnam; keep up the fight for peace.
Dr. and Mrs. ROBERT J. DUMMEL.

TROTWOOD, OHIO,
February 18, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Keep speaking up. God, humanity, and us on your side.

D. EUGENE LICHTY.

SAN JOSE, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
As an ordinary citizen we support you fully in your stand on Vietnam.
THYRON and JUANITA HOOD.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
I am the majority of people who agree with you have no way of expressing our opinion. Thank you for doing it for us.
Sincerely,
J. P. GRANT.

VERNON, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
We applaud your courageous and honest conviction on our policy in Vietnam.
LOUIS and KATIE SEIDEN.

POMONA, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Senator MORSE, I love you.

LAUROSE PAGE.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Have Rusk clarified position on Geneva Agreements. Acceptance or just basis for negotiation.

THOMAS PLAUT.

LANSING, MICH.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
We are grateful for your heroic efforts. All America will be someday. Please continue.
ROBERT and MARGARET WASSERMAN.

WAKEFIELD, R.I.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations on your patriotic and intelligent stand in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

E. R. and W. H. TOWNSEND.

ROSLYN HEIGHTS, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Your interrogation of General Taylor today was a brilliant service to the country exposing inconsistencies and reckless attitude of administration and its military advisers your work beginning to have telling effect and

deeply grateful personally and am sure years to come entire country will honor your great work.

ROBERT L. ZIMLER.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank God in this modern world there is still a voice like yours crying out in this vast wilderness searching for the truth to help mankind. God bless you and give you strength.

EARL C. JUST.

MENLO PARK, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Keep up the good work. You're doing our country a great service.

T. I. STENSIG.

LOUISVILLE, KY.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Foreign Affairs Investigation Committee, Washington, D.C.:
We are behind you 100 percent. Against escalation of war.

Mr. and Mrs. SOL ABOFF.

FAIRLAWN, N.J.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We are forever indebted to you for your courageous battle against the generals.

JENNY KARTE.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thank you. We are very fortunate to have a gentleman of your intellect and integrity using words instead of arms to seek peace.

Mr. and Mrs. SHELDON B. KEELER.

MOUNT KISCO, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Pour it on. You speak not only for Oregon but for sane men everywhere.

HERBERT G. BOHNET.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please keep up your good work. We need peace.

EVAN WINFIELD.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
February 17, 1966.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

We fully support yours and Senator FULBRIGHT's endeavor for a rational foreign policy.

Mr. and Mrs. ROBERT L. CANFIELD.

[From the New York Review of Books,
Mar. 3, 1966]

"VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF WAR"
(By Jean Lacouture)

"On the long thin coast of Vietnam," wrote John K. Fairbank in the last issue of this paper, "we are sleeping in the same bed the French slept in even though we dream different dreams."

The dreams of course are very different but

so are the beds and the dreamers themselves. Let us compare them and see when the end of the night may come.

Nothing could be more valuable for American leaders at the moment than a close examination of the disastrous errors made by the French in Indochina from 1945 to 1956. To know the faults of a friend may not cure one's own, but from France's experience America might well learn something of what has gone so dreadfully wrong in Vietnam today.

The French had three great dreams for Indochina and each led them into a different and more ugly phase of the war. At first, in 1946, they clung briefly to the dream of re-establishing their prewar empire in Indochina. Indeed, for one hopeful moment they seemed to be on the verge of a promising new colonial policy: General Leclerc, sent out to reconquer the territory, decided instead to negotiate with the Vietnam revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh. Leclerc recognized Ho's Vietnam as a "freestate," connected with France, but controlling its own diplomacy, army, and finances. This was the first agreement made between a European colonial power and the Asian revolution—and one of the shortest lived and saddest in retrospect. For within weeks the intrigues of colonialists in Saigon and Paris and extremists among the Vietminh and its nationalist allies succeeded in scrapping it. The way was now open for France to plunge into full-scale colonial war. But it soon became clear to everybody that this would have been a hopeless venture, doomed from the start by the half-ruined state of France, the lack of an air force and navy, and the disapproval of the Russians and Americans.

At this point the French conceived their second Indochinese dream which led them into a second war, lasting from 1948 to 1951. Now they would transform their colonial struggle into a civil war. Against Ho's Vietminh they would set in opposition the "independent" Emperor Bao Dai, encouraging him to cultivate his own anti-Communist but nationalist leadership—a policy described by the distinguished scholar Paul Mus as "nationalist counterfire."

Perhaps it might have succeeded if the nationalists had been given a chance to make it work. But their power and prestige and autonomy were always limited. While Vietnamese and French troops died courageously, Bao Dai preoccupied himself with tiger hunting, his ministers with profiteering. The Vietminh methodically liquidated Bao Dai's officials, dominated the countryside, and organized its soldiers into divisions soon after the Chinese Communists arrived on the northern frontier in 1950.

After this decisive event and the outbreak of the Korean war, France dreamed once again of transforming the nature of the war in Vietnam, this time into an international conflict with communism. In September 1951 General de Lattre arrived in Washington to argue that France, faced with Vietminh subversion supported by Communist China, now needed and deserved to have its risks shared. He was given both credits and weapons. But later, in 1954, on the eve of Dienbienphu, the French Government demanded far more: It requested that several hundred American bombers be ordered to attack the enemy from Manila. To these requests Washington finally responded that "Indochina does not fall within the perimeter of the area vital to the defense of the United States."

We can now admire the wisdom which led President Eisenhower to reject both the agitated appeals of the French and the advice of Admiral Radford and Vice President Nixon, both of whom recommended intervention. But we may well ask why a country not considered of vital importance

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to American interests in 1954 became so in 1965. The Communist camp, after all, is no longer a monolithic force able to exert unified global pressures as had been the case in 1954. In Korea, moreover, Chinese had recently been fighting American soldiers, something they have since refrained from doing; and missile strategy has meanwhile diminished the importance of local air force bases. One can only conclude that the diplomatic views of American leaders have hardened during these years. In the light of Mr. Rusk's performance the diplomacy of John Foster Dulles must be reconsidered and credited with an admirable flexibility.

Thus France launched three wars in Indochina and lost them all. Its allies having refused to provoke a brutal extension of the war in order to avoid a local defeat, France's dream of an international anti-Communist crusade collapsed at Dienbienphu in the spring of 1954. General Glap destroyed France's main combat force; the Vietminh controlled two-thirds of Vietnam; and neither Hanoi nor Saigon were protected from attack.

Ho Chi Minh had offered negotiations 6 months before this debacle and had been ignored. Now Moscow and Peking were agreeable to an international détente and Washington seemed prepared to accept the consequences of its failure to intervene. Thus at the Geneva Conference table in 1954 the Western Powers benefited from a certain complicity on the part of Molotov and Chou En-lai: The West succeeded in wresting from the victors half the territory and the larger part of the material wealth of Vietnam. Ho agreed to fall back to the north in exchange for a promise that elections preparing the way for unification would be held in 1956—elections that he had no doubt of winning.

A great deal of confusion surrounds this Geneva settlement. It must be emphasized that the only texts signed at Geneva were the armistice agreements between the French and the Vietminh. No one at all signed the "final declaration" of the Conference—both the United States and South Vietnam had reservations about it—and it carried only the force of suggestion. But apart from the North Vietnamese, the French were the only nation that formally guaranteed to carry out the Geneva accords that provided both for partition at the 17th parallel and for elections.

And now France committed a new error (its last?), dreaming this time that it might finally leave Vietnam and forget it altogether. Diem, now installed as dictator in the South, wanted the French to quit his country as soon as possible. This was not only because certain French interests were intriguing against him—something that helped strengthen his position as a nationalist leader—but also because the French Army was the only force that could compel him to hold elections in 1956. In the event, the French quickly yielded and the last of their army departed in April 1956.

The consequences of this final French error were, and remain, enormous. Diem was now free to declare himself free of all the Geneva obligations and soon did so with American encouragement. The south could now be reorganized as an anti-Communist bastion, from which a reconquest of the north could eventually be launched. The Diem government in fact soon created a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam, which, beginning in 1958, parachuted agents into the north, notably into areas such as Vinh, where Ho's agrarian reform had provoked violent peasant uprisings. But meanwhile the north, considering itself cheated by Saigon and Washington (with France's cooperation), began preparation to exploit the political and social discontent in the south to establish a base for subversive operations. And Hanoi was to show

itself far more adept at this political game than Saigon.

Could the French have resolved this Vietnam problem? In fact, they were confronted by two immensely volatile forces whose demands would have shaken any Western governments, as they are shaking the United States today. First, the demands of a people thirsting to overthrow colonialism and to recover their national identity, their freedom of maneuver, and their unity. But also the demands of a revolutionary group, supported by one of the great power blocs, which claims the right to impose its authority on the entire nation in the name of a Communist doctrine highly suspect to the majority: a group, nonetheless, whose heroism, discipline, and ruthlessly effective methods seem to assure its success.

It is the deep and constant intermingling of these two forces which have made the Vietnam problem seem so hopeless and defeating to the West. How can a Western government successfully sponsor an independent "nationalist counterfire" when the strongest feelings of many Vietnamese have been invested for many years in the local civil war; and when one finds among those who have rallied to the Vietminh, and then the Lao Dong and the NLF, a great many patriots, drawn to the organization because they believe it to be the hope of Vietnamese nationalism, capable of defeating colonialism and Western domination.

Perhaps it might have been possible for the French to disassociate the nationalist inspiration in Vietnam from the Communist organization. But to do this would have been very difficult. For to gain the confidence of the nationalists I believe that French aid to Vietnam would have had to meet three extremely demanding conditions: that the donor of the aid would have no right to intervene directly in the government; that the aid would be given to the most worthy leaders; and that it would not lead to the creation of oligarchies of profiteers and a climate of corruption.

By all these standards the French failed. If they ever had a chance to survive the Asian revolution, they lost it, basically, because they were unwilling to alter their patronizing colonialist attitudes and deal with Asians with some sense of mutual respect or cooperation. For the most part they preferred instead to appoint and then control the manageable, the incompetent, and the operators, many of whom made fortunes out of the corrupt French aid program.

Opposed in Vietnam, then, were a coherent, principled, and implacable revolutionary movement of militants organized in the villages—the country's fundamental social and economic unit—inspired by an evident nationalism and posing as defenders of stern justice and equality; on the other hand, a regime obviously supported and controlled by foreign powers, partly composed of former colonial officials, disdainful of peasant claims, tolerant of a social order where the influential and successful were frantically engaged in profiteering—preparing for the arrival of the inevitable catastrophe. The only possible result was a catastrophe on the scale of Dienbienphu.

How relevant is the French experience to Vietnam today? Certainly the American situation is different in important respects, but really how different? For example, the United States has no colonial past in Vietnam, no strictly imperialist drive for economic gain. But its objectives are, curiously, both more altruistic and more imperious than those of its predecessor. After all, a country seeking colonial profits is quite capable of making a compromise to preserve at least some of its endangered wealth. But what of a country that supposes itself to be defending a selfless principle? In fact, the United States does seem to have several fair-

ly concrete motives; e.g., to prove to certain nations that it is faithful to its alliances; to show the underdeveloped peoples of the Southern Hemisphere how costly it can be to choose Marxism-Leninism. There would seem to be sufficient elements of calculated self-interest here to make realistic bargaining possible—on the basis of spheres of influence, for example.

A second difference concerns the size and power of the forces involved. General Westmoreland not only commands a good many more troops than General Navarre (750,000 as compared with 500,000) but he is also relatively free from the financial, logistical, and transport problems that plagued the French. A far greater advantage, however, lies in America's enormous firepower as well as its Air Force and complete mastery of the sea. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States and South Vietnamese forces are now 20 times more powerful than the army of General Navarre (which had no more than 80 combat planes at its disposal during the battle of Dienbienphu). The small size of the present theater of operations in South Vietnam thus becomes a favorable factor of great importance: The French forces were charged with the defense of all Indochina, a territory four times the present size of South Vietnam.

But given these advantages can it be said that the United States is now succeeding where France was forced to retreat? Of course, one answer must be yes, in the limited sense that it is impossible to imagine the United States suffering a major defeat in the present circumstances. During the past year President Johnson has been able to dispatch enough American troops to Vietnam to avoid another Dienbienphu, but beyond this the situation is less than hopeful. The arrival of over 100,000 troops has done no more than stabilize a deteriorating military situation; it did not result in a sharp swing of military advantage to the Western side, as certain observers had expected. The military map published on January 30 in the New York Times showing four-fifths of the South "under Vietcong influence" must be regarded as accurate, notwithstanding contrary claims by officials. (Incidentally, this map recalls the military charts the French press did not dare to publish 12 years ago. The American public has recently been getting far more information on the Vietnam question from the press, television, Senate hearings, etc., than was ever available in France.)

The fact is that American policy in Vietnam, although originally inspired by very different intentions, now resembles all too closely the disastrous policy of the French. The United States has also failed to solve the problem of providing support to genuine local leaders without excessive intervention in the country itself. Indeed, it can be said that the French—perhaps hypocritically—did nevertheless succeed in transferring some responsibilities to the Vietnamese: These were quite feeble ones in military matters, rather more important in politics, and nearly total in such administrative work as tax collecting. By contrast, we are now seeing the progressive Americanization of both the war and the country itself: The influence of the local military headquarters grows weaker; the efficiency of the government in Saigon continues to decay; American experts have taken over a great many local functions. Of course one understands the concern for efficiency, but the psychological effects are hardly calculated to encourage the emergence of authentic nationalist leaders at the present time, as Roger Hillsman forcefully pointed out in his recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Certainly the Americans have done no better than the French in finding worthy non-Communist leadership. There is no need to

reexamine now the tragic liquidation of Diemism, an event made inevitable by the sectarian religious isolation and the oligarchic obstinacy of the Ngo family. But since then, what decadence. Sad mandarins from certain conservative milieu in Saigon—courageous and outdated men—are followed in office by juntas composed of young generals-of-fortune who add a new star to their shoulders after each defeat in battle.

As for the moral climate in Saigon, one can only say that the corruption which dominated the life of the city's elite in 1953 has now been democratized. Shady dealings having to do with aid and military programs are no longer confined to people in high places, but seem to involve every kind of business. Testifying before the Senate on February 4, Mr. David Bell, the director of foreign aid, said that he knew of no black market in Saigon—which only shows that a brilliant and hard-working official has had no time to stroll along the streets of a town where someone begs you to break the law at every step.

It would be wrong to predict a priori that President Johnson's new counterinsurgency and pacification programs, based on plans for economic and social development in the southern villages, will fail as totally as did the quite similar plans sponsored by the French and later by the Diem regime. Can they produce a qualitative change in Vietnamese attitudes toward the present government and the United States? What can be said is that any efforts by political and army leaders in the south, however doubtful their results, will surely be more effective than the current bombings of the north. I will not take up the moral aspects of these attacks. It should be sufficient to examine their diplomatic and military results thus far. According to predictions made in January 1965, several weeks of daily raids would bring the north to its knees and thence to the negotiating table. In fact, Messrs. Ho and Dong have since toughened their demands, passing from the relatively flexible "four points" of March 8 to the recent letter of January 31, which refers to the NLF as the "only representative of South Vietnam"; until then, Ho had mentioned only the NLF "program."

As for military results, we must realize that the bombing of the north has no overwhelming impact on a people who only recently emerged from a resistance movement and are now being trained to return to one; for the most part their lives are not greatly affected by the destruction of a bridge or a truck depot. On the other hand, in January 1965 there were two northern regiments in the south, while now in February 1966 there are eight. Furthermore, the combat reserve forces in the north are numerous enough to permit the dispatch of more northern troops to General Giap in the south every time the United States escalates the bombing. The American public has been told that the north is being bombed to save American lives. But, on the contrary, it seems clear that the bombing in the north only increases the pressure on General Westmoreland's troops: The American footsoldier must pay for the destruction caused by the American Air Force. And if Hanoi itself is bombed, we may be sure that the Vietcong forces have well-laid plans to take atrocious revenge on Saigon, a city they have both infiltrated and surrounded. The adversaries have now sunk their claws into each other and so long as the ground fighting continues, we may expect that each blow will be followed by damaging reprisals.

Thus a political solution becomes all the more urgent—although unlike the settlement of 1954, it will not be preceded by a military disaster. But here American diplomacy is the victim of its own myths. Because the U.S. Government has decreed from the first that the war in the south was originally provoked by invasion from the north, it has

insisted that a solution must be negotiated with Hanoi, and only Hanoi.

A false historical analysis has led to a political impasse. For a careful study of the history of South Vietnam over the last 10 years will show that from 1956 onward, strong resistance groups, the surviving members of political-religious sects crushed by Diem, were in active opposition to the regime in the south; they were in fact already called Vietcong by the Diem regime at that time. Furthermore, this essentially nationalist dissident movement gained added support as a result of the rural discontent which led Diem to suppress the elected municipal councils in 1957; it spread further after the promulgation of the terrible law of 1959 which prescribed the death penalty for all accomplices of Communists—and communism comes cheap in South Vietnam.

At this time the resistance was composed of nothing more than southern groups organized in self-defense against Diem. Hanoi had made no connection with them. The North Vietnamese did not begin to exploit this situation and infiltrate agents until 1959; and it was only after pressure from a southern congress of "former Vietminh resisters" in March of 1960 that they prepared to intervene. At the Northern Communist Party Congress in September of the same year the Hanoi government gave direct encouragement to the revolutionary activities in the South. Still, it was not until November 11, 1960, following an attempted military putsch against Diem, that the Vietcong—feeling the pressure of competition from military nationalists—gave itself formal identity and established a political headquarters by creating the National Liberation Front.

Today it is clear that the NLF leaders are closely linked to Hanoi, on which they depend for much of their supplies and arms. But anyone concerned with a peaceful settlement in Vietnam should be aware of both the local origins of the front and its strong persisting regionalism—its attachments to the milieu, traditions, economy, and countryside of the South which give it a fundamental autonomy.

And yet, notwithstanding the fact that the southern origins of the Vietcong insurrection have been carefully confirmed, no element of the Vietnam problem has been so neglected, especially in American official circles. We may be astonished, for example, that the immense, spectacular, and probably sincere efforts of recent American diplomacy to persuade Hanoi to negotiate finally produced, after 30 days of pause in bombing, a single defiant letter. Yet America is dealing here with a small and poorly armed country; its allies are reluctant to give it aid too openly, fearing a crushing American response. Certainly it is a Communist government, but one presided over by a man who in 1946 and 1954 was able to prove to the French his willingness to accept compromise. And of the four points posed as conditions by Hanoi last year, Washington now accepts three. Why then doesn't Ho play Lyndon Johnson's game? In a conference the North Vietnamese would hold so many trumps that their present position is hard to understand.

But perhaps they were not in a position to negotiate at all. If we look back over the history of the NLF we find support for the view that Hanoi is not able to speak for the front. First for psychological reasons: The published program of the NLF expressly mentions the possibility of an independent South Vietnam; and it looks forward to forming an alliance with Laos and Cambodia only. Thus it seems most unlikely that the front would consider itself adequately represented by the northern government. Finally, there may be a purely practical reason. Combat conditions in the south are such that it is by no means certain that a decision or an agreement even if approved by the NLF would be supported by all the fighters in the field.

If we are to undertake a serious and credible search for peace in Vietnam, we must take account of this diversity of the southern resistance; we must recognize that it is in fact a federation of maquis of different ages and different inspiration, and that it is not as yet completely unified.

There is not as much geographic and psychological distance between the typical southern military chief and Ho Chi Minh as there is between Ho Chi Minh and Mr. Kosygin. But to be effective now in Vietnam diplomacy must certainly take account of the maquisard and his part in the war. It must also attempt to understand the role of the Central Committee of the NLF, where Maoist influence is strong but where all tendencies coexist; of the Lao Dong party in Hanoi, with its pro-Chinese and pro-Russian factions; and the Political Bureau in Peiping, with its cast of performers, both civilian and military. And finally we must comprehend the very complex position of the Soviet Union, which is quite unwilling to sacrifice either its policy of peaceful coexistence or its commanding position as leader of the Communist world. If the diversity of governmental levels, alliances, and forces involved in the war presents difficulties, it also offers many more chances for an alert diplomacy than were available during the monolithic conflict of the cold war.

It is true that American leaders now argue that to recognize the Vietcong is to admit defeat. A curious intellectual position indeed—to refuse to recognize your adversary for what he is. Perhaps it is worth recalling that in December 1953, after Ho Chi Minh had first announced himself ready to negotiate, the French Socialist, Alain Savary, suggested to Georges Bidault (then Foreign Minister, now living in Brazil) that he seek Ho out for talks. "You only make them bigger by talking to them," said Bidault—who did finally talk with Ho's delegate at Geneva, but after the fall of Dienbienphu.

Recognizing the Vietcong certainly will not solve the problem of peacemaking in Vietnam at a stroke. It would nevertheless be an extremely constructive idea to focus diplomatic attention firmly on the South at the present time—without meanwhile ceasing efforts both to make contact with Hanoi and to assess Communist Chinese intentions.

But to bring about peace it will not suffice simply to recognize the existence of a powerful revolutionary organization supported by the North and already in control of the largest part of the national territory. More important is the task of reestablishing the constitutional legitimacy which Diem embodied for a brief period—reactionary as he was—and which has since vanished. The NLF is an essential element of this legitimacy because it is the heir to the revolt against Diem's totalitarianism as well as the principle force of resistance to foreign intervention. But there are others who make up the social and political society as well—the Buddhists, the Catholics, and also the Army, a bourgeoisie in uniform.

An effective policy to bring about a peaceful settlement should begin by making it possible for each of these groups to return to an active political role. While General Ky, after having won his sole victory of the war at Honolulu, occupies the stage, we may be sure that the other groups are ready in the wings, waiting for the protection and encouragement the United States could still supply. And from such a revived political life we could expect an authoritative leadership to emerge whose lot it would be to debate with the NLF on the future of the South and to establish a coalition government to represent South Vietnam in future peace conferences. While the NLF is the largest force in the South it recognizes that it is obviously not the only force, reserving a large fraction of the seats on its central committee for groups who do not belong to

the NLF. The democratization of power in South Vietnam is not a fantasy. The destruction of the small democratic movements struggling to survive under Diem was among the factors that led to the civil war.

French colonial policy was only too familiar with these very diverse political factions and brilliantly played them off, one against the other. But to divide and rule became a pathetic policy as France's control became more feeble. An American policy which seeks a peaceful settlement must take account of both the sociopolitical pluralism of South Vietnam and its extraordinary capacity for finding original—and local—solutions to its problems. Surely it is time for American leaders at last to confront the people with whom they have become so inextricably involved.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in accordance with the order previously entered, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock tomorrow noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 20 minutes p.m.), the Senate adjourned, under the previous order until tomorrow, Tuesday, February 22, 1966, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate February 21, 1966:

U.S. ATTORNEY

John M. Imel, of Oklahoma, to be U.S. attorney for the northern district of Oklahoma for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for promotion in the Regular Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284 and 3299:

To be lieutenant colonel, Women's Army Corps

Bouton, Irma V., L195.
Brinegar, Maurine O., L531.
Deady, Virginia R., L167.
Howes, Alice N., L146.
Stout, Ariel E., L126.
Thompson, Ruth D., L121.

IN THE NAVY

The following-named officers of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of captain in the staff corps, as indicated, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

MEDICAL CORPS

Bass, Robert E.
Beer, David C.
Bernard, Donald P.
Chandler, Deck E.
Cummings, Ronald A.
Delaney, Thomas B.
Dempsey, John J.
Dinsmore, Harry H.
Downey, John J.
Dykhuizen, Robert F.
Ebersole, John H.
Fox, Lay M.
Gallagher, William J., Jr.
Ireland, Roger G.
Klein, Chester L.
Kramer, Scott G.
Laning, Robert C.
Lehman, Ross M., Jr.

*Linchan, Francis J., Jr.
*Lonergan, Walter M.
*Long, James A.
*Martin, Stuart H.
*Milnes, Roger F.
*Neptune, Edgar M., Jr.
*Pascoe, Delmar J.
*Richardson, Fred W.
*Rosenwinkel, Norbert E.
*Sparks, Henry A.
*Speaker, Richard B.
*Steen, Frank G.
*Sweeney, Francis J.
*Trummer, Max J.
*Watten, Raymond H.
*Webb, Martin G., Jr.
*White, Neil V.
Wilber, Martin C.

SUPPLY CORPS

*Aitken, Douglas G.
*Balcom, Vaughn O.
Baird, Richard S.
*Batterson, Robert E.
*Bland, Herbert L.
*Blandin, Sherman W., Jr.
Doucette, Forrest H.
*Duncan, Henry C.
*Dunn, George G.
Elmore, John W.
*Ericson, James B.
Forrest, James E.
*Grinstead, Eugene A., Jr.
Harbaugh, Norman R.
Haslett, Robert H.
Holbert, Kelley V.
Josselyn, Allan H., Jr.
Larson, Leslie O., Jr.
Lewis, Raymond O.
McHenry, Wendell, Jr.
*O'Loughlin, Richard C.
*Patton, Gerald J.
Peffley, John F.
Renfro, Edward E., III
Rodgers, Wallace F.
Tongren, Hale N.
*Williams, William C.

CHAPLAIN CORPS

*Capers, Keene H.
*Doyle, William F.
*Hutcheson, Richard G., Jr.
Keeley, John A.
Lavin, Henry T.
*Morton, Frank R.
Parham, Thomas D. Jr.
*Ray, Milton U.
Trower, Ross H.

CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS

Cunning, David P.
Forquer, Charles J.
Francy, William J.
Gault, Alan C.
*Grah, Ralph B., Jr.
Hansen, Bernard L.
Iselin, Donald G.
Jones, Whitney B.
Kaloupek, William E.
Lalande, Albert M., Jr.
Miller, Charles G., Jr.
More, David C.
Patrick, Donald A.
*Rogers, William R.
Saunders, Edward M.
Souder, Charles L.
Spangler, William S.
Van Leer, Blake W.
Walton, Albion W., Jr.
Yount, George R.

DENTAL CORPS

*Bassett, Donald R.
Beall, Frank P., Jr.
Chap, Bernard
*Green, George H.
Holmes, Corey H.
Mahoney, Jack D.
*Marmarose, Frank A.
*Rogers, William J., Jr.
Samuels, Homer S.
Scribner, James H.
*Sobieski, Edward F.
Stephenson, Thomas D.

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Baldrige, Henry D., Jr.
*Bing, John H.
Boyd, Thomas A., Jr.
Burr, Leonard W.
*Curtis, Ned B.
Eastman, Robert W.
*Goldenrath, Walter L.
*Keener, Mary F.
*Lester, William F.
McLellan, David J.
Miller, Lloyd W.
Rasmussen, John E.
Ray, Jewel P.
*Rigg, Robert F.
Sabbag, George J.
Shepherd, William H.

NURSE CORPS

Blaska, Burdette M.
Bulsheski, Veronica M.
Reilly, Alice R.

The following-named officers of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of commander in the line and staff corps, as indicated, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

LINE

Abbott, William B., III
*Abelein, Herman C.
Ackerman, Richard F.
*Ackerman, Warren J.
Adams, Robert L., Jr.
Addis, Robert W.
*Adler, Robert E.
Akagi, Joe L.
Aldern, Donald D.
Alexander, Adam G., Jr.
Alexander, Marvin G.
Alexich, Milton P.
Allen, Douglas A.
*Allen, James A.
Allen, John B.
Allen, Richard C.
*Allender, Gene T.
*Alley, Lester L.
Altwegg, David M.
Anderle, Charles K.
*Anderson, Charles L. R.
*Anderson, Norris O., Jr.
Anderson, Paul L.
*Anderson, Stanley J.
*Anderson, William J., III
Angler, Donald L.
*Anglim, Daniel F., Jr.
Applegarth, Samuel H., Jr.
Argiro, Vincent J.
Arn, Robert W.
*Arnold, Henry C., Jr.
Arnold, John E.
*Arp, Philip S.
*Ashmore, Jackie K.
*Ashurst, Albert J.
*Asmus, Paul A.
*Aston, William J.
Atherton, Robert F.
*Ausb Brooks, Erskine P., Jr.
Avallone, Eugene M.

Avery, Howell D.
*Axthelm, Charles E.
Ayres, James H.
*Babine, Arthur L., Jr.
*Bachtold, James R.
Backman, Fred M.
Bacon, James A.
Badgett, John J.
*Baggett, Talmadge S.
Baillie, Richard H.
*Bain, Robert
*Baker, James E., Jr.
Baker, James G.
*Bakke, Harlan J.
Balchunas, Robert C.
Baldridge, Louis D., Jr.
Baldwin, Robert A.
*Barbee, Delbert F.
*Barker, Harold D.
Barker, Merle M.
*Barnard, Ralph E.
*Barnes, Clifford P.
Barnes, James P.
Barnett, Gerald P.
Barney, Glenn P.
Barrett, Gardner S.
Barrow, Robert W.
*Barunas, George A., Jr.
Batten, Charles G.
*Bauer, Edward C.
*Bauman, Charles J., Jr.
*Beasley, James W.
*Beates, James K.
Beatty, Lloyd D.
Beck, Stuart M.
Beech, Wayne L.
Beecher, John D.
Beem, Jack M.
*Belk, Reece G., Jr.
*Bell, Gerald R.
*Bennett, Robert W.
Benton, Hugh A.
Berg, Frederick H.
*Bergman, Daniel
Bibby, Lowe H., III
*Bickel, William B.
*Bigenho, Roy M.
Bills, Robert G.
*Bippus, Henry
Bird, Charles S.
Blades, Lawrence T.
Blair, Closkey L., Jr.
Blake, Harry R., Jr.
*Blasi, Richard E.
*Blough, Arthur K., Jr.
*Boakes, William H.
Boles, Lee R.
Boles, Richard L.
*Borgstrom, Charles O., Jr.
Bos, Roger C.
Boschen, Henry C., Jr.
Bosse, Joseph H., Jr.
*Bowen, Jack W.
Bowen, William J.
*Bowers, Thomas L.
*Bowersox, Earl C., Jr.
*Bowling, William H.
*Braddy, Don L., Jr.
Bradford, Gerald R.
Bradshaw, Brice L.
*Brady, Allen C.
*Brainard, Donald R.
Brandel, William J., Jr.
*Brantley, William J.
*Bres, John H.
Bress, Allyn V.
Brewer, Glenn M.
Bridge, Daniel T.
Bridges, Kenneth K.
Bridgham, Russell B.
*Briggs, Douglas W.
Briggs, Edward F.
Broadwell, Edward A.
Brogan, Robert C.
Brooks, Walter A.
*Broomhead, Marvin S.
Brown, Bobby J.
*Brown, Bruce W.
Brown, Charles H.
Brown, Gideon L., Jr.
*Brown, Peter G.
Brown, Robert L.
*Bryan, Gordon R., Jr.
Bryant, William R.
*Buck, John A.
Bucklin, Jerald W.
*Buffkin, John W., Jr.
Burkemper, Raymond G.
*Burkhalter, Edward A., Jr.
Burnett, James A.
*Burnham, Rowland E.
*Burton, Herbert O.
*Bush, Charles L.
Butler, Charles A.
*Butts, John L.
*Buzzell, Carlisle W., Jr.
*Byrd, Paul R.
Cahill, William A., Jr.
*Calhoun, William P.
Calif, Toxey H.
*Callahan, Earle R.
*Campbell, Neil V.
Campbell, Ronald A.
*Campbell, William E. Jr.
Campion, Robert F., Jr.
*Carlson, Burford A.
*Carlson, George R.
*Carraway, Terry F.
*Carter, Edward W., III
Case, Richard W.
Caskey, Donald L.
Cassani, Henry L.
Caswell, Frederic C., Jr.
Caudill, William E.
Cecil, Durward C.
Chambers, Lawrence C.
Chandler, Albert N., Jr.
Charbonneau, George L.
Chasse, Robert L.
Cheatham, Augustus B.
Cherrier, Herbert A.
Chertavian, Armen
Chesser, Samuel L.
Chewning, Robert W.
*Childers, Donald J.
Chisum, Oscar C.
*Christensen, Donald A.
*Christenson, Donald A.
Christie, Francis J.
*Church, George A.
Clare, James S.
*Clark, Andrew
*Clarke, John R.
*Clausner, Edward, Jr.
Clermont, William J., Jr.
*Clubb, Reginald D.
*Coale, William A.
*Cobern, Ernest L.
Coffman, Charles L.
Coimer, John A.
*Colenda, Herbert F.
*Collins, Charles H.
Collins, Frank C., Jr.
Collins, Harold E.
Combs, Robert E.

- *Compton, Bryan W., Jr.
 Condon, Edward J.
 *Conlon, Frank S.
 Connally, Robert F., III
 Connell, Lewis E.
 Connelly, Robert B.
 Connors, Eugene T.
 Conrad, Peter C.
 *Cook, Carroll T.
 Cooney, David M.
 *Cooper, Carleton R.
 Corbett, William J., III
 *Cornelius, Winston W.
 Cornwell, James W.
 *Cornwell, Robert K.
 Corsepius, Everett D.
 Coski, Bernard J.
 Costigan, Robert A.
 *Crawley, Don E.
 *Criner, James E.
 Croft, Alfred J., Jr.
 Cromwell, John P., Jr.
 *Crosby, Russell U.
 *Cross, Daniel F.
 Cross, William F.
 *Crowder, James P., Jr.
 Cullins, Peter K.
 Cunningham, Melville D.
 Cunningham, Richard B.
 Cunningham, Alan R.
 *Dagg, Robert M.
 Dallaire, Richard P.
 Dallamura, Richard A.
 *Daly, Norman F.
 *Danis, Anthony L., Jr.
 *Danner, William P.
 Darodda, Aldo J.
 Darrell, Charles G.
 Darwin, William C.
 Davis, Henry J., Jr.
 Davis, Jay K.
 Davis, Michael C.
 Davis, Paul H., Jr.
 *Davis, Ralph O.
 *Davis, William J.
 Deaton, Paul
 *DeCook, David W.
 *DeFelice, Edward A.
 Demun, Taylor K.
 DeView, Joseph R.
 *DeWitt, Duane D.
 *Diers, Charles E.
 *Dietrich, Henry T., Jr.
 Dietz, Richard C.
 *Dittmar, Louis C.
 *Dobbins, John B., Jr.
 Dodd, Charles A.
 *Dodd, Robert L.
 *Doering, Eugene R.
 Doggett, William K.
 Dorso, James N.
 Drows, Sheldon
 *Duke, Marvin L.
 *Dukes, Warren C.
 *Dunaway, Gene T.
 *Dunbar, John P.
 *Dungan, John D.
 *Dunn, Robert F.
 *Dunn, Theodore Y., Jr.
 Dwyer, Laurence A.
 Eakle, Burke E.
 Earl, William C.
 *Easterling, Crawford.
 Eastman, Alfred C., III
 Ebbert, Edwin I.
 *Eckert, Richard H.
 *Eckhout, Wilmont S.
 *Eckstein, John R.
 *Edmonds, Hobart J., Jr.
 Edmunds, Philip H.
 Edris, Richard J.
 Edwards, Chester C.
 *Ehleringer, Henry G.
 Ekman, Roger E.
 Elder, James C.
- *Elfelt, James S.
 *Ellinghausen, Walter A., Jr.
 Elliott, Charles L.
 *Ellis, James L.
 *Ellison, David J.
 *Englehart, Harry J.
 Engquist, Gordon W.
 Enos, Ralph L.
 *Erkelens, Clarence
 Eshman, John H.
 *Estabrook, Robert K.
 *Estes, Dana, II
 *Estes, Leland F.
 *Etchison, Frank L., Jr.
 Evans, Daniel H., Jr.
 Evans, Laverne E.
 Farley, James W.
 Farris, George K.
 Federico, Charles D.
 *Feit, Harry H., Jr.
 *Fenton, Robert E.
 Finn, Gerard P., Jr.
 Fitzpatrick, Joseph A.
 *Fletcher, Charles D.
 Fontaine, Richard K.
 Ford, James M., Jr.
 *Forrester, James H.
 *Forsyth, Robert J.
 *Forsythe, Forrest D.
 *Foster, Ralph W., Jr.
 *Foster, William F.
 Fowler, John W.
 *Fox, Kenneth
 Fox, Raymond G., Jr.
 Frame, Edward L.
 *Francis, John P.
 Francis, Thomas A.
 *Frankie, Richard D.
 Franklin, Billy D.
 Fremd, Harry L.
 *French, Jack T.
 *Frost, William L.
 Fruchterman, Richard L., Jr.
 *Fuller, Robert B.
 *Gaddy, James K.
 Gahafer, Joseph G.
 Gair, Bruce O.
 Galing, Searcy G.
 *Gallagher, Lawrence E.
 *Gamber, Harold W.
 Garcia, Jaime
 *Gardner, Richard C.
 *Gardner, Richmond
 *Garrett, Everett C.
 Gatje, George C.
 Gearhart, Norman R.
 *Geiger, Eugene D.
 *Gerlach, Richard E.
 Gibbins, Gareth W.
 *Gilbertson, John E.
 Gilchrist, John F., II
 Gillerist, Paul T.
 *Gillespie, Charles R., Jr.
 *Gire, Howard A.
 Glancy, Thomas J., Jr.
 *Goebel, Herman E., Jr.
 Goetschius, Forrest D.
 Gordon, David E.
 *Goslow, Paul
 *Gottschalk, Art W., Jr.
 *Goulds, Ralph J.
 *Govan, George W.
 *Grady, Edward L., Jr.
 *Graf, Harry R.
 Grandfield, Francis J., Jr.
 Grant, Richard T.
 *Grant, Thaddeus R.
 Granum, Bradford S.
 Grappi, Robert L.
 *Grayson, William R.
 *Greathouse, David M.
 *Green, John N.
- *Green, Richard W.
 *Green, Robert E.
 *Greene, John L.
 Greenleaf, Wilbur E.
 Greff, Clarence H., Jr.
 *Griffin, Jack R.
 *Guffey, Elton E.
 *Guion, Joseph E.
 Gurney, Charles E., III
 Gustaff, Vito J. V.
 *Haff, William B.
 Hahnert, William F., Jr.
 Haight, Gardiner M.
 Hale, William T.
 Hall, Harrell W.
 *Hall, Timothy K.
 *Hallett, Edward R.
 Hamilton, John W.
 Hamilton, Leo L.
 *Hampton, Charles T.
 Hansen, Merle C.
 Hansen, Ronald R.
 *Hanson, Elighue G., Jr.
 Harbick, Donald L.
 Hardisty, Huntington
 Harnden, Charles G.
 *Harper, Lorren G.
 Hart, Donald F.
 Hart, Richard L.
 *Hart, Stephen L.
 *Hart, William D.
 *Hartell, Ronald D.
 *Hartigan, Richard B.
 Hartnett, Bernard E., Jr.
 *Hassman, Andrew U., Jr.
 *Hausler, Carl O.
 Hawk, James T.
 Hawkins, Phil R.
 *Hayden, Glenn M.
 Hayes, Morris L.
 *Hayman, Robert B.
 Head, John L.
 Healy, Richard H.
 Hedges, Ralph R.
 Heenan, Richard D.
 Heffernan, George A.
 *Heigl, John T., Jr.
 Henson, Otis A.
 Heon, Robert H.
 *Herbert, Thomas J.
 *Herbig, Henry F.
 *Herdson, William J., Jr.
 *Herrin, Holden R.
 Hession, James M.
 Hetu, Herbert E.
 *Hibson, Leo A., Jr.
 Hicks, Harold F., Jr.
 Hiehle, Frank G., Jr.
 *Higginbotham, Leonard H.
 Higgins, Clinton K., Jr.
 *Hill, Howard A.
 *Hill, James C.
 *Hines, Gulmer A., Jr.
 *Hinsen, Kenneth L.
 *Hirz, Joseph D.
 *Hodnett, Robert A.
 Hoffman, Merle L.
 *Hoganson, John H.
 *Holland, James S.
 *Holler, Edward R.
 Hollick, Frederick B.
 Holmberg, Lennart G.
 Holt, Neil G.
 *Holt, Robert E.
 *Hoover, Richard M.
 *Hopf, Elwood J.
 Hopper, Richard S.
 Horne, Charles F., III
 Hovater, James D.
 Howe, Richard B.
 *Hubbs, Donald R.
 Hughes, Peter F. H.
 Hughes, Wayne F., Jr.
 Hull, George T.
- Hume, Robert J.
 *Humphries, George P.
 Hunt, Albert M.
 *Hurd, Russell E.
 Ingley, Edmund W.
 Inman, Bobby R.
 *Ismay, Arthur P.
 Jaburg, Conrad J.
 Jackson, Thomas L.
 *Jameson, James N.
 Janulis, George
 Jarvis, John M.
 Jarvis, Donald H.
 Jayne, Gordon H.
 *Jenkins, Paul J.
 *Jenkins, Ralph A.
 *Jennings, John S.
 *Jermann, Donald R.
 *Jesse, Harold W.
 *Jett, William S., III
 Jewell, Thomas A.
 *Jimmerson, Thomas J., Jr.
 *Johns, Arthur J.
 Johns, Forrest R.
 *Johnson, Dale C.
 *Johnson, Donald L.
 Johnson, Guy D.
 *Johnson, Joseph J.
 *Johnson, Richard C.
 *Johnson, Richard D.
 *Johnston, Frederick B.
 Johnston, Maurice M., Jr.
 *Johnstone, Richard A.
 Jones, Carol W.
 Jones, John E.
 Jones, Samuel O., Jr.
 Kaczmarek, Carl C.
 Karvala, Curtis A.
 *Kasehagen, Arthur T.
 *Katz, Martin
 Kaulback, Russell D.
 Keach, Donald L.
 Keane, James P.
 *Keathley, Charles C.
 Kehoe, James W., Jr.
 Kelley, Frederick W.
 Kellin, Albert L.
 Kelsey, Robert L.
 Kemble, John R.
 *Kennedy, Nevin, III
 Kennedy, Ronald W.
 Kennedy, Robert C.
 Kennedy, Walter J.
 *Kersch, Roger N.
 Kilmer, Donald A.
 *King, William R.
 *Kinery, Samuel G.
 Kinnbrew, Thomas R.
 *Kinsley, Donald T.
 *Kirchner, David P.
 Kirschke, Ernest J.
 *Klabo, Richard T.
 *Klett, George J.
 Knopp, William A.
 Knutson, Donald W.
 Knutson, Wilbert D.
 *Koch, Richard A.
 Koehler, Walter C., Jr.
 Kollmann, Glenn E.
 *Kollmorgen, Leland S.
 Kosar, William S., Jr.
 Kovarik, Frank L.
 Kraft, Leroy M.
 *Kramer, Robert P.
 Kuehner, Karl E.
 Kuhn, Edwin A.
 Kully, Sheldon D.
 *Kunkle, Floyd S., Jr.
 *Lacy, James E.
 Laitton, Robert H.
 Lake, Charles M., Jr.
 Lumb, Derwin T.
- Lancaster, Robert W.
 Langton, Charles E., Jr.
 Larocque, George N.
 *Larry, Walter C.
 Lasowski, Donald T.
 *Latimer, Samuel E., Jr.
 *Lautermilch, Paul A., Jr.
 Layman, Lawrence
 *Leach, Everett N.
 *Leach, Ralph W., Jr.
 Leahy, John P.
 *Leibold, William R.
 *Leibowitz, Martin M.
 *Leis, Alfred C.
 Lenox, Glen W.
 *Lentz, Charles M.
 *Leppin, William F., Jr.
 *Lewallen, John D.
 Lewis, Charles G.
 *Lewis, James R.
 Lewis, James T.
 *Libey, John D.
 Lidel, Carl J.
 Lighter, Elbert D.
 *Lindsay, John D.
 Liston, John M.
 *Little, James G.
 Loberger, James C.
 Lockhart, Glenn S.
 Lofton, Freeman L.
 Logner, Robert L.
 *Longhi, William J.
 Looney, Francis L.
 Lopper, Avery K., Jr.
 Lounsbury, Jack A.
 *Lloyd, Rupert H.
 Luckett, Thomas W.
 Ludwick, Louis L.
 Lukas, Thomas E.
 Lunt, Vernon S.
 *Luskin, Arthur G.
 *MacFie, Richard B.
 MacKercher, John C.
 Madden, Raymond A.
 *Madedo, Joseph F., Jr.
 *Malce, Lee, Jr.
 Mains, Homer O., Jr.
 Malone, Roy W.
 Manara, Vincent J., Jr.
 Mann, Robert E.
 Manning, Charles D.
 Marbott, Henry W.
 Marin, William T.
 *Martin, William K.
 Martin, William R.
 Massimi, Robert F.
 Matheron, Richard
 Mattioni, Blasco
 Mau, George W., Jr.
 *Maxwell, Daryl O.
 May, Porter E.
 Maynard, Donald J.
 *Mazzolini, John A.
 *McAdams, John W., Jr.
 *McAnulty, David J.
 McBurney, William J.
 *McCarthy, Francis X.
 McCormick, Daniel G., III
 McCutcheon, Edwin L.
 McDaniel, Clarence L.
 *McDonough, William
 Murphy, Ray D.
 McFadden, Grafton R.
 McGaughy, Richard W.
 McGeachy, Francis L.
 *McGlohn, Robin H., Jr.
 McGrath, Harold A.
 *McGuire, Eugene J.
 McIntyre, John J.
 *McKee, Kinnaird R.
 *McKee, Samuel T.
- *McKellar, Edward D., Jr.
 *McLaughlin, Robert F.
 *McLemore, Albert S.
 *McLoughlin, James
 *McMillan, Donald G.
 *McNally, John H.
 *McNeely, James S.
 *McNerney, James F.
 *McQueston, Jack E.
 *McQuillin, John P.
 *McWey, Russell B.
 McWilliams, Frederick F.
 Mead, Theodore E.
 Meader, Bruce I.
 Meadows, Okey I.
 Meek, Kenneth L.
 *Meeks, Robert B., Jr.
 Meeks, Thomas L.
 Mehl, James P.
 Meltzer, Melvin
 *Mench, Leland E.
 *Merchant, Paul G.
 Merrill, Forest J.
 *Merrill, Warren H.
 *Merritt, Glen C.
 Messerve, Charles L.
 Messina, Sylvester C.
 *Metcalfe, Joseph, III
 *Metz, Forrest E.
 Mhoon, Fred M.
 Michaels, Robert J.
 *Mikkelsen, Richard E.
 Millus, Paul L.
 Miller, Donald A.
 *Miller, Floyd H., Jr.
 *Miller, James P.
 Miller, James L.
 Miller, Kenneth R.
 Miller, Robert L.
 Miner, Duane A.
 *Minnigerode, John H. B.
 Mischke, Gayland J.
 Mitchell, Edgar D.
 *Mitchell, Joe C.
 *Mitchell, John R. C.
 *Mitchell, "J" Wallace
 Mitchell, Leland G.
 Moffitt, Russell L.
 *Montgomery, Graden L.
 Moody, Thomas J.
 Moore, Charles J.
 Moore, Ernest M. Jr.
 Moore, Loren I.
 Moore, Mallie B.
 Moore, Tommy C.
 Moore, Virgil W., Jr.
 Moriarty, Peter M.
 *Morrin, Richard J.
 *Morris, Howard L.
 Morris, Robert Eastin
 Morris, Robert Elliott
 *Morrow, Charles D.
 *Morse, Jack L.
 Moss, William C., Jr.
 Mountford, Edward J.
 *Mow, Douglas F.
 *Moyer, Donald R.
 *Mueller, George E.
 Mullin, James
 Muncy, William E.
 *Murphy, Douglas C.
 *Murphy, Gilbert F., Jr.
 *Murray, Douglas V.
 *Muto, Charles J.
 Myers, Carroll E.
 *Myers, William S.
 *Nation, William C.
 Naugle, James O.
 Naylor, Charles K.
 *Neff, Richmond B., Jr.
 *Negron, Delis, Jr.
 Nelson, Eric A., Jr.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

February 21, 1966

that cigarettes probably caused cancer, heart disease, and chronic coreopsis.

An alarmed Congress, concerned with our welfare above all, took the momentous step of ordering warnings printed on all cigarette packages that the coffin nails therein might be bad for us. It then voted continued subsidies to the farmers to go on growing more cigarette tobacco.

But many a smoker, on viewing the warning, cried: "Good heavens. Cigarettes may be bad for me. I never would have thought it." And, naturally, the cigarette industry was gravely concerned.

The dilemma seemed insoluble. But the Department of Agriculture has now stepped into the breach. It's spending \$210,000 on a filmed commercial entitled "The World of Pleasure." It's designed to stimulate more cigarette smoking. But that's OK, because we're only going to show it abroad.

The Department says the film will be shown in Japan, Thailand, and Austria as part of a "promotion program to help buffer any damage to American tobacco sales" caused by the cancer scare at home. The Department did not say what the rest of the program consisted of.

Actually, I'm in receipt of another chatty letter from the noted CIA agent, Homer T. Pettibone, Yale 1907, which may shed further light on this interesting new concept:

"I've been in Japan these past few months on loan to our new supersecret EOP Service, old bean," he writes. "That stands for Export Our Problems and I don't mind telling you it's been pretty dreary work—hanging around schoolyards offering these Japanese kids fags.

"Frankly, I didn't care much for it. 'Pssst, kid.' I'd say. 'Want a new thrill? Not a cough in a carload.' And while I realized I was serving my country in the finest traditions of the EOP Service, I never could stand all that coughing and spluttering.

"So when the Chief called me in to offer me a new assignment, I was ready. 'We're giving you a bigger job, Pettibone,' he said. 'Pushing marihuana.'

"'Marijuana, sir?' says I.

"'Right, Pettibone,' he says. 'After all, the world supply of marihuana is limited. The more we can get smoked up over here, the less there will be for those beatniks at home. So get out there, for the glory of your country, and hook those kids.'

"Well, I can't tell you what a joy it is to see the way these kids' eyes light up. It shows you the value of sharing, doesn't it? But I must say, I do hope the Chief doesn't take me off marihuana and put me on the heroin detail.

"To tell the truth, the motto of us dedicated agents in the marihuana branch appeals to me most: 'For the good of America, help the world go to pot.'"

Vote on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DEL CLAWSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. DEL CLAWSON. Mr. Speaker, Saturday's Washington Post contained an editorial which presents a clearcut statement of the alternatives facing us in Vietnam. I should like to commend the following editorial to the attention of my colleagues under leave to extend my remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD:

VOTE ON VIETNAM

Policies that the United States is pursuing in South Vietnam have emerged out of convictions matured over a generation. They are based on the settled policies of one government after another. They rest legally and constitutionally on the resolutions and appropriations and actions of Congress.

The hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, especially in the testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, have reminded the country of how we arrived at these convictions. They have focused attention on the premises upon which we have acted. They have made clearer the continuity of American policy. They have reminded Congress and the country of the legal and constitutional framework of our policy.

The southeast Asia resolution of August 10, 1964, was inspired by a particular crisis but it did not initiate a new doctrine, depart from precedent, discard any prior commitments, or introduce anything novel in American policy. And it was and is a fair statement of this country's intentions over decades. It said:

"The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Senators are right to say that Congress did not thereby forfeit its responsibility, but they are not right to attack the Government for not abandoning the policy approved on August 10, 1964. This remains the policy of the United States until, under the terms of the resolution, the President declares the peace of the area secured or the Congress terminates the policy by concurrent resolution.

The appropriate path has been made clear for those who now wish the policy changed. The policy has had an adequate review in the hearings before the committee. Those who dissent from it ought to embrace the invitation of Secretary Rusk to vote. Such a vote could be had by the introduction of a concurrent resolution to terminate the authority which the Congress gave the President 18 months ago.

It will be a grave choice, as Secretary Rusk has pointed out. But the Senate has the duty to make such grave choices. It cannot properly neglect or abdicate its responsibilities and then reproach the executive department for disregarding the Senate's constitutional duty to give its advice and consent on foreign policy. The country will have a right to regard the failure of the committee to now recommend any amendment of the concurrent resolution of August 10 as a solemn reaffirmation of policy.

In broad principle, Congress and the executive spokesmen may not be as far apart as they imagined when the hearings commenced. Resistance to aggression has been a central element of national policy for a long time. As far back as 1946, Senator FULBRIGHT himself pointed out that "a basic principle of our foreign policy must be that there is a point beyond which we cannot, in justice to ourselves and to the civilization of which we are the heir, permit a nation to expand without offering resistance by force."

The general policy has been in effect since the Truman doctrine was proclaimed. Its application to the particular crisis in South

Vietnam was affirmed in August 1964. Congress has the power to reaffirm or to change the general policy or the application of that policy in South Vietnam. It should do so, at the end of the Senate hearings, in a manner that eliminates all uncertainty as to the national purpose.

Rural America Must Not Be Shortchanged

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GLENN CUNNINGHAM

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, Congress should give serious consideration to a statement issued by the National Farmers Union Executive Committee. Rural America must not be shortchanged, as such neglect would have grave consequences so far as our national welfare is concerned.

The statement referred to follows:

STATEMENT OF NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN DENVER, COLO., FEBRUARY 8, 1966

The Johnson administration's new budget, if put into effect, would be a slap in the face for America's hard working and already disadvantaged farm and ranch families. We fail to see any reasonable justification for the heavy cutbacks in funds for soil conservation, the commodity programs, farm and home loans, rural electrification, vocational agriculture and the land grant college and extension education when a hungry world is crying for food. The slashing of school milk funds is a tragic oversight.

Few people realize most of these moneys, except for agricultural education, are on matching funds or reimbursable lending basis and contribute importantly to the gross national production in addition to adding strength to rural living. Yet these vital functions are being seriously weakened while there has been no such cutback in Federal aid to the big bankers, as the budget shows this interest item for the Federal debt has been set at the astounding level of nearly \$13 billion annually.

We call upon Members of Congress to remove these gross deficiencies in the Johnson budget that adversely affect agriculture and:

1. Provide sufficient matching funds to step up the valuable conservation of soil which concerns the future of the Nation.

2. Increase the authorization for Farmers Home Administration permitting that agency to go on with the job of making low-cost credit available to undercapitalized rural areas.

3. Put sufficient funds into the price support programs with an upper limit on loans and payments so that larger-than-family farms and city-oriented agribusiness will no longer have an undue advantage over family-type farmers and ranchers and enable the latter to overcome the deficiency of their 77-cent dollar.

4. Appropriate at least \$680 million for desperately needed rural electric loans and establish a revolving REA loan program permitting the repeated use of the millions of dollars in advance repayments diligent farm associations are making on their obligations, and to maintain the 2 percent REA interest rate.

5. Make available further public investment for agricultural education and research commensurate with the growing con-

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economic development programs reach them. The needs of Goias are basic needs. The people need desks and blackboards for their stum and rural schools; medicines and instruments for their health posts and clinics; and pumps and pipe for community wells. They have supplied the labor and materials and have done 73 or 80 or 90 percent of a job but need a boost to complete a job. Since their finances are meager, they can't raise locally the funds to make up the difference between a completed and usable unit and an abandoned project. For \$100, \$200, or \$300, groups and organizations in Wyoming can give the assistance required to help progress. When Wyoming private funds are earmarked for an impact-type project, the people of Goias will know that it is the people of Casper or Laramie or Cody who have reached them.

The Partners program is a two-way street, allowing private groups in Latin America to participate with dignity in true partnership. We expect and are receiving a flow back of benefits from Latin America. We have much to learn from our neighbors in this hemisphere. Costa Rica sent 12 educators to Oregon to help upgrade high school Spanish classes and serve as resource people in social studies. Oregon has gained most from this partnership activity in reverse. An art collection from Venezuela is now touring the galleries in their Partner State of Tennessee. A Brazilian instructor conducted a course in Portuguese in Ohio for Spanish teachers which resulted in new interest in the language in college curriculums.

Each U.S. Partner State is looking to its own Partner in Latin America for areas in which they can be assisted in a real sense with this reverse flow of culture and resources. We were pleased with the chairman of the Iowa Partners Committee when he announced recently that Iowa was "happy to join the traffic" in their two-way street partnership with an area in Mexico.

From the response experienced here in Wyoming these past few days, we feel confident that the people of your State desire to move forward in this program. We sense that they want to reach out to the grass-roots of Goias and make telling impact in those rural areas to let their Brazilian partners know that a ground swell of interest and concern has begun here. The people have shown a commendable responsibility in wanting to share their know-how and resources with those who are exhibiting much self-help.

The newspapers of Wyoming were paid a fine compliment by an editorial in the Casper Star-Times yesterday. It said that the papers of this State "became permanent partners in the growth of the areas they served." We know that this is true. It is our hope that your great press will join in supporting the partnership between Wyoming and Goias.

Voting Record of Congressman Wayne L. Hays on Major Legislation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. WAYNE L. HAYS

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include my voting record on major bills to come before the House of Representatives during the 89th Congress to date. I have done this since I have been in

Congress and mailed out copies so that my constituents could have a convenient method of checking my record. As voters in the 18th Congressional District

they have the right to know how their Congressman represented them in Washington and how I voted on the major issues. The record follows:

How I voted	Issue	Status
Yes	Appalachian Regional Development Act authorizes aid to revive economy of Appalachian region.	Enacted.
Yes	Public Works and Economic Development Act authorizes loans and grants in economically depressed areas.	Enacted.
Yes	Extension of Manpower Development and Training Act for 3 years.	Enacted.
Yes	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorizes \$1,300,000,000 to improve elementary and secondary education.	Enacted.
Yes	Higher Education Act of 1965 authorizing grants for college students with exceptional financial need, fellowships for teachers, and a National Teachers Corps.	Enacted.
Yes	Reduction of excise taxes.	Enacted.
Yes	Social Security Act amendments to authorize medicare and 7 percent increase in social security benefits.	Enacted.
Yes	Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 extending public housing, urban renewal, and community facilities laws and authorizing grants to communities for water and sewer facilities.	Enacted.
Yes	Establish a Cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban Development.	Enacted.
Yes	Voting Rights Act of 1965 to enforce the 15th amendment.	Enacted.
Yes	Abolish national origins quota system in immigration.	Enacted.
Yes	Authorize \$1,500,000,000 for fiscal 1966 for antipoverly program under Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.	Enacted.
Yes	Federal Water Pollution Control Act to strengthen control over water pollution and increase aid for community sewage projects.	Enacted.
Yes	Establish a National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities.	Enacted.
Yes	Provide average 10.4 basic pay increase for uniformed military personnel.	Enacted.
Yes	Provide 3.6 pay increase for classified, postal, and other Federal employees.	Enacted.
Yes	Increase veterans' disability compensation.	Enacted.
Yes	Foreign aid bill providing economic and military assistance.	Enacted.
No	Resolution proposing constitutional amendment for Presidential continuity.	Adopted.
Yes	Establish effective controls for depressant and stimulant drugs.	Enacted.
Yes	Gold war GI bill.	Approved by Congress.
No	Asian Development Bank Act.	Passed House.

Safe Surrender

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. E. Y. BERRY

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, I have asked unanimous consent to insert in the Record a poem which I think goes a long way toward expressing in rhythm what many think in prose.

The poem is as follows:

SAFE SURRENDER

Is it, true, must we surrender;
Are we better "Red than dead?"
What of those who've gone before us,
Who hoped and fought and bled?

Was it not inventive genius,
And the courage of the free;
That built this mighty Nation,
Gave it then to you and me?

Our leaders talk of war, in years;
Of containment, so they say,
Contain but not to conquer him,
Just keep the foe at bay.

How must our young men feel today,
In the murky jungle deep?
Our bombers not allowed to strike,
The enemy we keep.

Why choose this distant Asian land
To blood-wash this disease;
While near our shore this enemy,
We coddle and appease?

Disarm. Disarm. appease appease
Our great planners do insist.
The enemy will not attack,
If we cannot resist.

So remove defensive missiles.
Take the bombers from the air;
Yes, limit every phase of war,
To not arouse the Bear?

Let the cream of this great country,
Waste and fight and die betrayed,
With weapons of the ancient past,
Because we are afraid?

Afraid to use the might that's ours,
Win and end this futile strife,
And stop this cancer at its source,
Before it takes our life.

Will our sovereignty surrendered,
And our banner tightly furled;
Loose shackles, foolish cartels placed,
On men throughout the world?

—JACK KENNEDY

Got Problems? Learn To Share

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, again the master satirist, Mr. Arthur Hoppe, had a very good column in the February 15 San Francisco Chronicle, relative to this Government's position on cigarette smoking.

The column follows:

GOT PROBLEMS? LEARN TO SHARE

(By Arthur Hoppe)

The smooth interworkings of our Government agencies have never been better demonstrated than in the great smoking battle. No informed citizen can deny that in their constant efforts to protect us all these agencies are holding their own.

For years, as you know, the Department of Agriculture has been subsidizing farmers to encourage them to grow more cigarette tobacco. Which was fine until another agency, the Department of Public Health announced

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by Russian Boyars, Poland tried to form a union with Russia, but this did not bring positive results. In this period (1566-1632) the Polish Armies under the leadership of Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski, occasionally occupied Moscow and the Kremlin.

In 1920, Poland, with future federation in mind, helped Ataman Semen Petiura to form an independent Ukraine, and in a battle with Soviet armies, the Polish forces liberated the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev.

FIRST REPUBLIC

As for internal constitutional forms, from the year 1573 the Polish nobility began to elect its kings, and thus Poland became the first republic, although only nobiliary.

Political freedom flourished, manifested by such outgrowths as "Pacta Conventa," or agreements made by the nobility with the elected kings which imposed various political and financial obligations on them, and "Liberum Veto," which made it possible for only one deputy to parliament (the Sejm) to dissolve the parliament and annul its resolutions. (In a sense the veto in the United Nations Security Council can trace its ancestry to Poland in the 17th century.) This led to an anarchy in political life and the collapse of the inner strength of the nation and contributed to the partitions of Poland.

Nevertheless, it was an expression of the spirit of freedom. Finally, the modern constitution of May 3, 1791, did away with this anarchy, restoring hereditary monarchy and a strong government and canceling the "Liberum Veto." Three years later, on May 7, 1794, Gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko issued the Polaniecki Manifesto which served to partially free the peasants from serfdom while during the 1863 uprising against Russia the National Government freed them from these duties completely.

COUNTRY OF FREEDOM

During the course of history Poland became the country of religious freedom and tolerance, insured by the Warsaw Confederation of 1573 which guaranteed the free worship of any religion. Arians, Lutherans and Calvinists, Poles and foreigners, enjoyed this freedom. From the 11th century Jews settled in Poland in their flight from persecution in other European countries. Before the Second World War more than 3 million Jews, enjoying full rights, lived in Poland. Jewish religious life flourished. The most important Hebrew universities and publications were to be found in Poland (Jeszybot in Lublin). The Hitlerite occupation put an end to this—at this time the Polish Jews were exterminated, except for 300,000 hidden by the Polish people, although they were threatened with the death penalty for helping them.

In present-day Poland there is no room for religious tolerance, but nevertheless the Catholic Church and the Polish people successfully oppose the religious persecution by the Communist regime.

POLISH MILLENNIUM—CONCLUSION

SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION

Poland's contribution to the scientific achievement of the world is considerable. Here may be mentioned the Jagiellonian University founded in 1364, which celebrated its 600-year anniversary a short time ago, the first ministry of education in Europe founded on the basis of the Constitution of 1791, or scholars such as Mikolaj Kopernik (1473-1543), Ignacy Lukasiewicz (1822-82), the inventor of the kerosene lamp, a process of distilling oil and the founder of the world's first oil mine near Krosno, Ludwik Zamenhoff, the inventor of the language of esperanto (1887) and Maria Curie-Sklodowska (1867-1934) Nobel Laureate for the discovery of radium.

In the field of literature the following writers gained recognition: Wladyslaw Reymont (1867-1925), who received the Nobel

Prize mostly for his novel "The Peasants"; Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916), who also received this prize mostly for his epic "Quo Vadis," and Jozef Conrad-Korzeniowski, a Pole writing in English, an author of world fame.

In music Fryderyk Chopin (1810-49) is one of the world's best renowned composers; besides him there are Stanislaw Moniuszko (1819-72), Ignacy Paderewski (1860-1941), and Karol Szymanowski (1882-1937). In the theater and cinema Helena Modrzejewska-Modjeska (1840-1909), Pola Negri, born 1897, gained world fame.

POLES IN UNITED STATES

At the time of the Polish partitions, Polish life also began to develop outside of Poland, particularly in the United States, where thousands of people emigrated. Poles took part in the American Revolution.

The first five Poles arrived in America on the English ship *Mary and Margaret* landing in Jamestown on October 1, 1608.

General Tadeusz Kosciuszko came to America in August 1776, and General Kazimierz Pulaski in 1777, and both of them took part in the Revolutionary War under the leadership of George Washington.

At the end of the war Kosciuszko was called "the father of American artillery," and Pulaski, who fell in the battle of Savannah, was called "the father of American cavalry." The American people honor them to this day. Statues of Kosciuszko may be found in the square before the White House, in West Point, and Pulaski's on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, and in many other places. Many towns, bridges and highways in the United States bear the names of these American heroes.

During the Civil War 168 officers and about 4,000 men of Polish extraction served in the Union Army, among them Generals Wlodzimirz Krzyzanowski, Jozef Karge and Albin Schoepf, and in the Confederate Army there were 17 officers and about 1,000 men of Polish extraction, among them General Kasper Tochman.

Approximately 900,000 Polish-Americans served in the American Army in World War II.

In 1860 the Polonia in the United States numbered 30,000; at present it numbers more than 10,000,000 Americans of Polish descent, and the capital of Polish-American organizations comes to approximately \$500,000,000.

There are more than 50,000 members of the Polish-American intelligentsia (professors, attorneys, judges, doctors, engineers, journalists, etc.). In the present U.S. Congress there is 1 Senator of Polish extraction, Edmund Muskie, and 11 Congressmen.

From the perspective of the thousand-year existence of Poland as a Western Christian country, 81,500,000 Poles at home and 10,000,000 Poles abroad living all over the world can view proudly Poland's role in the history of the world and its part in the progress and achievement of mankind. The indomitable spirit of Polish history is a guarantee that this country, halted in its progress through the Communist regime, imposed on it by force by Russia, in time will throw off its shackles and will regain its freedom and independence.

To Build Up

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT N. C. NIX

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. NIX. Mr. Speaker, the Communists have let loose an idea in southeast

Asia which cannot be stopped by bullets—but only by another idea, more appealing and more meaningful to the hearts and minds of the people.

Because of this, it was wise of this administration to realize that the Vietnam war is a war on two fronts, and both must be waged at the same time.

The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin of February 8 had a thoughtful editorial along these lines the other day, and it pointed out that:

The task has always been understood. The difficulty was and remains a related problem, how to protect the civilian aids in areas still open to Vietcong attack.

Yet, the editorial continued—

Protection and progress must go hand in hand. That will require a massive effort, in which the Saigon government seems disposed to try to play a more effective role, with greater resources, than it was ever able to play before.

The need for, and the problems of reconstruction and a general building up of homes and schools and crops in this land of agony is one which concerns us all, and because of this, the editorial—so enlightening on the subject—is offered for the RECORD.

RECONSTRUCTION IN VIETNAM

As Premier Ky has expressed it, the central problem for the Vietnamese Government is "not only to root out the Vietcong from the rural areas, but also to root ourselves in."

This means, as it has for the past 10 years, the training of thousands of young Vietnamese to go out in teams to isolated villages after the army, with American assistance, has cleared the area. Their purpose will be to replace the sinister and shadowy domination of the Vietcong with something visibly better in the way of health and sanitation, school construction, police, crop management, land reform, and local self-government.

The task has always been understood. The difficulty was and remains a related problem, how to protect the civilian aids in areas still open to Vietcong attack. Over the years, the Communists have relied on a cold-blooded campaign of assassination, which has bled South Vietnam of thousands of trained young workers. Combined with sabotage, it has effectively terrorized the villagers.

Not until they know that participation in Government reconstruction will not bring savage reprisals from the Vietcong will the farmers of South Vietnam and their families be able to join wholeheartedly in rebuilding their community life in peace. Protection and progress must go hand in hand. That will require a massive effort, in which the Saigon Government seems disposed to try to play a more effective role, with greater resources, than it was ever able to play before.

School Lunch Program

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. E. Y. BERRY

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, in this problem of poverty that the President would have the people of America believe he is desperately fighting, the one group of people that need help the most are the youngsters of America, and yet in his budget message the first group of people

whom he proposes to cut are the youngsters who are getting a warm school lunch at noon and who are getting a glass of milk.

Of all the worthwhile, established programs, Mr. Speaker, the school lunch program is the best, and does the most good and, of course, this is a ripe plum to be picked by the welfare state in order that they may substitute some fancy newfangled political program, not with a view of aiding the poor, but with a view of aiding some poor politician who may get himself a real nice salary out of it.

I have a letter from a superintendent of schools in my State who has described this cut in the school lunch program much more eloquently than I.

The letter with the name and the school district stricken is as follows:

On behalf of our school patrons and board of education I am writing to ask that you use all of your influence to obtain reinstatement of the funds which have been taken from the school lunch program.

This program has long since proven itself to be highly worthwhile and valuable to schools in South Dakota. We have kept the costs to a remarkably low level of 25 cents per pupil in order to keep it within the reach of nearly all families. For those who cannot afford even this low charge we gladly furnish lunches entirely free while still others are given some sort of minor work detail whereby they can earn their lunches. Surely no one can question the value of a hot lunch which supplies all the nutritional needs, to every child.

We cannot possibly maintain this program without an increased charge or through general fund subsidy which would increase the school tax that is already at or near the legal limit in most of our schools. If we increase the per pupil cost we will shut out some who cannot afford it and are too proud (thank God we still have some such) to take a "dole" or "handout."

It was a nip-and-tuck battle to make ends meet at the 5 cents per meal and 4 cents per one-half pint of milk reimbursement plus the commodities which we once received. With a cutback in the latter, from 5 to 4 cents per meal and a 10-percent reduction in the milk program we cannot continue the program without one or the other of the above-mentioned policies.

Why have these cuts been made in the face of the liberal appropriation under 89-10 for title I and others? How can one justify cutting back programs which are tried, tested, and proven valuable on the one hand and then turn around and offer the money for something new which must still be tested?

I take the liberty of enclosing a bit of my own thinking on the whole Federal aid concept. Frankly, I am sick to death of the "giveaway" program and scared to death of the controls which most assuredly will follow in due time. I don't care to hand my children and grandchildren an inheritance of Federal controls and socialism which seems to be the direction in which we are heading all too fast.

The 37th Anniversary of League of United Latin American Citizens

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BARRATT O'HARA

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, with a warm appreciation of the good

works of the League of United Latin American Citizens, popularly known as LULAC, I join in the laudatory comments of my colleague from Texas [Mr. WHITE], in this Chamber on Thursday last, the 37th anniversary of the founding of the organization, that as Congressman WHITE says has become one of the outstanding groups of our Nation for the fostering of good citizenship.

It has been my privilege and pleasure to participate with the members of the league in the patriotic observances that annually are a vibrant feature of the Fourth of July holiday in the district that I am honored to represent in this body. American citizens of Latin blood are a numerous and proud part of our community, and they hold a high and dignified place of eminence in all the activities of our people. The brilliant record of one of the leaders of LULAC, the Honorable David Cerda, as a judge in the courts of Cook County, has been a source of great satisfaction.

National Security and the Merchant Marine

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JACK EDWARDS

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, an effective statement of what the U.S. merchant marine means to our national security was delivered recently by Capt. J. W. Clark, president of the Delta Steamship Lines, and chairman of the Committee of American Steamship Lines.

Speaking on February 8, to the Mississippi Valley Association here in Washington, Captain Clark highlighted in excellent fashion the need for action to bring our merchant shipping capability to the level required by the national security.

His remarks serve to reinforce statements made by several members of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the House recently, including mine of February 16.

I am inserting Captain Clark's statement in the Appendix of the Record:

THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE: KEY TO NATIONAL SECURITY

(An address by Capt. J. W. Clark, president, Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. (New Orleans), (chairman, Committee of American Steamship Lines), Mississippi Valley Association's 47th annual meeting, Washington, D.C., February 8, 1966)

American-flag shipping is a key to our national security, and our national security involves not only the defense aspect, but also the commercial aspect—the ability of our manufacturers to effectively compete in international commerce with foreign products.

American-flag shipping is today, however, only a "skeleton" key to national security (although we can still open many foreign trade doors), and I say this because our maritime authorities have permitted this important key to national security to be reduced from its former proud position of first

merchant fleet in the world to the status today of a poor sixth—we rank far behind Great Britain, Norway, Japan, Russia, and Liberia.

Most of you, no doubt, are aware of the controversy currently boiling around proposals to revise our national maritime policies and to restructure the so-called subsidy programs. On October 7, 1965, there was issued a report entitled the "Interagency Maritime Task Force Report." This is frequently referred to as the "Boyd report," after my fellow panelist, Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, Alan S. Boyd. The interagency report was followed promptly by a report prepared by the President's Maritime Advisory Committee. The interagency report was prepared by Government personnel; the principal architects were the Maritime Administrator and his planning staff.

Maritime Administrator Nicholas Johnson is a brilliant young law professor, with considerable charm, who has the oratorical delivery to sway almost any lay audience to his point of view—and in this case his selected mission has been to "sell" the interagency report.

The MAC report was prepared by professionals, drawing heavily on the maritime industry for advice, including shipowners, maritime labor, and shipbuilders.

Secretary of Commerce Connor publicly stated on January 25, that "if the Government had been fulfilling its obligations toward building up the merchant marine over the years, the balance-of-payments problem would be resolved because there would be adequate American-flag tonnage to haul American commerce." Secretary Connor serves as chairman of the President's Maritime Advisory Committee, and has been a consistent supporter of American-flag shipping.

Under Secretary Boyd, on the other hand, in a recent article in the U.S. News & World Report, stated that only intuition causes him to feel that we need an American merchant marine. He further stated that ships built today in foreign shipyards cannot be registered under the American flag. This is not so; they can be "imported"—and without duty. There are practical problems which discourage such practices. Under Secretary Boyd has also made the statement that the only valid reason for financial assistance to American-flag ships is for reasons related to national defense.

In all fairness to Mr. Boyd, I must say that we suspect that the interagency report was probably completed before he assumed his present position of responsibility. In assembling the information presented in the controversial interagency report, the MARAD planning group conferred with Government experts in various departments and agencies. Professional shipping men view these largely theoretical recommendations of these experts as impracticable, and we draw the conclusion that this is primarily due to lack of experience and practical knowledge.

Thinking of these "experts," I am reminded of the story about the fellow who was appearing on the television show, "\$64,000 Question."

After going through all of the preliminary questions and reaching the final \$64,000 question, the gentleman was advised that he could have the services of an expert to assist him with the final question. As the question involved was one with three parts, dealing with the subject of love, our friend thought long and hard and finally decided that he would obtain the services of a Frenchman well known for his romantic expertise. Came the big night and our contestant faced the master of ceremonies. The first part of the question was given to him as, "if you were walking in a forest and came up a clearing, and you saw a beautiful chalet in a most romantic setting, and a lovely, blossomy young lady appeared in the doorway, completely in the nude, what would you do?" Our friend, without any hesitation whatsoever, promptly responded,

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been given no explanation whatsoever for the projected doubling of the rate differentials applying to cargo preference cargoes.

Recent analyses and reports on merchant marine policy have unanimously agreed that the current tramp ship program is ineffective and that, with provision for cost differential subsidy payments, a modern and competitive bulk fleet can be developed and rate differentials paid to tramps can be phased out.

Further, there are no known plans for an increase in foreign aid tonnage. Just last week, in fact, President Johnson strongly emphasized self-help as a basis for administering our foreign aid programs. Although the United States has emphasized self-help for years in administering aid, no President has stressed it as strongly as President Johnson.

The President indicated a change in foreign aid policy primarily in the direction of making it harder for aid beneficiaries to qualify. When you add to this reports that our surplus grain stores have been greatly reduced in the last few years, it is clear that foreign aid cargoes may decrease rather than increase. If you take the projected savings away from the interagency report calculations, then there is little merit to any claim for economy on the part of the interagency task group report, as compared to the MAC report. Add to this the fact that American-flag shipping wage support subsidy per ship should be drastically reduced through automation in the next 10 years, and the relative cost projections, and results, are highly debatable.

NATIONAL SECURITY DEFENSE ASPECTS

As to the importance of merchant shipping to our national security, several eminent naval officers in recent months have spoken out in favor of the tremendous contributions of the American merchant marine to the defense effort in Vietnam, and to the outstanding qualities of our modern vessels which participated in the "steel pike" landing exercises off the Spanish coast.

Let us, for a moment, reflect on World War II and the fleet of American-flag merchant ships which supplied the logistical support for our major campaigns in Europe and in the Pacific areas.

American-flag ships played a major role in the Korean conflict and, as usual, the merchant marine is heavily involved in the Vietnam conflict. It is disturbing to note the lack of cooperation received from our NATO allies in the Vietnam war and, just as in the case of Cuba many of our fair-weather friends are serving Communist masters contrary to U.S. interests. On checking through recent issues of Lloyd's "Shipping Index Voyage Supplement," I learned that ships flying the flags of Great Britain, Norway, Greece, and other European countries have been calling at Haiphong and at Chinese and Russian ports. A typical example of one of these voyages involves the Norwegian ship *Herborg*, as listed in the January 21, 1966, issue of Lloyd's. This Norwegian ship sailed from Hong Kong on October 12, and remained in Haiphong until October 18, then proceeded to Nakhoda (Russia), then back to Hong Kong on December 22, and thence to Port Said, Egypt. It is recalled that in the Cuban crisis our NATO allies flagrantly violated our embargo, and some still do. At one time, the Norwegian Prime Minister publicly stated that Cuba was an "American affair."

It was the U.S. merchant marine which was promptly called into service to supply vessels for the Vietnam emergency, just as we have been the first to go to war during so many previous emergencies, and it is a pathetic circumstance that foreign crews have refused to carry U.S. military cargoes to Vietnam. This bears out the good advice of high-ranking naval spokesmen who have repeatedly warned that the interest of foreign-flag shipping during periods of emergency might not

coincide with the national interests of the United States.

Secretary McNamara has recently reiterated the Department of Defense's 1962 position that "the reserve fleet plus the vessels in service plus the construction program that has previously been outlined (1962) as a tentative program appear adequate." On January 28, Secretary McNamara was quoted as saying that "the national defense reserve fleet is adequately serving the purpose for which it was planned and, in conjunction with our active merchant fleet, it is doing a fine job." Further, he is quoted as saying "the responsible reaction of the merchant fleet together with reserve fleet reactivations in the current Southeast Asia emergency confirms the adequacy of our seafleet."

While we appreciate the kind remarks of Secretary McNamara as to the effectiveness of American-flag shipping cooperation in the southeast Asia area, I am sure that the Department of Defense must now be well aware of the poor condition of our reserve fleet. A great many of the ships which have been broken out of the reserve fleets, mostly World War II Victory type vessels, have incurred excessive reactivation costs averaging \$400,000 each, and the frequent breakdowns experienced, indicate that these over-age vessels cannot be considered reliable.

The Department of Defense has hailed the development of the giant cargo aircraft, the C5-A—scheduled to be placed in operation sometime in the early 1970's—as a great advance in logistical support. This aircraft is being developed at a cost of approximately \$2 billion—paid for by the Department of Defense—and predictions have been made that this 360-ton flying "Holland Tunnel" will promote a tremendous increase in future air-cargo services. Strangely enough, the principal commercial airlines of the United States who are usually the beneficiaries of heavy subsidization in plane design and development through Defense Department contracts, are reported to be lukewarm on the project. The C5-A could be another "Great Republic"—the oversized and ill-fated clipper ship of a century ago. According to a November article in *Fortune* magazine, the C5-A "will liberate the Army from dependence on sea transportation except for low cost bulk items such as fuel." There are certain practicable considerations which immediately come to my mind. In the first place, these planes are expected to land on relatively short runways in remote areas under adverse circumstances, and such runways are subject to damage or destruction by enemy action. These planes would also make a nice fat target for enemy aircraft and missiles. By comparison, seaborne transports provide highly flexible logistical support—with naval support—ships can be moved from one port to another and are not necessarily dependent on fixed facilities for delivery of war material. As troop carriers, giant planes such as the C5-A could carry 600 to 700 fully equipped troops, but malfunction or enemy attack on this relatively slow aircraft would be a great risk. As a skipper of cargo and troop ships during the last war, I participated in landing operations, I saw ships go down—including one of my own. Sea rescue operations, however tragic and dangerous, afford a much greater probability of recovery than do aircraft disasters.

At the present time, seafleet is supplying 98 percent of all logistical support to the Vietnam theater and a high percentage of personnel. The First Cavalry Division, of which you hear so much about these days carrying on operations in Vietnam, was transported to Vietnam entirely by ship along with all of its equipment, including 400 helicopters.

The U.S. shipping industry is affording full cooperation to our military people in the Vietnam conflict. Our seamen have offered to assist in unloading operations, and labor

leaders have visited the area and suggested ways and means of overcoming labor bottlenecks in the ports. Our Committee of American Steamship Lines has offered to supply fully qualified professionals, at our own expense, to assist in overcoming port and harbor problems related to ship and cargo operations.

The role of American shipping as a key to our national security, both as to the commercial and defense aspects, will greatly depend upon the administration's program and the consideration which will be given by the second session of the 89th Congress. As professionals, we sincerely believe that American-flag shipping can play an increasingly important part in the Nation's best interest.

The Committee of American Steamship Lines supports the President's Maritime Advisory Committee report. We trust that administration and congressional leaders will give us an opportunity to participate in constructive maritime policy planning.

Editorial by William Mathews

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JOHN J. RHODES

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, William R. Mathews, editor and publisher of the Arizona Daily Star, of Tucson, has traveled widely in the Far East. He has studied its people, its governments, and has well-formed ideas concerning the appropriateness of our actions in that part of the world.

In the Arizona Daily Star, of January 30, 1966, Mr. Mathews published an editorial which is so well considered that I am sure it should be read by every Member of the House and Senate.

The editorial follows:

MAKE THE BEST OF A TRAGIC MESS

(By William R. Mathews)

Rather than shed more tears about the President and Vietnam, the time has come when our Nation should unite to make the best of what unmistakably is a tragic mess.

The President's peace campaign, unrealistic as it has proven to be in bettering things in Vietnam, has produced the positive results of improving the image of the President throughout the world, as well as at home. It has damaged seriously the image of the Peiping Communists and North Vietnam by making themselves appear to be rigidly unreasonable. Johnson has neutralized those who posed as negotiators, conferencemakers, peacemakers, and so on by seriously trying to do what they pleaded he do.

The uncompromising attitude of North Vietnam leaves no other alternative than to wage war in traditional American manner. That it amounts to sheer stupidity on the part of North Vietnam, becomes more apparent.

If, for instance, North Vietnam had responded to the President's pleas, it could have caught him out on a limb. He promised over and over again unconditional surrender. Yet when he was pinned down by his fellow countrymen and others, he insisted on imposing the original conditions of American policy. This seems to have gone over the heads of most of the people of the United States and other countries, too.

If the Vietnamese had stolen the ball from him by offering to negotiate unconditionally,

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"I would say 'hello.'" The master of ceremonies said, "You're absolutely right." The second part of the question was, "and then what would you do?" Our lad, again without hesitation, answered, "I would introduce myself." "Absolutely right," said the questioner.

Then he went on to say that in view of the critical importance of the final part of the question, the contestant should think long and hard, and should seriously consider seeking the advice of his "expert" before answering. The last part of the question for \$64,000 was—"and then what would you do?" So, our contestant, realizing the situation, conferred with his noted adviser.

The Frenchman, with face somewhat red, advised: "You had better answer for yourself, I was wrong on the first two questions."

I would like to make it clear that I certainly mean no disrespect to Under Secretary of Commerce Boyd, or to his expert advisers, but at the same time I cannot agree that they have been right about even the first two questions concerning the maritime industry.

American-flag shipping contributes almost \$1 billion yearly to our balance of payments. Our Cast Lines alone contribute in excess of \$500 million a year in favorable payments.

In addition to this, as I have already pointed out, our Cast members are engaged in extensive trade promotional activities, spending \$17 million a year of their own resources to increase the foreign trade of the United States.

By comparison we regret to say that the Maritime Administration, which is charged specifically by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to promote the foreign commerce of the United States and the American Merchant Marine, has publicly displayed little interest in this mandate of Congress. To the contrary, the public statements of the Maritime Administrator, however well intentioned, have resulted in considerable confusion not only among industry members, but also among international traders and the public.

It has been alleged that American-flag shipping is excessively subsidized, and that American-flag operators display little initiative in advancing technological development.

All of this simply is not true, and I only wish that I could take enough of your time to refute each and every criticism of American-flag shipping.

But, briefly, let me answer loud and clear a few of these inferences.

First, American-flag shipowners do not receive one penny of subsidy. Costs ashore, such as overhead (including my salary), cargo-handling expenses, and the vast multitude of expenditures incurred in operating steamship lines, and representing 75 percent of all of our costs, are for the sole account of American shipowners.

Steamship operators merely channel Government wage differential subsidy payments to American seamen to offset lower wages paid on foreign ships. American plants abroad can use low-cost local labor—we cannot—our "plants" must compete in the world market while employing high-standard-of-living American personnel.

The same applies to the construction differential subsidy, which is paid directly to U.S. shipyards to make them competitive with foreign shipyards, and to assure their availability for construction of ships in times of national emergency.

We have no guarantee of profit whatsoever, and we must actively compete with foreign-flag competitors for every dollar of revenue that we receive. Our profits are modest and generally average less than 5 percent.

Our contributions to the national economy, especially when you consider the usual economic multiplier of three, are overwhelmingly on the plus side in comparison to the Government wage differential subsidy paid to American labor. We are required by statute and regulations to build and repair our ships and to purchase all of our supplies and

equipment in the United States. These expenditures, along with the salaries paid to our American citizen employees, constitute a major contribution to the Nation's economy and security.

Conversely, when foreign-flag shipping is used, 73 cents of every freight revenue dollar is taken away from the United States. It might interest you to know that we recently made a study of the purchasing and repair practices of one of our Scandinavian competitors. We found that this line regularly obtains the greater part of its supplies from foreign sources, even foodstuffs. When major repairs and drydocking are required, their ships are sent back to Europe on a voyage charter. Most of their seamen's low wages are sent back to the old country in the form of family allotments. In other words, these people spend as little dollar exchange in this country as they possibly can, and drain away "invisible" payments (dollar exchange) in the form of freight revenues.

American-flag lines have displayed real initiative in developing and programing technical advances such as multihatch ships, automated machinery, barge ships, containerships, and many other design features which are now being copied by our foreign-flag competitors. This has been accomplished by American-flag steamship lines with negligible Government assistance. We have used our own money in the development of these new design features. What has the Maritime Administration done to help technological development? As I understand it, the Maritime Administration's limited research and development funds have gone principally into the *Seavannah* program, initiated 10 years ago, but a substantial amount has gone into such exotic developments as the hydrofoil and air-cushion vessel projects, which primarily involve small craft and are related to national defense or short-range passenger transportation. I personally know of no single major project involving large ocean-going vessels to which the present Maritime Administration has made any significant contribution.

CARGO PREFERENCE

For years our foreign-flag competitors have clamored long and loud in protest against our cargo preference laws which require that 50 percent of all Government aid or Government financed cargoes be transported by American-flag vessels. The interagency report recommends elimination of these cargo preference statutes, and it does so with a very naive approach. I was amazed to learn that few of our high Government officials realize that there are two considerations affecting cargo preference—(1) routing preference and (2) rate preference. The interagency report recommendation that cargo preference be eliminated is confusing and is based on the false philosophy that elimination of cargo preference and payment of "incentive" subsidy would enable a few bulk carrier fleet to successfully compete with foreign-flag competition. This is absurd. There is no objection to the phasing out of "rate" differentials as new bulk carriers are placed in operation, but it is absolutely imperative that preferential "routing" be retained or there will be little opportunity for the transportation of any bulk U.S. aid cargoes. It is a well-known fact that foreign governments will divert aid cargoes to their own vessels for "political" reasons. Further, the trade missions and foreign freight brokers appointed by foreign Governments to handle these shipments are highly susceptible to nationalistic control. With bulk imports largely controlled by industrial giants who favor their own "flags of convenience" fleets, and the complete lack of any assurances that American-flag bulk carriers would participate in U.S. aid cargoes, it can hardly be expected that any responsible owner will venture the necessary risk capital.

The proposed elimination of cargo pref-

erence, including PR 17, would leave us to the tender mercies of foreign Governments and there would remain no effective instrument for leverage in assuring fair and equitable treatment for U.S.-flag vessels. There is ample evidence that the elimination of many discriminations against U.S.-flag vessels has only been accomplished through cargo preference leverage. To the contrary, the routing aspects of cargo preference legislation should be made more effective.

If U.S.-flag vessels do not carry such cargoes then obviously they will be carried by foreign-flag vessels to the detriment of the U.S. economy through adverse balance of payments and national income.

Our cargo preference laws and maritime policies have been adequately defended in the past by the U.S. Government. The defense of our present statutes is a matter of international record.

There is a further misconception that cargo preferences result in higher freight rates. This is basically incorrect with regard to all cargoes which move in the liner trades. Freight conference rules and rates apply equally to American- and foreign-flag vessels, and freight conferences are strictly controlled by the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission.

As to the proposed Russian grain deal, there is no assurance that Russia or any of the Communist satellite countries would regularly purchase large quantities of U.S. wheat when and if the Government restriction imposed for the use of American-flag vessels is eliminated. It is my opinion that Russia has seized upon the 50 percent ship American policy as a propaganda tool to stir up further trouble with our NATO allies. It should be recalled that several of these European countries, notably Germany, have recently protested against the aggressive use of Russian-controlled vessels to break prevailing freight rate structures.

Russia is building up a large merchant marine and, by her own admission, intends to utilize her shipping as an instrument of foreign policy without regard to cost. If the Russian objective is achieved in building up a huge merchant marine and utilizing same to force down international freight rates, the maritime nations of the world would soon find their respective fleets without cargoes and facing virtual bankruptcy. Therefore, only through an effective and active U.S. merchant marine, operating with minimum Government restraint, yet with adequate Government protection in the direction of cargo routing, and with Government backing to eliminate foreign government discriminations, can we avoid putting ourselves completely at the mercy of Communist-dominated shipping.

In view of the affinity of our NATO allies to serve the Communist trades in Cuba, the Middle East, Communist China, North Vietnam and Russia itself, it follows that in consideration of charters and the concession of participation of Communist trades, foreign-flag shipping could be influenced to assist the Communist program to dominate American foreign trade.

DOLLARS AND CENTS ECONOMY

As to commercial justification for the American merchant marine, the administration will undoubtedly be greatly influenced by the dollars-and-cents costs of American-flag shipping operations. While we disagree with many of the interagency projections, I would like to spotlight one glaring question mark on the part of the people who prepared the interagency report.

The projected high savings frequently referred to by interagency report advocates is highly questionable. This is largely based on a projected increase in Government aid cargoes and a doubling of the rate differentials, amounting to a projected savings through 1985 of almost \$2 billion (\$100 million a year). In the first place, we have

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they would have driven him into a corner. But such an attitude on the Communists' part seemed to defy the centuries-old tradition of the Chinese and most orientals, to take their time and make haste slowly.

Time would have been on their side, if they had restrained the Vietcong and themselves to the point that would have made American military forces no longer necessary. Within a few years the odds would be greatly on their side. In a few years they could win by subversion, which would have allowed them to make communism appear to be a peaceful political philosophy.

That they abandoned their basic political philosophy of confidence in time, apparently has been caused by the corrupting of Marxism of the West, which calls for glorifying violence and actual war.

The world, not just America, should take note of this change. It confirms how uncompromising and unreasonable Communists are. It confirms how undependable their word is. Their violation of their own proposed cease-fire amounted only to a trap to bring in more supplies and regroup their forces. That Lenin himself made a peace in 1918 with Germany, in order to give time to consolidate the Russian revolution, these oriental Communists seem to forget.

As to the role of China, it appears more and more as a great big bluff. It is worth noting how she withdrew from her invasion of India, when India showed her will to fight. We have to do the same thing. If President Johnson limits the bombing of targets in North Vietnam, we are confessing our fear of China. If the President extends bombing to strategic targets like electric generating plants, oil storage tanks, and various industrial complexes, we are definitely calling the Chinese bluff. We will be shortening the war, not prolonging it. Of course, tactical bombing against railroads, bridges, and other military targets must continue with an increased tempo.

China does have vast manpower, but she can supply North Vietnam, and the Vietcong, with only a part of the weapons they use. The latter have to depend upon supplies from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. At the present time, China has only a few atomic bombs. If she dares make use of them, we must retaliate until we break her power to make nuclear and other weapons.

It is hard to believe that China would run the risk of being completely destroyed now, when she knows that by keeping at peace she will grow stronger daily and yearly. She will keep on bluffing as long as we evade calling her bluff by strategic bombing in North Vietnam.

Georgia Land Is MineEXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**HON. CHARLES L. WELTNER**

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, my constituent, Elise Boylston, is a charming lady now in her 80th year. She was art director of the Atlanta public schools before her retirement and has written several textbooks. She is still an active member of the Atlanta Pen Women.

Among the many lasting contributions she has made are her lyrics to the song, "Georgia Land Is Mine." Mrs. Lynda Moore wrote the music for this song.

I insert this in the RECORD in the hopes that many more will enjoy it as I have.

GEORGIA LAND IS MINE
(Lyrics by Elise Boylston, music by Mrs.
Lynda Moore)

If I were a poet with a magic loom,
I'd weave a banner of gold;
And I'd tuck a wish and a loving thought
In the midst of each shining fold;
I'd snare me a sunbeam and fasten it tight
In the threads of the silken band;
And I'd weave a legend for all to read—
Georgia, by cherished land!

CHORUS

I'm weaving a song of Georgia land—
The land that I adore;
Her smiles and tears throughout the years
Make rainbows evermore.
My shuttle hums a merry tune
As heart and loom combine
To weave a prayer of thankfulness
That Georgia land is mine.

I'd catch the spark of a baby's smile;
The joy of a love divine;
The rippling sound of a singing brook;
The scent of a jasmine vine.
I'd match the carmine of the soil
With the blue of a distant hill;
I'd capture a wild bird's melody,
And the sing of the whippoorwill.

Ho Chi KennedyEXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, one of the latest developments in the mass confusion over our foreign policy is the dangerous advice being given by the radical left Members of the U.S. Senate.

The Chicago Tribune commented editorially on this situation in this morning's issue, and I am inserting their editorial in the RECORD:

HO CHI KENNEDY

Senator BOBBY KENNEDY has reached a level of irresponsibility without parallel even for him in suggesting that the way out of the war in Vietnam is for the United States to accept a coalition government in South Vietnam which would admit the Communist Vietcong as a ruling element.

Mr. KENNEDY could only advance an idea of this sort if he was entirely ignorant of history and experience. We conclude that he is utterly deficient in both.

The record of coalitions with communism demonstrates that any coalescence of this sort leads inevitably to a surrender to communism. Czechoslovakia, after World War II, tried the experiment. It led to a complete Communist takeover.

Gen. George C. Marshall was dispatched to China after the end of the same war with instructions written by State Department appeasers to force the Nationalist China of Chiang Kai-shek into a coalition with the Communists who had been fighting his government for 20 years. When Chiang refused this suicidal deal, the United States cut off all supplies to his forces for a year and a half. Meanwhile, the Communists, armed with weapons taken from the Japanese army which had surrendered to the Russian Communist forces in Manchuria, were gathering

the strength to conquer the country, as they did.

Most recently the coalition formula was invoked in Laos, which, like Vietnam, is a splinter state out of the former French possession of Indochina. In that country an uneasy combination was attempted among disparate elements of the pro-Western and anti-Communist monarchy, a neutralist element of the military, and the Communist Pathet Lao. The Communists have taken over great areas of the country and intend to take it all. The idea that such antagonistic forces will or can cooperate is a myth—the myth promulgated by the Kremlin that "peaceful coexistence" is a means of reconciling sheep and wolves.

Mr. KENNEDY might be dismissed as the demagogue that he is if he were ignorant of this history, but he may not be excused for his ignorance of the origins of the war in South Vietnam. If he had read the statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk last Friday, he would know that the Communist Vietcong, and its political sponsor, the so-called National Liberation Front, are not indigenous elements of a civil war in South Vietnam, but are the deliberately contrived "fronts" of the Communist government of North Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh.

The third conference of the North Vietnamese Communist party in Hanoi decreed, in 1961, that South Vietnam was to be abolished as an independent state and rendered subject to the Communists. For this purpose, a dummy political arm, designated as the National Liberation Front, was established as a pretender to authority in opposition to the noncommunist regime in Saigon. The Vietcong became the military extension of this invented political cat's-paw of Hanoi. It has no more standing as an authentic element in the political or social organization of South Vietnam than the Hebrides Islands in relation to the United States.

Senator KENNEDY, out of his ignorance and political ambition, has compromised his loyalty to the United States when it is at war by subscribing to Communist myths and adopting them as his own, in opposition to a national policy, which is supported by an overwhelming majority of American citizens. He is not the junior Senator from New York. He is the senior senator from Communist North Vietnam—Ho Chi Minh's Trojan horse in the U.S. Senate.

Dickson County Doctors Are PatriotsEXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**HON. WILLIAM R. ANDERSON**

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, the Vietnam conflict has inspired many acts of patriotism by civilian groups. One of the finest and most selfless acts that has been brought to my attention is described in the following article from the Dickson County Herald, "Medical Association To Offer Free Medical Care to Outpatients of Vietnam Soldiers."

By offering free out patient medical care to the wives and children of soldiers now fighting in Vietnam, the members of the Dickson County Medical Society have set an example that all Americans could do well to ponder and follow.

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MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TO OFFER FREE MEDICAL CARE TO OUTPATIENTS OF VIETNAM SOLDIERS

The Dickson County Medical Association, in an unprecedented move, has agreed to extend outpatient medical care to the wife and children of servicemen engaged in this country's struggle in Vietnam, it was announced today by D. W. A. Crosby and Dr. J. T. Jackson, who drafted a resolution to this effect at the request of the association.

The Dickson County Medical Association is composed of all practicing physicians of the county.

The resolution reads as follows:

"Be it resolved by the members of the Dickson County Medical Association, That we are in complete sympathy with the foreign policy of the Government of the United States of America in its effort to promote lasting peace throughout the world, and we are proud of our fellow Tennesseans who are now serving and who will serve our country in Vietnam in trying to bring to an early end the fighting which has already cost the lives of many of the fine brave youth of this great State; be it further

"Resolved, That we here at home realize the hardships and the inconveniences that our servicemen are going through in being separated from their loved ones while on active duty in Vietnam; be it further

"Resolved, That we want to express our appreciation for the great effort and sacrifice being made by our fellow Tennesseans by offering our services in the following manner: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, If any man who has ever been a patient of any of the members of the Dickson County Medical Association is called to serve his country in the struggle in Vietnam, then we willingly agree to extend outpatient medical care to his wife and children free of charge so long as he remains on active duty in that theater of operations; be it further

"Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the proper authorities of the Tennessee State Medical Association, the American Medical Association, and to the War Department of the United States of America.

"Signed:

"MEMBERS OF DICKSON
COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY."

Robert Shaw in Atlanta**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. CHARLES L. WELTNER

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, in 1965 Atlanta entered into major league sports with the franchise of the Atlanta Braves, and most recently with the newly formed National League football team, the Atlanta Falcons.

Last week, Atlanta, always a cultural center, scored another "big league" feat, with the Atlanta Arts Alliance announcement that the distinguished Robert Shaw has been named music director of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra.

Mr. Shaw will resign his post as associate conductor of the Cleveland Orchestra and will assume his duties in Atlanta in 1967.

One of the world's most renowned choral directors, his famous Robert Shaw Chorale has made musical history in its tours of 48 States, and its celebrated Russian tour in 1962.

Conductor Henry Sopkin, retiring after 21 years of selfless and able service to his

art and his city, leaves Mr. Shaw a carefully assembled aggregation of 80 excellent musicians—a solid foundation from which to launch further musical triumphs.

The Atlanta Arts Alliance, under the able leadership of Chairman Richard H. Rich, and Vice Chairman Lucien Oliver, Charles L. Tower, symphony president, and Charles R. Yates, chairman of the symphony executive committee, are to be commended for their painstaking search of over 100 applicants from the United States and Europe—the search which culminated in the selection of Mr. Shaw.

The late Arturo Toscanini said of Robert Shaw: "I have at last found the Maestro I have been looking for." As Atlanta Constitution Columnist Bruce Galphin noted, "So has Atlanta."

The Schools of Compton, Calif.**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. DEL CLAWSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. DEL CLAWSON. Mr. Speaker, a singular honor has come to a section of my constituency, the city of Compton, Calif., and I am pleased to share the recognition with my colleagues.

In a way, this honor synthesizes a number of interrelated issues which have had our attention for a long time.

We speak of poverty, of racial tensions, of law violation. There is general agreement that the heart of the matter is education and understanding—and the heart of education, we have been told many times, is "money"—as if "money" alone could buy the skill to inspire children to learn, prevent dropouts, and give to a community a deep and penetrating interest in raising the educational level of its citizens.

The fullest measure of money means little without the zeal to do, the imagination to conceive, the willingness to dare, and genuine dedication to a cause.

In this city of Compton, there are people with all these qualities—and their dedication is to education—although their wealth is modest. These are the people who administer its school system under the able leadership of Mr. Leonard C. Erickson, superintendent of the Compton city schools.

More than 17,000 pupils crowd its classes. We are advised the cost of educating each student is the lowest in all of Los Angeles County—and understandably so—as Compton is a city with a number of poverty areas—and no Federal funds are allocated for building new school structures.

Yet this community voted to increase its property tax, to increase it so that new schools could be built. The entire community voted this sacrifice. An entire multiracial community voting in favor of the future.

This, however, is not unusual.

It was decided to build the first of these schools in the area of the city where

the need was the greatest. This, too, is not unusual.

But rather than merely decide to build a school that would house a specific number of pupils, the goal was more ambitious. It was decided to build a school that would be beautiful, one in which the community would take pride, one that would provide a welcome atmosphere, one that the people would cherish, one that would motivate students to learn, an oasis of knowledge—a center of learning worthy of any city—anywhere.

And all this they hoped to achieve on the slimmest of budgets.

Long, tedious hours went into the search for the answers. It would have been easy to merely press a button or two and have a school much like all other schools—and no one would complain, for they would be getting what they would naturally expect.

But the city of Compton can be proud. This school, designed by the architectural firm of Carmichael-Kemp, AIA, to be built in a section designated by Los Angeles County as a hard-core poverty area, has just received a national award for its excellence in architecture—its beauty, its warmth, its color—and its functional use in education, from the American Association of School Administrators' Architectural Jury of the National Education Association. This architectural jury is composed of three of the Nation's leading architects selected by the American Institute of Architects, and three of the Nation's most eminent educators.

This is no small school. It is 2 stories with more than 30 classrooms, and gentlemen, the cost of building this school will be well within the budget set by the State of California as the average cost for similar size structures. It is fitting, too, that this institution of learning will be named the Clarence A. Dickson Elementary School, honoring a pioneer of the city of Compton, who was not only its first mayor, but who also made his contribution to education as a teacher, vice principal, principal, and a member and president of the Compton City Elementary School Board.

And as if Compton needed further honor, the California State Department of Schoolhouse Planning is considering using this award-winning school for a pilot study relative to the savings effected by its type of structure in heavily populated areas.

This coveted award, naturally, means a great deal to Mr. Erickson, the Board of Education and to the architects, Dan Carmichael and Dick Kemp, but it means immeasurably more to the people of the area. A school worthy of the wealthiest city anywhere is theirs.

Religion in the Soviet Union**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. EDNA F. KELLY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, last year, during the 1st session of the current

ple of the State of Hawaii and the citizens of the city of Bruyères in far-off France. Perhaps some of my colleagues will recall that Bruyères is one of the French towns which were liberated by the men of Hawaii's 442d Infantry Regiment and the 100th Infantry Battalion in World War II. Having been a member of the 100th Infantry Battalion, I am greatly pleased that out of the fierce struggle for Bruyères among the forested foothills of the Vosges Mountains has come about a lasting friendship between two peoples. Many of our brave fighting men were felled in Bruyères, and they too would rejoice that they did not die in vain.

Although the relationship between the people of Hawaii and the citizens of Bruyères had a dramatic beginning, I am sure that "Bruyères" would today be a mere memory of a battle, had it not been for dedicated individuals who have devoted much time and effort in the intervening years to keep this friendship alive. I stand before you today to pay tribute to a man who has done so much to foster this friendship. He is a French citizen and a councilman in the city of Bruyères M. Gerard Deschaseaux.

The unselfish devotion of Councilman Deschaseaux has been movingly recounted in a recent letter I received from Mr. Wilbert S. Holck, deputy clerk of the city and county of Honolulu. As one who also has been instrumental in promoting this friendship and the sister city affiliation between Honolulu and Bruyères, Mr. Holck points out that the Hawaii State Senate and House jointly, the City Council of Honolulu, and the 442d and 100th Infantry Clubs in Hawaii intend to pay tribute to Councilman Deschaseaux.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I am inserting in the RECORD the inspiring story of Mr. Deschaseaux's accomplishments as related by Mr. Holck:

"Councilman Deschaseaux is one of the many who are instrumental in creating the congenial pro-American attitude among the citizens of France, particularly within the Vosges area. His newspaper articles describing our citizens of the mainland United States and Hawaii during a visit in 1963 was most revealing. His articles provided the French citizens with a most intimate understanding of the people of our Nation.

He has established close contact with the U.S. officials in the people-to-people program. Today there are three cities in France participating and cooperating with the United States people-to-people program. These are Marseille, Strasbourg, and Bruyères. Individuals in charge in each of the three cities arrange for our young U.S. students to live in the private homes of their cities for a few days. Mr. Deschaseaux, who is responsible for Bruyères, also takes in two U.S. students each year.

In addition to the above, Mr. Deschaseaux has been unselfish in giving his time, energy, and money in providing for visitors from Hawaii. He personally entertains all Hawaiians and arranges for all 442d and 100th veterans to tour former battle areas and meet old wartime friends. Any Hawaiian visiting Bruyères is immediately made to feel at home by many citizens of that town until Mr. Deschaseaux arrives to take over. Hawaiian servicemen and women and their families in Europe are welcomed by the people there because of Mr. Deschaseaux's untiring efforts to maintain good will and his sincere beliefs

in the Honolulu, Hawaii-Bruyères, France sister city relations.

The people of Bruyères honor the men of the 100th and 442d Infantry killed in the battle to liberate their town on the third Sunday of every October. Since October of 1961 they also celebrate the anniversary of their sister city affiliation with Honolulu, Hawaii. The celebrations really commence on the day before and terminate on the evening of the third Sunday. Mr. Deschaseaux, being the chairman of the Bruyères, France-Honolulu, Hawaii, sister city committee of Bruyères, is also program chairman. He arranges for hotel and private home accommodations for all visitors (primarily from Hawaii) and coordinates the celebration activities.

Since 1961 Mr. Deschaseaux has made arrangements for all students of Bruyères to have a pen pal in Hawaii. This pen pal association continues till this day with high school students from Farrington Castle, and the Catholic schools. His goal is to educate the young people of France and other nations through correspondence so that better understanding and good will can be developed. He long-range plan is to have an exchange of young students such as that undertaken in the U.S. people-to-people program.

Mr. Deschaseaux is of high moral character and a well-respected man in the Vosges area. Although he could be elected in higher political offices, he has refused only because of devotion to his occupation. He is an engineer of natural resources (forestry, water, and game) in the Vosges area.

Mr. Speaker, the world would be a much better place in which to live if we had more men like M. Gerard Deschaseaux. I take great pleasure and deem it an honor to pay tribute to this great Frenchman and world citizen.

L.B.J.'s Big Week Left the World Gasping

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. RICHARD BOLLING

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's untiring efforts to make this a world of stability and peace were hailed by the Kansas City Times, which noted that he "made the 7 days of February 6-12, 1966, a week to remember. The President was positively dazzling in the pace and breadth of his personal performance."

The paper noted that in Honolulu:

The military campaign was played down. The greater emphasis was on the struggle against poverty, disease, and illiteracy in South Vietnam. The Saigon government was represented as pushing social-economic betterment programs with the enthusiastic support of the Johnson administration.

As a summary of efforts to attain peace the "big week" as reviewed by the Times is noteworthy, and I am including it in the RECORD:

L.B.J.'s Big Week Left the World Gasping

Lyndon B. Johnson made the 7 days of February 6-12, 1966, a week to remember. The President was positively dazzling in the pace and breadth of his personal performance.

On very short notice he flew into Honolulu for a whirlwind conference that re-

focused the picture of the U.S. efforts in Vietnam. The military campaign was played down. The greater emphasis was on the struggle against poverty, disease, and illiteracy in South Vietnam. The Saigon government was represented as pushing social-economic betterment programs with the enthusiastic support of the Johnson administration.

The Johnson style demands more than words, however. The President summoned Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY to meet him at the Los Angeles airport for a run-down on the Honolulu conference. Then Mr. HUMPHREY was whisked off across the Pacific to dramatize the administration's peaceful intentions in Vietnam. Orville Freeman, the Secretary of Agriculture, was also dispatched to Vietnam on a food-counseling and inspection trip that had been scheduled earlier but fitted perfectly into the Johnsonian timetable.

Upon returning to Washington, President Johnson scarcely paused before sending Congress a message outlining a 5-year American food-for-freedom program, with the promise of expanded foreign food assistance based on a requirement that hungry areas help themselves.

Late Friday President Johnson called a press conference to discuss, among other matters, the U.S. military operations in Vietnam. He placed his own interpretation on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, which some people thought the President wanted to consign to the shadows by the drama of his newsmaking trip to Hawaii. Mr. Johnson commented that the two chief witnesses, retired Army Gen. James Gavin, and George Kennan, a former diplomat, both said that they did not want "to escalate or get out" and "that's how we feel." But he also said that American troops would be sent to Vietnam as needed by the field commanders.

Still full of spizzierinctum, Mr. Johnson announced that he has picked a new man to be his press secretary, a new Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and a new Comptroller General—all highly important posts.

The average American must have felt worn out from just trying to keep up with President Johnson's performance last week. As for L.B.J. himself, he gave the impression of not even being winded. Nevertheless, even for him, this man of such amazing energy and inventiveness surely made it a memorable 7 days.

The Federal Reserve

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. RICHARD T. HANNA

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, in the other body, Senators question the judgment of military policymakers in an active confrontation with North Vietnam, and they criticized the advice and direction of the State Department in defining and pursuing a national policy in regard to that conflict. They are carrying out a basic responsibility of the Senate in foreign affairs. We in the House have the fundamental power of the purse. It is well that we should carry on a dialog over the judgment of the Federal Reserve and criticize the advice and directives of the Treasury.

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That trip was made in open defiance of a law which prohibits travel to Hanoi without approval by our Government. While other laws were probably violated, there appears to be no doubt about guilt in failure to obtain approval of the journey.

Mr. Speaker, millions of Americans are asking: Why has nothing thus far been done about prosecuting these characters?

The editorial follows:

JUSTICE ON TRIAL

There must be no justice, in the minds of those two GI's who sold their uniforms to some East Germans who wanted to go over the wall. The Army has scheduled a court-martial where the two could draw as much as 2 years and 4 months in jail and dishonorable discharges.

The soldiers broke the law. So did the three East Germans who bought and wore uniforms against Western Allied regulations. But what of some other recent lawbreaking incidents?

Remember those three "factfinders" who dropped in on North Vietnam not long ago? Well, they're back home now. One, a professor, has been all over the newspapers and television with his inside tips on how to get out of Vietnam: Give up and throw ourselves on the mercy of the Communists.

The "factfinders" have Communist and other leftist affiliations that fill several type-written pages. They blatantly defied a State Department ban on travel to North Vietnam and are subject to 5-year prison sentences and fines of up to \$5,000. So far, no prosecution or reprimand.

And what of the Transit Workers Union which violated two State laws with an illegal strike that cost New York City at least a billion dollars? The charges were dropped when the strike was settled, and the lawbreakers, instead of drawing stiff fines, got fat pay raises.

Yet the Army is preparing to punish two young men for helping a small group of Communist captives flee to freedom. Is it justice?

The answer lies in the Western concept of law and order. Under our system, laws are made to be enforced, and agencies are set up to handle enforcement. Police departments fall into this category, and so, in a larger sense, do the Armed Forces.

Law enforcement should begin with those who enforce the law. Thus it is that policemen are suspended and soldiers court-martialed for breaking laws and regulations.

Because enforcers of the law should set an impeccable example of law and order, the Army's course of action is just. Hopefully it will be contagious.

It is a bold, imaginative, pioneering effort that might make central Illinois a national model for peace in the construction industry—a condition that should do a great deal to further stimulate economic development here and make construction work plentiful.

The idea is simple. The details are terribly complex.

Construction is complicated on the one hand by the extremely flexible system of a general contractor and a series of subcontractors, brought together on the basis of the specializations needed on each given job.

On the other hand, construction workers are organized into a variety of specialties, each with its own union and its own jurisdiction.

One of the problems for all concerned has been the fact that often when a dispute over which union jurisdiction is appropriate rears its head the contractor, the unions directly involved, and all the other union worker groups employed on the job are apt to suffer as the job lies idle for all concerned while the dispute is ironed out.

Most of those injured are innocent bystanders—the unions not a part of the dispute who would otherwise be working, the contractor, and the person who is counting on the factory, dwelling, or commercial building he is paying for and has contracted for but which isn't getting built.

Yet, for a union to yield jurisdiction in such a dispute means not only the loss of work involved in the one case but might prejudice all such jobs in the future.

Indeed, in a craft union, if jurisdiction is chipped away the union is out of business and ceases to exist—and its members are without work.

With the variety of unions involved and the variety of contractors and subcontractors involved, a variety of such problems have arisen and the overall problem has become very serious.

So serious that a great deal of sober and responsible effort has gone into the problem of how to fairly decide and consistently resolve such disputes—and establish fixed and known and stable jurisdictions.

These efforts were climaxed in the establishment of a national joint board and an appeals board for the specific settlement of jurisdictional disputes in the building and construction industry.

Further, basic agreements and decisions that have been made are compiled in what the trade calls "the green book" for the guidance of all concerned so as to avoid the same dispute erupting twice.

This structure was hammered out by the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO and the two major contractor associations with the President of the United States as witness.

It is a significant step forward, but far too often this machinery doesn't come into play until a job is underway and the job itself is held up until the procedures for settlement are completed.

What is now proposed, at the initiative of local leaders in the construction unions, is a general meeting of all interested parties, contractors, union representatives, and others—such as bank finance people.

The purpose would be to iron out a further step, providing for procedures whereby the plans and work outline of any job, once contracted, would be made available in advance in a "plan room" or by some other arrangement.

Within 1 week of this availability, the various unions would be required to formally claim which work fell into their jurisdictions. If claims overlapped, creating the conditions for a dispute, a hearing would be scheduled in an attempt to iron it out, and when all the hearing evidence was in regarding past agreements, past decisions in like cases, and if need be, lacking such case histories, reference to past local practice, the

contractor would make his decision as to which of the disputing unions he believes has the best claim of jurisdiction.

The union in contention may then, if it chooses, appeal that decision to the already established and presently functioning national joint board.

In the meantime, the contractor's decision stands and the work must go forward without disruption or a work stoppage. If the national joint board agrees with the contractor, he goes forward as is. If it reverses him, he must shift the work over to the designated union.

In either case, there is a pledge of no work stoppage because of the dispute.

In short, the local leaders propose to take a further step on present procedures designed (1) to detect a jurisdictional dispute or problem in advance, (2) to settle it by orderly and recognized processes, and (3) to get this done before the work commences so it will not interfere with the work, and in any case to outlaw a work stoppage during the procedural steps if the matter does go to appeal at the present national joint board level.

Such a purpose, and such initiative among union leaders in this area, can only be applauded. The complex details of an effective "plan room," of signatories to such an agreement, and of the rights of appeal—all involving in some way both many unions and many contractors may pose problems, and differences of approach.

But it is certainly worth while to attack those details and try to work them out fairly. Success in such a conference would produce a labor landmark of national significance.

It would be a leadership step here in this area that would focus the attention of the entire industry, and a climate that would encourage development in this area to the joint benefit of contractors and construction unions—as well as the community as a whole.

It could also be a classic example of how people engaged in the same basic activity in different ways can make much more progress by finding those areas where pulling together provides a mutual advantage, rather than fostering differences to mutual disadvantage.

And it is significant for the potential future of this area that the initiative, the energy, and the responsible study bringing forth this effort has come from the ranks of labor.

—C. L. DANCEY.

M. Gerard Deschaseaux, Promoter of French-American Friendship

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA
OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, because much has been made of recent differences between our Government and the Government of France, I take particular pleasure today in unfolding to you and to my esteemed colleagues a heartwarming story of friendship between the United States and France. Although this friendship is probably not one that would lead to world-shaking decisions, it should serve as an inspiration for those of us who are continually striving to promote good will among the different peoples of the world. For, after all, are not Governments made up of people?

I refer, Mr. Speaker, to the steadfast friendship that exists between the peo-

Peoria Unions Pledged to Progress

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent, I wish to include the following editorial from the February 9, 1966, issue of the Peoria Journal Star:

AN INTERESTING UNION PROPOSAL

A group of Peoria union chiefs are spearheading a plan which, if the details can be ironed out, looks like one of the most progressive programs to come down the road in a long time.

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scendant's of the stalwart men who fought in the Canadian expedition of 1690.

The names of Starr, Converse, and Rolfe also figure prominently among these early grants which were given by a grateful Massachusetts Bay colony in recognition of the gallantry and great contributions of these families in the building of a new land.

It was in 1650 that young Dr. Thomas Starr gave his life in a struggle with the fearsome Pequot Indians, leaving behind a young wife and eight small children. It is the later descendants of this family who benefited from Dr. Starr's heroism when they were given 400 acres of land in his memory.

A similar grant is named after Maj. James Converse whose heirs benefited from his distinguished service to the colony. The son and two daughters of the Reverend Benjamin Rolfe were given 600 acres after escaping an Indian raid in 1708, in which the parents and another sister lost their lives.

It is from these heroic deeds and sacrifices of the pioneer settlers that Ashburnham got its start, and it is from the spiritual strength, resourcefulness and determination of these early forebears that our Nation got its strength and purpose to become the great country it is today—truly a giant among the nations of the world, the most powerful, richest, and most advanced with the highest standards of living the world has ever known.

Among the great names still echoing from that rugged and glorious period of growth and progress in golden history of Ashburnham is that of Cushing, which is with us today in the living memorial of Cushing Academy, named after the Reverend Thomas Cushing, and one of the great secondary schools of the Nation.

It was my great privilege to participate last year in the 100th anniversary celebration of Cushing Academy, which is today, more than ever, a model of academic excellence.

The Reverend Thomas Cushing was the first minister for the Ashburnham settlement. On the occasion of his half-century sermon, delivered on November 3, 1818, he reflected on past events in the history of the town, describing the perilous days when "soldiers were stationed in these parts to range the wilderness and protect the scattered inhabitants which numbered under 50."

After recounting the births, deaths, illnesses, and marriages which took place during his years of ministry, he concluded with this description of the Revolutionary War, which is particularly noteworthy at this time of homage to the memory of George Washington:

The opposition to the acts of the British Parliament, the war that ensued, * * * cannot be fully conceived of by the present generation. It cost the States immense blood and treasure.

What people have been more highly favoured? God raised up Washington to lead our armies to victory and independence; and when the new Constitution was established, he was, by a unanimous vote of the people, placed twice at the head of the Government, where he shone with as distinguished lustre as at the head of our armies.

What is the man in all history to be set in competition with him?

If Washington could have visited Ashburnham any time last year he would not have been surprised by the looks of some residents of the town because the bicentennial celebration prompted many to wear the wigs and garments of colonial America. Even the parades would have seemed familiar to him, featuring as they did, oxen, horse-drawn carriages and wagons, various fife and drum corps, and bagpipe units. He certainly would have been impressed with the October 10 fireworks display, one of the largest ever presented in the area, and the cannon firing, and the "Gentlemen of the Brush" would not have surprised him.

I think, Mr. Speaker, that on the whole George Washington would have been well pleased with the birthday year of Ashburnham and all the wonderful events which went into making it the great memorable celebration that it was—the Boy and Girl Scout participation, the helicopters and antique automobiles, the lovely and gracious bicentennial queen, the time capsule with its ballpoint pen and modern razor among its contents, the parties and balls.

I think also that George Washington would have been convinced that Ashburnham has not stood still, but has kept pace with the times and the demands of the age in which we live. He would draw inspiration, as we all can, from the great and glorious history of our past, as reflected all over America by the growth and prosperity of hundreds upon hundreds of thriving communities like Ashburnham.

Let us all be thankful, with hearts overflowing with everlasting gratitude, for the blessings of the Creator and the epochal work and achievements of those who have preceded us and whose blessed memory we honor on days of remembrance.

Let me again express the hope and the prayer that the next 200 years will bring to Ashburnham and all its loyal people that greatness in the spirit and the ways of independence, liberty, and peace which will insure prosperity and happiness, not only in the material sense, but in the spiritual graces that have always been so much a part of this splendid American community.

The Supreme Sacrifice

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BURT L. TALCOTT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 9, 1966

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, too often we hear the voices of defeat and despair from those who know little of the trials and tribulations of the battles being waged in Vietnam.

The views and feelings of the soldier in the thick of battle may be interesting and enlightening to those safely at home.

I request unanimous consent to insert a letter which I received recently from Army Sgt. Thomas E. Wilcox. He says several important things in a simple but poignant way.

TTY HOA, VIETNAM,

February 13, 1966.

DEAR SIR: My name is Thomas E. Wilcox. I reside at 1817 Lincoln Avenue in Seaside, Calif.

I have been in this country since the 2d of January, 1966. Thus far I have seen many of my buddies killed and wounded.

This is a dirty, stinking war. I am willing to pay the supreme sacrifice for freedom here in Vietnam to stop Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

I trust you are a backer of the administration's Vietnam policies. This country and its people must not be betrayed and abandoned into Communist hands. In South Vietnam the United States must stand firm.

If you must deal with people who insist that the Vietcong are our brothers and only want peace, you can ask them to come to South Vietnam and take note of the Vietcong's "brotherly, peaceful" politics. I guarantee these Vietnicks would change their tune after taking note of the Vietcong's ritual of murder and violence in South Vietnam.

I hope that peace will come to this land before too long.

Yours with respect,

TOM WILCOX.

Sergeant Wilcox is a patriot, convinced by firsthand experience of the meaning of our national commitment and our grave responsibility in South Vietnam. We all join in his hope for that foreign land which is nevertheless inhabited by human beings who would cherish liberty and freedom above physical peace.

School Lunch Program

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. J. WILLIAM STANTON

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 27, 1966

Mr. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, I am not in the habit of inserting into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD letters from constituents in my district; in fact, I have never done so until now. However, when I received a letter from Mr. John C. Friese, director of food services at Kent State University, I was thoroughly impressed with his eminent knowledge of the school lunch program. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to insert Mr. Friese's letter into the RECORD.

KENT STATE UNIVERSITY,

Kent, Ohio, February 16, 1966.

Hon. J. WILLIAM STANTON,
1625 Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN STANTON: May I also add my thanks for your help in procuring the excellent colored film on the astronaut flights that we showed to two local Boy Scout troop last month. It was amazing to me to listen to the intelligent comments of these 12- and 13-year-old boys after watching the pictures.

My prime reason for writing to you is because part of my responsibility here at Kent State University is that of directing the